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Abstract 
 
     The dissertation contextualizes the unique creation of citizenship during the first two 
decades of the British-administered Palestine Mandate.  It emphasises the mandate’s quasi-
colonial regime in order to understand how the British officials and the Palestinian Arabs 
understood and actively practiced citizenship and the rights associated with that status.  The 
aim of the dissertation is to offer a historical analysis of the legislation, discourses, practices 
and expressions of Palestinian nationality and citizenship.  In doing so, it finds that 
nationality and citizenship became less like abstract concepts and more like statuses 
integrated into political, social and civil life and as markers of civic identity in a changing 
society.  British officials in London and in Jerusalem crafted Palestinian nationality and 
citizenship in order to ensure that these statuses reflected the policy of support for a Jewish 
national home in Palestine.   
     The thesis examines the topic by analysing both the British colonial perceptions and 
subsequent legislation of citizenship in Palestine and the reactions by the Arab population to 
the transition from Ottoman subjecthood to the new status of Palestinian citizens within the 
larger British colonial empire.  I argue that the native population relied heavily on their pre-
war experience as nationals of the Ottoman Empire, a status granted by both jus sanguinis 
and jus soli provisions, as a basis for their contestation over mandate citizenship.  
Meanwhile, British officials crafted citizenship to be separate from nationality based on prior 
colonial legislation elsewhere, a view of the territory as divided communally, and the need to 
offer Jewish immigrants the easiest path to acquisition of Palestinian citizenship in order to 
uphold the mandate’s policy.  From 1918 throughout the Palestine Revolt that began in 1936, 
the institutionalisation of citizenship effectively distinguished between Jewish and Arab 
citizens and allowed for the administration to treat the citizenship status each group 
differently.    
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
        
 In the fields of Palestinian studies and modern Middle Eastern history, arguments over the 
existence of nationalism in Palestine have so far been approached from nearly all angles.  
The historiography of Palestinian Arab nationalism is saturated with literature dealing with 
questions of when, how, and to what end nationalism became a political practice and social 
reality.  Although in the past decade or so, the study of nationalism under the Arab mandates 
has shifted from a grand narrative that emphasized the paramount role of Arab notables to a 
greater concentration on the agency of the popular classes, the framework of nationalism 
remains the ever-present explanation for Arab interactions with and resistance to the interwar 
mandates system.
1
  The study that follows brings a new focus to an important and under-
studied element of Palestinian history as well as to the study of mandates in the interwar 
Arab Levant.  Rather than concentrating on Arab nationalism, the focus of this research is in 
fact on multivalent discourses and practices of Palestinian nationality and citizenship under 
the first two decades of British administration of Palestine from 1918 to 1936. 
 This historical study on the formation of Palestinian citizenship in the mandate period will 
be contextualized with emphasis on the mandate’s quasi-colonial administration in order to 
understand how the Palestinian Arabs understood and actively practiced their nationality and 
citizenship.  During the mandate, both nationality and citizenship became less like abstract 
political concepts and were integrated into political, social and civil life and as markers of 
civic identity in a changing society.  I will focus on the discourses of Palestinian citizenship 
popularised by several groups: the British colonial officials within the Palestine 
Administration, the League of Nations, the Arab populist and national leaders and the 
middle-class intellectuals throughout Palestine, and Palestinian Arab emigrants, particularly 
those who resided in Latin America during the period under study.  An essential component 
of this thesis is to historicise how and when the notions and definitions, terminology and 
active expressions of a specifically-Palestinian citizenship came into being for the British 
administration, the Arab leadership and the Arab population.   
                                                   
1 For a nuanced compilation of studies, see Nadine Meouchy and Peter Sluglett, The British and French 
Mandates in Comparative Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 
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 Not only is this ideological and practical transformation missing from the historiography, 
but it is beneficial for the contemporary political implications of Palestinian citizenship.  The 
Palestinian citizenship held by the Arabs of the territory at the time the British rescinded 
control over the mandate and as the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 was a status that 
the Arabs themselves alternately molded, rejected and resisted actively.  By that point, the 
Arabs had been constituted as political subjects and active citizens for over two decades: 
they did not simply exist in nationalist imaginings but were a legally-defined demographic 
entitled to passports, identity documents, measures of civil, political and social rights and an 
international recognition.  In 1947 and 1948, the Palestinian Arabs were citizens and as such 
they did not, and could not have, accepted the partition of Palestine, the creation of Israel, or 
the massive displacement of over 700,000 Arabs as a result of the creation of Israel.  The 
contemporary political implications of this citizenship are thus reflected in the history of the 
existence of, and the engagement with, a rights-based notion of a uniquely-Palestinian 
citizenship and civic identity among the Arab population.   
     The use of discourse, as in the title of the thesis and throughout the following chapters, is 
defined here in terms of language, rhetoric and vocabulary.  Discourses refer to the multiple 
ways in which political language, rhetoric and vocabulary represented nationality and 
citizenship, as well as the ways in which institutions, such as civil society, nationalist 
organisations and the mandate government, used and manipulated discussions of nationality 
and citizenship.  As part of this discourse, expressions of citizenship were evaluated and re-
defined by the institutions and the individual actors (British and Arab) involved in the 
construction of Palestinian citizenship between 1918 and following the end of the Palestine 
Revolt in 1939.  The language of rights, duties and behaviours associated with citizenship 
will be analysed in light of the Palestinian Arabs’ understanding of their status after 1918 as 
members of a ‘primordial’ Arab nation that had been recognised and granted nationality by 
the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.  The following chapters investigate how 
mandate legislation shaped a unique Palestinian citizenship that did not take into full account 
the provisions of the pre-existing Ottoman nationality.  As a result, Arab leaders redefined 
and came to understand citizenship as a national, political and social status imbued with 
certain political, civil and social rights.  In other words, the thesis will show how citizenship 
identity and markers of citizenship as a status of membership in a nation, especially between 
12 
 
1918 and 1937, became an integral part of the social and political behaviour of the Arab 
population.   
     By using mandate legislation, the Arabic press, documents of Palestine’s nationalist 
organisations, and letters sent to Palestine and the League of Nations from native Arabs 
resident outside of the mandate territory, I aim to trace how British officials in London and 
Jerusalem, nationalist populist leaders, traditional notable Arab politicians and the Zionist 
Organisation, alongside international regulations, influenced the construction and evolution 
of the post-war national and citizen.  The processes by which the mandate administration 
created an internationally-recognised Palestinian nationality and citizenship have been given 
scant attention in the historiography.  This thesis will hopefully contribute to an 
understanding of how the British and the Palestinian Arabs developed ideologies of 
nationality and citizenship as well as highlight how these ideologies permeated practices of 
citizenship under the Palestine Mandate.  Notions and definitions of what constituted 
‘national’ and ‘citizen’ developed in the context of colonial policies, Britain’s own transition 
from empire to nation-state, and Jewish immigration, through a series of negotiations and 
confrontations between the actors noted above.   
     The term ‘citizen’ is itself used seemingly without qualification or explanation in the 
histories of not only the Palestine Mandate but also of the other Arab mandates.  In fact, the 
presence of ‘the citizen’ was an essential element in the formation of nation-states in former 
colonial and imperial territories in the interwar period.  Yet, in studies of Palestine under the 
mandate the term has been used as if citizenship was an accepted and uncontested reality for 
the population of Palestine from the earliest years of the mandate administration.  Indeed it 
was not, as the thesis details, and the provisions, status and terminology of citizenship 
continued to be contested and reshaped through the 1940s and until the creation of Israel in 
1948.  Such assumptions of the term’s ubiquity are misleading and do not consider the 
historical processes through which Palestinian nationality and citizenship came into 
existence in a particular colonial context.   
     The historian Ilana Feldman has noted that the British promoted an apolitical citizenship 
in Palestine meant to transcend nationality and offer rights in a social rather than political 
13 
 
sense.
2
  Since the mandate charter included the Balfour Declaration, the establishment of a 
Jewish national home in Palestine was the driving force for early policy under the British 
administration.  As such the charter required the mandatory power to pass legislation in order 
for Jewish immigrants to acquire Palestinian nationality.  This nationality would grant 
certain rights and obligations not only to the Jewish immigrants, but also to the Arab 
population since the mandate also stipulated that the Jewish national home policy could not 
prejudice the civil or religious rights of the existing majority population.  Hence, the British 
had to walk a fine line in their legislation on nationality and citizenship and they needed to 
act as a colonial power in order to implement a colonial citizenship that offered only limited 
rights.  In light of the restrictions posed by the mandate, the British feared giving explicit 
liberal citizenship rights or supporting citizenship practices such as a representative 
legislative council and proportional voting rights.  These types of proposed democratic 
measures severely challenged the foundation of British policy in Palestine—the facilitation 
of a Jewish national home.  Palestinian citizenship had to be created in a way that it would 
not allow any civil, political or social right to threaten the provisions of the Balfour 
Declaration as enshrined in the mandate. 
     Historians must however be careful to study the development of citizenship in the Arab 
mandates in as nuanced a way as possible.  In fact, throughout the period under study 
citizenship was not viewed by all Arab Palestinians or even by all Jewish immigrants in the 
same manner as there were considerable variations depending on social status, class and 
geographical location.  The issuance of the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council, 
which effectively codified citizenship, did not suddenly create standardised practices or 
behaviours of the Palestinian citizenry.  The thesis analyses citizenship in two ways.  The 
first is the development and definition of the status by British colonial administrators in line 
with imperial policy, international regulations and the opinion of Zionist leaders.  The 
process began with the earliest drafts of the Palestine Mandate charter which specified that 
the mandatory would be responsible for creating a nationality law for Jewish immigrants.  
Together, these bodies and individuals created an internationally-recognised Palestinian 
citizenship.  The second approach, in parallel with the first, is an analysis of the Palestinian 
                                                   
2 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 194-196. 
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Arab nationalist concepts, definitions and language of nationality and citizenship which were 
both influenced by Ottoman nationality legislation and resulted from reactions to British 
legislation.  Whereas the British framed citizenship in a colonial manner by not imbuing the 
status with a set of political, social or civil rights and by creating ‘the citizen’ without any 
input from the Arab population, the Arabs defined citizenship as linked to nationality in light 
of the mandate and its policy in support of a Jewish national home. 
     Both approaches will be followed through 1937, the year the Peel Commission released a 
report that recommended partition of Palestine as well as substantial changes to citizenship 
legislation following the outbreak in 1936 of massive popular demonstrations organised 
against the mandate and the Zionist project in the form of the six-month general strike that 
marked the beginning of the Palestinian Revolt.  The chronology used in the thesis is meant 
to demonstrate the nature of change over the time period that began with the late Ottoman 
Empire and ended a decade before the termination of the mandate.  The start of the British 
administration in Palestine in 1918 does not represent a break in the history of what became 
Arab Palestine.  Instead, self-identities among the Arab population continued to be in line 
with late Ottoman identification: the end of the Ottoman Empire did not signal a new 
conception of political selfhood or even nation-hood by the Palestinian Arabs, who 
continued to stress their legal and ideological identity as Arab nationals of the Ottoman 
Empire.   
 In the years preceding 1936, the British made amendments and changes to the 1925 
Citizenship Order-in-Council in an attempt to satisfy both the Arab and Jewish population as 
to the conditions of citizenship and immigration.  By the early 1930s it was clear the 
legislation effectively created two separate bureaucracies for Jews and Arabs in the 
application, grant and removal of Palestinian citizenship.  By 1936, the rise of Palestinian 
Arab mass politics and an active civil society allowed for citizenship to take on a deeper 
meaning for a larger section of the population than simply that of a legal status.  New Arab 
grassroots organisations and anti-mandate leaders issued joint challenges to the existing civic 
order.  However, as Great Britain passed the final amendments to the citizenship law in 1939 
and 1942, attention to legislation was curtailed due to the beginning of a new European war. 
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Background: the Palestinians, the mandate and the construction of citizenship  
 
     In 1920, British civil officials came to Palestine both with instructions to uphold the terms 
of the Palestine Mandate as dictated by the League of Nations and their own style of colonial 
administration and management.  As such, these officials brought with them Western 
European concepts of law, administration and government that they molded in order to apply 
in the territory governed by the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War.  
Alongside this, the British Empire began to lack stability as it transitioned into a nation-state 
in which citizenship and nationality merged.  In their position as the mandatory power, Great 
Britain in fact created the new Palestinian citizen through legislation.  Prior to the imposition 
of the mandate, the Arab Palestinians were recognised internationally as Ottoman nationals 
owing to their birth in one of the provinces of Bilād al-Shām, or Greater Syria.3  By the time 
the British relinquished the mandate over Palestine in 1948, citizens in the political entity 
called Palestine included mainly Arabs and Jews either born under the Ottoman 
administration or who had been naturalised along the lines of British-imposed legislation.  
Before the arrival of British troops to Jerusalem in late 1917, the status of Ottoman civic and 
legal citizenship had existed since the middle part of the nineteenth century; by 1948 it no 
longer existed, as it had been altered and transformed through the integration of Ottoman 
precedents and British regulations.  The purpose of the following background section is to 
offer an explanation of the scene in Palestine in terms of political identity and society before 
and after the First World War.  The relationship between the British, the League of Nations, 
the Zionist movement and the Palestinians is also in order.   
 The transition from imperial subject to Ottoman citizen began during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century but initially meant little for the popular classes in the Arab provinces of 
the Empire.  Debates on Arab identity and belonging to the Ottoman Empire and the duties 
of the Empire toward its subjects were conducted solely within the domain of the Arab 
educated elite.  As such, until the end of Ottoman rule the Arab political and intellectual 
leadership did not demand that the Sublime Porte recognise a separate, wholly Arab 
                                                   
3 Many countries simply regarded all Arabs from the region as either Syrians or ‘Turkos,’ a term based on their 
‘Turkish’ origins.  The countries in Latin America as well as Cuba and Haiti did not always make the 
distinction between Arabs and Turks or always refer to both as ‘Ottoman nationals,’ their proper international 
status. 
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nationality and national status.  Rather, the Arabs remained subjects of the Ottoman sultan 
despite a level of regional decentralisation.  The Ottoman state delegated control over the 
Arab population, the majority of whom were peasants, to what Elizabeth Thompson calls 
“paternalistic elites” such as large landowners, tax collectors and provincial officials.4 
 Indeed from the latter nineteenth century until the outbreak of war in 1914, Ottoman 
citizens held a number of rights within the provinces.  They voted for municipal councils and 
for the Chamber of Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament and could stand for election.  Due to 
property qualifications that limited the exercise of the right to vote, those individuals elected 
came from the wealthy landowning class and the urban elite class.  The municipal and 
provincial councils rarely functioned as truly representative bodies since members came 
from the very small elite stratum of society.  Still, the electoral laws did stipulate that the 
franchise was a right granted by the sultan to Ottoman nationals.  Arab identity meanwhile, 
emerged as distinct from Ottoman Turkish or other identities out of the Nahda, the Arab 
cultural and literary revival of the nineteenth century.  Historians have also pointed to the 
policies implemented by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government after 
1908 as triggers for the development of an Arab identity in Greater Syria.
5
  This 
identification was part of an expression of national political goals in the Levant as linked 
with the establishment of Arab clubs like the Young Men’s Society (al-Fatāt).6   
 At the time of the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman sultan, certain Arab political 
leaders in Syria and Iraq made clear their desire for independence and representative and 
parliamentary government under an Arab king.  The King-Crane Commission, put in charge 
by United States president Woodrow Wilson with consulting the population of Greater Syria 
about its wishes for a post-war settlement in the Arab provinces, carried out work in 1919 
and received thousands of petitions.  The commission concluded the wishes of the 
inhabitants to be nearly completely against any form of a protectorate.  The Syrian 
                                                   
4 Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French 
Mandate Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia Press, 2000), 75. 
5 For much more on pan-Arabism, Islamism, Ottomanism, and other forms of nationalism, see the aptly-titled 
Hasan Kayali, Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997) as well as Philip Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of 
Damascus, 1860-1920 (Cambridge: University Press, 1983). 
6 Muhammad Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 
63.   
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population made clear they wanted total independence and rights to representative 
government under the Hashemite Emir Faisal in Damascus in 1918.
7
  However, the Allied 
victory in the First World War and the subsequent British and French mandates in the Arab 
Eastern Mediterranean went against the inhabitants’ wishes and demands.8   
     From 1918 until 1920, the Arab leaders in Palestine, still referred to ‘southern Syria’ 
(suriyyā al-janubiyya), rallied behind the idea of a Greater Syrian federation headed by 
Faisal.  This spirit of pan-Arabism manifested itself in the form of the Syrian Istiqlal 
(Independence) Party, a pro-Syrian congress and the Arabic press.  Faisal presented the 
Arabs’ demands to the post-war Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the San Remo 
conference of 1920.  The latter conference confirmed the mandates system of the newly-
formed League of Nations and assigned mandates for the Arab provinces.  These mandates 
were to be international trusteeships over the former Ottoman lands.   
     The British military administered Palestine from late 1917 to the middle of 1920 as 
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South (OETA).  The transition to a civil 
government took place in 1920 with the appointment of Herbert Samuel as the first high 
commissioner, although the League did not ratify the mandate for Palestine until 1922.  The 
text of the Palestine Mandate included the 1917 Balfour Declaration which promised British 
support for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews.  Prior to 1914, Palestinian 
delegates in the Ottoman parliament spoke about the Zionist movement, the force behind the 
Balfour Declaration, and the potential dangers it posed to Arab control, land ownership and 
the economy in southern Syria.  Once the British administration began in Palestine and as 
drafts of the Palestine Mandate charter first circulated in 1919 it became clear that 
Whitehall’s support of the Zionist aims in Palestine meant that the administration of the 
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territory had to be carried out in order to accommodate the Balfour Declaration as much as 
possible.  This necessitated a break from Ottoman legislation in a number of realms, 
including that of nationality regulations.   
     Martin Bunton’s studies on land law in Palestine have demonstrated the need for 
historians to “problematize and contextualize the Ottoman law in force during the mandate” 
as it related to and impacted on the British and international legislation that affected 
Palestine.
9
  Bunton focuses on Ottoman land law, but his argument is applicable to the 
Ottoman nationality law.  The Arab inhabitants of Palestine (Muslims, Christians and Jews) 
were familiar with the Ottoman nationality legislation and their status as ‘citizens’ of the 
Ottoman Empire prior to 1918.  Once mandate legislation to regulate and institutionalise 
Palestinian citizenship came into being in 1925 and then through periodic amendments, 
national leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the clear contradictions between its 
provisions and that of Ottoman nationality. 
 The British in Palestine, Bunton adds, worked on the assumption they should maintain the 
status quo of Ottoman legislation where possible.  However, in issues of nationality and 
citizenship the civil administration could not keep the status quo.  The main reason to discard 
Ottoman regulations for nationality was that the status quo would threaten the mandate’s 
immigration policy and indeed the mandate charter itself since a law was necessary in order 
to grant Jewish immigrants the nationality of Palestine.  The 1925 citizenship order, more 
than other legislation, meant that Great Britain could assume and keep direct control over 
Palestine’s inhabitants through the grant or denial of their citizenship.  The mandate’s laws 
did not exist unto themselves but “were part of an institutional framework which included 
lawyers, law schools, attorney-generals, translators, law reports, manuals and settlement 
officers.”10  In Palestine, all parts of this framework influenced the creation of citizenship 
and contributed to the bureaucratization of citizenship as a status to be applied separately to 
the Jewish and Arab communities. 
 Furthermore, the number of actors—individuals and governmental departments—
involved in the administration of Palestine played a significant role in the construction of 
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nationality and citizenship.  Other studies have been published that detail the relationship 
between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in the administration of Palestine (as well as in 
Britain’s other mandates and colonies) and it is well-known to historians of British colonial 
history in the Middle East that the centre (i.e., London and Whitehall) did not always 
exclusively control actions in the colonies.  In the case of Palestine, this was even more so 
since two international bodies, the League and the Zionist Organisation, lent considerable 
influence into the administration and legislation of the mandate. 
 Within Palestine, the British administered all branches of government: the executive, 
legislature and judiciary and the Arabs did not have any official representation to the 
mandatory.  The Jewish immigrants and settlers did: the mandate charter granted the Jewish 
Agency the right to advise Great Britain on policy and the Zionist Organisation also advised 
on legislation and policy that affected the entire citizenry of Palestine.  The legislature 
included both mandate officials and officials in Great Britain.  For instance, the Law Officers 
of the Empire and the Dominions Office as well as Parliament supported the ratification (or 
conversely, the non-implementation) of laws and regulations in Palestine based on Empire-
wide standards and British public opinion.  Naturally, albeit with some disagreement,
11
 
mandate officials often neglected to use Ottoman legislation as they institutionalised 
citizenship since British and imperial standards had been used elsewhere in the Empire.  
Although the first two high commissioners were conciliatory towards the Zionist 
Organisation and Jewish national homeland policy of the mandate, later high commissioners 
often clearly stated their distaste for the policy and the influence of Zionists in Palestine.  
Each high commissioner, as well as other administrators such as Palestine’s attorney-
generals and district commissioners, carried with them a certain ‘colonial experience.’  
Indeed, British rule in the Middle East was largely carried out by men who served in Egypt, 
India and Nigeria prior to their posting in the Levant.   
     In Palestine, the legacy of colonial experience had an impact on citizenship legislation as 
well as land settlement, personal status law and taxation policies.  Additionally, the realities 
of belonging and identification to the mandate were complicated owing to Great Britain’s 
own changing policies of nationality in its colonies and citizenship at home.  Old precedents 
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in colonial possessions no longer fully applied for Palestine, since the concept of British 
subjecthood could not be consistently instituted in these possessions after the end of the First 
World War.  As historian Rieko Karatani has shown, the interwar period marked the 
beginning of the development of nation-state citizenship in Great Britain, in contrast to 
imperial subjecthood.
12
 
     The laws issued by the Palestine Administration shaped and were shaped by the changing 
interwar society in Palestine.  The thesis is focused primarily on the Arab nationalists who 
identified themselves as being supportive of a pan-Arab ideology of nationhood and who 
were against the mandate administration’s policies.  In 1918, the pan-Arab populist activists, 
often local leaders, consisted of intellectuals from a variety of middle-class backgrounds 
such as lawyers, teachers and writers.  According to Keith Watenpaugh, with reference to 
Palestine’s counterparts in Aleppo, this middle class believed in liberalism and saw their 
roles in modern society as fostering revolutionary change.
13
  By contrast, closer to the new 
British administration were the traditional leaders in Jerusalem who have been characterised 
as practicing the ‘politics of notables.’14  The Palestinian effendi (notable class) came from 
established families who had long held political and religious power during the time of the 
Ottoman Empire including seats in the former majlis (council) in Jerusalem.
15
  Once the 
British arrived to Palestine, this group easily slipped into the role as allies of the British 
administration.  Since most were reluctant to lose their positions of power they used 
nationalist terminology when it suited their aims.
16
   
     Two influential bodies, although not officially representative, were established just after 
the civil administration began in Palestine.  One was the British-created Supreme Muslim 
Council, or SMC (al-majlis al-islamī al-‘aliā), formed in early 1922 to oversee affairs of the 
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Muslim community.  The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Mohammed Amin al-Husayni, was 
chosen to head the SMC.  The second was the Arab Executive Committee, or the Executive 
(al-lajna al-tanafīdhiyya al-‘arabiyya), a body elected by the Arab delegates to the Third 
Palestinian Arab Congress of 1920 in order to convene nationalist congresses meant to 
represent the Arab population of Palestine.  The British did not recognise the congresses or 
the Executive as representative of the Arab population.
17
  In the early 1920s, the president of 
the Executive, Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, and many of its members came across as 
aligned with pan-Arab views.  The Executive initially had wide influence in Palestinian 
towns since the congresses, held until 1924 and again in 1927 to issue resolutions against the 
government and in support of the Arab inhabitants, included members of the Muslim 
Christian Association, or MCA (al-jam‘iyya al-islamiyya al-massihiyya), branches 
throughout all of Palestine.  The MCA, established in Jaffa in 1918, the Arabic press, 
political and civil society groups demanded an end to the mandate, the cancellation of the 
Balfour Declaration and Syrian unity.  The press and nationalist organisations were well-
aware of legislation issued by the mandate administration including that on citizenship and 
immigration.  The press conveyed the terms of legislation to the Arabs in simple, rhetorical 
language, creating vocabularies of citizenship, civic identity, rights and duties.   
 
Research themes 
 
     The process of ‘inventing’ Palestinian citizenship was unlike anything else Great Britain 
had done in its colonial empire, especially because the mandate administration had to take 
into account international treaties and regulations, Ottoman laws and particularly the Balfour 
Declaration.  While Palestinian nationality and citizenship laws were a by-product of the 
British Government’s legislative process to meet the obligations of the mandate, 
citizenship’s legal validity came from international law—the Lausanne Treaty’s law of state 
succession in 1923 and the mandate itself as an international document.  In the early years of 
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the civil administration, the colonial administrators’ notions of nationality were influenced 
by their empire’s own citizenship legislation and history of colonialism in the ‘Orient’ 
(including India and Egypt), the perception of Palestine as divided into Muslim, Christian 
and Jewish religious communities and the Jewish national home policy that the mandate 
encompassed.
18
  The entire process of inventing citizenship in the crucial early 1920s 
resulted in unanswered questions that pertained to the changing statuses, sovereignty and 
political and civil rights of Palestinian Arabs and Jews.  The process also formally separated 
Arab from Jewish Palestinian citizenships as both communities received, lost and used their 
citizenship in different ways. 
 The primary objective of this thesis is to offer a historical understanding of how the 
particular concepts of nationality and citizenship took on active social, political and civic 
expressions and meanings in Palestine from 1918 through 1937.  The conclusion offers 
further insight on citizenship in Palestine after 1937 and until the end of the mandate in 
1948.  The differences between the multiple doctrines, vocabularies, expressions and 
concepts of citizenship during the first two decades of the mandate administration are 
reflected in the legislation on citizenship passed by the British administration and in the 
reactions by the Arab citizens to that legislation.  In relation to colonial administrations, 
Frederick Cooper explains that terms like citizenship, ethnicity, nation and race became 
categories of social and political practice and social and political analysis.
19
  Cooper’s 
argument is relevant to Palestine not only as it pertains to the colonial administration and 
colonial citizenship.  Indeed, Arab writers and national leaders also used terminology and 
rhetoric in order to shape the social and political practices associated with citizenship. 
     In regard to citizenship status, Engin Isin argues that what is important is not only the 
legal status of citizenship issued from above but the practices of ‘making citizens’: practices 
which are social, political, cultural and symbolic.  Isin questions the conditions under which 
subjects act as citizens and thus transform into citizens, as well as how they claim rights, 
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benefits and responsibilities.
20
  The thesis refers back to this theme of the making of the 
Palestinian citizen.  This entailed not only an ideological process through which notions of 
citizenship and the rights associated with that citizenship were crafted by the British 
administration and redefined by the Palestinian Arabs, but it also meant changes to the 
political language and vocabulary of identity and belonging.   
     Through the Arabic press especially, a standardization of terminology that expressed 
belonging to the nation-state took place.  The terms for nationality (jinsiyya), citizenship 
(muwatana), and civil rights (huquq midaniyya) took precedence over others, and their 
meanings in the context of the Palestine Mandate became familiar to readers and a larger 
segment of Palestinian society as the readership of newspapers grew throughout the 1920s.  
Still, throughout the 1920s, writers and politicians often used citizenship and nationality 
interchangeably, and incorporated other meanings for citizenship such as midaniyya, which 
denoted a greater sense of urban civic identity.  The dialogue of citizenship that emerged in 
Palestine by the mid-1920s countered the definition of the citizen provided through orders-
in-council passed by the mandate administration.  The terms that accompanied this discourse, 
such as qawmiyya, emphasised the synthesis of Palestinian nationality with a pan-Arab 
national identity.  As Helen Haste has shown, in the construction of the citizen the historian 
must take into account the ways in which individuals negotiate rhetoric, meaning and 
definitions of citizenship and particularly the narrative that explains and justifies the citizen 
and the nation.
21
  In the case of Palestine during the era of British mandatory rule, the 
representation and the understanding of the citizen was directly linked to Ottoman-era social 
categories of (Arab) nationhood, community (southern Syria or Bilād al-Sham) and a sense 
of an Arab ethnic identity.  
     The overarching theme of the period under study is the development of the relationship 
between Palestinian citizenship and civic identity on the one hand, and Arab nationality and 
national identity on the other.  It is also necessary to place the interaction of Arab nationality 
and Palestinian Jewish citizenship into a colonial context.  The mandate administration 
specifically created Palestinian citizenship to facilitate Jewish immigration.  As a 
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consequence, the Arabs stressed their nationality against the citizenship order’s provisions 
that favoured Jewish immigrants.  This thesis intends to answer, through an analysis of the 
discussions, vocabulary, behaviour, and active expressions of Palestinian citizenship during 
the first two decades of the mandate, when and why the Arab population began to think of 
themselves and others as citizens of Palestine in a political, social, civic and national sense.  
Palestinian politicians and writers equated a sense of pan-Arab commonwealth nationality 
(qawmiyya) with citizenship and continued to refer to the latter status as jinsiyya.  
‘Nationality’ was a term “with an ethnic dimension and indicated that a certain person 
belongs to a nation in an ethnic sense,” writes Gerard-Rene de Groot, while ‘citizenship’ 
“indicates inter alia the formal link between a person and a state.”22  The ‘Arabness’ of the 
former concept was prominent in the discussions about it by the national movement and 
especially in the press.  The term also offered a link, understood as primordial, between the 
Palestinian Arabs with Syria and the other Arab territories.  Citizenship as a status did not do 
the same because citizenship separated Palestinians from other Arabs in both a legal and 
colonial sense.   
     In her writing on colonial citizenship status under the French mandatory administration in 
Syria and Lebanon, Elizabeth Thompson proposes that the citizens (the Arabs) and the state 
(the mandate administration) interacted within the sphere of a “colonial civic order” where 
citizenship and state power were expressed and constantly renegotiated.  Since the French 
offered diplomatic protection, a system similar to a welfare state, and Arab representation in 
government, Syrians were incorporated into the mandate as citizens with access to 
knowledge of their rights and the duties of the mandate.
23
  In Palestine, the British did not 
structure their administration in quite the same way and a major point of conflict (and a 
theme constantly referred to) between the colonial administration of Palestine and the 
Palestinian Arab leaders was the lack of representative institutions.  As Benjamin Thomas 
White has shown for Syria during the interwar period, alongside representation, institutions 
such as citizenship are necessary to facilitate a sense of commonality upon which a public 
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sphere develops.
24
  Citizenship is thus a key part of the formation of civil society and the 
institutions through which inhabitants of a territory and the state negotiate rights and duties.   
     In addition, the thesis highlights the particular discourses linked to the emergence of 
popular politics in Palestine.  The chapters chronicle the changes within the fragmented 
nationalist movement as the politics of local, middle-class leaders became dominant over the 
middle and upper-class leadership in the Jerusalem-based Arab Executive Committee.  
Almost all of the actors who spread certain notions and active practices collectively came 
from the same social and political—as well as economic—groups in Palestine. The sources 
used in the thesis are nearly all from the literate upper and middle classes, and many activists 
and writers came from the same socio-political families in Palestine.  Their approaches might 
have differed, but the status of the individuals and groups responsible for popularizing 
certain discourses were relatively homogenous.  However, certain currents of discourse of 
citizenship and nationality existed alongside counter-currents of these discourses, although 
the latter remained subaltern by the end of the 1930s.   
     Even so, those populist leaders who shaped a counter-current of nationalist activity 
negotiated and manipulated the multiple meanings and assertions of Palestinian citizenship 
in the decades before and during the early years of the Palestine Revolt.  By ‘populist’ and 
‘populism,’ I refer to what Partha Chatterjee has called a theoretical framework that 
describes a process of often temporary aggregation of non-elitist associations and groups 
under a common banner as ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ in opposition to a colonial structure of 
rule.
25
  By the late 1920s, these populist groups stressed that the Arab citizens of Palestine 
included the subaltern classes who could make demands for rights upon the mandatory.       
     Similarly, the agency of the Palestinian Arab emigrants (muhājarīn) is traced as 
thematically connected with the process of ‘making citizens.’  The Palestinian Arab diaspora 
(mahjar), especially the emigrants in the Americas, played a major role in crafting a counter-
definition of Palestinian citizenship intimately linked with that of Arab nationality.  
Historians of Palestine have long neglected the role of the emigrants from southern Syria in 
ideological and political movements against the mandate government and the Jewish national 
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home policy of administrators and the Zionist Organisation.  The emigrants’ discourses on 
the questions of identity and belonging demonstrate that their ‘outside-in’ and ethnically 
segregated existence in the Americas allowed for the diaspora to make clear the realities of 
the British administration to their families, the national movement and socio-political 
organisations in the homeland.  For example, the experiences and the ideologies of the 
emigrants in North and South America, especially that of statelessness with the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire influenced changes to the political and social notions of qawmiyya, or pan-
Arab national identity, and Palestinian wantaniyya (territorial nationalism) after 1918.   
     In fact, the denial of citizenship to many natives who resided abroad at the time of the 
1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council triggered the development of the argument that Ottoman 
nationality needed to be recognised as a qualification for Palestinian citizenship.  The 
benefits that this approach to the Palestinian diaspora is a more nuanced understanding of 
multiple meanings of citizenship, Arab nationality and civic identity which at times 
converged with or diverged from the development of these same meanings and movements 
within the mandate territory.  The diaspora also offers a third community through which the 
historian can understand the impact of British policies in Palestine, especially in light of 
changing imperial policy.  The history of the mahjar is also crucial to contemporary 
understandings of Palestinian statelessness and refugee status.  Those who emigrated before 
1925 were disenfranchised twice: first in the interwar period when the notion of statelessness 
became pressing and as the mandate administration did little to offer an inclusive Palestinian 
citizenship to natives who lived abroad and then again with the creation of the state of Israel 
and the abolition of Palestinian citizenship.  
     As it is well known, the Palestine Mandate charter stated that the mandatory power must 
develop self-governing institutions: this implied the creation of a new relationship between 
the population and a central government.  The history of the debates around the creation of 
Palestinian citizenship did not involve only the Colonial Office (which administered the 
Palestine Mandate) and the Palestine Government under a British-appointed high 
commissioner, but touched on the core meaning of what an international mandate was, and 
how citizenship in a mandatory territory fitted into Britain’s general understanding of 
colonial subject status.  These themes are covered in the following chapters alongside the 
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development of the dual administration in Palestine, a system that allowed for the British 
administration to interact in separate ways with the Arab and Jewish communities.
26
   
     A great deal of the historiography on mandate Palestine has emphasised Britain’s creation 
of dual structures of administration and society.
27
  Dan Horowitz defines dual authority 
polities as a characteristic of bi-communal or multi-communal territories in which political 
authority is divided between the sovereign political centre and the semi-institutionalised 
political centres of the constituent communities of the territory.  Dual authority polities are 
divided along ethno-national, religious or linguistic lines, often causing conflict between the 
‘national’ in the sense of nationality and ‘national’ in the sense of nationalism.  A duality of 
national identity means a duality of the structure of authority for each nationality.
28
  The 
Jewish national home policy of the Palestine Mandate influenced the early notion of separate 
national statuses for the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine.  Other examples include 
the development of separate councils for Jews to advise the administration on matters of 
policy, the division of the electorate and system of secondary electors by religious groups 
and concessions for Jewish corporations.
29
  
     The chapters of the thesis are structured both chronologically and thematically, alternating 
focus between the British creation of citizenship provisions and the Arab reactions and 
counter-definitions of Palestinian citizenship as the mandatory solidified its support of the 
facilitation of a Jewish national home.  Following the current chapter, Chapter Two explains 
how debates on nationality framed the mandate charter and citizenship legislation between 
1918 and 1925.  The general implications and issues that arose from discussions in Palestine 
and London, such as the separation of Jewish nationality from the Arabs’ Ottoman 
nationality, were further influenced by key historical markers such as the mandate charter, an 
organic law and the Treaty of Lausanne.  The chapter introduces the number of actors 
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involved in the creation of citizenship and their negotiations over the terminology and 
applicability of Palestinian citizenship.   
     Chapter Three shifts focus to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and analyses the 
development of a political community in the territory, positing the middle-class nationalist 
leaders as the most able group to challenge mandate citizenship legislation.  The chapter also 
provides the historical background to nationality and national rights.  It highlights the Arabs’ 
understanding of political and civil rights as linked to Ottoman nationality and the 
development of a language of rights during the early years of the mandate administration.  
This terminology was used frequently by the middle-class national leaders to express the 
national status of the Arabs vis-à-vis the Jewish immigrants.  Chapter Four offers a new 
perspective on the Palestinian Arab emigrants from 1925 through 1931, analysing how 
citizens were ‘made’ in the diaspora.  The impact of citizenship legislation on the diaspora 
frames the entire chapter.  Additionally, the chapter notes the ways in which continued 
conflicts over the administration of the mandate within Great Britain hindered the resolution 
of emigrant grievances against the citizenship order’s provisions. 
     Chapter Five again focuses on legislation and the institutionalisation of citizenship by the 
mandate administration and Great Britain in the decade after the former issued the 1925 
order-in-council.  The chapter demonstrates how Palestinian citizenship was offered and 
revoked in different ways for Arabs as opposed to Jews, and that the differences between 
administrators over policy toward Jewish immigrants had an effect on changes to citizenship 
legislation.  Although the distinctions created by legislation were very much a part of the 
wider colonial project and the changing fortunes of the British Empire, the chapter also 
stresses that the unique nature of the mandate and its national home policy resulted in an 
internationalisation of citizenship questions and debates.  Chapter Six returns to the context 
of popular politics in Palestine in the late 1920s and early 1930s in order to analyse how new 
ideas associated with subaltern political notions of citizenship existed in parallel with the 
dominant nationalist movement.  The press, largely due to its reactions to legal developments 
in the mandate, was arguably the medium through which these ideas took shape.  Citizenship 
rights are shown as taking on greater significance within the development of Arab popular 
politics and the latter’s influence on a more inclusive notion of national belonging in 
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Palestine.  The changing expressions of citizenship, especially as articulated by the Istiqlal 
political party, are also charted in Chapter Six prior to the Palestine Revolt of 1936 to 1939.  
     Finally, prior to the conclusion, Chapter Seven refers to the notion of a stalled citizenship 
in Palestine upon the outbreak of the nation-wide revolt.  The revolt’s early stages are 
situated in a broader understanding of the development of mandate institutions that 
influenced the meaning and practice of citizenship.  In particular, the Peel Commission 
report, which offered recommendations on policy in Palestine following the initial 
disturbances, is described in terms of its impact on citizenship in order to offer a historical 
explanation of the continuities and changes of both the British and the Arabs’ perceptions of 
nationality, citizenship and rights by 1937.  The chapter is also focused on the changing 
definitions of the Palestinian Arabs in the discourse of colonial officials: martial law and 
other measures that the British implemented in order to contain the revolt resulted in the 
treatment of the Arabs as ‘the population,’ an apolitical category employed by the 
administration to limit citizenship rights and protections for suspected rebels.  Throughout 
each chapter, nationality, citizenship and rights are presented as ideologies and as 
expressions used and manipulated by a variety of actors who attempted to make sense of the 
mandate, its colonial nature and the ever-growing assertions of both Palestinian Arab 
nationalism and Zionism during the period under study.  With this in mind, it is useful to 
briefly discuss the history of nationality in nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. 
 
Citizenship, national identity and nationalism 
 
     During the mid-nineteenth century, the influx of ideas and concepts from Western Europe 
into the Ottoman Empire began to crop up in writings and discussions by the intelligentsia in 
regard to identity and territorial belonging.  New Ottoman reforms stressed equality before 
the law of all the Empire’s subjects regardless of religion or ethnicity.  The terminology of 
liberalism used in the western political discourse (especially as associated with the French 
Revolution) on identity and rights influenced the Ottoman reforms, known as the Tanzimat: 
edicts evoked equality, liberty, natural rights and the protection of life and property.  The 
reformers strove to cultivate a single Ottoman identity among the respective subject 
30 
 
population.  This attempt to unite the population was one of several defensive measures 
against the development of territorial and religious-based national movements which 
threatened the centralisation of political power.
30
   
  
General developments in Western Europe 
 
     In studies on the ideological development of the nation, scholars such as Jurgen 
Habermas have posited two types of nationhood whose roots lie in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century.  The French notion of the nation refers to a nation of citizens whose 
identities do not come from common ethnic, cultural or linguistic properties but instead from 
the practice of citizens exercising their civil rights as participants in the state.  Political unity 
as related to the territorial and institutional structure of the French state has been the deciding 
factor of inclusive belonging to the nation as citizens (demos).
31
  Therefore, citizenship was a 
right through the provision of jus soli (territorial rights to citizenship).  The German notion 
of the nation differs from the French notion in that national identity developed before the 
nation-state in the territory that became modern Germany.  Citizenship and nationality were 
much more exclusive than in France: the community formed the nation through their shared 
culture, language and ethnicity (ethnos).  The right to citizenship came from the provision of 
jus sanguinis (rights to citizenship by descent).
32
  The provisions for nationality are crucial 
components for a study of Palestinian citizenship.  Both jus soli and jus sanguinis were 
recognised by the Ottomans.   
 Nationality developed out of the concepts of nationhood and the nation came to define the 
political identity of its citizens.  Brubaker defines nationality as ethno-cultural membership 
in a nation and argues that the nationality of an individual is not dependent upon their place 
of residence but rather on descent.
33
  Once the nation-state comes into existence with 
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sovereign borders and democratic political and legal structures, it becomes responsible for 
deciding the terms of citizenship as a legal and recognised status and then granting rights 
associated with it.  National identity, as opposed to nationality and citizenship, is a more 
abstract collective consciousness and a nation can exist without being sovereign.  A 
sovereign entity however, is essential to regulate citizenship and provide the proper 
identification to its citizens.  According to the narrative of citizenship as linked with the 
nation-state, the city was the space in which groups defined their identity, rights and duties 
as citizens.
34
  
     In academic discourse, the notion of citizenship refers to the legal relationship between an 
individual and the state.  It is full membership in a community with civil, political and social 
rights and responsibilities.  T.H. Marshall, the notable scholar on citizenship, stresses that the 
rights of citizenship must be shared equally by all citizens in a given community.  
Citizenship obligations include paying taxes and obeying laws and constitutions, as well as 
the defense of these rights for others in the same community and promotion of common 
interests.
35
  Importantly, citizenship status determines access of an individual to the resources 
of the state and is used as a way to distribute power.  Bryan Turner defined citizenship as a 
set of social practices of rights and obligations that define the nature of social membership of 
a community.
36
  Citizenship allows for three classes of rights: civil, political and social, 
which Marshall identified as part of the stages of citizenship formation.
37
   
     By the nineteenth-century, people slowly became dependent on the state they lived under 
to legislate their identity in terms of borders.  As John Torpey notes, nationality is 
implemented through a state’s bureaucratic measures (such as the passport) to control 
movement and borders.
38
  With the collapse of empires in the early twentieth century, 
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nationalism often shaped laws on nationality and immigration as states determined which 
individuals, or ethnic groups, belonged as nationals.
39
  British officials in Palestine shaped 
nationality legislation based upon other colonial and imperial precedents as well the 
regulations in place within the United Kingdom.  In sharp contrast to the Ottoman nationality 
law, the Palestine Administration’s attorney-general crafted the citizenship order-in-council 
along the lines of colonial nationality laws.  As Ann Laura Stoler has shown in reference to 
one of the principle architects of colonial law in the Indies, colonialism made obsolete jus 
sanguinis and jus soli as the sole determinants of nationality.  In other words, birth or descent 
from indigenous inhabitants of the colonies did not confer the subjecthood or nationality of 
those colonies but rather denoted a lesser status—that of the native.  By the late nineteenth 
century, new criteria to mark citizens and nationals included middle-class values and morals 
as well as privileged ‘white’ backgrounds.  Indigenous inhabitants thus had to transform 
themselves and their cultures in order to achieve the nationality or citizenship granted by 
colonial rulers.
40
    
 
General developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Arab provinces 
 
     Ottoman nationality can be placed into the broader history of citizenship in the nineteenth 
century.  However one must be especially careful when defining Ottoman nationality in 
terms of instances or absences of certain rights and duties associated with membership in a 
nation-state.
41
  In the Ottoman Empire, the lines between nationality and citizenship blurred: 
in the absence of the nation-state, the imperial officials issued a nationality law in 1869.  The 
law classified all inhabitants as Ottoman nationals in a territorial, rather than ethno-cultural, 
sense.  The following subsections discuss citizenship generally, and then elaborate on the 
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relationship between citizenship, nationality and the nation-state after the First World War in 
the context of the end of empires. 
     In the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, the legitimacy of the state depended in part on the 
ability of groups to be able to ‘think’ that state as their own.42  Central to its Tanzimat 
reforms, the Ottoman government actively promoted a new national ideology termed 
Osmanlilik (Ottomanism) and the 1856 Imperial Edict declared all subjects equal regardless 
of religion.  The 1869 Citizenship Law again reinforced the concept of equality and termed 
all subjects as ‘Ottomans.’  This law combined both jus soli and jus sanguinis.43  Prior to the 
law, the population’s relationship to the state was mediated through their millet, or religious 
community.  The citizenship law allowed for a direct relationship between the citizenry and 
the state.  By the turn to the twentieth century and after the 1908 Young Turk take-over of 
Ottoman government, the notion of Turkish nationality became incorporated into citizenship 
legislation, and citizenship became more akin to nationality in the imperial codifications of 
identity.
44
 
 
General developments in the colonial world 
 
     In the nineteenth century the imperial nations of Britain and France did not grant full 
citizenship to the natives of their colonies and territorial possessions in contrast to the 
legislative practices by the Ottoman Empire in its provinces.  In the case of British rule, India 
from the late eighteenth century and Egypt from the late nineteenth century were testing 
grounds for the import of British law into protectorates and colonies.  Great Britain 
implemented the same legislation in India that had been drafted and issued in Britain itself, 
rather than create new laws specifically for India.  This was a wholly colonial practice.  As a 
type of precedent, Britain applied its own nationality and alien acts, passport legislation and 
judicial procedure.  India did not have its own citizenship legislation until after independence 
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in 1947.  Rather, Indian legislation on nationality was influenced by British liberal thinkers 
such as John Stuart Mill and Edmund Burke.  Burke felt that nationality needed definite 
nation-state boundaries and suggested for this concept to be promoted in India.  Mill, on the 
other hand, claimed nationality was a quality achieved by only those societies at a certain 
level of development.  Natives were thus not entirely fit to have their own Indian 
nationality.
45
  It would be arguments such as Mill’s that influenced the Colonial Office 
policies in the Middle East after the imposition of the mandates system. 
     In India, ‘the law of England’ governed the definition of nationality, citizenship and 
domicile until the end of colonial rule.  The same law was applied in Palestine under the 
mandate.  According to British law, nationality referred to “the jural relationship which may 
arise for consideration under international law” while citizenship referred to “the jural 
relationship under municipal law.”  Nationality determined the civil rights of individuals, 
while citizens had full political rights as separate from nationals who may not also be 
citizens.
46
  These definitions in British law were imported into the colonies as the basis and 
framework for colonial legislation.   
     Egypt as a British protectorate offers a different historical situation than that of India.  
After 1882, the Egyptians acquired the status of British-protected persons.  Protectorates did 
not acquire the nationality of the occupying power, nor could that power import its own 
nationality or citizenship laws wholesale.  Protectorates did not have the framework of 
sovereignty exercised by the power that held the territory.  Under prior Ottoman suzerainty, 
Egypt received an Egyptian nationality separate from Ottoman nationality.
47
  According to 
historian Mervat Hatem, Egyptian nationalist discussions of citizenship began after the 1919 
revolution that ushered in the declaration of independence in 1922.  Importantly Egypt, like 
India, was a training ground for British colonial officials who later served the mandate 
administration in Palestine or advised the Colonial and Foreign Offices on policy.  For 
instance, under Lord Cromer the influence of legislation and practices used in the ‘East’ was 
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evident in Egypt.
48
  In the Egyptian case, the British kept in place the system of personal 
status laws and sharia courts to regulate the native Muslim population. 
     Finally, the development of citizenship under the French administration in Algeria 
provides an interesting comparison to that in British territories.  Citizenship and personal 
status laws governed the legal position of different population groups under French colonial 
rule.  The French notion of republicanism combined with the experience as a colonial power 
“shaped the nature of citizenship” and its “elusive status for the colonised” in North Africa.49  
In July 1865, the French decreed that the indigenous Muslim and Jewish population of 
Algeria had French nationality but not French citizenship.  According to James McDougall, 
French colonialism “reconstituted communities in categories of French nationality” but they 
were governed by a special civil code which made them “un-French in civic status.”50  This 
example proves the thorny and often unresolved problems of defining nationality and 
citizenship in European colonies and it also demonstrates the separate meanings for 
nationality and citizenship in both British and French colonial discourses. 
 
The nation-state, nationality and self-determination in the aftermath of the First World War 
 
     The demise of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empires in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century—the Austro-Hungarian, Russian Romanov and the Ottoman empires—
strengthened the ideology that posited the nation-state as the prime political formation and 
centre of belonging.  During the course of the nineteenth century, the “principle of 
nationality,” which Brubaker defines as the conception of states as and for certain nations, 
became the major factor in the organisation and imagination of territorial space as political 
space.
51
  In the Middle East, the political reality of the post-war creation of mandated 
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territories in the former Ottoman lands came up against hopes for measures of self-rule in the 
Arab provinces.   
     The mandates system was envisioned as one of trusteeship meant to guide subjects in 
former imperial territories toward sovereignty.  In practice however, the British mandates 
were administered in a fashion similar to colonies and the League of Nations had little 
influence over them.  Instead, as historian Susan Pedersen argues, the mandates system was 
largely an institution for ‘talking’: it was a ‘discursive arena’ in which Britain, France and 
others interacted in particular ways as they sought to establish or defend political claims.  
The system did not function as stated in the League Covenant: it did not work to support 
self-governing institutions for individuals not yet able to stand on their own.  Still, the 
dichotomy between the purpose of the mandates system and its practical functioning did 
allow for the colonial citizens to access and to use a new language of international justice, 
rights, governance and citizenship in addressing claims and grievances to the mandatory 
powers and an international audience.
52
   
     After the First World War, the League conceived of nationality as flexible and thus 
transferable.  In the Middle East, Great Britain’s colonial officials conveyed a British 
understanding of the ways individuals acquired nationality.  Even so, British officials did not 
unanimously agree upon provisions for the transfer and grant of nationality in colonies.  An 
article in an international law journal published in 1917 explored these disagreements and 
argued that jurisdiction of the territory in which a subject was born (jus soli) was the most 
satisfactory foundation of nationality since it avoided instances of double nationality and 
absence of nationality.  The author argued in support of “the full rights of citizenship . . . [to 
be] extended to as many persons as possible.”53  However, another author appealed to the 
international acceptability of jus sanguinis rather than jus soli as the former was more in line 
with realpolitik.  The ultimate aim, he claimed, “should be to avoid as much as possible a 
divergence between legal status as to nationality of an individual and the national sympathies 
of that individual.”54  Colonial officials became increasingly concerned with ensuring that 
colonial legislation cultivated a loyalty of subjects toward Great Britain.  A decade after the 
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Treaty of Lausanne, the editor of The American Journal of International Law wrote that the 
issue of nationality brimmed with difficulties and its “confusion is so great, so universal, and 
so embarrassing, not to say exasperating” that its definition needed to be singled out for 
international agreement.  The lack agreement was based on whether nationality stemmed 
from a blood relationship with or birth within a particular state.
55
  It would be in this 
muddled interwar context that British colonial officials developed nationality legislation in 
Palestine.   
  
The Palestine Mandate, citizenship and the colonial citizen in secondary literature  
 
     There is no study in the existing historiography of the Palestine Mandate and Palestinian 
national identity that narrates the development of citizenship and nationality.  This is 
striking, since the legislative context set up by the British, the League of Nations, the Zionist 
Organisation and the Palestinians themselves during the mandate have had a lasting 
influence on legislation that today still governs Israel and the Palestinian territories.
56
  Only 
very few studies have approached the development of identity politics in Palestine through 
the lens of citizenship.  Since so few historical works on Palestine deal with mandate 
citizenship, I have had to consider a wide range of studies often outside the discipline of 
history.  The analysis of this literature is particularly illuminating of the thesis’ themes.  
Ultimately, this thesis can be a step toward filling the gaps in the history of interwar 
citizenship in the mandates.    
 
Citizenship, colonialism and the modern nation-state 
 
     The literature on the development of political identity in the transition from colonialism to 
the modern nation-state is vast.   National identity is a crucial part of identity formation in 
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the modern world, as the often-cited Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm have shown.
57
  
In the past, many researchers tended to work within the discipline of sociology and use the 
model of Western Europe to posit citizenship as a sort of ‘exclusive’ Western concept.  
Several useful, general studies on the development of citizenship in Western Europe 
document the creation of the individual citizen.  For example, one of the scholars cited 
frequently for his work on the process of citizenship formation is T.H. Marshall who has 
suggested that citizenship evolved in stages related to grants of rights. The authors who built 
upon Marshall’s work continued to convey the formation of the citizen as a process.58   
     One theme relevant to the development of general citizenship is the codification of 
obligations, rights and privileges that a modern state provides to its citizens.  As such, studies 
of the development of active and passive citizenship and civil society are an important 
element in the thesis’ themes.59  The connection between imperialism and citizenship is most 
critically discussed by David Gorman in Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of 
Belonging.
60
  Imperial Citizenship is worth mentioning as it examines the “imperial 
ideological language” of citizenship in non-sovereign states and uses the British colonial 
world as a case study.  However, the book explains the construction of citizenship for 
subjects of the British Empire from the perspective of the British themselves, rather than the 
other way around.
61
  The analysis offered by this book is of importance to the study of 
officially-sanctioned citizenship discourses: it chronicles how subjects outside of the United 
Kingdom came to have rights as subject-citizens of imperial Britain and it analyses those 
negotiations over identity as ‘subject’ and ‘citizen’ that led to a new model of colonial 
citizenship adopted by Britain at the end of the nineteenth century.   
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     The work of Engin Isin, mentioned above, and Bryan Turner are influential.  In particular 
are collections of essays and other writings on citizenship’s evolution as a concept and 
practice, and comparative inquiries into the ‘making’ of citizens.  The theme of the creation 
of citizenship runs through other publications which have been useful in their fluid 
applicability to the historical context of the Middle East as well as Europe.
62
  The genesis of 
nationality is equally important to this thesis.  The construction of nationhood in France and 
Germany is not so far removed from the historical construct of the same concept in the Arab 
world.  Particularly insightful for the meaning of nationhood, nationality and the provisions 
of the former is the work of Rogers Brubaker.
63
  Brubaker has also given significant attention 
to the link between citizenship and nationality, a link which the thesis examines in greater 
detail for the case of Palestine. 
     However, very little work within specific citizenship studies offers a historical analysis of 
the nuances of colonial citizenship.  In order to flesh out the themes of colonial citizenship, 
struggles over civic identity and rights and the role played by race in the construction of the 
citizen in colonies, two works have been most influential.  The first is Ann Laura Stoler’s 
Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power.
64
  Stoler addresses the categories of race in colonies 
held by the Dutch and French, linking power and the hierarchy of race and ethnicity to the 
determinants of subjecthood and citizenship.  In Palestine colonial discourses on citizenship 
and nationality were sites of the production of British (and Zionist) power in that the 
individuals most qualified to be citizens were white, entrepreneurial and industrious 
immigrants.   
     The second influential work on colonialism and the construction of identity is Frederick 
Cooper’s Colonialism in Question.65  Cooper, like Stoler, draws upon the symbiotic 
relationship between coloniser and colonised.  He situates his discussion of the ownership of 
notions and expressions of citizenship firmly in the Global South and traces the genesis of 
how colonised peoples conceived of belonging in the context of colonial modernity.  
Certainly this is applicable to Palestine under the mandate, as historians must be sure to 
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recognise that the colonial citizen shaped colonial legislation on legal identity in specific 
ways.  Finally, colonial citizenship has been explored in new ways in the case of African 
colonies.  Emma Hunter’s work on the development of citizenship in Tanzania and 
Cameroon in the twentieth century stands out as it is largely based on indigenous writings 
and the press.
66
  Hunter’s thoughtful and nuanced use of the press is evidence of a common 
link between printed culture and the construction of the colonial citizen. 
   
Citizenship in Palestine and the Middle East 
 
     Until recently historians have discussed Arab identity in Palestine from the late Ottoman 
period through the interwar era as molded by the modernist, educated minority segment of 
society.  These approaches do not allow much room to study citizenship as part of the history 
of political modernity as it was shaped and developed through popular politics.  Historians 
have not yet taken on in-depth studies of the formation of civic identity in Palestine during 
the British colonial administration.  In comparison, a small number of studies have been 
published that provide greater detail on the formation of civic identity in Syria and Lebanon.  
These works illustrate how the system of ‘new’ colonialism in Syria as advocated by the 
mandates shaped the discussions of the middle-class and civil servants on topics of 
modernity, sovereignty, minorities and rights and obligations to the mandatory government.  
Obviously these themes are all relevant to Palestine under mandatory administration but they 
have not yet been significantly explored.
67
   
     Instead, useful analyses on colonial citizenship can be gleaned from outside the field of 
history.  They include perspectives on politics, law and sociology, as these disciplines offer 
compelling analyses of citizenship formation in the Middle East.  One important work that 
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combines historical, sociological and political approaches is the edited volume Citizenship 
and State in the Middle East.  Its contributors use an interdisciplinary framework to analyse 
the differences between a state and a nation in Arab political thought.  This allows for an 
elaboration of ideologies of identity and belonging in the Arab nation.  An engaging and 
more specific discussion comes from Uri Davis, who argues that democratic citizenship was 
a term introduced by the British and made a part of the colonial system in Palestine and 
Syria.
68
  This is a good starting point to begin an exploration of the vocabulary and rhetoric 
of citizenship and nationality in the colonial context.  What is missing is an explanation of 
the historical roots of the concept of Arab nationality in the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman 
Empire.   
     Little attention has been paid to the vocabulary of citizenship in Arabic and this is indeed 
a historical gap.  The evolution of citizenship terminology from the Ottoman period is also 
missing from studies of identity in the Arab world.  Davis and Gianluca Parolin are among 
the few academics who address the terminology of nationality and citizenship.
69
  Relevant to 
the ‘making of citizens’ is the work of Manuel Hassassian.  He argues that the interpretations 
of citizenship in the Levant at the turn of the century were ambiguous compared with the 
concepts of citizenship that circulated in Western Europe.
70
   
     The only works on citizenship and legislation in mandatory Palestine have been produced 
in the context of legal and political studies.  These works approach citizenship as part of the 
official British discourse with particular reference to nationality laws and they make use of 
documents produced by the British administration and by the League.
71
  Although the 
shortcomings of these studies is that they do not convey a popular or ethnographic 
perspective, they are nonetheless important for their use of League archives including 
                                                   
68 Uri Davis, “Democratization, Citizenship, Arab Unity, and Palestinian Autonomy: A Critical Reading of the 
New Middle East”, in Citizenship and State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications edited by Nils A. 
Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 62-63. 
69 Uri Davis, “Jinsiyya versus Muwatana: the question of citizenship and state in the Middle East,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 17 (Winter/Spring 1995): 19-50; Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World. 
70 See Manuel Hassassian, “Palestinian Political Culture, Civil Society, and the Conception of Citizenship” in 
Citizenship and State in the Middle East. 
71 Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism, and Law in Early Mandate Palestine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Gorman, “Liberal Internationalism, the League of 
Nations Union, and the Mandates System,” Canadian Journal of History 40 (Dec. 2005): 449-477; Likhovski, 
Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine; Qafisheh, The International Law Foundations of Palestinian 
Nationality; Feldman, Governing Gaza. 
42 
 
petitions from the mandate’s inhabitants and for drawing comparisons between the Arab and 
African mandates.
72
  
     More recently, historians of Palestine and the interwar Arab region have paid attention to 
the Arab diaspora and its links with the Levant.  A small number of studies address the topic 
of Palestinian citizens in the diaspora during the mandate period, most notably those who 
lived in the Americas.  They are important in their analysis of the social and political 
structures in the Arab diaspora through which emigrants expressed and experienced the 
burgeoning ideology of nationalism.  However these secondary sources do not present an 
extensive history of the emigrants, and their experiences with mandate citizenship are largely 
un-documented.
73
  Scholarship on civic belonging in the Levantine diaspora has been largely 
influenced by crucial studies by Albert Hourani, Kemal Karpat and Akram Khater.  These 
authors use Syria and Lebanon as case studies to highlight the history of the Syrian diaspora 
from the nineteenth century through to the latter half of the twentieth century.  The literature, 
particularly Khater’s work, traces the formation of civic associations in the diaspora as tied 
to the notion of a Syrian emigrant nationality.
74
  Despite the social history of the emigrants, 
scholarship tends to emphasise the post-Second World War era.  Whilst obviously important, 
studies by Gonzalez, Marin-Guzman and others do not generally use mandate archives.  A 
thorough overview, in light of the sources used, can be found in Adnan Musallam’s Folded 
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6-22; Kathy Saade Kenny, “The Power of Place: Katrina in Five Worlds,” Jerusalem Quarterly 35 (Autumn 
2008): 5-30; Christina Civantos, Between Argentines and Arabs: Argentine Orientalism, Arab immigrants and 
the writing of identity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); and work by Adnan Musallam on 
Bethlehem’s emigrants.  Jacob Norris has written about Ottoman-era migration of Christian Palestinians to 
Latin America, the U.S. and Russia who sold so-called holy land artifacts. 
74 See Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Kemal Karpat, “The Ottoman Emigration to the America, 1860-1914,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 17 (May 1985): 175-209; Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi, 
eds., The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992); Akram Fouad Khater, 
Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920 (Berkeley: UC Press, 
2001). 
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Pages from local Palestinian history in the 20
th
 century.
75
  Musallam notes the negotiations 
and struggles of Palestinian Arab emigrants from Bethlehem who were unsuccessful in 
securing mandate citizenship.  The discussion however is part of the larger book, which does 
not provide further details on nationality and citizenship.     
 
Regionally-specific studies on citizenship and Palestinian popular nationalism 
 
     National identity is more of an abstract concept than citizenship; the latter being a legal 
relationship between an individual and a state.  The main problem with historical debates 
over nationalism in the case of Ottoman and mandate Palestine is, as Justin McCarthy says, 
that “the ultimate definition of nationalism is personal.  Those who consider themselves to be 
Palestinians are Palestinians.  The only real measure of ‘national identity’ is self-
identification, not legal citizenship.”76  The historians and political scientists who engage 
with these distinctions are few, and the ones most relevant are discussed below.  The 
important secondary literature for my research is that which explores the relationship 
between the creation of national communities and civic identity.  A number of studies 
approach the evolution of citizenship in a way similar to that of nationalism: as a product of 
deep political processes, as the rejection of other statuses, and as a result of homogeneous 
narratives promoted by elites to gain consensus.
77
 
     A historiographical shift occurred in the late 1990s toward broader analyses of the 
formation of popular Palestinian identity owing to the popularity of social and oral histories 
and ‘histories from below.’  Of course, the history of the identity of popular classes had not 
been completely ignored in publications before the mid-1990s but subaltern studies 
scholarship is not generally applied in reference to the Middle East.  Some monographs 
mention civic and political identity formation in the context of village councils and 
                                                   
75 The full citation is: Adnan Musallam, Folded Pages from local Palestinian history in the 20th century: 
Developments in politics, society, press and thought in Bethlehem in the British era, 1917-1948, Bethlehem: 
WIAM Conflict Resolution Center, 2002 (Arabic and English).   
76 Justin McCarthy, Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2002), 297. 
77 These arguments come from Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997) by Nira Yuval-Davis, 
which is not completely oriented to the development of the Western European nation and devotes considerable 
space to the use of citizenship by populist, radical leaders as a call for general political mobilisation; Adrian 
Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: University Press, 
1997); Miller, Citizenship and National Identity. 
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provincial decentralisation.
78
  Historians such as Ted Swedenburg, Musa Budeiri and Joel 
Beinin highlighted the counter-agency of certain actors in Palestine including peasants, 
workers and communists.  The essays in Rethinking Arab Nationalism in the Middle East 
contributed to the shift toward popular identity politics and a history from below.  The 
critical research of Rashid Khalidi, Zachary Lockman and James Gelvin confronts the 
accepted meaning of nationalism in Palestine.
79
 Namely, the focus on nationalism as a 
discourse guided by the moderate national movement only has been sidelined in favour of 
the agency of the subaltern classes.   
     Ottoman Palestine has also been revisited by historians, most recently in a monograph by 
Michelle Campos that approaches the making of Ottoman citizenship through social and 
political reforms and development.
80
  Campos pays close attention to popular notions of 
                                                   
78 These include the early chapters of anthropologist Rosemary Sayigh’s Palestinians: From Peasants to 
Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 1979); Ann Mosely-Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Arab 
Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1974); Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a 
Nationalist Movement (1979); Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National 
Movement 1918-1929, (London: Frank Cass, 1974) and The Palestinian Arab Nationalist Movement 1929-
39: From Riots to Rebellion (1977); Joel Migdal’s Palestinian Society and Politics (New York: 
Macmillian,1980); Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism; Ylana Miller, Government and Society 
in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).  For a new perspective on 
identification of the Arab Christian community see Noah Haiduc-Dale, Arab Christians in British Mandate 
Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917-1948 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2013). 
79 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press,1997); and James Gelvin, Divided Loyalties; Zachary Lockman, Comrades and 
Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996); Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian Women’s Movement 1920-1948 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003) by Ellen Fleischmann; Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist 
Party, 1919-1948: Arab and Jew in the Struggle for Internationalism (London: Ithaca Press, 1979).  
Several newer theses, articles, and works on memoirs by scholars that have given more space to the subject 
of identity and modernity in Palestine under the mandate deserve mention: Rena Barakat, “Thawrat al-
Buraq in British Mandate Palestine: Jerusalem, Mass Mobilization and Colonial Politics, 1928-1930,”(PhD 
diss., University of Chicago, 2008); Mutaz Qafisheh, “Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel: 
Palestinian Nationality during the Period 1917-1925,” Journal of the History of International Law 11 
(2009)1-36; Salim Tamari, Mandate Jerusalem in the Memoirs of Wasif Jawahariyyeh. Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 2007; Michelle Campos, “A ‘Shared Homeland’ and its Boundaries: empire, citizenship, 
and the origins of sectarianism in late Ottoman Palestine,” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2003); Laila 
Parsons, “Soldiering for Arab Nationalism: Fawzi al-Qawuqji in Palestine,” Journal for Palestine Studies 
36 (April 2007): 33-48. 
80 Campos, Ottoman Brothers; Yuval Ben-Bassat, Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and 
British Rule (Syracuse: University Press, 2011); A.W. Said Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1978); Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986) edited by David 
Kushner; Scholch’s Palestine in Transformation; Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants 
and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Hasan Kayali, 
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subjecthood and citizenship prior to 1914.  Other recent monographs on the mandate that 
explain popular mobilisation through discourses of identity that deserve mention include 
Swedenburg’s Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National 
Past and Weldon C. Matthews’ Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab 
Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine.
81
  Swedenburg broke new ground 
using oral history to re-orient the Palestine Revolt through a narrative of political 
mobilisation privileging memories of peasants and rebels.  The approach reflects the 
transition in society toward a national and civic identity as it charts changes in attitudes 
among representative groups in Palestine in the years under study.  The same type of study 
remains to be done on the preceding decades of the mandate.  Matthews’ work is the most 
up-to-date study on the dissemination of civic and national identity through a grassroots 
political approach used primarily by Palestine’s pan-Arab Istiqlal Party.   He uses newspaper 
sources along with records of the Istiqlalists and national and civic organisations.  The 
research contributes significantly to our understanding of the growth of a pan-Arab national 
identity in the early 1930s but again, citizenship is not mentioned.   
     Zeina Ghandour’s A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine ‘unwrites’ the 
history of the mandate and particularly the revolt through the use of oral history and British 
sources in order to convey the viewpoint of ordinary Palestinians and colonial 
administrators.
82
  Ghandour, unlike most historians of Palestine, explicitly engages with 
subaltern studies as a means to critique other work on mandate Palestine that privileges elite 
and middle-class narratives.  In light of these studies, the current thesis seeks to engage the 
history of the subaltern citizen further in order to get at the core meanings, notions and 
expressions of citizenship and nationality as they were shaped by the Arab subaltern, the 
middle-class local leaders, the emigrants and the British colonial project in Palestine in 
association with the Jewish national home policy.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).   
81 Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003); Matthews, Confronting an Empire. 
82 Zeina Ghandour, A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine: Imperialism, property and insurgency 
(London: Routledge, 2010). 
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Primary sources 
 
     An entire chapter can be written on the subject of the primary sources used in this thesis.  
The archives for the Palestine Mandate are at the same time rich and limited and therefore 
highly problematic.  To be sure, these archives housed in the United Kingdom are easily 
accessible and consulted frequently by scholars.  On the topic of citizenship, the Colonial 
Office, Foreign Office, and many other departmental files have quite a story to tell.  Certain 
sources are easy to find and consult, while others are either easy to find and impossible to 
access, or impossible to find in the first place.  What follows will illustrate the primary 
material that supports this thesis with a brief note on the politicization of the mandate’s 
archives.   
     The official debates and legislative record for the mandate administration and League of 
Nations are primarily located in the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew, London.  Other 
major British resources for the mandate can be found in the British Library, Rhodes House 
Library in Oxford and the Middle East Centre archives at St. Anthony’s College in Oxford.  
These documents, mainly in English, include legislative orders-in-council, regulations, laws, 
the official gazette of the administration, minutes of League of Nations meetings, policy 
papers and commission reports, petitions from the civil population of Palestine, and 
correspondence in the form of letters, decrees, memorandum and notes between the Colonial 
Office, Foreign Office, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Egyptian Consulate, the 
India Office, the League’s Permanent Mandate Commission, and administrations in Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon. 
     Since the British dealt with the League of Nations through the Foreign Office and Cabinet 
Office, documents on the League, the mandate for Palestine, and peace treaties are in the 
following series: FO 371, 374, 608, 893 and general correspondence in FO 369, 372, 395, 
411; treaty arrangements, in which nationality played a major role, in Cabinet Office series 
24, 27, 29.  Since the Colonial Office actually administered the mandate, relevant holdings, 
including documents of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, are included mainly in CO 
733 and 793 among other more specific files.
83
  In St. Anthony’s are stored personal 
                                                   
83 They include CO 967/2, CO 377, 742, 765, 793, 794, 814, 821 
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collections, such as an archive on the Palestinian police force and the Philby Collection on 
the Mandates Committee.  Additionally, Herbert Samuel’s papers are housed in the 
parliamentary archives in London. 
     The archives in the Arab world are essential for my research and for any research on the 
mandate period, but they remained unused for many decades after the mandate ended.  Due 
to the lack of a central Palestinian archive and intentional destruction of many mandate 
documents, sources are scattered widely.
84
  Both personal and institutional archives and can 
primarily be found in the Palestinian West Bank, Israel (including East Jerusalem) and 
Beirut.
85
  For my own work on Arabic sources I was able to access a number of archives in 
the West Bank which were particularly helpful.  First of all, the university libraries of Birzeit 
and Bethlehem contain mandate-era newspapers (Filastīn and al-Difā’ at Birzeit).  The 
Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine-American Research Center in Ramallah were 
indispensible for their holdings of published memoirs of Palestinian national leaders and 
general Arabic histories on social and political developments in mandate Palestine.  Where 
possible I have used memoirs and personal papers of active, self-professed nationalists.  
They have provided an understanding of society in mandate Palestine and the terminology 
used in relation to the status of the population.
86
   
     I used two main archives in West Jerusalem extensively.  The first is the Israel State 
Archives (ISA).  The archive contains thousands of pages of documents from the mandate’s 
British records as well as ‘lost Arab Executive property,’ the latter being useful to fill in the 
gaps for those missing records in Britain.  The Executive document files include records 
from the Ottoman census and nefus population registers, waqf papers, the British Colonial 
Office and Chief Secretary, profiles of Palestinian leaders and social groups, minutes of Arab 
                                                   
84 Archives were destroyed by the Israel forces during various times since 1948 including the 1982 invasion of 
Beirut and wholesale looting and destruction of the PLO Research Center. 
85 Roger Heacock, professor of history at Birzeit University and head of the university's archive project, has 
written about the subject of suspicion by Palestinians and associations for projects to combine their archives in 
a centralised database for researchers.  See Roger Heacock and Caroline Mall-Dibiasi, “Liberating the Phantom 
Elephant: The Digitalization of Oral Archives,” Birzeit University Working Paper No. 2011/8 (2011).  
However, for a different view on archiving and accessing Palestinian history, including the definition of an 
archive in the Palestinian context of family papers, see Beshara Doumani, “Archiving Palestine and the 
Palestinians: The Patrimony of Ihsan Nimr,” Jerusalem Quarterly 36 (Winter 2009): 3-12. 
86 For example, this includes the memoirs of Izzat Darwaza, Akram Zu‘aytir, Wasif Jawhariyyeh, and Khalil 
Sakakini. 
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Executive meetings and conferences, and petitions from civil society.  They are a mix of 
English and Arabic and the Arabic petitions were most useful.   
     The second Israeli archive that I used for much of my research was the Hebrew 
University’s Jewish National Library in Jerusalem.  This library holds the most extensive, 
accessible collection of Palestinian periodicals on microfilm and in bound volumes.  The 
press records form a major part of my primary source list, and the Palestinian discourse on 
citizenship, nationality, civil rights, and the plight of emigrants left without citizenship, 
comes from the press.  The library holds not only the main weeklies and dailies from 
Jerusalem and Jaffa but crucially for my work, the smaller and shorter-run periodicals from 
places like Gaza or Tulkarm.
87
   
     I was also able to use the Institute for Palestine Studies Library in Beirut, where I found 
not only memoirs and personal papers but also collections of Arabic documents from the 
Palestinian nationalist and anti-Zionist movement during the mandate, complied by 
Palestinian intellectuals.  These documents included letters of protest dating from 1917, 
strike and boycott decisions, and full proceedings of nationalist conferences, delegations and 
speeches.  They are invaluable to constructing the Palestinian perception on the national 
movement.
88
 
     In recent years the number of new publications based on rich primary source material held 
in libraries and personal collections have grown.  They offer complex, nuanced and 
fascinating mixtures of stories about the Palestine Mandate, the mandate’s place in the 
colonial, international and transnational contexts, and the agency of historical actors whose 
voices have previously remained silent.  Indeed, nationalism continues to be a topic that 
draws the interest of students of the modern Middle East but it need not be a concept 
portrayed narrowly.  It is hoped that what follows will offer an entirely new contribution to 
the field of Palestine studies and to the history of particular spaces of negotiation which 
shaped the historical narrative of the Palestinian Arab citizens.  Finally, the thesis offers a 
                                                   
87 The newspapers include Filastīn, al-Difā’, Mir’at al-Sharq, Sawt al-Sha‘b, al-Jamiyya al-Arabiyya, al-
Jamiyya al-Islamiyya, al-Ittihad al-Arabī and Sawt al-Haqq. 
88 Most notably, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Wathā’iq al-Muqāwama al-Filastīniyya al-‘Arabiyya did al-
Ihtilāl al-Britānī wa al-Zioniyya , 1918-1939 [Documents of the Palestinian Arab Resistance against the British 
and Zionist Occupation] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967); Wathā’iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-
Filastīniyya min Awrāq Akram Zu‘aytir, 1918-1939 [Documents of the Palestinian National Movement from 
the Papers of Akram Zu‘aytir] (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1979). 
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methodological and theoretical framework through which the mandate and the Arab colonial 
citizen can be represented as active agents of global interwar connections, discourses and 
practices of citizenship. 
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Chapter Two 
Inventing the National and the Citizen: The British Legislative Context, 1918-1925 
 
“That terminology [between citizenship and nationality] marks the difference which 
exists in Oriental countries between allegiance to a State, which is citizenship, and 
membership of a nationality within a State, which is a matter of race and religion.  Arabs 
and Jews in Palestine claim respectively to have Arab and Jewish nationality, but they 
are equally Palestinian citizens.” 
(Norman Bentwich, Palestine’s first Attorney-General) 
“Palestine is a land of marvels and this new regulation [of provisional nationality] is one 
of them.” 
(Abdulkader al-Muzaffer, Oct. 1922) 
 
Introduction 
 
     The cornerstone of mandate policy, as has been shown in numerous studies, was to 
facilitate the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine as embodied in the mandate’s 
inclusion of the Balfour Declaration.  This policy influenced the legislation proposed by 
British colonial officials and the mandate administration in London and Jerusalem between 
1918 and 1925, and it was reflected in the intricacies of Palestinian nationality and 
citizenship legislation.  In order for the successful establishment of a national home, the 
British favoured arrangements that allowed Jewish immigrants to easily acquire Palestinian 
citizenship upon their arrival to the territory.  At the same time, Great Britain was keen to 
ensure the legislation in their mandates remained in line with new, post-war international 
regulations.  As the mandatory in Palestine, Great Britain undeniably acted more as an 
imperial power than as a trustee, and the colonial nature of its rule is evidenced by the ways 
in which the mandate’s civil administration created and implemented legislation in 
cooperation with the British Colonial and Foreign Offices, the British government and the 
Zionist Organisation.     
 This chapter demonstrates how debates on nationality, both in general and as specific to 
Palestine, prior to the 1922 ratification of the mandate actually framed the mandate charter.  
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These debates further influenced the shape of the Palestinian nationality legislation 
introduced between 1922 and 1925.  The general implications and issues that came to light 
from discussions, debates and questions between government departments in London and 
with the League of Nations, the Zionist Organisation and the Palestine Administration were 
defined largely by international treaties and British colonial policies.  Equally important is 
that after 1918, the British Empire began to contract and citizenship, nationality and 
subjecthood lost their former meanings in both the metropole and the imperial possessions.  
These changes are reflected in the muddled nature of belonging in Palestine as envisioned by 
mandate and colonial authorities and policy-makers.   
     The chapter argues that the main outcome was the separation—first codified in the 
mandate’s 1922 Order-in-Council—of a Jewish-Palestinian nationality from an Arab-
Palestinian nationality.  Finally, this chapter investigates the immediate impact upon the 
Jewish immigrants and the native inhabitants of the subsequent 1925 Palestine Citizenship 
Order-in-Council as a citizenship order rather than a nationality law.  The debates over the 
creation of Palestinian citizenship were not confined to the Colonial and Foreign Offices and 
to the Palestine Administration, but were framed more broadly by ambiguity and measures of 
uncertainty over nationality and citizenship based on Britain’s experience with imperial 
subjecthood, national status and imperial consular protection.   
 Immediately after the end of the First World War, British officials in Palestine grappled 
with the contradiction between fulfilling both the obligations of the proposed Palestine 
Mandate and those of the Balfour Declaration.  Although officials found points of 
comparison with colonial administrations elsewhere in the Middle East and India, the post-
war rhetoric of national self-determination that inspired the awards of the mandates ran 
against imperial practice.  Yet in Palestine, a colonial style of administration became 
necessary to uphold the Balfour Declaration and to prepare the population for independence.  
Although as enshrined in the Declaration the mandate could not prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of the Arab majority, Great Britain could not offer Jews and Arabs an equal, 
rights-based citizenship.  Administrators feared that giving rights to the Arabs to vote or 
sanction the enactment of legislation would hinder their obligations towards the Zionist 
movement.  Therefore, citizenship had to be framed as a legal status devoid of accompanying 
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political or civil rights, and the ultimate power to give or take away such a status rested with 
the British high commissioners in Palestine.   
 As noted in Chapter One, the British institutionalised a dual administrative structure 
which offered Arab and Jewish individuals separate and unequal civil, political and social 
rights.
1
  The foundations of this structure can be traced back to the period between 1918 and 
1925 when the British made every attempt to exclude the demands of the Palestinian Arab 
leadership in matters of political rights from the official discourse on nationality and 
citizenship.  In the early 1920s as the British codified nationality provisions, Arabs were 
treated differently from Jewish ‘provisional’ citizens in the practical matters of travel, 
passports, diplomatic protection and voting regulations. 
 
Great Britain, Palestine and the League of Nations: questions of nationality, 1919-1922  
 
     The military administration in Palestine, lasting from December 1917 to mid-1920 and 
known as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South (OETA), decided in 1918 to keep 
the status quo of Ottoman laws until bureaucratic measures could be undertaken upon the 
arrival of the first High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in July 1920.  During these two years, 
and for quite some time after, the most pressing issue was that of sovereignty in the territory 
that was to become the Palestine Mandate.  The basic structures of the League of Nations 
were not yet fully formed when the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 decided the future status 
of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia.  The uncertainty of the 
early post-war years in the Levant affected the status of the inhabitants of Palestine and one 
of the most pressing issues linked to sovereignty proved to be the dissolution of Ottoman 
nationality.   
     In particular, this section explores the basic questions faced by the British on the 
sovereignty of Palestine as they related to nationality prior to the ratification of the Palestine 
Mandate in 1922.  This uncertainty played a role in the official conceptualisation of the 
nationality of the inhabitants of Palestine.  Initially, the colonial experts in Britain who 
supervised the establishment of the mandate system did not place much emphasis on the 
                                                   
1 Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 
1917-1929, Second Edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 109. 
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necessity to formulate new provisions to clarify sovereignty and nationality in each mandate.  
These officials concerned themselves more with the international validation of Great 
Britain’s position as mandatory power in Palestine.2  Individual colonial administrators in 
Palestine, delegates to the League and Zionist leaders all held different opinions as to the 
implementation of certain legislation under the mandate.  Primary sources from 
governmental departments in Palestine and London (namely the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices) and correspondence with international bodies such as the League and the Permanent 
Mandates Commission (PMC) are used to reconstruct the history of the varied debates 
centring on the status of Palestine and its inhabitants after 1918.   
     From the beginning of the military administration in Palestine, the Colonial Office and 
the Foreign Office diverged on policy and only reluctantly worked together.  Historians such 
as Aaron Klieman argue that the two departments had fundamental differences of 
orientations and priorities for Palestine which emerged out of the post-war tensions over 
their shared responsibilities for British interests in the Arab mandates.  The Colonial Office 
(and its Middle East Department, established in 1921) was responsible for the administration 
of the mandates while the Foreign Office was responsible for conducting their relations with 
independent states.
3
  The India Office, Air Ministry, Home Office, Dominions Office and 
other departments also claimed some measure of responsibility for Palestine or its foreign 
relations.  
 After the appointment of Samuel in 1920 to replace the military governor, the 
departments in London guided the activities of Palestine’s civil administration through the 
newly-established high commissioner’s office once the latter passed ‘on-the-ground’ 
information to policy makers in the British capital. The government formed directives and 
issued decrees which were sent to Jerusalem for implementation.  Throughout this process, 
divergences in opinions became clear: in 1921, Winston Churchill noted that ninety-percent 
of the British officials in Palestine, at that time closely aligned with the Foreign Office, 
opposed the Zionist policy of the local British administration headed by Samuel.
4
  Although 
                                                   
2 Wm. Roger Louis, “The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919-1922,” 
International Organization 23 (Winter 1969): 74-75. 
3 Aaron Klieman, “The Divisiveness of Palestine: Foreign Office versus Colonial Office on the Issue of 
Partition, 1937,” The Historical Journal 22 (June 1979): 423-424. 
4 Roger Louis, “The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System,” 91. 
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the Colonial Office was concerned with Arab public opinion specifically to maintain political 
stability and public security, the Foreign Office was by contrast aware of the importance of 
Palestine for the wider Arab and Muslim world and felt more sympathetic toward the general 
Arab opposition to Zionist policy.
5
   
 As the process of drafting the mandate charters began in 1919, Great Britain recognised 
the need to work with the League of Nations to administer the territories, but the relationship 
was often tense because Great Britain had claimed since 1918 to be the sovereign power in 
Palestine.  In 1919, Lord Robert Cecil, head of the British delegation to the League and 
president of the League of Nations Union (LNU) stated his opposition to any League 
interference with future administrative decisions made by mandate governments.  At the 
same time, British statesmen played the main role in writing the proposals for the three 
classes into which mandates came to be divided.  Class A territories included the former 
Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces, whose inhabitants required some administrative 
assistance and advice before sovereignty.  In the case of Palestine, differences of opinion 
over these specific preparations for independence surfaced between colonial officials in 
London, members of the civil administration and Zionist leaders.  Disputes in 1920 over 
which Allied power would take the Arab mandates postponed the actual implementation of 
the mandate system.
6
  By then, the terms of the mandates were well-known from the highly-
publicised Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.   
 Between 1919 and 1922, although colonial officials delegated power to other members of 
the PMC to help formulate the framework of each future British-administered mandate, 
Britain greatly influenced the ultimate acceptance or refusal of mandate charters.  For 
example, the director of the Mandate Section, Switzerland’s William Rappard, supervised 
the day-to-day running of the PMC and collected data on the proposed mandates.  His 
colleague Sir Frederick Lugard served as Britain’s first representative on the commission, 
despite a lack of diplomatic or political experience (he had been a former governor-general 
in colonial Nigeria).  Internally, in the battle between the Colonial and Foreign Offices over 
the supervision of the mandates, Lugard argued that the mandates fell within the realm of 
                                                   
5 Klieman, “The Divisiveness of Palestine,” 425-426. 
6 Roger Louis, 93.  Class B and C mandates were for “lesser civilized” former German colonies in Africa and 
the Pacific.   
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colonial rather than foreign policy.  In order to pre-empt further disagreement, in 1921 
control of the civil administration of Palestine was transferred from the Foreign Office to the 
Colonial Office.
7
   
 By the end of January 1920, the British delegation to the League had a general 
understanding of the structure of the mandates but no consensus existed as to how they 
would work in practice, especially as to provisions of nationality.
8
  The mandatories were 
nominated at the San Remo conference in April but the situation in Anatolia and the refusal 
of the Turkish nationalists to endorse a peace treaty further complicated the practical 
implementation of the Arab mandates and a change in the national status of their inhabitants.  
Regardless, British Prime Minister Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau decided to grant the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain, as one of the fourteen 
mandates divided between six countries.  The decision came despite strong Arab objections 
as clearly evident from the conclusions of the King-Crane Commission’s report.9  At the 
same time, the Arab leaders voiced their opposition to Article 22 of the League Covenant 
because it did not clarify how each mandate could be abrogated.
10
  The official preamble of 
the Palestine Mandate charter had twenty-eight articles and included the provisions of the 
Balfour Declaration.  In contradiction with the Covenant which stated that advice and 
assistance to the mandate administration could come from the mandatory, the mandate 
charter gave the Zionist Organisation privilege to assist the mandate administration.      
 It must be stressed that the territories of the former Ottoman Empire remained nominally 
part of that empire until the conclusion of a peace treaty with the forces of Mustafa Kemal 
and the new Republic of Turkey in 1923.  Kemal did not accept the first peace treaty, the 
1920 Treaty of Sèvres and therefore he remained symbolically at war as the Ottoman Empire 
with the Allied Powers.  The Treaty of Sèvres’ importance to the current discussion can be 
related to its provisions for the enforcement of nationality in Palestine and in all of the 
                                                   
7 Ibid., 70, 72-75. 
8 Callahan, Mandates and Empire, 34-35.  The Allies drafted policies that gave the League stronger powers 
such as complete supervision over the mandates, the right of their inhabitants to appeal to the League, and the 
establishment of a mandate commission which was to receive annual reports on each mandate. 
9 King-Crane Report on the Near East.  The commission consisted of two Americans sent to greater Syria to 
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Ottoman Empire’s former territories.  The treaty sanctioned the League’s consensus on state 
succession: Ottoman nationality would effectively cease to exist and the new administrations 
that took the place of the Empire would be responsible for the creation and regulation of 
nationality.  However, without Turkey’s approval of the treaty, the inhabitants of the 
mandated territories remained Ottoman nationals.  They included not only Arabs but also 
ethnic Kurds, Turkomen, Circassians, Armenians, and Eastern European Jewish immigrants.   
 As the Allied powers considered questions of nationality in the international, post-war 
context, the British placed the population of Palestine into categories and accorded different 
treatment to them.  Until the later ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the civil 
administration dealt with two different ‘nationality’ groups: the native inhabitants, Arab or 
otherwise, who had all been Ottoman subjects, and the immigrant Jews who arrived after 
1914.  During the later decades of Ottoman rule, immigrant Jews from Europe who resided 
in the Empire came under the protection of European consuls.  In contrast, Jews who came 
from the other Arab lands including North Africa usually took Ottoman nationality.
11
  Some 
groups of Mizrahi Jews (such as merchants and especially Baghdadi Jews) acquired British-
protected status in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
12
   
     Prior to 1923, the Euro-centric Zionist Organisation led by Chaim Weizmann lent a great 
amount of influence into the initially nebulous discussions of nationality which affected the 
Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, the separation of ‘national’ groups in the territory, and the 
framework of the mandate.  Indeed, the mandate charter allowed only for the Zionist 
movement, rather than the Arab leadership, to offer assistance and advice to the British 
administration.  Due to the Balfour Declaration’s obligations and the increased Jewish 
immigration after the war, the British confronted the unique question of how to create a legal 
and political framework of nationality and citizenship to satisfy the conditions in Palestine.  
The answer offered by the administration and the Zionist Organisation shaped both the 
mandate charter and nationality legislation.  Weizmann, after seeing the earliest draft 
mandate charter in 1919, proposed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Palestine’s 
inhabitants must have full freedom of religion as part of the ‘civil rights’ of citizenship.’ 
                                                   
11 Matthias B. Lehmann, “Rethinking Sephardi Identity: Jews and Other Jews in Ottoman Palestine,” Jewish 
Social Studies 15 (Fall 2008): 93. 
12 Sarah Abrevaya Stein, “Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the 
Persistence of Empire,” The American Historical Review 116 (Feb. 2011): 85. 
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However, the proposal gave no definition for civil rights.  Weizmann’s close friend Baron 
Rothschild added his own commentary to the proposal.  He suggested that Jews should 
receive preferential treatment with a separate citizenship in order to satisfy the Zionist 
leaders of British sincerity for the national home policy.  Rothschild elaborated further by 
suggesting that the Jews of Palestine should also be given the status of full British subjects.  
The British noted the potential difficulties of such a measure: Arab demands for the same 
status as British subjects and widespread opposition to the mandate, a mass emigration from 
Palestine of Jews who had full British protection, and the impossibility of maintaining a 
suitable mandate with such a provision.
13
   
     While British officials and the League worked on drafts of the mandate, it became clear 
that departments within the government needed clarification as to the application of 
Palestinian nationality since colonial precedents could not be used in their entirety.  The 
discussions framed what later became Article 7 of the mandate.  The article required the 
administration to enact a nationality law specifically for Jewish immigrants.  Colonial 
legislators focused their attention on the means through which they could provide these 
immigrants with a national status.  Initially, the drafts stated that immigrants who took up 
residence in Palestine within two years of the ratification of the mandate would lose their 
existing nationality and automatically become Palestinian citizens.
14
  Until that time 
however, Zionist leaders requested that the Foreign Office offer consular protection to 
Palestine’s Jewish immigrant population.  These discussions framed Article 12 of the 
mandate charter, which entitled all citizens to British protection when outside of Palestine.
15
   
 The debates and discussions highlighted above—whether between British administrators 
in the Colonial and Foreign Offices, officials in London and Jerusalem or members of the 
Zionist Organisation—informed the practical application of the mandate charter between 
1919 and its ratification in 1922.  From the beginning of Herbert Samuel’s civil 
                                                   
13 ‘Future Constitution of Palestine Zionist Proposals with Secretary of State’s Amendments,’ 27 Feb. 1919, FO 
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administration in 1920, the local British government visualized two separate national 
communities in Palestine.  The abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres by Mustafa Kemal forced 
the administration to recognise Jewish immigrants as provisional nationals but reinforced the 
status of the majority Arab natives as former Ottoman subjects who were accorded different 
treatment from that of the immigrants.  Great Britain’s various categories of co lonial 
subjecthood also influenced the different treatment of the Jewish immigrants.  The Palestine 
Mandate charter stated in Article 7 that the mandatory was to enact a law for the acquisition 
of Palestinian nationality by Jewish immigrants but crucially did not define nationality or 
citizenship and it made no mention of the Arab population.  Arguments over whether Great 
Britain could offer consular protection to immigrants and natives further complicated 
matters.  Members of the administration failed to come to a unified and definitive opinion on 
the international status of the Palestinian population despite intense discussions.  A number 
of variables forced administrators to delay the completion of a nationality law to regulate 
citizenship and these reasons are placed into context below. 
 
Norman Bentwich and discourses of nationality, citizenship and imperial protection in 
the early 1920s 
 
 The mandate administration did not take swift action to affirm the legal status of the 
native Palestinian population and the Jewish immigrants in large part because colonial 
officials debated the intricacies of the status of Palestine as a territory within the British 
Empire prior to the ratification of the mandate in 1922.  Neither the League of Nations nor 
the mandate charter stated whether authority in Palestine came from the League, the British 
Crown, the Parliament or some other international body.  The League did not make clear the 
procedures through which the British could administer the mandated territories, which meant 
that between 1920 and 1923 the civil administration headed by High Commissioner Herbert 
Samuel hesitated to pass legislation.  The question of sovereignty remained largely unsolved 
through Samuel’s term of office although the British flew the Union Jack in their mandated 
territories with the belief that they, rather than the League, were the sovereigns.
16
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 One issue that the government in London and Samuel’s administration spent a great deal 
of time to agree upon was the status of the Palestinian natives.  In particular, officials 
disagreed on whether to treat them as British-protected persons, Ottoman subjects, 
foreigners, or as members of an altogether new legal category.  As was the nature of the 
empire at the point, the officials who served in London and those who had experience in the 
colonies and protectorates each had their own clear understandings of nationality, citizenship 
and subjecthood in the context of British imperial policy.  These understandings were 
situated at a unique juncture in the history of empire, and thus were subject to change with 
the changes to British and international legal realities.  As part of these transformations 
within and outside of the British Empire, officials wondered how other states would treat 
residents of an international mandate when they left the mandate territory.  One of the first 
concerns faced by the administration after the demise of the Ottoman Empire was the 
cancellation of protection and capitulations granted by the British government to some of the 
empire’s Jewish and Christian residents, and the effect this had on the Jews in Palestine.  As 
a result, the Foreign Office failed to come to an agreement with the Colonial and Home 
Offices as to whether all inhabitants came under British protection or if Great Britain could 
instead grant Jewish immigrants the status of imperial subjects.
17
  The task of defining the 
new legal status of Palestinian citizenship, as well as offering advice on other matters of 
nationality, fell to Norman Bentwich, the administration’s first attorney-general and an 
expert on colonial legislation.   
 Norman Bentwich was appointed the attorney-general of Palestine in 1920 after service as 
a barrister in England and a post in the Egyptian ministry of justice prior to the First World 
War.  Nationality legislation was one of his most important creations in Palestine during a 
tenure that lasted until 1931.  In shaping legislation, he worked closely with Samuel and 
firmly supported the facilitation of a Jewish national home.  Shortly after his appointment, 
Bentwich expressed the hope that the majority of foreigners in Palestine, the Jewish 
immigrants, could automatically receive Palestinian citizenship.  At that time, Jewish arrivals 
                                                   
17 Stein, “Protected Persons?,” 87-90.  British-protected persons and British subjects were accorded the same 
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to Palestine were treated differently dependent on the country of origin of the newcomers.  
When they made applications for provisional certificates of nationality some lost the 
nationality of their birth country but others were able to keep their original nationality when 
they acquired provisional Palestinian nationality.   
 The Foreign Office helped guide Bentwich in arranging for consular facilities to be 
offered to provisional nationals as part of the office’s overall management of the 
international relations of the Palestine Administration.  In line with Bentwich, Foreign Office 
legal advisor H.W. Malkin felt it important that Jews who settled in Palestine became full 
citizens, with the right to take part in political and other activities.  To ensure this, he advised 
Bentwich during the early days of the draft legislation process that it would be undesirable to 
allow foreign Jews who resided in Palestine to be entitled to the protection of their own 
country.  At the time, Malkin doubted that most immigrants would take the necessary steps 
to naturalise in order to lose their original nationality.  He suggested that Palestinian 
citizenship be automatically given to them, and warned that if this was not to be the case 
Britain “shall have the spectacle of the Jewish National Home containing quantities of Jews 
who are not citizens.”18   
     Bentwich assisted the Foreign Office on the drafting of regulations for dual nationality, 
the revocation of nationality and naturalisation under the mandate.  These regulations needed 
to conform to British standards and especially to the 1914 British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act and the 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act.  Meanwhile, the immigrants’ 
entrances were coordinated with the Zionist Organisation.  Bentwich turned to the Treaty of 
Sèvres as a guide to ensure the compatibility of the Palestinian nationality law with 
international regulations.  However, the latter regulations could not be implemented as long 
as the Turkish nationalist forces refused to sign the treaty, as noted above.  Thus, the Arab 
inhabitants of the former Ottoman Empire remained Ottoman nationals while Bentwich 
worked on the law.   
     Diplomatic and consular protection were further complicated by the classification of 
Palestine by the League as an A mandate.  While Great Britain provided consular protection 
to inhabitants of its B and C mandates, the administration of the A mandates, not the home 
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government of the mandatory power, was obliged to offer such protection.  The 
disagreements over how Great Britain could regulate protection for Palestine’s inhabitants—
whom were then neither British subjects nor Palestinian citizens—meant that both Arabs and 
Jewish immigrants had an ambiguous international and national status.     
 The on-the-ground effect of the differences of opinion over the international status of 
Palestinians in the early 1920s is illustrated in the following example taken from Foreign 
Office correspondence dealing with Palestinian Arab residents of Egypt before 1922.  The 
Foreign Office classified Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews who resided in Egypt 
separately based on their ‘race’ and ‘culture.’  British Foreign Secretary Curzon, a man with 
an extensive background in colonial administration, presented his concerns to High 
Commissioner Samuel as they related to consular protections and capitulatory privileges for 
Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Egypt and in other British protectorates.  In Samuel’s opinion, 
the Palestinian Arabs lost the protection of the Ottoman Empire and therefore in their travels 
abroad Great Britain assumed the responsibility to provide consular protection.
19
  He also 
assumed that the Palestinians would benefit from capitulatory privileges whilst in another 
territory under British administration.  
 The frame of reference for Samuel and Curzon was the former system of capitulations 
between Britain and certain nationals of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.  British-protected 
persons had a special status under the protectorate in Egypt.  Whilst Ottoman nationals in 
Egypt had been subject to Native Courts in matters of law, British-protected persons and 
British subjects were offered favourable treatment in courts of law, such as trial in the Mixed 
Courts by British or French judges, and favourable tax duties.  After the inhabitants of 
Palestine became subject to the regulations of the civil administration in 1920, Curzon asked 
Samuel for advice on whether to continue to treat certain individuals from Palestine as 
Ottoman nationals or as British-protected persons in Egypt or in other British imperial 
possessions.
20
  The Foreign Office and the mandatory power realised that if the Palestinian 
Arabs received British protection they could be tried in Mixed Courts.  At the very least, 
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such a practice would affirm their international status as British-protected persons (without a 
separate Palestinian nationality) and at most it would indicate the Palestinians were akin to 
British colonial subjects.   
 The correspondence reveals the telling attitude of the Foreign Office on the matter: 
Curzon argued that the British in Egypt should attempt to grant privileges only to select 
Palestinian individuals.
21
  These “select individuals” specifically referred to the “better-
educated” Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Egypt.  In a letter to Samuel, Curzon stated that the 
Egyptian administration assumed the Levantine Arabs to be “on a lower plane of civilisation 
than the average Egyptian.”22  The correspondence highlights the practical separation 
between Jewish and Arab Palestinians who traveled or resided outside of the mandate 
territory.  Educated Jews and a select few Arab Christians qualified for special treatment 
such as trial in British courts outside of Palestine.  Their international statuses then, mirrored 
that of British colonial subjects.  
     The debates over consular protection diverged into related issues including new questions 
that referred to passports and visas for Arab and Jewish residents of Palestine.  Before the 
implementation of the mandate, a uniform passport system for the Palestinians did not exist 
and travelers used Ottoman passports.  After the end of the war, British consulates treated 
Palestinians in a number of ways: as ‘former alien enemies,’ foreigners or protected persons 
when they traveled outside of Palestine.  The debate over the proper treatment of Palestinian 
Arabs and Jews in Egypt underscores the confusion that stemmed from the classification of 
Arabs as former Ottomans and of Jewish immigrants as provisional Palestinian nationals.  In 
one particular instance in 1920, immigration officials in Jerusalem treated a Palestinian 
holding a British passport and a valid Ottoman passport as a ‘former alien enemy.’23  
Because Ottoman passports became invalidated after 1918, British consular officials were 
unable to endorse them for travel to and from Palestine.  Neither the Foreign Office nor the 
Palestine Administration appealed to the League for advice but instead, in contravention of 
the future mandate charter, the Foreign Office in 1920 advised consular officers not to 
recognise any claims to British protection by Arabs who lived abroad.  In practice however, 
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the Foreign Office provided emergency certificates for Arabs and Jews that entitled them to 
receive one-way Palestinian visas or laissez-passer in order to travel.   
     As part of the development of separate ‘national statuses,’ in August 1920 the Foreign 
Office published the details of the two categories devised for the Arab and Jewish population 
of Palestine.  The first category included those people born in Palestine who possessed 
Ottoman nationality but whom were not habitual residents.  Ottoman nationals (by birth or 
descent) who lived abroad but wanted Palestinian nationality could either obtain their 
nationality by exhibiting their Ottoman passport or other identity documents as proof of 
paternal descent from an Ottoman subject.
24
  The second category featured non-Ottoman 
residents who wished to adopt Palestinian nationality, and this group consisted mainly of 
Jewish immigrants.  The Zionist Organisation issued certificates to Jews going to Palestine in 
order for the mandate administration’s immigration officials to grant them a laissez-passer.25  
To receive a laissez-passer, individuals in both categories needed to reassure the authorities 
that they would opt for Palestinian nationality as soon as a law passed to that effect and 
conditional on their permanent residence in the mandate territory.  The measure also ensured 
that travelers did not use their status as provisional Palestinian nationals only to obtain 
British consular protection.  At this point, the Foreign Office and Bentwich expressed the 
belief that Palestinian natives, whether Arab or Jewish, could not have changed their 
allegiance as Ottoman nationals prior to the ratification of a peace treaty with the Empire.
26
  
By the time of the 1923 formal assumption of the mandate by Great Britain, a nationality law 
had not been promulgated and the concerns of the Foreign and Colonial Offices and 
Bentwich and Samuel regarding the national status of Arabs as opposed to Jewish 
immigrants remained unresolved.    
 
Mandate legislation, 1921-1922 
 
     As the League of Nations and the Allied Powers argued over the conditions necessary for 
the implementation of the mandate system between 1920 and mid-1922, the administration 
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in Palestine and the government in London worked on several other pieces of legislation in 
anticipation of the formal award of the mandate over Palestine.  The legislation was also 
meant to clarify a number of the questions discussed above, including those that concerned 
the international status of the territory and its inhabitants, faced by Norman Bentwich.  The 
legislation included a nationality law, an electoral law and an organic law (or constitution).  
The following section contextualises the challenges the mandate administration faced in 
drafting and implementing legislation intended to regulate Palestinian nationality in the early 
1920s.   
 Nationality and citizenship, and the rights associated with both were connected with the 
enactment of an organic law and the establishment of a partially-elected legislative council.  
As early as 1921, High Commissioner Samuel expressed hope for the rapid formation of a 
legislative council and the enactment of a constitution.  The administration in Palestine and 
the government in London debated the framework and function of such a council but decided 
that an electoral law could not be passed before the ratification of the mandate by the 
League.  However, the administration felt it necessary to issue an order-in-council to regulate 
Palestinian nationality in order to compile electoral registers.  The administration depended 
on such registers in order to classify inhabitants as citizens entitled to vote, but it first faced 
the task of defining the parameters of nationality.     
 The British government, which was ultimately in charge of approving major legislation 
for Palestine, outlined three options: the first was to pass a nationality order-in-council; the 
second was to issue an electoral order-in-council so that an elected legislative council could 
discuss a nationality law and constitution; and the third was to pass a temporary nationality 
order-in-council before an elected assembly could work to finalise provisions to regulate 
nationality.  High Commissioner Samuel favoured the first option as he had promised early 
municipal elections to the Arab leadership.
27
  The mandatory government did not opt for any 
of the three options before the League approved the Mandate for Palestine on 24 June 1922 
but instead completed orders-in-council for a constitution and legislative council. 
Consultation with the League or the Arab leadership over the specifics of the legislation was 
unnecessary as the mandate text allowed the mandatory full power of legislation and 
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administration.   
 Following the ratification of the mandate in July 1922, His Majesty’s Government 
approved the Palestine Order-in-Council as an organic law.  Enacted on 10 August 1922, it 
outlined the functions of the mandate government and provided for the composition of the 
legislative council of appointed British officials and elected representatives from each 
religious community.  The text of the 1922 Order-in-Council defined a foreigner as any 
national or subject of Europe, America or Japan, whereas natives from a British mandated 
territory or any area under direct British rule, Ottoman subjects, or any person who lost his 
Ottoman subject status were not considered foreigners in Palestine.  Crucially, the order 
defined the Palestinian citizen for the purpose of enfranchising inhabitants for the legislative 
council.  Those considered citizens included ‘Turkish subjects’ (meaning Ottoman) 
habitually resident in Palestine and all other inhabitants who did not possess ‘Turkish 
nationality’ but were habitually resident in Palestine (Jewish immigrants) provided they 
applied for provisional citizenship within two months.
28
  Jewish immigrants did not need to 
renounce their birth nationality to be enfranchised since the 1922 Legislative Election Order-
in-Council, passed in conjunction with the organic law, did not actually confer any 
nationality.
29
 
 The electoral order-in-council provided Jewish immigrants with provisional nationality 
while the mandatory kept the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 as the basis for the 
provisional nationality of the Arabs.  The order-in-council stipulated that the right to vote, 
the first political right linked with nationality, would be on the basis of communal identity—
an important concept to British rule in Palestine.  The proposed elected legislative body 
limited the power of Arab representatives to pass laws because the nominated British and 
Jewish members would outnumber them and the high commissioner (with two votes) could 
veto or change any legislation.
30
   
 The use of communal and religious divisions as the basis of the new voting system did not 
reflect the realities that secular Ottoman nationality had created on the ground in the Arab 
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provinces since the mid-nineteenth century.  The mandate administration instated a notion 
that rights, duties and the status of Palestine’s inhabitants came from their belonging to a 
religious community.
31
  Some mandate officials, such as Edward Keith-Roach, suggested 
that proportional representation was a better option.  Other officials deemed his suggestion 
too complicated and argued that the Arabs lacked knowledge of self-government due to high 
illiteracy rates.
32
  The order-in-council implemented a system of secondary electors in 
electoral colleges and in each district community leaders determined the number of 
secondary voters for the legislative council’s elections.  These voters formed electoral 
colleges divided by religion and a fixed number of ‘provisional’ citizens could stand for 
election from each religious community.   
 The correspondence between government offices, the Palestine Administration and the 
Zionist Organisation and the resulting legislation in 1922 shaped the idea of a Palestinian 
citizen without consultation with the League or the leadership of the Arab population.  The 
citizen that emerged through early legislation was on the whole a colonial one.  He was a 
British-protected person with an ambiguous status outside of the mandated territory.  The 
codification of two distinct categories of nationals in 1922 would be reproduced in the 
subsequent nationality law.     
 
The draft ‘nationality’ order: definitions, concepts and the status of Palestine, 1922-
1924  
 
     In order to properly trace the legislative development of Palestinian nationality soon 
before and after the issue of the 1922 Order-in-Council, historians must rely on records of 
the Colonial, Foreign, Home, Dominions and India Offices, as well as records from 
Parliamentary debates, Trade and Treasury Offices, the Crown Agents and the Law Officers.  
The drafts of the nationality order were also influenced by officials in Egypt, the French 
administration in Syria and the Zionist Organisation.  This section covers the period from 
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1922 through 1924 and has several purposes.  It traces the various debates and ideas that 
influenced the drafts of nationality legislation and highlights different definitions and 
concepts.  Additionally, the section demonstrates how the regulations set out by the post-war 
peace treaties dictated new provisions for nationality that the British government had to 
incorporate into their imperial legislation. This section further depicts the struggle (first 
mentioned earlier in the chapter) between London and Palestine to reach a consensus on the 
meaning of nationality and citizenship, especially as the two terms became linked within 
Great Britain itself as the realities of the nation-state as the new, primary political formation 
took hold.   
 As mentioned above, due to the refusal by Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish nationalists to 
endorse the Treaty of Sèvres, its provisions were instead incorporated in the Treaty of 
Lausanne which was signed by the Turkish Republic in 1923.  Both peace treaties stipulated 
that nationality orders needed to be passed in each mandate within twelve months from the 
date of endorsement by Turkey.  In Palestine, Attorney-General Bentwich constantly updated 
the draft of a nationality law in order to adapt it to the conditions stipulated by the peace 
treaty.  He submitted its first draft to the Foreign Office in February 1921.
33
   
     In 1920, Bentwich initially modeled the nationality draft on international provisions 
regarding Palestine in the Treaty of Sèvres.  Article 129 of the treaty directly benefited the 
Zionist ambitions in Palestine.  The article allowed for the ipso facto acquisition of 
Palestinian nationality for all non-Ottoman Jewish residents of Palestine who had resided in 
that territory for two years on the date of the treaty ratification.  This automatic acquisition of 
nationality meant that Jewish residents could keep their birth nationality.  Bentwich argued 
in 1920 that although political difficulties would arise in Palestine if the article remained in 
the treaty or if it was used in the nationality law, it could not be eliminated.  He was well 
aware that not all Jews resident in Palestine would want to automatically receive Palestinian 
nationality.  He predicted protests against the article and suggested an amendment for the 
Lausanne Treaty that allowed the non-Ottoman Jews of Palestine the option to receive 
citizenship and renounce their former nationality.
34
  The Zionist Organisation seconded this 
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proposed amendment and the Treaty of Lausanne did indeed exclude the text of Sèvres’ 
Article 129. 
     Some Zionist leaders also disagreed with Bentwich’s amendment on the grounds that 
Jewish residents would be forced to give up their birth nationality upon receipt of Palestinian 
citizenship.  Both the Joint Foreign Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies, headed by 
the British statesman Lucien Wolf, and the Anglo-Jewish Association termed their 
disagreement “a very grave objection.”35  The Colonial Office took up this objection and 
suggested that Jewish immigrants could also declare their desire not to become citizens and 
that the mandate administration could authorise them to remain in Palestine.  This suggestion 
allowed for British and American Jews who might wish to stay in Palestine and help 
establish the national home to keep their own nationality.
36
  The Foreign Office agreed and 
even suggested that non-habitually resident Jews who wished to help build the national home 
should have the option to acquire Palestinian citizenship “to take their full part in [the Jewish 
national home’s] political life instead of remaining foreigners.”  British and Zionist leaders 
came to a consensus with Bentwich that Palestinian citizenship should not be enforced on 
Jews either resident or non-resident but should be made an option just as people resident in 
other territories detached from Turkey opted for their new nationalities in accordance with 
international regulations.
37
 
     Article 125 of the Sèvres Treaty particularly affected Palestine.  The article stated that 
only those individuals who belonged to racial minorities in their new post-war states could 
opt for the nationality of other territories composed of the racial majority they desired to join.  
In his position as Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill advocated that Palestine be included 
as one of the territories listed as compliant with this article.  The inclusion of Palestine 
among such territories exclusively benefited the Jewish national home plan: it meant that 
Arabs of Syria or Iraq could not opt for Palestinian nationality since they belonged to the 
racial majority in their own country.  Although Arabs in places like Armenia could opt for 
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Palestinian nationality, the British administrators felt this would be unlikely and “would not 
probably make a serious difference to the balance of the population [in Palestine].”38   
     In light of disagreements by Zionist leaders and pro-Zionist British statesmen with certain 
articles in the Sèvres Treaty, Bentwich attempted to shape Palestine’s nationality regulations 
in order to be more favourable to the Jewish national home policy.  The Palestine 
Administration realised that it was not possible to exempt any special class of Jews from the 
nationality provisions of the peace treaty.  However, Bentwich could insert articles into the 
nationality law in Palestine to give the mandate government discretion in how it regulated 
the nationality of Jewish immigrants, as long as the articles did not contravene the treaty.
39
  
The Home Office initially suggested what would become the most important of these 
nationality provisions, that jus sanguinis should be limited so that nationality did not pass 
indefinitely through native-born Palestinian fathers to future generations resident outside of 
Palestine.  Contrary to the Sèvres treaty, the Home Office recommended that citizenship 
should pass only to the first generation born outside of Palestine.
40
  Officials felt that this 
limitation should be made clear in the legislation but Bentwich ultimately chose not to 
explicitly mention it in the final draft of the citizenship law despite its inclusion in that law.
41
   
 Colonial officials and Bentwich never quite resolved the issue of terminology in the early 
draft nationality ordinance.  The early drafts adopted the terms ‘Palestinian subject’ and 
‘Palestinian nationality’ to indicate the international status of Palestinians under the mandate.  
The Sèvres and Lausanne treaties used ‘citizen’ with the same meaning.  In a memo to the 
Foreign Office in February 1921, High Commissioner Samuel argued that ‘nationality’ was 
the better term to use since it indicated belonging to a nation-state.  On the other hand, the 
Foreign Office noted that the phrase ‘Palestinian citizen’ should be used and argued that the 
term ‘citizen’ was used to denote a national of a state whose constitution was not 
monarchial.
42
  ‘Subject’ seemed unfitting for the Palestinians because it incorrectly indicated 
the inhabitants were the subjects of the British Crown.   
                                                   
38 Memo, Herbert Samuel to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 July 1921, GB 165-0025/2/54-55. 
39 Memo, R.H. Campbell to Foreign Office memo, 27 May 1921, GB 165-0025/2/97. 
40 ‘Draft Palestinian Nationality Order,’ 7 June 1921, CO 733/12/13-14. See also, Report by HMG to the 
Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan, 1925 (London: HMSO, 
1926). 
41 Memo, John Pedder to Home Office, 7 June 1921, GB 165-0025/2/60.  
42 ‘Palestinian Nationality Draft Ordinance, Samuel to Curzon,’ 9 Feb. 1921, CO 733/9/391. 
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 The Foreign and Colonial Offices disagreed on other important practicalities in the law 
and their disagreements lengthened the process of drafting nationality legislation.  One 
important disagreement concerned the link between habitual residence in Palestine and 
eligibility for nationality.  The policy of support for the Jewish national home influenced 
naturalisation and residency arrangements.  For his part, Bentwich advocated a favourable 
treatment for Jewish immigrants in the process of naturalisation compared with immigrants 
to other British-administered territories.  By providing for the two-year residency provision 
Home Secretary Edward Shortt wrote to Bentwich that such “very special provision” would 
modify Great Britain’s ordinary requirements of residence for the purpose of naturalisation.43  
In their communication with Bentwich, Zionist leaders stressed that all Jews resident in 
Palestine could become “Palestinian subjects” but crucially asked that the nationality law 
allow Jews usually resident in other countries the right to hold dual nationality.  Yet the 
Organisation declared that they would oppose the latter policy if it meant that Arabs would 
also be entitled the right to dual nationality.
44
  Owing to their influence, the final legislation 
met the demands of the Zionist leaders.   
 On the other hand, the Foreign Office adamantly opposed granting nationality to native 
Palestinian Arab emigrants who lived even temporarily abroad if any chance existed that 
applicants would use their status to claim British protection.  The office had maintained this 
position since the first years of the civil administration, a position which contravened British 
nationality laws.
45
  In the final months of 1922 in the midst of the above-mentioned debates, 
the Palestine Administration and HMG began to receive petitions from Palestinian Arabs 
stranded in Latin America, Haiti and Cuba.  British consuls had not received definite 
instructions on Palestinian nationality or the dissolution of Ottoman nationality and the 
qualifications for grants of laissez-passers and provisional certificates of nationality were not 
uniformly recognised by consular representatives.  British consuls sometimes refused to 
issue passports or visas to Palestinian Arabs (many who claimed Ottoman nationality) 
wishing to return to Palestine or to travel on business.  These travelers were often forced to 
remain in one country for extended periods although a number applied to French consuls in 
                                                   
43 Memo, John Pedder to Home Office, 7 June 1921, GB 165-0025/2/62. 
44 ‘Zionist attitude on the draft Palestinian Nationality Order,’ 7 June 1921, CO 733/12/12. 
45 ‘Foreign Office Minute on Draft Ordinance,’ 9 Feb. 1921, CO 733/9/406. 
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bids to obtain Syrian passports or visas to enter mandate Syria.
46
   
     The international recognition of Palestinian nationality (alongside Turkish, Syrian, 
Lebanese, Iraqi, Egyptian and other nationalities) came as a result of the application of the 
Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allied Powers in September 1924 (a year after it 
had been signed in July 1923).  Its regulations for state succession forced the Palestine 
Administration and the British government to rush the completion of the Palestine nationality 
law in order to regulate the relationship between the population and the mandatory power.   
Throughout 1923, officials were keenly aware of the debates among delegates to the 
League over the national status of inhabitants of mandated territories.  Members of the 
Permanent Mandates Committee (PMC) grappled with the concept of mandate nationality 
and the Allied Powers’ perceptions of citizenship.  For example, one British delegate insisted 
that a mandate power could not grant a status other than its own national status to 
inhabitants.  In other words, the delegate claimed that Britain did not have the power to 
create a new nationality.
47
  Other delegates agreed, noting that “native inhabitants should not 
be led to think they were not under the protection of the Mandatory Power.”  This posed the 
danger that “natives, or those who incited them” would be more difficult to control if they 
thought their nationality was separate from the nationality of the mandatory.  A French 
delegate added that the nationality of the mandate power could not be offered to certain 
populations because of the differences in the natives’ “state of civilization.”48  
The same themes were mentioned in the debates that took place within the British 
government in regard to Palestine prior to the signing of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.  The 
Foreign Office wrote to the Home Office that Palestine did “not bear the slightest 
resemblances to an independent state” and its citizens had no such status as belonging to one.  
Foreign Office leaders declared that Palestinian inhabitants had a local national status in 
Palestine but internationally were British-protected persons which they deemed to be an 
important position.
49
  The Home Office, responsible for naturalisation, agreed and stated that 
                                                   
46 Examples of this can be found in letters from 1922 contained in the file CO 733/27. 
47 Minutes of the 24th session of the Council, Geneva, 17-23 Apr. 1923, League of Nations Official Journal, 4th 
Yr No. 6 (June 1923), 567-568. 
48 Ibid., 568-570. 
49 ‘Endorsement of Provisional Certificates,’ 8 May 1923, CO 733/55/487-491. 
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Palestinian nationality was a “creation” that gave Palestine a definite status whilst it 
remained a state under external British protection.
50
   
 In a general sense, the debates over the national status of Palestine clearly influenced 
future legislation, including the nationality law.  Most notably, if Palestine were a protected 
state (let alone a foreign country), the King had no jurisdiction over it, yet the King had 
already ratified the 1922 Palestine Order-in-Council.  Even Bentwich, the most senior legal 
scholar in Palestine, was confused as to the nature of British power in Palestine.
51
  In late 
1923, the Colonial Office argued that the phrase “the Government of Palestine” was not just 
a title but rather “the instrument by which HMG is exercising his authority under the 
Mandate” even if Palestine did not fall into any existing Dominion, Protectorate or British-
protected State category.  In that case, nationality legislation, like the orders-in-council, 
could be drafted by various departments and by the Palestine Administration, but it could 
only be ratified by order of the King.  By early 1924, the Colonial Office and Law Officers 
concluded that the population was under a type of unique British protection.
52
  Despite the 
opinion of departments in Great Britain, the League of Nations did not consider Palestine to 
be a protectorate of Great Britain.
53
  The issue remained unsolved. 
 To return to the use of terminology, Bentwich and other colonial officials decided only in 
May 1925 to change the title of the nationality legislation from a Nationality Law to the 
Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council.  One month before the order’s ratification, the term 
‘nationality’ was crossed out and replaced with ‘citizenship’ throughout the text.54  A short 
article written fifteen years later by Bentwich offered an explanation for the use of each term.  
Bentwich noted that citizen and citizenship replaced national and nationality in the final text 
of the order because of the “Oriental” difference of the terminology.  In Oriental countries, 
he maintained, citizenship marked the allegiance to a state whereas nationality was a matter 
of race and religion.  Both Arabs and Jews were equally Palestinian citizens, wrote 
                                                   
50 ‘Draft Palestinian nationality,’ 19 November 1923, CO 733/56/490-497. The Home Office cited two other 
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Bentwich, but they both claimed to have separate Arab or Jewish nationality.
55
  After the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, the provisions of nationality were first applied to 
Palestine, but citizenship remained a debatable term and status.  This again demonstrates the 
messy definitions of both terms proposed within Great Britain during the 1920s as the empire 
disintegrated and as policy-makers began to fuse citizenship and nationality to mark 
belonging in what would become the political formation of nation-state. 
 
Implementing citizenship legislation in Palestine, 1923-1925 
 
 In December 1923, High Commissioner Samuel recommended that the administration 
adopt into law the framework for conferring nationality stipulated in the 1922 Legislative 
Election Order.  It must be remembered that the order codified separate provisions through 
which Jewish immigrants, as opposed to former Ottoman subjects, could acquire Palestinian 
nationality.  Samuel had postponed municipal elections until the adoption of these provisions 
in a nationality law so the “right of voting” could be exercised by all inhabitants with the 
“definite and incontestable right to Palestinian citizenship.”56  In the interim before the 
completion of the nationality law, members of the Foreign Office argued against the terms of 
provisional nationality listed in the Legislative Election Order-in-Council.  They stated that a 
class of “undesirable people” such as communists, prostitutes and fugitives could remain in 
Palestine as habitual residents who received provisional nationality through the order.  These 
individuals would then acquire citizenship without a waiting period once the proper 
legislation was ratified.
57
  Since the short residency requirement for citizenship was meant to 
favour Jewish immigrants only, it led to intense debates that further delayed the final draft of 
the law.
58
   
 One of the mandate’s chief administrators, Edward Keith-Roach, opined that the two 
years’ residency requirement for naturalisation would be abused by immigrants who wanted 
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British protection and not Palestinian nationality.  He gave examples of residency 
requirements in Great Britain, the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, France and Italy, and 
all required at least five years.  He maintained that the Jews in Palestine, with their two-year 
residency qualification, would have been greatly advantaged, and pointed out the Arabs 
would give a “tremendous howl” that a Jewish individual from Europe could become a 
citizen of Palestine in two years.  The Treaty of Lausanne prevented Arabs who resided in 
Arab-majority countries from choosing Palestinian nationality.
59
   
 However, in 1923 the immediate repercussion of the Treaty of Lausanne in Palestine was 
that the Arab inhabitants were no longer treated as former Ottoman subjects.  Still, the treaty 
required native inhabitants to be resident in Palestine on the date that it came into force and 
to possess proof of their Ottoman nationality in order to become subject to the laws and 
regulations of the Palestine Administration.
60
  Those former Ottoman nationals who lived 
abroad upon the date of ratification in July 1924 were obliged to first declare their 
willingness to become nationals of their new states within two years and then to return to 
those states to reside.  By 1924, the circulated draft of the Palestine nationality law 
conformed to Lausanne’s regulations.  It stipulated that native-born Arabs who resided 
abroad on the date of the enactment of the law (not the treaty) had to return to Palestine in 
order to be considered permanent residents able to opt for citizenship.
61
  By the end of 1924, 
the Colonial Office noted that because of the Jewish policy in Palestine (termed “a set of 
unparalleled circumstances in the history of the world”) the draft order required further 
administrative tweaks.  These were competed one year after the implementation of the 
Lausanne Treaty.   
 Five years after the advent of the civil administration, HMG approved the Palestine 
Citizenship Order-in-Council and its provisions officially came into force on 1 August 1925.  
This was the only citizenship order the British government enacted in any of its mandate 
territories.  In Iraq and Transjordan, the mandate power placed local Arab authorities in 
charge of nationality legislation.  In Britain’s African mandates, inhabitants remained 
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60 “Al-ra‘iyyā al-uthmāniyyun āsbahu filastīniyyīn” [Ottoman subjects become Palestinians], Al-Huquq 
Scientific and Education Journal, Vol. II (Aug. 1925). By virtue of the treaty the former Ottoman nationals, the 
largest national group in Palestine, would be able to opt for Turkish nationality.   
61 ‘Nationality Order-in-Council,’ 1924, CO 733/75/271. 
75 
 
British-protected persons.
62
  The provisions of the citizenship order-in-council concerning 
naturalisation and the paternal transmission of nationality were drawn from the British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914.  Article 1 of the order, which mirrored Article 
30 of the Lausanne Treaty, declared all “Turkish subjects” habitually resident in Palestine on 
1 August 1924 (the date Lausanne came into force) to automatically become Palestinian 
citizens on 1 August 1925.  Turkish subjects referred to all Ottoman nationals as defined by 
the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869.  This article did not account for individuals who had 
been given provisional nationality under the 1922 Legislative Election Order, most of whom 
were Jewish immigrants.  It also did not take into consideration Ottoman subjects who lived 
abroad on 1 August 1924.  In total, the number of Ottoman nationals resident in Palestine on 
the date of the order who became Palestinian citizens was nearly 730,000.
63
  A subsequent 
article addressed the immigrants as the non-Ottoman residents who received provisional 
Palestinian nationality through the 1922 electoral order and automatically became Palestinian 
citizens under the 1925 order-in-council regulations.   
 The order addressed natives of Palestine who lived outside the territory.  According to 
Article 2, individuals over eighteen years of age born in Palestine and with Ottoman 
nationality who had habitual residence abroad on 1 August 1925 could opt for citizenship 
“subject to the consent of the Government of Palestine” in accordance with the regulation 
they have been in Palestine for six months prior to opting and on the condition that they had 
not acquired a foreign nationality.  This option had to be done within two years from the date 
of the order, by 31 July 1927.
64
  Despite British attempts to keep its citizenship order in line 
with Lausanne, the discussions within the departments in London and Palestine led to the 
codification of different terminologies.  These differences were to the detriment of the 
Palestinian Arabs.   
 The difference in wording of Article 2 of the citizenship order from its sister Article 34 in 
the treaty denied citizenship to those individuals residing abroad.  Article 34 of Lausanne 
used the phrase “native of” to reference former Ottomans whereas the order-in-council used 
“born in Palestine” in reference to the same individuals.  The latter phrase was used due to 
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the recommendation from the Home Office that nationality by birth not be passed on 
indefinitely for former Ottoman subjects residing outside of Palestine.
65
  This change meant 
certain descendants of native Palestinians were not to be ipso facto recognised as citizens.  It 
also meant that the order did not conform with prior policy that gave laissez-passers to 
children born abroad to Palestinian parents.  It contradicted international standards, British 
nationality law, and the 1869 Ottoman law, all of which supported the acquisition of jus 
sanguinis nationality.        
 The non-Ottoman applicants, mainly Jewish immigrants, who wished to be naturalised or 
had received provisional certificates of nationality dated prior to October 1922 were required 
to have been resident in Palestine since that date.  They were obliged to surrender any 
passport or laissez-passer on receipt of citizenship documentation.  It must be remembered 
that the surrender of a passport was a different process from the renunciation of birth-
nationality.  The order required applicants for naturalisation give a formal declaration that 
they would permanently reside in Palestine, to take an oath of allegiance to the government 
and to show proof of an ability to converse in English, Arabic or Hebrew.  Naturalised 
citizens received a certificate of citizenship that entitled them to (unlisted) political rights and 
privileges and subjected them to obligations, duties and liabilities of a Palestinian citizen.
66
 
 While the citizenship order arguably had positive implications for Jewish immigrants, it 
negatively affected the international status of Arab emigrants from Palestine.  The former 
Ottoman nationals who lived outside of Palestine initially had two years to opt for citizenship 
in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne.  High Commissioner Samuel exercised sole 
power to amend the order—and he did so drastically before he left office.  In November 
1925, Samuel pushed forward the date for option of nationality for these non-habitual 
residents.  Rather than give these individuals two years to choose Palestinian citizenship 
beginning 1 August 1925, the two year timeframe for option was put into effect retroactively, 
from 6 August 1924—the date the Treaty of Lausanne came into force.  This change further 
brought the order in line with the Treaty of Lausanne’s Article 34.67  The change affected 
Arabs, Jews and any other former Ottoman native of Palestine; however, Arab Christians and 
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Muslims composed the majority of individuals who lived abroad.  These natives, such as 
students or merchants who resided outside of Palestine in August 1924, had less than one 
year to opt for citizenship.   
 Without any ipso facto nationality, Palestinians resident abroad on 1 August 1924 lost 
Ottoman nationality with the Treaty of Lausanne and were unaccounted for once the 
Citizenship Order-in-Council came into effect in August 1925.  The order’s provisions 
barred these individuals from citizenship unless they returned to Palestine by 1 August 1926.  
Emigrants usually needed a valid provisional certificate of nationality or other proof to show 
that their father was an Ottoman subject, not only to opt for citizenship but to travel.  
Without this documentation, these individuals often could not travel to Palestine to comply 
with the six-month residency period before opting for citizenship.  In places such as Latin 
America, Cuba and Haiti, Palestinian émigrés were hit particularly hard.  They encountered 
difficulties to even receive a travel visa to Palestine to visit family.  Moreover the order-in-
council was not published broadly outside Palestine until at least November 1925.
68
  In mid-
1923, the Foreign Office reported that in the region south of Peru alone, up to six hundred 
Palestinians held a laissez-passer issued the British that identified them as Ottoman 
nationals.
69
   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council, once in effect, offered a local citizenship 
independent of British nationality for Palestinians under the mandate administration.  When 
outside of Palestine, the mandate’s provisions placed these citizens (but not necessarily 
natives) in the position of British-protected persons.  In an odd twist, they were recognised as 
citizens of the Palestine Mandate but in the absence of mandatory consulates, these 
inhabitants came under the same type of protection as did British colonial subjects.  
Citizenship in this sense was not equal to full nationality as far as international law was 
concerned since Palestinians became British-protected persons when outside of the mandated 
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territory.
70
  The postwar situation was unique in that the Treaty of Lausanne created new 
principles of nationality that related to state succession in the Ottoman lands.  For the 
inhabitants of Palestine, the application of the latter principles turned nationals of territories 
detached from Turkey into nationals of the state to which the territory was transferred—an 
entirely new international regulation.   
 Even so, the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council did not grant Palestinian citizens the 
rights they agitated for as citizens: control over their own government, rights to their borders, 
educational affairs, public works, election laws, taxation and tithe rates and trade laws.
71
  
The Permanent Mandates Commission reported in October 1925 that political agitation had 
diminished in Palestine and that the enactment of the Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council 
“should do much to strengthen a sense of Palestinian nationality.”72  As will be seen, the 
Palestine Arab Executive leadership unanimously rejected the proposed legislative and 
advisory councils and the election law.  They disagreed with the citizenship legislation on 
the basis that through these measures the government continued to neglect the natural civil 
and political rights of the Arab population.  Although Great Britain defined how one could 
be granted Palestinian citizenship, the specific rights and protections given to citizens were 
subjects of disagreement.  What was clear however was that the ultimate power to decide on 
the legal status of the Palestinians was claimed by the British government, the mandate 
administration and the leadership of the Zionist Organisation.  These groups refused to 
accept any input from the Palestinian Arabs.  Despite the frustration of the Arab leadership, 
the method and attitudes that shaped Palestinian nationality persisted after the ratification of 
the citizenship order, setting the standard for how future legislation on nationality and 
citizenship would be drafted and implemented.   
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Chapter Three 
Nationality, Citizenship and Rights: Discourses and Practices from the Palestinian 
Perspective, 1918-1925 
 
“Countries with their civil and other rights and privileges are the property of their 
inhabitants and constitute an heirloom of the nation.” 
(Palestinian Arab Executive Committee President Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, to 
British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, 1921) 
 
Introduction 
 
     During the early years of the Palestine Mandate, as described in the previous chapter, 
British colonial and mandate officials together developed an apolitical citizenship for the 
territory’s inhabitants.  These officials did not recognise rights normally associated with 
membership in a modern nation-state, and mandate legislation disassociated Arab nationality 
(jinsiyya) from Palestinian citizenship (muwātana).  Given the complexity of the Palestinian 
and international situations after 1918, the British administration established different 
qualifications for Palestinian nationality and citizenship between Jewish immigrants and 
Palestinian Arab natives.  The ethno-religious determinant was reflective of the support for 
Jewish immigration and a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Provisions of nationality 
reflected the dual administrative structure of the mandate whilst the Zionist Organisation 
influenced legislation on nationality and naturalisation as they affected Jewish immigrants.  
In response, the Palestinian Arab leadership demanded that native Arabs hold an equal status 
and an equal combination of citizenship rights with the Jewish immigrants.  Even before the 
issue of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council, the Arabs framed these demands to the 
British and the League of Nations in terms of natural, civil, political, social and national 
rights.  The current chapter analyses the articulation of the ideas and practices associated 
with these rights from 1918 to 1925. 
     Beginning in 1918, Palestinian Arab leaders and associations presented letters to the 
British and the League of Nations that demanded the right to self-determination and the 
creation of an independent and democratically-elected parliament in Palestine.  In the 
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aftermath of the war, not only were Arab leaders and politically-aware residents hopeful to 
gain autonomy and unity with Syria, they increasingly feared future Zionist immigration and 
land settlement.  To a large extent, the furor over the threat of British and Zionist colonialism 
and the preparations of the Allies to assume administrative control of the Levant gave the 
Arab leaders and the middle-class a greater awareness of their own membership in an Arab 
political community which was specifically Palestinian.  Still, the educated middle-class, 
aware of the genesis of civil and political rights in France and Great Britain, tended to 
assume that the British would offer equal citizenship rights to all inhabitants of Palestine.
1
   
     From this early stage, these educated leaders, who identified ideologically as pan-Arab or 
Palestinian nationalists, articulated the clear contradiction between liberal citizenship as 
legislated in the context of a democracy and colonial citizenship enforced in Britain’s 
overseas possessions.
2
  They framed their demands as a quest for civil and political rights.  I 
differentiate between the traditional, notable (‘ayan) leadership and what I term the middle-
class populist (sha‘bī) leadership.  The latter group supported unity with Syria in the early 
years of the British administration and emerged as an important political actor by the late 
1920s.  These populists used various symbols, slogans and arguments to represent their ideas 
of civic identity.  They advocated for rights with a heavy emphasis on the notion of 
‘primordial’ Arab nationality.  It must be remembered that both leaderships came from the 
same elite, educated socio-economic group in Palestine.  Their discourses were what 
characterised the differences in their discourses as grassroots or populist.  This chapter 
analyses what Palestinian historiography has not yet uncovered: the ways in which the 
Palestinian Arab national movement developed and publicised its own notions of citizenship 
from 1918 to the initial reactions to the citizenship order in 1925.   
     It is necessary to first give a sense of the structure of Palestinian Arab society at the end 
of the war in order to draw out the differences between the British-supported traditional 
notable Arab leaders and the populist, often middle-class anti-mandate leadership.  The 
chapter then offers an analysis of the meaning of Ottoman citizenship and Arab nationality in 
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Greater Syria (Bilād al-Shām) as each concept emerged within the political framework of the 
late nineteenth-century.  Both the ideology and implementation of provisions of nationality 
during that period are connected to broader processes of political and social change, most 
notably the evolution of new power relationships and a fledgling civil society in Greater 
Syria.  The ideology of Arab nationalism propagated by leading Arab intellectuals in Greater 
Syria in the second half of the nineteenth century appeared alongside the new Ottoman 
provisions of nationality.  By the end of the First World War, Arab nationalism provided the 
ideological framework for the articulation of the political aim of national membership in a 
future nation-state.  When the Allies proposed the imposition of the Palestine Mandate, a 
strong, secular and pan-Arab populist movement developed counter-political discussions and 
actions from those politics of the more traditional leadership based in Jerusalem.  A middle-
class stratum of writers, educators, lawyers, civil servants and students assumed leadership 
of this subaltern movement in Palestine.   
 The current chapter uses populism and populist politics as a frame of reference to 
understand how nationalist groups and individuals mobilised under the banner of ‘the nation’ 
or ‘the people’ to express their opposition to what they saw as the enemy, the mandate 
administration.  They viewed the Zionist movement as the lesser problem and one that would 
be solved with the abrogation of the mandate.  Whilst part of the new middle-class, the 
Palestinian Arab populist groups rarely endorsed the pro-British agenda of men such as 
Mufti of Palestine Mohammad Hajj Amin al-Husayni, members of the Jerusalem-based 
political factions of Husayni and Nashashibi family, or the members of the Supreme Muslim 
Council.
3
   
 
Ottoman foundations of nationality and the discourse of ‘rights’ 
 
     Histories on the development of the modern nation-state in the Arab world often posit the 
Tanzimat reforms introduced by the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s as the trigger for the 
                                                   
3 The factionalism of politics in Ottoman Jerusalem and mandate Palestine is linked to what Albert Hourani has 
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ideological formation of national identities.  The history of the modernising reforms in the 
Empire’s provinces is too complex to be analysed here.  In what follows I will concentrate 
on the link between the reforms and the creation of an imperial citizenship.  The Ottoman 
reformers who created this citizenship intended to give an equal, non-religiously defined 
status to all Ottoman subjects.  Historians have discussed the Tanzimat from different 
perspectives, recently as a mission civilisatrice but the issue of Ottoman citizenship in the 
provinces has not been fully explored.
4
   
     The 1839 Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber, issued by Sultan Abdulmecid, is generally 
noted as the start of the reform period.  As a first step, the edict stated the equality of all 
imperial subjects.  The more specific Ottoman Citizenship Law issued in 1869 codified a 
definition of Ottoman citizenship (tabiiyet-i Osmaniye kanunnamesi) without reference to 
religion.  Article 7 of the law stated that all subjects were to be Ottomans without religious 
distinction, and that this nationality could be gained (jus soli and jus sanguinis) or lost 
according to conditions in the law.
5
  As Karen Kern notes, this was a shift from subjecthood 
to citizenship and a unifying measure to cultivate the loyalty of all Ottomans to the central 
government.
6
  According to Kemal Karpat, the wording of the law attempted “to reconcile 
the Ottoman concept of nationality stemming from the millet [religious community] 
experience with the European idea of citizenship.”  The law supported a direct relationship 
between the individual and the state.
7
   
 The reforms triggered important changes in southern Syria. In 1830, just before the 
Egyptian invasion of Syria and Palestine, the Ottoman Porte had redrawn administrative 
districts (sanjaks) in order to better unify the territory.  The sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus, 
and Acre all came under the control of the governor of Acre, an official appointed by 
                                                   
4 Recent works that move away from a rigid nationalist history include Campos, Ottoman Brothers; Selim 
Deringil, “ ‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial 
Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45 (April 2003): 311-342; Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman 
Orientalism,” The American Historical Review (June 2002):768-796; Karen M. Kern, Imperial Citizen: 
Marriage and Citizenship in the Ottoman Frontier Provinces of Iraq (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2011); Karen M. Kern, “Rethinking Ottoman Frontier Policies,” The Arab Studies Journal 15 (Spring 2007): 8-
29; Thompson, Colonial Citizens. 
5 Nawaf A. Salam, “The Emergence of Citizenship in Islamdom,” Arab Law Quarterly 12 (1997): 140. 
6 Kern, “Rethinking Ottoman Frontier Policies,” 8. 
7 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays (Boston: 
Brill, 2002), 640. 
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Istanbul.
8
   After the brief period of Egyptian control of Greater Syria, Ottoman power was 
restored in 1840 and the Empire started to implement administrative reforms.  In 1841, 
Jerusalem became the administrative centre of southern Palestine.  The Empire reorganised 
its vilayets (provinces) into larger units in the 1860s and introduced general provincial 
assemblies and administrative councils alongside appointed governors (valis).  For the 
Ottomans, the importance of the new vilayet administration was that power could be 
centralised and the provinces administered through an appointed official directly controlled 
by Istanbul.  The reorganisation of territory and the new elected provincial councils fostered 
the distinct notion of a separate ‘Syria.’9   
 The administrative changes were conducive to the development of ideas of territorial 
patriotism by Ottoman and Egyptian intellectuals.  Egyptian writer Rifa‘a Badawi al-Tahtawi 
first used the word watan to refer to the fatherland or homeland (influenced by French ideas 
of patrie) as the focus of identity, belonging and duties.
10
  It is argued that the popularisation 
of the concept of watan as a signifier of patriotic identity laid the groundwork for the idea of 
citizenship.  Citizenship became one of several grounds for membership in the changing 
Ottoman political community.
11
 
     There is no better starting point to discuss the genesis of modern liberal discourses of 
nationality and citizenship than the writings of the Syrian scholar and educator Boutrus al-
Bustani who wrote after the intercommunal clashes in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 
1860.  Ussama Makdisi concludes that local debates, such as those started by al-Bustani, on 
the place of secular politics in the Empire as they unfolded in Syria after the clashes fostered 
modern concepts of citizenship.
12
  This is particularly evident in a series of pamphlets 
written and distributed by al-Bustani in support of Ottoman nationalism and Syrian Arab 
                                                   
8 Scholch, Palestine in Transformation, 12.   
9 Ibid., 12-14.  See also a similar argument: Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians Between Ottomanism and 
Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 11 (May 
1980). 
10 Al-Tahtawi was influenced in part by French intellectuals and ideas during his time in Paris in the 1830s.  
Although he held sharia as the highest authority, his writings frequently use the terms for patriotism and 
homeland, hubb al-watan and watan.  He wrote of duties of citizens toward their homeland and of rights of 
freedom for citizens.  See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1983), 78-83. 
11 Salam, “The Emergence of Citizenship,” 141-2. 
12 Ussama Makdisi, “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (Nov. 2002): 601-617. 
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patriotism.  Bustani urged his fellow patriots (abna’ al-watan), primarily other Ottoman 
intellectuals, to actively work toward a secular citizenship that could be “developed, taught, 
and embraced simultaneously at an imperial and local level.”  Importantly, he wrote that 
Syrians were bound together as one nationality (jinsiyya) within the larger Ottoman state.  
He stressed that all Syrian nationals as Ottoman citizens must “sacrifice for the nation” so 
that the Empire could protect the rights of its citizens.
13
  In his pamphlets al-Bustani referred 
to civil rights such as the freedoms of thought and speech.
14
   
 Representation and participatory government began with the introduction of 
administrative and provincial councils in the Tanzimat era.  As discussed in Chapter One, 
citizenship rights develop in modern nation-states through the grant of civil rights, such as 
individual freedoms and land ownership, and of political rights such as the franchise and 
representative decision-making.  Al-Bustani’s writings combined with Ottoman reforms are 
evidence that early ideas of active citizenship developed alongside structures of participatory 
government and civil rights as advocated by political reform.  The Ottoman constitution, 
promulgated in 1876, listed the further rights of Ottoman nationals including a reaffirmation 
that all Ottomans had personal liberties and freedoms.
15
  At the time of the promulgation of 
the constitution, a pamphlet translated from French appeared in Istanbul.  Titled Le Droit des 
gens, the tract popularised the idea of the ‘natural rights’ of men which included elected 
representative democracy.  The appearance of the pamphlet is evidence of the spread of 
western European liberal thought on citizenship rights, natural rights and constitutional 
government in the Ottoman Empire.
16
  As a result of the French Revolution liberal ideas 
reached the Empire and the 1869 citizenship law was a clear reflection of the popularity 
enjoyed by liberalism in official circles.  Michelle Campos notes that Ottoman nationality as 
enshrined in the 1869 law demanded patriotism and love of the homeland as part of a new 
territorial, political and social contract of rights and duties.
17
 
                                                   
13 Ibid., 605-608. 
14 Nafir Suriya 4, 25 Oct. 1860, in Al-Mu‘allam Boutros al-Bustani: Dirāsa wa thā’iq [The Teacher Boutros al-
Bustani: A Study and Documents] (Beirut: Publications de la Revue Fikr, 1981), 121-122. 
15 For the full text of the constitution see “The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated 23 December 1876,” The 
American Journal of International Law 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct. 1908): 367-387. 
16 Salam, “The Emergence of Citizenship,” 144. 
17 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 68-81. 
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     In the years before the First World War Arab intellectuals in the provinces of the Empire 
promoted the transition from passive to active imperial citizenship.  The late Ottoman usage 
of citizenship, however, changed.  Linguistically, the Ottoman and Arabic terms remained 
the same but existed alongside the dominant Arabic term for nationalism, qawmiyya.  The 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 ushered in changes to the meaning of citizenship, framed by 
the nation-building project of the second constitutional era.  As Erol Ülker suggests, the 
policy of Turkification was meant to construct a national, Turkish core to the Empire and the 
Ottomanism that stemmed from the 1869 citizenship law and other reforms was reinterpreted 
in line with the ideology of a dominant Turkish nationality.
18
  Thus nationality came to be 
synthesized with muwātana in the Arabic context.   
     The use of muwātana to refer to a Turkish nationality conflicted with the development of 
jinsiyya in the Greater Syria, and its fusion with qawmiyya.  In Syria, the new middle-class 
of merchants, shop keepers, lawyers, editors, writers, army officers and teachers began to see 
themselves as the vanguard of liberal values, modernity and Arab nationalism.
19
  Their often-
ambiguous, or otherwise not completely defined, claim to ‘rights’ (huquq) voiced in the 
press, civic associations and in the Ottoman representative councils produced a new 
discursive field that placed rights and duties in the context of an Ottoman nation.  
Meanwhile, public gatherings created spaces for the lower classes to join an emerging 
political community and to be exposed to debates surrounding key events like the 1908 
revolution, the parliament, the constitution and the dissolution of the Empire after the First 
World War.   
 
Post-war Palestine and the development of a political community, 1918-1921  
 
     The rise of mass politics in the final years of the Ottoman administration reshaped the 
relationships of power within the Arab political community towards a more horizontal rather 
than vertical structure.  James Gelvin has shown that after 1918 civil society in Syria became 
                                                   
18 Ülker, “Contextualising ‘Turkification’,” 615-616. 
19 Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East, 64. 
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separate from the realm of the state and was prominent over the state.
20
  The press and civic 
associations played a crucial part in the political development of the former Ottoman 
Empire’s Arab provinces.  With the example of Syria in mind, the following section analyses 
the significance of the political and civic community that emerged in Palestine at the end of 
the war in the light of the articulation of new definitions and notions of nationality and 
citizenship rights.  The development of this political community between 1918 and 1920 
depended upon the role played by the middle-class educated leaders in spoiling dominant 
politics.  The populist leaders refused to work as closely with the British as did the leaders in 
the Nashashibi and Husayni factions, and thus the former eventually became better-
positioned to challenge mandate legislation. 
 The main medium through which the parallel nationalist movements communicated was 
undoubtedly the Arabic press, itself an elite medium for political discussions.  Newspaper 
editors and journalists, educated in western-style national schools, were situated firmly in the 
new middle-class.  During this first decade of the mandate, the largest Palestinian Arabic 
newspapers such as Filastīn or al-Difā‘ were linked to one of the two elite factions in 
Jerusalem.  Egypt and Beirut-based newspapers also continued to be imported to Palestine 
after the advent of the civil administration.
21
  Of the several newspapers circulating in 
southern Syria before the war, the most notable was Filastīn, which was founded in Jaffa in 
1911.  Its name is evidence that the concept of Palestine as a geographical location and site 
of political identity had been established in public discourse.  Another newspaper, Haifa’s al-
Karmil, claimed in 1909 that newspapers were dedicated to the service of the people and 
“inform[ed] citizens of their rights and obligations in this country.”22  Fifteen Palestinian 
newspapers appeared in 1908 alone after the Young Turk revolution but the development of 
literacy remained uneven. However, a growth in education contributed to a larger reading 
public in the decades before and after the First World War.
23
   
                                                   
20 James Gelvin, “Demonstrating Communities in Post-Ottoman Syria,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25 
(Summer 1994): 29. 
21 Zachary J. Foster, “Arabness, Turkey and the Palestinian National Imagination in the Eyes of Mir’at al-
Sharq, 1919-1926,” Jerusalem Quarterly 42 (Summer 2010): 64-65. 
22 Mustafa Kabha, The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion, 1929-1939: Writing up a Storm 
(London: Valentine Mitchell, 2007), xv. 
23 Ami Ayalon, Reading Palestine: Printing and literacy, 1900-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 
16.  Ayalon explains that the British used arbitrary sticks to measure literacy, and that a sketchy meaning 
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 The importance of the press cannot be understated: it helped to create public opinion and 
familiarised readers with political discussions, mandate legislation, voting regulations, 
nationalist ideologies and other affairs.  The Palestinian press had a considerable circulation: 
newspapers made their way into the villages where the literate men would read aloud the 
week’s international, regional and local news during public gatherings.  C.A. Bayly has 
called late colonial north India a “literacy aware society.”  This condition certainly applies to 
Palestine soon before and during the interwar era.
24
  The subaltern nationalists formed social 
organisations that set up libraries and night schools that offered reading lessons.  In 1913, the 
editor of Filastīn delivered free copies of his newspaper to many of the villages in the Jaffa 
district to “ ‘teach the peasants their rights.’ ”25  As a result, few inhabitants were left 
completely unaware of the most significant political issues and events.
26
   
 
Nationalist organisations and the concept of rights  
 
     After the British occupation of Palestine in late 1917 the discourse of Arab nationalism 
expanded in opposition to what Palestine’s self-professed nationalists referred to as British 
‘colonialism’ (āsta’mār).  Members of the emerging Palestinian Arab national movement 
presented demands to Great Britain and the League of Nations written in a linguistic style 
replete with references to ‘natural,’ national and civil rights.  The terminology was not 
properly defined but it was influenced by the spread of liberalism and new concepts of self-
determination under the aegis of the nation-state.  This language shaped the ‘national’ 
discursive field that incorporated symbols and rhetoric of nationality and citizenship.  In the 
early 1920s, this discursive field was the domain of the educated classes.  In Palestine, 
political demands for national rights focused on the idea Ottoman nationality had warranted 
that rights be granted to the indigenous population who would then assume administrative 
                                                   
24 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 39. 
25 Ayalon, Reading Palestine, 107. 
26 For example, the Literary Society of Bethlehem sponsored a large demonstration in late February 1920 in 
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and political control over the territory and its people.  This idea legitimised the discourse of 
Palestine’s first, post-war nationalists.27   
     The first political group with nationalist inclinations to form in Palestine was the Muslim 
Christian Association (MCA), established in 1918 in both Jaffa and Jerusalem.  The 
popularity of the MCA was evident in the fact that branches were soon opened by its middle-
class leaders in every major city in Palestine.  With slogans that endorsed Muslim-Christian 
unity, the MCA attracted a large following as a secular and inclusive political association.  
The MCA touted itself in petitions and letters to the British authorities as representative of 
all Palestinian Arabs, and used stamps and a flag that combined ‘Palestinian’ images such as 
the Holy Sepulcher and the Dome of the Rock.
28
  The association was instrumental in 
organising the first Palestinian Arab Congress in early 1919 and continued to convene it in 
the following years.  Members of the congress went on to form the Arab Executive 
Committee (the Executive) of the Palestinian Arab Congress in 1920.  This committee 
assumed the MCA’s role as the representative body of the Palestinian people.  In the name of 
the Palestinian Arabs, it carried out the resolutions of the national congresses which were 
held on a yearly basis until 1924.     
     From 1918, nationalists in Palestine identified as members of the wider community 
(umma) and national movement (al-haraka al-wataniyya) but political allegiances and 
ideologies often shifted.   One large bloc of self-professed nationalists included those who 
adhered to the ideology of Arabism (or pan-Arab nationalism).  These nationalists supported 
a political union of Greater Syria administered through a federal-style system.  However, the 
ideology of pan-Arabism did not influence the politics of the traditional leadership to the 
great extent as it did in the case of the middle-class and younger nationalists.  These pan-
Arab populist leaders, such as intellectuals, writers, lawyers and teachers, mobilised and 
reached out to the population at large, a process which was facilitated by the structure of 
Palestinian society and by the popularity of the press.  As in Syria, Palestinian society had by 
1920 become more horizontal as links were forged between the middle-class and subaltern 
                                                   
27 For more of ideology as a part of communities of discourse and their discursive features, see Robert 
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groups, particularly peasants (fellahin), women and students who had formerly been 
excluded from politics.
29
  For example, the urban intellectuals publicised the perceived threat 
to the fellahin posed by the Zionist project and land issues became topics of discussion in 
national conferences and associations.  Editorials likened all Palestinians to the symbol of the 
farmer as the embodiment of the nation.  Yet the nature of urban-rural relations was 
complex.  Urban notables and absentee landlords often sold collectively-farmed land to the 
Zionists.  Even so, the appeal of mass political involvement came from representations and 
symbols of national unity that obscured the activities of the notables in favour of a 
presentation of nationalism as the means to resist the British administration.  As Gelvin has 
shown in the case of Syria, protests, slogans and public demonstrations which expressed 
unity instilled a civic model of the nation based on the bonds of a common Arab nationality 
and citizenship.
30
   
     Integral to the growth of the nationalist political community in Palestine was the 
transformation of the public sphere.  Nationalist leaders and associations such as the MCA 
and the Executive used the public sphere, including the press, schools, religious institutions 
and other public areas, as a site of civic expression and shows of opposition to the mandate 
and Zionism.  As early as 1918, significant demonstrations and marches took place in the 
urban centres of Jerusalem and Jaffa.  The several written protests addressed to the military 
administration in 1919 can also be understood as active practices of citizenship—in 
particular, written protests were given to British officials during demonstrations.
31
  Local 
popular committees in Palestine’s large towns staged demonstrations and claimed to 
represent the ‘will of the nation’ and to act in order to assert the primacy of civil society 
against the imposition of foreign control.
32
  Similarly, the MCA organised one of the first 
political gatherings in the name of the nation in January and February 1919, the First 
Palestinian Arab Congress.  As delegates attended from all major areas of Palestine the 
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congress claimed to speak on behalf of all Palestinians when it passed resolutions in support 
of independent representative democracy and unity with Syria.
33
  The congress was not 
united politically however: a definite separation existed between the pro-British and the pan-
Arab blocs of delegates especially in terms of tactics necessary to achieve independence.
34
  
The Congress’ demand for unity with Syria represented the break with the political position 
of the dominant factions.   
     This break between strands of political discussion and action sharpened in 1921 when 
British officials appointed the young Hajj Mohammed Amin al-Husayni as the Grand Mufti 
of Jerusalem and as the head of the newly-created Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), a body 
formed by the British to manage Muslim religious affairs.  The appointment of Hajj Amin 
was made on the basis of his willingness to work with Great Britain.  The Mufti and the 
SMC members held the most moderate nationalist views in order to remain on good terms 
with the administrators who paid their salaries.  If anything, the First Palestinian Arab 
Congress and subsequent appointment of Hajj Amin as mufti demonstrates that by the 
beginning of 1921 Palestinian nationalism was developed to a large extent but the nationalist 
movement itself was certainly not a united, anti-British front.   
     The MCA and the Arab Executive of the congresses voiced new demands for ‘rights’ in 
petitions, strikes and boycotts—actions that had been performed in Ottoman times as active 
expressions of citizenship.  Boycotts, for example, were “an echo of a republican 
understanding of citizenship, where every individual has to contribute to the public good” 
and an example of popular participation in politics.  For example, Palestine’s port cities led 
an Empire-wide boycott in 1908 against Austrian and German products to protest the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
35
  Similarly, petitions had long been used by the Arab 
population to address the local Ottoman administration and the central government in 
Istanbul.  In his analysis of the language of petitions from Egyptian peasants in the late 
nineteenth century, John Chalcraft notes that subalterns appealed to “the rule of law and new 
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and old rights” and made use of “the figure of the just ruler.”36  In the case of Palestine, 
petition campaigns, like demonstrations and public meetings, introduced inhabitants to a 
form of direct political participation.  By virtue of their signatures, the “the masses” held a 
stake in their own political affairs and defined their power of negotiation with the 
authorities.
37
   
 
Political nationality  
 
     Discourses of national belonging from the 1910s carried over into the 1920s.  The 
national belonging associated with Arab nationality and later, Palestinian citizenship, were 
linguistically associated with concepts for Arab nationalism which had been common since 
the mid-19
th
 century and which featured in the writings of al-Bustani, al-Tahtawi and others.  
Wataniyya and qawmiyya, which referred to belonging to a sovereign Palestinian nation and 
to a broader Arab nation, respectively, were used in newspapers and statements in 
association with muwātana and jinsiyya.  Into the 1920s, these terms were used 
interchangeably and they were also perhaps picked and chosen to suit certain circumstances 
or audiences.  In Palestine, the early public activities of the pan-Arab nationalists helped to 
create a link between the identity of the Arab population as ‘nationals’ and the need for these 
nationals to demand their ‘natural rights.’  In this atmosphere “a new political public was 
both created and mobilized.”38  For example, on the first anniversary of the British 
occupation of Jaffa, that city’s MCA wrote a letter that stressed the relationship between the 
status of the Arabs and their rights in British-administered Palestine and reminded the British 
that the nationality of the country and its people was Arab.
39
  That relationship between ‘the 
Arab nation’ or an Arab commonwealth nationality, qawmiyya, and rights cropped up 
frequently in newspaper editorials and in letters by local politicians and members of the 
                                                   
36 John Chalcraft, “Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (Aug. 2005): 304-309. 
37 Gelvin, “The Social Origins of Popular Nationalism in Syria,” 648. 
38 Gelvin, Divided Loyalties, 145. 
39 Wathā’iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastīniyya min Awrāq Akram Zu‘aytir, 1918-1939 [Documents of the 
Palestinian National Movement from the Papers of Akram Zu‘aytir] (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 
1979), 7-8. 
92 
 
Executive to the British administration and to the League.  The link made between nation, 
nationality and rights is crucial to the establishment of a politically-aware Arab citizenry.   
     During the military administration of Palestine (until 1920), attempts by writers and MCA 
leaders to explain the text of the Balfour Declaration helped to shape a definition of Arab 
nationality (jinsiyya) and Palestinian citizenship (muwātana) in the public sphere.  An 
editorial published in November 1918 by the newspaper Filastīn tried to define nationality in 
light of the phrase coined by Great Britain, ‘Jewish national home’ (al-watan al-qawmī al-
yahudiyya).  Its writer surmised that the application of nationality in Palestine meant that the 
national status of Arabs and Jews was equal before the law.  The editorial stressed that this 
concept of nationality dated back to the Ottoman period as imperial legislation had conferred 
the same rights to all the Empire’s inhabitants.  The writer expressed fear that this meaning 
of nationality could not be reconciled with the Balfour Declaration and warned British 
officials that the Arab “citizens” would not accept a Palestinian nationality that privileged the 
political standing of the Jewish immigrants within the wider ‘Arab nation.’40   
     The conflation of terminology used in editorials and in statements by the middle-class 
leaders in the Executive is an important element in the analysis of the evolution of 
citizenship in mandate Palestine.  At the end of the nineteenth century, as mentioned in the 
discussion on al-Bustani’s pamphlets, the term jinsiyya came into usage in the Arab 
provinces to denote nationality.  During the mandate period the word referred to nationality 
in the context of a territorial nation-state.  In the late Ottoman era Arab writers used a 
different term for ‘citizen.’  Muwātin was based on the Arabic word watan (homeland) and 
denoted a native as opposed to a foreigner.  Both terms came into more frequent use in the 
interwar years as nationality evolved to connote membership in the Arab nation.  Political 
and civil rights became attached to the status of belonging.
41
  The plural for citizens, 
muwātinīn, was rarely used within Palestine in documents or articles in the early 1920s.  
However, the term is not entirely absent: for example, leaders in the cities of Nablus and 
Tulkarm signed petitions to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference “on behalf of our citizens” 
(nīāba ‘an muwātinīnā).42  
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     The national leadership explained terms like nationality and civil and political rights in a 
rhetorical language through which a large section of the Arab population could easily 
identify.  For example, newspaper articles published in 1919 voiced the complaint that the 
then-military administration gave certain rights to the immigrants as if these immigrants 
were “nationals of Palestine.”  ‘National’ (watanī or qawmī) became equated with ‘native’ 
(ibn al-balad).  These articles utilised a particular rhetoric to refer to Jewish and Zionist 
companies being wrongly granted the right to monopolies for natural resources, contracts 
with the government for land rights, and later, political rights such as suffrage.
43
  Certain 
‘rights’ were thus equated with the Arab population’s native origin in the territory.  Both 
nationalist writers and members of the Executive understood the Arabs as the natives of 
Palestine either by birth or descent.   Both entitled them to nationality and national, civil and 
political rights (huquq midaniyya and huquq siyāsiya).44   
     The symbol of the Arab peasant continued to have a prominent role in the burgeoning 
Palestinian Arab political community as a link to the traditional past and a reminder of the 
threats posed by the Jewish national home policy of Britain.  Local and populist (or 
otherwise non-notable) Arab nationalists challenged the British administration’s failure to 
protect what they explicitly called the citizenship rights of Arab cultivators and peasants.  
Leaders stressed the importance of what they depicted as ‘civil rights’ to land.  For example, 
when the 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance amended the 1910 Ottoman law that had restricted 
land ownership to Ottoman national corporate entities, editorials decried the new threat 
posed to the civil rights of the peasants with regard to land ownership and agricultural 
tenancy on land acquired by foreign Jews.
45
  The amendment meant that Jewish immigrants 
and Zionist entrepreneurs could purchase land in Palestine without holding provisional 
Palestinian nationality, or proving any family attachment to Palestine.  The implication of the 
Land Transfer Ordinance was that the British no longer upheld the customary law that 
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favoured communal land ownership.  As a result, peasants were evicted from the land they 
farmed when they could not produce titles of ownership.
46
  In one particular case in which 
residents of Beisan faced eviction, the Arab lawyer W.F. Boustany pointed out to the 
government in 1922 that the residents were “bona fide citizens” whose “civil rights” must be 
maintained rather than disregarded in pursuit of mandate policy.
47
  Palestinian peasants and 
villagers alike formed their own elected associations to protect their interests as they were 
increasingly drawn into the new political community.  For example, the Nablus Village 
Association in 1920 took on the task of helping the farmer understand that he had the same 
rights as any other Palestinian through the use of pamphlets and village meetings.
48
   
     Since its founding in late 1920, the Executive stressed civil rights in the new language of 
internationalism when rendering appeals against the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish 
national home to the League, Great Britain and the Palestine Administration.  The Executive 
argued that British policy was incompatible with principles of international rights and the 
“natural rights” of the Palestinian people, and that it “violated the sanctity of civil laws.”49  
The Third Palestinian Arab Congress of 1920 stated its goal to achieve “international human 
rights, civil rights, historical and social rights” including representative government in 
Palestine.
50
  Thus the Executive seized upon the growing awareness of not only a rhetoric of 
political nationality but it also illustrated this rhetoric with examples of national, political and 
civil rights that were applicable to both urban and rural Palestinians.    
 
The national movement and the meaning of Palestinian nationality  
 
     Several months after the appointment of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner in mid-
1920, the Arab Executive elected the recently-deposed mayor of Jerusalem Musa Kazim al-
Husayni as its president.  Musa Kazim, who was then in his late sixties, came from the 
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prominent al-Husayni family of Jerusalem.  He opposed the British administration and his 
politics came to be respected by all sectors of Palestinian society.  Until his death in 1934, 
Musa Kazim supported equal civil and political rights for all former Ottoman citizens and he 
was the first Executive leader to question the nationality legislation of 1925.  This section 
traces how leaders like Musa Kazim discussed concepts such as nationality and citizenship 
prior to 1925.  The populist leaders and the traditional politicians understood civil and 
political rights in the same way, based on the rights associated with Ottoman nationality as 
well as their elite education.  Individual leaders and associations used these precedents to 
develop a language of rights which they then demanded the British administration offer to 
the native population of Palestine. 
     As discussed in the previous chapter, the British started to draft a nationality law in 1920, 
two years before the confirmation of the mandates, and after the Treaty of Sèvres set 
provisions for nationality in the former Ottoman lands.  The Zionist Organisation and Chaim 
Weizmann consulted with colonial officials in London and Palestine on citizenship as early 
as 1919 and consequently influenced the drafts of the nationality law.  Although the 
Palestinian Arabs were not granted the same opportunity, Musa Kazim used his position as 
Arab Executive president to question the British administrators on nationality issues.  In a 
letter addressed to British Secretary of State Winston Churchill in 1921, he pointed out that 
before the war, the Jews of Palestine enjoyed all the privileges and rights of citizenship in the 
Ottoman Empire.  Musa Kazim expressed the belief that “countries with their civil and other 
rights and privileges are the property of their inhabitants and constitute an heirloom of the 
nation.”  In other words, he stressed that the native sons of Palestine (abnā’ filastīn) had 
ultimate control over their country but also their affiliation with an Arab qawmiyya 
(nationalism) conveyed that they be granted certain rights and duties.   
     Musa Kazim also questioned the status of the British Jews who served in the Palestine 
administration, such as High Commissioner Samuel.  He asked Churchill whether they were 
Jewish or British nationals, arguing that “it is obvious they cannot be both at the same time.”  
Musa Kazim wondered if “Jew-ism” was in fact a nationality, and if so, he pondered the 
“English-ism” of men like Samuel whilst in Palestine.  It was clear to him that “one –ism 
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must be sacrificed for the other, but which for which?”51  The idea that the Jews constituted 
their own nationality group in Palestine posed a clear problem to the Arab nationalists who 
viewed nationality along ethnic lines.  This conflation of ethnicity and nationality confused 
Arab nationalists who could not understand how the British could confer the same 
Palestinian nationality on Jewish immigrants as they did on the Arabs. 
      
Civil and political rights 
 
     The Balfour Declaration was clearly a milestone in defining debates on rights as it stated 
that ‘nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine’ as a result of the mandate’s national home policy.  In terms 
of civil rights Musa Kazim argued that “they mean nothing more than equality and justice 
before the law and obviously no privilege is contained in this.”  According to him, the civil 
rights of the Palestinians as Ottoman subjects included representation in a parliament, 
provincial government and native councils, as well as Arab employment in the highest 
judicial and civil servant positions, and all the civic freedoms associated with it.
52
   
     Kazim’s statements are illustrative of a particular understanding of civil and political 
rights by some Arab national leaders very early in the British administration of Palestine.  
With the text of the Balfour Declaration in mind, he and his colleagues often accused the 
British of conflating civil rights with religious rights.  Since 1919 the popular nationalists 
started to link nationality (jinsiyya) to various types of rights (huquq), as mentioned in the 
preceding sections.  The development of this language is important because the frequent use 
of the term ‘rights’ was often placed alongside mentions of the national status of the Arabs in 
Palestine.  The Arabic press too traced back these civil and political rights to the Tanzimat 
reforms, the Ottoman Nationality Law and the influence of Western European constitutions 
in the Arab provinces of the former empire.  As Kazim stated to the Colonial Office, such 
rights were inalienable for all citizens and could not be granted or taken away by the 
mandate administration.  He suggested that their mention in the Balfour Declaration should 
have been unnecessary because the nationalist leadership already understood these rights as 
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inherent.  The national leaders made it clear that links of ethnicity (qawmiyya) bound Arabs 
across the Levant, and this ethnicity was the basis of national and inalienable rights in the 
Arab territories under mandate administrations.
53
  Thus, ‘rights’ were clearly perceived in an 
ethno-national sense. 
     Arab local leaders and intellectuals in villages and urban areas contributed to this 
discussion, thus shaping a new ideology of rights.  They wrote editorials or letters for 
newspapers and held meetings under the auspices of a number of civic associations.  For 
example, an editorial in the Jerusalem newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq wondered “what [would 
be] left of our political or civil rights” if the Jews established a national home.54  The rhetoric 
of political and civil rights resonated with the Arab public when linked to Zionism and the 
Balfour Declaration.  In this period, the Palestinian Arab population came to understand civil 
rights as unrestricted access to land ownership, livelihood and the control of immigration and 
the economy of Palestine.  Press reports and the MCA increasingly demanded to the 
government that every Arab in Palestine be granted civil rights to equal employment 
following the Zionist Organisation’s foundational policy of the conquest of labour (kibosh 
avoda).
55
  By the early 1920s, a number of active local leaders (outside Jerusalem) staunchly 
expressed their opposition to the imposition of the mandate, focused their attention on the 
demand for the political right to representative government and argued that an elected 
parliament would allow the Arabs of Palestine control of their country.  These nationalists, 
influenced by their memory of the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, noted that a parliamentary 
system and bill of rights would ensure the rights of the nation’s minorities (huquq aqaliyyāt) 
as well as other political and civil rights for the entire population of Palestine.
56
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Debating nationality  
 
     In 1921 the first Palestinian Arab Delegation (wafd) composed of Arab Executive 
Committee members, including Musa Kazim, traveled to London to meet with Colonial 
Secretary Winston Churchill and colonial officials.  The delegation made known its 
opposition to the decision made by the Allies at the San Remo Conference to award 
mandates over the Arab provinces.  Importantly it also raised the issue of the national status 
of the Jews in Palestine.  This was the first time the leadership directly addressed Great 
Britain on issues of nationality. 
     The Palestinian Arabs were aware of the delegation’s activities as regular reports were 
published in newspapers.  In a conversation between members of the wafd, Churchill and 
Hubert Young of the Middle East Department in London, the delegation’s secretary Shibli 
Jamal questioned Churchill over the plan to establish a national home for the Jews in 
Palestine.  The meaning of ‘national’ in the Balfour Declaration concerned the delegation.  
As mentioned above, the Arabs understood nationality in terms of ethnicity.  Jamal asked if 
what he called ‘the Hebrews [sic]’ became nationals of Palestine by virtue of the Balfour 
Declaration.  At the time of the meeting the draft nationality order was already circulating 
among mandate administrators and Zionist leaders such as Weizmann.  Churchill answered 
that the Jewish immigrants would become Palestinians.  The delegation responded with 
worry about the unconditional nature of nationality and sought assurance that certain 
provisions and requirements would be necessary to acquire nationality or for naturalisation.
57
  
This exchange is telling.  The delegation feared the loss of future sovereignty to immigrants 
on the basis of their ethnic nationality.  In turn, immigrants would become political equals 
with the Arabs and thus threaten Arab control over an independent Palestine.   
     At the time of the delegation’s visit, the Foreign and Colonial Offices and members of the 
League held ongoing debates over the appropriate body able to grant the nationality of 
inhabitants of an international mandate.  Aware of these wider debates, Jamal questioned 
what authority would grant Palestinian nationality.  Young surmised that the British as the 
mandatory would do so, but did not mention provisions for state succession or succession of 
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nationality as detailed in the Treaty of Sèvres.  The officials offered very little information 
on nationality despite the queries of the Palestinian delegation.  In fact, the Palestinian Arabs 
heard about the draft nationality law for the first time in London.  Colonial officials evaded 
the direct question of whether a legislative body in Palestine could have a say in the draft 
nationality law.
58
  At no point did the British government offer to involve the Arab 
leadership in the official discussions of nationality regulations.   
 Shortly after this meeting the delegation sent a report to the president of the League of 
Nations Commission in Geneva.  The report expressed regret that the British did not grant 
the delegation, representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the opportunity to scrutinise the 
provisions to regulate nationality.   The report lamented that the mandate would deprive the 
Palestinians of self-government and noted that the mandatory power did not have the 
authority to prepare a nationality law.  Instead, the delegation argued that “this legislative 
capacity lies within the sphere of the national government set up by the people.”59  After the 
delegation’s trip to London, the Arab members of the Advisory Council (which was 
nominated by High Commissioner Samuel) gained some knowledge of the draft nationality 
order.  The first time that the mandate administration discussed the nationality law with Arab 
political leaders was during a council meeting convened in November 1921.  After hearing 
an illustration of the constitution and nationality laws, council spokesman Turkan Bey 
declared to the British members of the council that it was obvious that the nationality law 
benefited the Zionist immigrants.  He voiced the Arab opposition to the two-year residency 
period required before an individual could be naturalised as a citizen.  He argued (not 
entirely accurately) that in every other country the residency requirement for naturalisation 
was at least five years.  After consultation with the council’s other Arab members, Turkan 
suggested the swift enactment of the nationality law to help Palestinian Arabs who lived 
abroad and had lost Ottoman nationality.
60
  He was the first to express concern for these 
stateless emigrants.   
     The press reports on the activities of the delegation reached a wide audience.  They were 
instrumental in popularising a terminology of civil, political and national rights and 
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nationality.
61
  Editorials and articles put forward alternative interpretations of Palestinian 
nationality.  The English section of the newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq stated in 1921 that the 
question of a “unity of citizenship between the countries of the Arabic world is one of 
paramount importance.”  The editor asked if the mandates’ classification of the Arab world 
under different colonial administrations inherently clashed with such a “unity of citizenship.”  
In answering “[w]e think not,” he went on to stress that the mandates had “absolutely 
nothing to do with questions of nationality or citizenship” and should not attempt to deal 
“with [these] fundamental questions of race, nationality, or citizenship.”  The ideology of a 
common citizenship in the Arab world was presented as a benefit for all Arabs and a 
necessity for the Palestinians.
62
  This ideology appeared in opposition to the Palestinian 
nationality provisions proposed by the British administration as the Palestinian Arabs 
formulated their own definition of nationality.  Writers, alongside the Arab delegation to 
London, were quick to point out that the draft nationality provisions did not mirror those in 
place in the Ottoman provinces since 1869.   
 
The rights and duties of the citizen and the state, and the evolution of citizenship 
practices 
 
     With the advent in 1920 of the civil administration, certain individuals who identified as 
part of the Palestinian national movement began to question the will of the British 
administration to solve the thorny issue of citizenship.  After the delegation failed to gain any 
concessions from colonial officials in London, the more radical, professed nationalists 
advocated the complete abrogation of the mandate and unity with Syria.  These activists 
included local political leaders as well as a number of Executive members.  After the 
delegation returned to Palestine, the ideological clash between the subaltern and the 
dominant political movements deepened and began to fracture the rhetoric of national unity.  
James Gelvin’s work on the rise of mass politics in Syria between 1918 and 1920 again 
provides useful points of comparison.  Social, economic and political changes brought about 
by the mandate system necessitated new local political structures which included the 
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formerly excluded groups.  For example, the middle-class stratum of educated Arabs (as 
opposed to the traditional, wealthy classes close to the Ottoman administration) formed 
political and social organisations open to all to address local concerns such as agricultural 
issues or the creation of more schools.  Through a growth in civic organisations, popular 
committees and populist leaders set about “reconstituting [themselves] as ‘the nation,’ ” 
holding meetings and conferences open to Arabs from throughout the former Syrian 
provinces.  The populist leaders spoke in a grandiose yet powerful and symbolic language.
63
  
In Palestine, these individuals and associations commanded greater grassroots influence than 
did the politicians within the Husayni and Nashashibi factions or the SMC in Jerusalem.   
     This section introduces the ideology of rights and duties articulated by populist leaders 
and organisations, through various approaches, in the years before the citizenship legislation 
came into being in 1925.  It is interesting to note that a colonial paternalism as practiced by 
the French in Syria and Lebanon did not develop in Palestine.  As Elizabeth Thompson has 
argued, the French mandate administration justified their control of Syria and Lebanon by 
their use of an ideology of social relief, not unlike a welfare state.
64
  In the 1920s, the French 
significantly expanded benefits to their colonial citizens, supported by a hierarchy of 
citizenship based on class, religion and location.  In Palestine, the dual system of 
administration limited the role of the British as paternal guardians.
65
   
     Even so, the British constructed an image of democracy in their colonial territories and 
mandates.  In a study on the development of citizenship in colonial Hong Kong, Agnes 
Shuk-Mei Ku criticises the British practice of “governance without democracy” through the 
façade of political rights given to Hong Kong colonial subjects.  Similar arguments can be 
made for mandate Palestine.  In this case Britain sought to give passive (non-political) rights 
to its subjects in order to legitimise its authority.  In Palestine, the proposal for the non-direct 
election by religious community for members of a legislative council that would have no 
power to pass laws illustrates such a practice.  The British used democracy “as a means to 
achieve political legitimacy and state goals,” rather than to foster civic participation and 
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state-building.
66
  Although the stated purpose of the mandate system was to prepare 
inhabitants for self-rule, colonial officials in London were inclined to think that the Arabs 
were not ready for representative government.  Furthermore, representative government 
posed a threat to the Jewish national home policy. 
     Still, notions of republican citizenship which created a symbiotic relationship between the 
population and the mandate are evident in some of the populist rhetoric of Arab rights and 
duties.  For example, members of the Arab Executive in 1921 pressed for Arab communities 
to support or open their own national schools since the administration had failed in its ‘duty’ 
to expand the educational system.  The aim of these schools was to teach young people “how 
to grow up good citizens of Palestine,” similar to the state schools established during the 
Tanzimat era that “[had] in their keeping, the molding of our young, and the training of our 
future citizens.”67  In the early 1920s newspapers published editorials that expanded upon 
these duties, including the need for Arab nationals to demand political rights to 
representation.  The smaller periodicals expressed criticism with both the mandate and the 
traditional leadership.  Some editorials recounted that British officials claimed that the 
people were unfit for democracy.
68
  In response, nationalists such as Filastīn’s editor, ‘Isa al-
‘Isa, encouraged the Palestinian Arabs to make more radical demands against the 
government.
69
  Such demands were termed “sacred” civic duties as some nationalists came to 
view civic activism at a grassroots level as the practical way for Arabs to reach 
independence.
70
   
     The administration’s refusal to acknowledge the Arab Executive, Musa Kazim, or groups 
like the MCA as representative of the Palestinian Arabs triggered an increase in public 
displays of dissatisfaction in the early 1920s.  The Executive and civil society leaders 
launched campaigns to demonstrate the people’s endorsement of the Executive as the official 
representative body of the Palestinian Arabs.
71
  Peaceful protests, letters, and the signing of 
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petitions became widespread markers of civic involvement.  Organisations such as the MCA 
handed notes of protest to British colonial officials whenever they visited cities and towns in 
Palestine.  These organisations also represented local interests and concerns and although 
they worked for national causes, they contributed to the fractured nature of the national 
movement.  While the urban-based Jaffa MCA protested the police action taken against 
unarmed demonstrators or press censorship, nationalists in the rural Galilee demanded that 
the government protect the villages and peasants of Nazareth.  At the same time, the MCA in 
1921 sent a letter to the Colonial Office to report that all classes in “town, village, factory 
and farm” comprised the nation and had the same demands.72  The canvassing of the MCA 
and activists in rural areas was evident.  For example, the Haycraft Commission which was 
sent to Palestine in 1921 to investigate disturbances between Arab and Jewish communities 
reported that the villagers of Tulkarm and elsewhere were “more politically minded than a 
small English country town.”73  The use of civic activism became more evident in 1922 
during the boycott of the elections for the legislative council, which featured widespread 
involvement by urban and rural Palestinians and marked an important step in the 
politicisation of the Arab citizens of Palestine.  
     After the mandate administration published the Electoral Order-in-Council in 1922, it 
became clear to the nationalist leadership that High Commissioner Samuel’s plans for a 
partially-elected legislative council would go ahead despite protests over its non-democratic 
nature.  The leadership decided to focus on an Arab boycott of the elections.  The practice of 
boycotting government-convened committees was not new but it grew in importance as a 
tactic of civil disobedience.  One year earlier, Musa Kazim al-Husayni had convinced the 
Arab members of Samuel’s consultative committee in Jerusalem to boycott its meetings on 
the basis that the Arab Executive alone could discuss constitutional and other matters with 
the British government.
74
  The Fifth Palestinian Arab Congress held in the summer of 1922 
resolved to support the boycott of the Legislative Council elections.  This decision received 
widespread endorsement by nationalist associations who touted the boycott as a civic duty.  
In a statement to the chief secretary in Palestine immediately after the congress, the Nablus 
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MCA argued that the 1922 Electoral Order was based on the terms of the mandate and 
therefore harmful to the nation’s interests.75  The legislative council itself was supposed to 
include, as explained in Chapter Two, twenty-two members: the high commissioner in 
addition to ten other officials along with twelve elected non-officials, of whom at least two 
had to be Christian and two Jewish.  The high commissioners alone could regulate 
immigration, and the members could not pass any ordinance deemed inconsistent with the 
terms of the mandate.
76
 
     The MCA’s claims (published in the press) that the legislative council would threaten the 
civil and political rights of Arab Palestinians prompted a wide, general boycott.  The boycott 
was a testament of the Arab leadership’s displeasure over the lack of political rights and their 
ability to mobilise their communities.  Palestinians were informed of the boycott not only by 
statements of the MCA and Arab Executive in the press but also by village mukhtars at large 
demonstrations and in mosques and churches.  However, neither the Mufti nor the SMC 
supported the boycott—a stance that firmly separated these traditional religious leaders from 
the middle-class activists.  In Jaffa and Jerusalem, the crowds that demonstrated in support of 
the boycott numbered in the thousands.  The elections took place, but out of a planned 809 
secondary electors, only 134 Arabs were actually elected—mainly by Jewish voters.  
Wasserstein refers to the attempt by the government to hold elections as “a fiasco, and . . . a 
humiliating setback for Samuel’s policy.”77  The British could not create a legislative council 
in 1922, and soon after the boycott, seven of ten nominated Arab members of the High 
Commissioner’s Advisory Council withdrew their candidacy.  After the success of the 
boycott, the popular leadership realised the necessity to involve rural and urban classes in 
civic protests and to expand the dialogue of civic rights and duties.   
     After 1922, the middle-class activists began to praise nonviolent tactics of disobedience 
against the mandate administration and referred to such acts as national duties.  Non-
cooperation in the early 1920s demonstrated the effective agency of popular leaders to urge 
fellow Palestinian Arabs to confront the mandate in order for the nation “to achieve its 
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legitimate rights” in association with citizenship.78  At the ever-growing public 
demonstrations, nationalist leaders and associations explicitly stated their intent to exercise 
what they termed as the civil rights of free speech and assembly.  The MCA branches held 
meetings and encouraged the involvement of other groups to explain and publicise such 
tactics throughout Palestine.  As early as 1921, activists touted strikes as an individual civic 
activism in working-class, urban areas.  Upon the return of the Palestinian Arab delegation in 
1922, national groups held the first two-day strike in support of an independent Palestine.  
Nationalist leader Omar Bittar wrote that all classes of people in Palestine went on strike to 
demand their ‘natural right’ (al-haqq al-tabī‘ayyī) of independence. 79   
     The deliberations of the Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress in 1923 included a plan to study 
the effectiveness of a boycott of land and property taxes.  The congress also decided to 
encourage citizens not to associate or work with any Arab who accepted membership to 
British-managed councils.
80
  It resolved to oppose a major concession proposed by the 
government to Zionist leader Pinhas Rutenberg and his electric company as well as any 
future concessions and monopolies.
81
  The congress delegates found that due to the split in 
the national movement the Executive could not enforce general boycotts of the 
administration because men such as the Mufti, members of the SMC and some others 
continued to work with the British.  What boycotts and strikes did do in the early 1920s was 
to raise awareness of practices of civic duty.  These activists depicted such duties as 
instrumental aspects of citizenship in order to force Great Britain to rescind the Balfour 
Declaration and give control of Palestine to the Arabs.
82
   
     The Executive did manage to unite the Arab community in a show of non-cooperation on 
the occasion of Lord Balfour’s visit to Palestine in March 1925.  The Executive declared a 
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general strike throughout Palestine and emphasised that the strike would “instill this 
patriotism to the youngest of our Palestinian Arab citizens.”83  At the same time and for the 
occasion of the visit the editor of Sawt al-Sha‘b, Bethlehem local politician ‘Isa Bandak 
addressed the nationality of the Jewish immigrants who settled in colonies such as Tel Aviv.  
He questioned whether they had ‘true’ Palestinian nationality—as other former Ottoman 
citizens—or if their nationality was simply ‘on paper’ as granted by the British.84  Bandak’s 
editorial raises an interesting point, as he saw the immigrants as having little more than a 
British-granted status that did not require the exercise of civic loyalty to Palestine.  As a 
result of their best efforts to draw attention to the notion of citizenship rights and duties Arab 
nationalists like Bandak and Musa Kazim were not offered a role in advising mandate 
legislation.  The provisions of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council certainly showed an 
absence of Palestinian Arab influence.  The early reactions to the 1925 citizenship order are 
the subject of the final section of this chapter. 
 
The immediate reactions to the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council 
 
     In mid-1925, H.E. Field Marshal Lord Plumer replaced Herbert Samuel as Palestine’s 
high commissioner.  Arabic newspapers were quick to address the issue of nationality since 
changes to the citizenship order came after his term of office began.  One open letter 
published in August 1925 in Sawt al-Sha‘b lamented that a number of Jewish immigrants 
“should never be allowed to become [Palestinian] nationals and citizens.”  The letter pointed 
out that under a national parliament in Palestine, the Arabs would declare that Jewish 
citizens would enjoy equal political rights with the Arabs.
85
  The focus on nationality 
legislation was a new one for the press: in the year before the British government ratified the 
1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council, leaders within Palestine offered few comments 
on nationality legislation but instead focused on national rights.   
     When the changes to the citizenship order were announced in November 1925, bringing it 
in line with the Treaty of Lausanne, newspapers prominently featured articles on the 
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meaning of Palestinian nationality.  The negative impact of these changes on Palestinian 
Arab emigrants brought the issue of citizenship and nationality to the front pages of 
newspapers.  The changes, which gave emigrants less than nine months to return 
permanently to Palestine to opt for their nationality, caused an outcry first from several 
emigrant groups in Latin America.  This is discussed in detail in the next chapter, but it is 
important to note that emigrants’ letters concerning the impact of citizenship legislation were 
published in the Palestinian press.  What follows concentrates on the immediate repercussion 
of the publication of the Citizenship Order-in-Council, enacted on 24 July and in force from 
1 August 1925. 
     The order confirmed what leaders like Musa Kazim had earlier opposed: Jewish 
immigrants would receive Palestinian citizenship with few restrictions.  These immigrants 
received the right to nationality after a short, two-year period of residence.  The Arabic press 
seized on this point of contention and portrayed it as a glaring example of the unfairness of 
the British colonial policy of privileging a foreign group over the native population.  
Newspaper articles noted the ease with which immigrants could become full citizens and 
writers predicted this as the final blow to hope for the cancellation of the Jewish national 
home policy.  Palestinian (provisional) nationality, according to one journalist, “can be 
obtained by every Jew who sets foot in Palestine and this is not an apparent assault on the 
highest of our civil rights?” Harking back to the 1921 delegation to London, articles 
concluded that the denial of the Palestinian voice in nationality legislation stood as another 
example that the British refused to take the rights of the Arabs into account.
86
  
     In the summer of 1925, Mir’at al-Sharq published two articles that questioned the 
meaning of nationality in the context of the mandate and the Jewish national home policy.  In 
the light of the high commissioner’s announcement of the impending publication of the 
citizenship order, the paper argued that contradictions existed between the nationality 
legislation and the meaning of national in the Balfour Declaration and in accordance with the 
Jewish national home policy.  The articles reflected the confusion among the Arab 
                                                   
86 “Al-shaq al-thānī min wa‘d Balfour: huquq al-watanīn al-midaniyya wa al-sīyāsiyya” [The second part of the 
Balfour Declaration: the national civil and political rights], 21 Dec. 1924, Mir’at al-Sharq. 
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nationalists and national bodies over the term ‘national’ (qawmī) in the Declaration.87  As 
previously noted, the Arabs understood ‘national’ in ethnic terms and envisioned themselves 
as part of an ethnic group separate from immigrant Jews.   The London delegation of 1921 
expressed the same view in its meetings with the Colonial Office.  The Declaration 
guaranteed that the Jewish national home would not harm the civil rights of non-Jewish 
communities.  The Palestinian Arabs translated this to mean that the national rights of the 
Arabs and their nationality would be protected.  Thus, the discourse was framed around a 
clash of interest, namely how the citizenship order could grant equal nationality for separate 
ethnicities.   
     Articles published in late 1925 pointed out that the Arabic term for nationality (jinsiyya) 
began to take on a more territorial meaning, more akin to wantaniyya (territorial 
nationalism).  The territorial concept added to the confusion over its explanation in the press.  
This is clear in the following example.  One writer questioned what nationality meant for 
Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, the birthplace of the majority of the immigrants.  He 
claimed that thousands of Jewish people scattered over the world did not all have the same 
nationality in the sense of ethnic affiliation in their different countries.  If these immigrant 
(mainly Orthodox) Jews were to be given a separate Palestinian nationality not on par with 
the Arabs but rather as members of a Jewish national home, then the Arab Palestinians would 
have an unequal status vis-à-vis the Jewish community.  The article also discussed the term 
national and its translation into Western European languages as ‘subject’ (ra‘iyya, from the 
term ‘flock’).88  For the Arabs, the meaning of ‘subject’ was the same as ‘citizen’ in terms of 
being under the jurisdiction of a particular state.  Herein was the difference between national 
and citizen for the Palestinian Arab writers.  While nationality was nearly the same as 
ethnicity, citizenship denoted a status of being under the jurisdiction of a state or 
administration.     
                                                   
87 “Taqrīr al-mandub al-sāmī ‘ain filastīn” [Decisions of the High Commissioner on Palestine], 19 July 1925, 
Mir’at al-Sharq and “Al-watan al-qawmīal-sha‘b al-yahudī” [National home of the Jewish people], 26 July 
1925, Mir’at al-Sharq. 
88 “Taqrīr al-mandub al-sāmī ‘ain filastīn” [Decisions of the High Commissioner on Palestine], 19 July 1925, 
Mir’at al-Sharq.  This conversation came as a response to Colonial Office discussions on whether a Jewish 
national home entitled all Jews to be nationals of that home even if they possessed citizenship of another 
country; see ‘Discussion of citizenship/nationality,’ 1925, CO 733/102/159-160.  
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     The previous article also made an important point about the text of the Balfour 
Declaration.  As the enforcement of the Declaration was not to alter the rights and status 
enjoyed by Jews in other countries, the status of immigrant Jews who became Palestinian 
nationals would not be affected.  They would remain nationals of their country of origin and 
become nationals of Palestine.  The writer asked “whether this text [Balfour Declaration] is 
inconsistent with the phrase ‘Jewish national homeland’ ” in terms of national status.  Would 
nationals of Britain, France or America who were Jewish and settled in Palestine as members 
of the Jewish national home be forced to become Palestinians to the exclusion of their 
original nationality?
89
  The query mirrored questions posed by British statesmen only two 
years’ prior, as discussed in Chapter Two.  The Palestinian Arabs wondered whether all 
Jewish immigrants could hold more than one nationality.  Such questions demonstrate that 
the notions of nationality and nation-state citizenship differed.  Only at the end of July 1925 
did a brief article clarify to readers that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine 
did not mean that ‘Jewish nationality’ would be imposed upon the inhabitants of Palestine.90   
     With the publication of the Citizenship Order-in-Council in the Arabic press and the 
Palestine Gazette (the administration’s official periodical) in September 1925 the Palestinian 
Arabs became familiar with the order’s provisions.  Newspapers published the full text of the 
order but some, such as Tulkarm’s al-Ittihad al-‘Arabī, relegated it to the last page.  Every 
Arabic newspaper titled the legislation as the ‘Nationality Law’ (al-qanun al-jinsiyya or al-
haqq al-jinsiyya) rather than as the Citizenship Order.  In the official Arabic translation of 
the order in the Palestine Gazette, jinsiyya was the term used.
91
   
     Two months after the administration published the citizenship order, the editor of 
Bethlehem’s Sawt al-Sha‘b, ‘Isa Bandak, took on the task of explaining the dangers posed by 
the law.  Bandak had established and edited the newspaper as a weekly since 1922 and until 
1939.  He was a popular politician in Bethlehem, where he founded the city’s Literary Club 
                                                   
89 Ibid. 
90 “Al-watan al-qawmī al-sha‘b al-yahudī” [The national home of the Jewish people], 26 July 1925, Mir’at al-
Sharq. 
91 In fact, the official translation of the order into Arabic also used ‘nationality law’ (qānun al-jinsiyya al-
filastīniyya) rather than translating ‘citizenship order.’  The Arabic-language scientific and legal journal al-
Huquq also used ‘nationality’ (jinsiyya) rather than citizenship (muwātana).  More citations of the terminology 
used in the press are included throughout this chapter and the next.  Mutaz Qafisheh’s work (The International 
Law Foundations of Palestinian Nationality) also notes the translation of nationality rather than citizenship.  
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and another pan-Arab periodical (Bayt Laham).  The Literary Club and the press in 
Bethlehem under Bandak’s supervision devoted much attention to the Palestinian diaspora 
since a large number of emigrants came from Bethlehem and its environs.
92
  Bandak’s 
immediate reactions to the citizenship order, as apparent from the pages of Sawt al-Sha‘b, 
were in fact the first ones to address the emigrants.  In an article titled “The law prejudices 
the rights of the Arabs,” he expressed anger at the harm done by the order to the interests of 
the nation since the legislation did not grant any rights for the Arabs on the basis of 
Palestinian nationality.  First and foremost, he critiqued the reason for the law: Great Britain 
enacted it to facilitate Zionist immigration and meet the terms of the Balfour Declaration 
within the mandate.  The critique fitted in well with the nationalist, anti-Zionist discourse 
and for good reason.  Indeed, the British worked with the Zionist leaders to draft the 
favourable provisions of the order concerning the acquisition of nationality by Jewish 
immigrants.
93
   
     Bandak compared the Palestinian order with citizenship legislation in the United States 
and found that immigrants to America had to meet several provisions, including five years of 
permanent residence, in order to be granted a certificate of legal residency.  He also 
explained to the readers the residency laws throughout Europe and reported—as the Arab 
delegation alluded to in 1921—that all countries required no less than five years of residency 
before an immigrant could apply for citizenship.  Bandak was the first editor to accuse the 
administration of unfairly placing no restrictions on whether Jewish immigrants could live 
full or part-time in Palestine in order to retain their nationality.  The situation, Bandak 
surmised, created “a wide crater in the roof of Palestinian nationality” as it allowed any Jew 
in the world to acquire Palestinian citizenship rights.  His main points all related back to the 
favouritism of Great Britain for the Zionist Organisation’s aims.94  Bandak’s arguments 
echoed those of the Palestinian delegation but the publication of the 1925 order led to the re-
emergence of vocal opposition to British legislation in Palestine.  This opposition to 
                                                   
92 Adnan A. Musallam, “Palestinian Arab Press Developments under British Rule with a Case Study of 
Bethlehem’s Sawt al-Sha‘b 1922-1939,” Bethlehem University Journal 5 (Aug. 1986), 
http://admusallam.bethlehem.edu/bethlehem/Sawt_Al-Shab.htm (accessed 20 Apr. 2012). 
93 “Qānun al-jinsiyya tahīzāt huquq al-‘arab” [The law prejudices the rights of the Arabs], 21 Oct. 1925, Mir’at 
al-Sharq. 
94 Ibid. 
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citizenship provisions was symptomatic of the wider anger against over the lack of 
consultation between the Arabs and the mandate administration.  
     A number of other reasons which triggered Arab opposition to the citizenship provisions 
can be grasped from editorials by Bandak and others.  One reason is the claim that the order 
was detrimental to the country, which was not economically-sound, and that unemployed 
foreign arrivals to Palestine would not be obliged to contribute to the welfare of the country.  
Rather, their loyalties would be to the Jewish national home project.  Furthermore, the 
illegality of the order—since a parliament of elected representatives did not create it—was 
another theme constantly stressed in 1925.  Bandak concluded that the establishment of a 
Jewish national home supported by the nationality order would obstruct Arab national 
control over the country’s resources, allow land to be requisitioned, and deplete Arab 
financial wealth by taking over businesses.  His early efforts to draw attention to the order’s 
dangers included written requests that High Commissioner Plumer form an elected 
representative body which would enact a new law.
95
  These early reactions to the citizenship 
order are also important because of the readership of Arabic periodicals such as Sawt al-
Sha‘b.  This readership included those most impacted by the citizenship order, families of the 
Palestinian Arab diaspora who remained in Palestine.   
 
Conclusion 
 
     For the Arabs, the year 1925 ended on a confused note in relation to the nationality order.  
Although the order was published in Arabic in Palestinian periodicals and in the official 
gazette, the change made to put its timeframe for option for citizenship in line with the 
Treaty of Lausanne in November was not immediately noted by the press.  In December, the 
mandate’s Department of Immigration and Passports issued an official statement to the effect 
that due to difficulties, the department could not accept requests from Palestinians abroad for 
passports and certificates of nationality.
96
  The publication of the provisions of the order that 
effectively denied citizenship to thousands of native born Palestinians who lived abroad 
galvanized the popular leaders.  ‘Isa Bandak and others poured their energy into lobbying the 
                                                   
95Ibid. 
96 “Bālgh rasmī” [Official communication], 19 Dec. 1925, al-Ittihad al-‘Arabī. 
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administration for the repeal of the order and the implementation of new legislation by a 
national assembly. 
     The previous and the current chapter have demonstrated that the concept of citizenship 
and the practices assumed to be connected to it diverged widely between the British colonial 
officials and the Palestinian nationalist leaders and associations.  Members of the latter group 
clearly understood the divergence as early as 1921 when the Arab Executive delegation 
traveled to London and addressed the topic of nationality.  The development of a political 
community in Palestine, due in large part to the beginning of mass political organisation at 
the end of the Ottoman Empire, the formation of a broader civil society and the spread of the 
press, was directly linked to the formation of a particular terminology that incorporated 
symbols and vocabularies of nationality and rights based on Ottoman nationality.  This new 
political public, as this chapter argued, negotiated the meanings of nationality and citizenship 
in the early 1920s in response to the precedent of Ottoman nationality, the mandate’s Jewish 
national home policy and mandate legislation.   
     The term jinsiyya (nationality) was used in writings and discussions by Arab nationalists 
during the time period under study in the current chapter and continued to be favoured over 
muwātana (citizenship).  The reasons for this have been analysed above, and the publication 
of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council in the Arabic press and Palestine’s official gazette 
further standardised the use of the term nationality to refer to the legislation on citizenship.  
However, ‘citizen’ (muwatin) was used in petitions and letters signed by Arab communities 
and forwarded to the administration, Great Britain and the League of Nations.  Editorials and 
printed requests to the Arab population by the Arab Executive and other national bodies, 
referred to the collective Palestinian Arab population in more rhetorical and nationalist 
language as abna’ or ahl Filastīn, sons or people of Palestine, respectively.   
     At the same time, because the Arabs only had unofficial representation and delegations to 
Great Britain and to the Palestine Administration, nationalist leaders were given very little 
information on the draft nationality legislation.  Thus, the reaction to the 1925 Palestine 
Citizenship Order-in-Council was one of confusion and uncertainly on the part of the 
educated Arab middle-class leadership.  In this climate, rumours spread that the mandate 
administration deliberately made citizenship provisions favourable for Jewish immigrants to 
the detriment of the Arab natives.  However, the Executive was limited in its opposition 
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tactics to the proposed nationality provisions.  In the first place, colonial officials denied 
permission to the Arabs to scrutinise the law.  In the interim period between 1921 and the 
order’s publication in 1925, the Executive devoted very little attention to nationality 
legislation as the issue seemed less pressing.  Secondly, the split in the national movement 
rendered it unable to offer a united front against legislation that affected nationality, 
particularly the creation of provisional Palestinian nationality that the immigrants received in 
1922.   The nationalists split over their attitude towards the British administration: some 
traditional leaders refused to work for the abrogation of the mandate, and others opposed the 
British completely.  Yet the opponents of the mandate were unable to force the 
administration to recognise civil and political rights for the Arab population.  Within this 
situation a number of nationalists, from Executive president Musa Kazim al-Husayni to 
Bethlehem’s ‘Isa Bandak, presented alternative definitions of civil rights and citizenship. 
     The development of civic activism and the discussion of rights and duties played a major 
role in this alternative definition of Palestinian citizenship.  Although the activities of the 
Executive body had slowed down considerably by 1925, ordinary Palestinians continued to 
express their ‘national rights’ with tactics that were meant to draw the attention of the 
British.  The successful boycott of the 1922 elections, public demonstrations and petitions 
were important means through which the population expressed a sense of civic activism and 
duty.  That sense of activism and duty can also be attributed to a historical legacy of 
citizenship that went back to the late Ottoman Empire.  A language of civil and political 
rights and duties to the Arab nation was developed during the Tanzimat and continued to 
influence the language of educated Palestinians.  Yet under British control, while the 
understanding of citizenship came from the Ottoman context, new national leaders expanded 
the rhetoric and dialogue of national rights in opposition to the terms of the mandate and the 
Balfour Declaration. The discussion noted throughout the chapter on the links that the Arab 
nationalists made between nationality and nationalism within the Arab nation to the concept 
of political, civil and national rights influenced the Palestinian Arab leadership for the 
entirety of the mandate in light of citizenship questions.   
     In 1922, Mir’at al-Sharq published an editorial that posed the question of what would 
become of the former traditions of the country and whether the British wanted the 
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Palestinians “to forget the honor of their Arab nationality?”97  That anxiety did not disappear 
by 1925, when the Citizenship Order-in-Council provided the mandate administration with 
the legal instrument to define Palestinian citizenship as different from Arab nationality.  This 
differentiation had the most spectacular impact on Palestinian emigrants, particularly those 
who had maintained Ottoman nationality but were unable to return to Palestine immediately 
to claim their new citizenship.  Their plight mobilised nationalists both in Palestine and in 
the diaspora.  The ways in which these appeals separated the meaning of nationality from 
that of citizenship are the subject of the next chapter. 
                                                   
97 “Sīyāsa al-hukuma al-hādara” [Current Government policy], 8 July 1922, Mir’at al-Sharq. 
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Chapter Four 
The Diaspora and the Meaning of Palestinian Citizenship, 1925-1931 
 
“[I]s it justice that allows the government to deprive the Arab natives of Palestine of the 
entitlement to their native nationality which they inherited from parents and 
grandparents while [the government makes] it easy for outsiders to obtain Palestinian 
nationality?” 
28 July 1926, Sawt al-Sha‘b 
 
“There is not a force in this world which can remove our rights [to citizenship] . . . for 
us, it is the blood in our veins and we have the right to nationality and naturalisation in 
the beloved homeland.” 
Society for Palestinian Unity, Mexico, August 1927 
 
Introduction 
 
 In 1927, the British Legation at La Paz in Bolivia rejected the cases of Palestinian Arab 
Sari Ismael and others who applied for Palestinian citizenship under Article 2 of the 1925 
Citizenship Order-in-Council.  The rejection was based on the legation’s assessment that 
they did not intend to return to Palestine because their lengthy absence (seven years in 
Ismael’s case) meant that connections with their native homeland were severed.  In an 
attempt to prove his case, Ismael even produced a laissez-passer from the Military Governor 
of Jerusalem that proved he was in Palestine in 1920.  The legation assumed that the 
applicants were former Ottoman citizens and held Turkish nationality by default given that 
they were not resident in Palestine.  Without a Turkish representative to confirm or deny this, 
the British authorities in Bolivia could not grant visas to these Arabs to reach Palestine.
1
  
They remained in Bolivia stateless as a result of the provisions of the citizenship legislation 
in mandate Palestine.     
                                                   
1 ‘British Legation, La Paz, 8 Apr. 1927,’ CO 733/142/45-46. 
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 In the first half of the 1920s, the British administration of Palestine combined precedents 
of colonial citizenship with British legislation and international regulations to produce a set 
of provisions which effectively created Palestinian citizenship.  As a response to legal 
realities on the ground Palestinian Arabs articulated different ideas of what it meant to be a 
citizen.  Only after the enforcement of the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council did 
clearly-articulated notions of citizenship emerge out of the discursive field of ‘the nation.’  
The primary factor that helped to clarify the meaning of nationality, citizenship and rights in 
the public arena was the situation of Palestinian Arab emigrants.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to show how the question of the emigrants (al-muhajarīn) actively created a space for the 
discussion of citizenship that linked citizenship with the concept of nationality as the Arabs 
of the former Ottoman provinces understood it.
2
  This chapter also sheds light on the new 
role taken by the Palestinian diaspora, or mahjar, after 1925 in the development of 
Palestinian civic identity.  Despite this new civic identity and the subsequent increased 
grievances of emigrants who opposed the citizenship legislation, internal and external factors 
hindered the ability of the mandate administration to resolve these grievances. 
 Two months before the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council was published, a 
Foreign Office official noticed a “possibly incorrect part of Article 2” of the order.  The 
article gave Ottoman subjects born in Palestine and resident abroad just two years to exercise 
the right to claim Palestinian citizenship once the order-in-council came into force in August 
1925.  The problem, as the official noted, was that Article 34 of the Lausanne Treaty 
conflicted with Article 2 of the citizenship order.  Article 34 gave Ottoman nationals (who 
resided abroad) the right to take on the nationality of their successor state within two years 
after the treaty came into effect in August 1924.  The Lausanne Treaty gave these former 
Ottomans until August 1926 to return and to Palestine and take on citizenship, while the 
Citizenship Order-in-Council gave the same individuals until August 1927 to do so.  Former 
Ottoman natives living abroad who wished to acquire Palestinian nationality on the basis of 
their birth were required to return to Palestine six months prior to claiming their status and 
reside in the territory permanently.  If they did not do so, they automatically received 
                                                   
2 For a general discussion on the linkages between the diaspora and the homeland, and the creation of 
discourses of nationalist sentiment, the homeland and nation-building within the diaspora, see Helena Lindholm 
Schulz and Juliane Hammer, The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of identities and politics of homeland 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 10-20. 
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Turkish nationality—although the means through which this took place were not elaborated 
upon—and were required to reside within the boundaries of the new Turkish republic.  The 
Foreign Office ultimately took no policy decision on the conflicting time limits before the 
ratification of the citizenship order-in-council.  It doubted the necessity for an amendment, 
believing it was “unlikely that there will be many applicants falling under Article 2 of the 
Order.”3  Article 2 actually caused many years of controversy, problems and constant 
protests by the Palestinian Arab mahjar and their supporters at home.  The history of this 
controversy, from the beginning of the British administration to 1931, is the subject of the 
current chapter. 
 First, it must be recalled from Chapter Two that the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council 
was indeed modified by the high commissioner four months after its announcement in order 
to bring Article 2 in line with Article 34 of the Lausanne Treaty.  The time period given to 
Ottoman nationals living abroad to opt for Palestinian nationality was shortened from two to 
one year.  Furthermore, because these nationals were required to return to Palestine and 
reside there for six months before they could apply, and had to remain in Palestine as 
permanent residents, they had less than a year to put their affairs in order and return from 
abroad.  Despite the implications of the amendment, the immediate reactions among the 
mahjar communities were quite limited since British consuls failed to publicise the change.  
Most of the Arab population in Palestine was also initially unaware of the consequences of 
the order since Arabs born and resident in Palestine were granted citizenship automatically.  
The earliest reactions to the order can be found in the Arabic press in 1925 when a small 
number of articles started to call attention to some of its provisions.  To understand the role 
of the press, it is necessary to briefly introduce the spread of periodicals in the region and the 
links that the press fostered between the diaspora and the homeland. 
 
Links between the diaspora and the homeland 
 
     The Arab diaspora maintained a connection to Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria) through the 
press.  In the years before 1914, the Syrian diaspora consisted of Arabs from the territories 
                                                   
3 ‘Citizenship Order-in-Council,’ June 1925, CO 733/104/201. 
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that later became Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan.  Those emigrants from 
Palestine who lived in the United States and Latin America received copies of periodicals 
published in Palestine and printed their own newspapers.  Akram Khater writes that between 
1892 and 1907, twenty-one Syrian Arab dailies, weeklies and monthlies appeared in the U.S.  
The Arabic press “flourished as a new medium for the [emigrant] community,” and a 
sizeable percentage of emigrants were exposed to at least one newspaper.  The mahjar press 
published commentary on the political and social situation in the Levant, and was thus 
“important in shaping the way the community looked at itself.”4  Through discussions and 
editorials in newspapers, the diaspora shaped ideas of citizenship as related to Ottoman 
identity and nationality.  At the same time, editors and journalists within Palestine who 
belonged to the educated middle-class nationalist stratum of society corresponded with 
relatives, colleagues and friends in the diaspora and encouraged the emigrants to write letters 
to newspapers.  By 1919, these letters included stories about Palestinian communities abroad 
as well as commentaries on the mandate and Zionism. 
 The connection between these communities and nationalist leaders in Palestine assisted 
the diaspora in crafting its own definition of Palestinian citizenship.  The present chapter 
draws on the argument made by Isin and noted in Chapter One that citizens are actively 
‘made’ through certain practices and expressions of belonging that mark individuals as part 
of the political, social, civic and cultural make-up of a nation.  Citizenship then is 
transformed from an abstract concept to an active and negotiated behaviour.  This chapter 
analyses the ways in which natives who resided outside of the mandate territory were ‘made’ 
into Palestinian citizens in the years before and after the 1925 order-in-council through 
social, political, cultural and symbolic associations shared between the mahjar and the Arab 
population of Palestine.  Before 1925 Palestinians retained their identification with their 
homeland not only through the Arabic press but also as their communities formed mutual aid 
societies and charities, elected leaders for community associations, and supported the 
national movement in Palestine. 
 
 
                                                   
4 Khater, InventingHome, 88-89. 
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The history of the Palestinian diaspora 
 
    The narrative of the Palestinian Arab diaspora is often lumped together with the general 
migration movements from the Levant that began in earnest in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century.
5
  Arabs from the Ottoman province of Greater Syria and the 
Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon began to emigrate in large numbers in those decades.  
From 1860 to 1914, between 600,000 and one million, as estimates vary, Arabic-speaking 
Ottomans born in Greater Syria left for the Americas.  Despite this large number, about one-
third returned home and did not permanently settle abroad.  According to Kemal Karpat, the 
Ottoman government often financed the return and re-settlement of emigrants and only those 
who acquired a foreign nationality lost their Ottoman nationality.
6
  The Americas attracted 
Arab migrants from southern Syria in the late eighteenth century and a large majority of 
these travelers came from the environs of Bethlehem and Jerusalem.  Arabs who intended to 
go to Latin America usually left from the port of Beirut and arrived in Haiti before 
continuing to Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Chile and other places.  By the turn of 
the century, records show that Palestinian communities in the diaspora created clubs and 
associations for cultural exchange, mutual support and to govern their affairs.   
 Immigration to the Americas intensified at the turn of the twentieth century as the 
Ottoman Empire experienced instability, particularly due to continual warfare in its 
European provinces and bankruptcy.  Many young Christian men left in 1914 due to new 
harsh Ottoman recruitment policies for the First World War and the financial opportunities 
offered by settlement in the American republics, as economics seemed to have played a great 
role in migration.  Latin America was particularly attractive due to lenient immigration 
                                                   
5 Specialised studies include Gonzalez’s Dollar, Dove, and Eagle; Marin-Guzman, A Century of Palestinian 
Immigration into Central America; Foroohar, “Palestinians in Central America;” and work by Adnan Musallam 
on Bethlehem’s emigrants.  Jacob Norris has written about Ottoman-era migration of Christian Palestinians to 
Latin America, the U.S. and Russia in the sale of holy land artifacts such as olive wood and mother-of-pearl 
carvings.  See Jacob Norris, Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development (Oxford: 
University Press, 2013). 
6 See Civantos, Between Argentines and Arabs, 7.  Civantos notes the problem of accurate records of 
immigrants due to illegal entries and departures, and non-standardised terms to record the immigrants’ origins; 
Karpat, “The Ottoman Emigration to the America.”  Karpat’s study is one of the most widely-cited, but it must 
be noted that Arabs immigrated to places other than the Americas during the Ottoman and post-war period, 
including Russia, the Philippines and throughout west Africa.  It must be remembered that emigration took 
place between the ‘global south’ or ‘third world,’ and not exclusively from the third world to the ‘first world.’ 
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policies of states such as Honduras and Brazil.
7
  Emigrants from both urban and rural areas 
of Syria took up work in business and commerce.  Some of them arrived to the Americas 
with enough capital to set up their own businesses.  
 Like the Ottoman Empire’s provinces, the former colonial territories of Latin America 
had recently achieved independence and were often sites of both nationalist movements and 
conflict.  Tensions between socialist reformers and military-based dictatorships turned 
violent in certain republics in the 1910s and 1920s.  Some governments such as that of Haiti 
did not maintain relations with the Ottoman Empire and anti-Arab sentiment was common.
8
  
The situation also meant that in Central and South America emigrants were more exposed to 
anti-colonial ideologies given the recent history of these countries.  With the end of the First 
World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs lost consular and 
diplomatic protection since their documentary identity as Ottoman nationals ceased to be 
internationally acceptable.  The British were reluctant to offer diplomatic protection to 
Palestinian Arabs or other Syrians who resided abroad.  It is in this international context and 
in the political system of newly-created nation states across the globe that the discussions 
and definitions of Palestinian nationality and citizenship can be situated.   
 
The Palestinian Arab mahjar and civic identity, 1918-1925 
 
 From the onset of the British administration of Palestine, the Arab emigrants confronted 
many practical problems.  Their loss of Ottoman nationality meant they did not have valid 
passports or claims to consular protection.  They were also denied entry to Palestine, and 
could not take part in future elections although some of them had retained land and property 
there, and paid taxes to the government.  It is in this situation that the emigrants of the 
mahjar appropriated the rhetoric of rights and duties of republican citizenship, embracing the 
concept that they had a duty to participate in political decision-making in Palestine.  From 
the start of the British military occupation in 1918 these Arabs identified themselves as 
‘Palestinians’ in letters of protest sent to the military government and to newspapers in 
                                                   
7 Gonzalez, Dollar, Dove, and Eagle, 25-28.  
8 For more on the situation of Arabs in Haiti in the pre-war years, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, “Race, 
Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean: The Syrians in Haiti, 1903-1934,” The International History Review 3 
(Oct. 1981): 520-521. 
121 
 
Palestine.  This section explores when and how the emigrants acquired awareness as 
Palestinian citizens.  It also shows how civil society organisations facilitated strong links 
between the diaspora and those Arabs in Palestine who identified themselves as nationalists.  
The civil society linkages formed within diaspora communities became the most important 
conduits for political and civic identity acculturation.  This civic awareness is partly 
measured through an analysis of the changing rhetoric displayed by their demands to the 
British administration of Palestine, the League of Nations and the Foreign and Colonial 
offices from 1918 to 1925.   
 
The growth of civic awareness in the diaspora   
 
 A clear theme in the earliest correspondence between the diaspora communities and 
individuals and nationalist organisations in Palestine such as the Muslim Christian 
Association (MCA) and the Arab Executive was the idea that the Palestinians formed part of 
a larger Arab nation.  That Arab nation, as detailed in Chapter Three, was based on the 
awareness of a common ethnicity.  This was evident to Palestinians who resided far away 
from their homeland.  Since 1919, with the advent of national associations that advocated the 
abrogation of the Jewish national home policy, groups and individuals in Palestine began to 
refer to themselves as sons of Palestine (abnā’ filastīn).  Newspapers and the activities of 
benevolent associations allowed those emigrants who left in the nineteenth or early twentieth 
century to remain connected to events in Palestine.  These émigré associations took their cue 
from earlier religious or mutual aid societies but developed a marked nationalist outlook.  
The diaspora had long included individuals who were conscious of identity politics and 
patriotism.  Intellectuals such as journalists, editors and political activists as well as ordinary 
men and women formed their own national clubs in the diaspora.
9
  Once the alarming news 
of the terms of the war settlement and the perceived threat of the Jewish national home 
policy reached these communities, their organisations became increasingly political in 
nature.   
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 Throughout 1918, numerous clubs sent letters and signed petitions to the MCA in 
Palestine, Emir Faisal in Damascus, King George V, the military administration in Palestine, 
and the League of Nations to express their support for an independent Syrian nation and their 
opposition to the Balfour Declaration.  Petition-writers usually identified themselves as part 
of ‘the Palestinian Colony’ of their host country.  For example, in November 1918, the 
Palestinian community of San Salvador signed a protest addressed to King George V that 
stated its opposition to the Zionist ambitions in Palestine.  Significantly, they signed the 
protest as ‘the Palestinians’ suggesting that in only a short period of time the community’s 
awareness changed from that of Syrian Arab to specifically Palestinian.   
 This shift in identity that was partly prompted by the British occupation of the territory 
that became the Palestine Mandate led diaspora communities to question their national 
allegiances.  Alongside the assertion of their growing recognition of a political identity as a 
group, emigrants expressed new concerns for their status vis-à-vis Great Britain.  In 1919 the 
signatories of a letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George asked if the Palestinian Arabs came 
under the diplomatic protection of Great Britain.
10
  The correspondence sent by Palestinian 
colonies urged the British to protect Arab ‘national rights.’  Meanwhile, the San Salvador 
community wrote to the American President Woodrow Wilson during the Paris Peace 
Conference asking for his help to protect the diaspora.  The letters used the rhetoric 
popularised by the League of Nations and by President Wilson that publicised the role of the 
Allied powers as the protectors of the rights of the smaller nations.
11
   
 Indeed, the same language of natural, national and civic rights was used by Arab 
nationalist leaders and associations based in Palestine.  Their counterparts in the diaspora 
became more attuned to the idea of a Palestinian civic identity, shared with the inhabitants of 
the territory, through rhetorical expressions of political rights and duties as opposed to 
equating Arab nationality with Palestinian citizenship.  By the early 1920s, the émigré 
organisations had started to voice the idea of national ‘duties’ as an important element in the 
definition of modern civic identity.  These organisations acted not only as communal spaces 
that offered support and assistance to emigrants from the same parts of Palestine, but also 
supported Palestinians at home.  For example, in 1925 a Palestinian based in the U.S. sent a 
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note to the Mufti of Jerusalem during the Syrian revolt and signed it as “a loyal citizen.”  
Framing his request as a Palestinian civic duty, he asked for ten victims of the violence in 
Damascus to be sent to live with his parents near Ramallah at his own expense.
12
  A number 
of clubs in places like San Salvador and Monterrey sent money to help the poor and needy of 
Bethlehem and other Palestinian towns and villages.  The emigrants discussed political 
duties as well and elected representatives in their societies.  For instance, Palestinians in El 
Salto, Mexico publicised elections for their local society by stating that the society was 
committed to continue the defense of Palestinian rights from abroad.
13
  Furthermore, the 
Palestine Renaissance Society in New York appealed in 1923 for continued support of the 
jihad (struggle) against colonialism in Palestine.  The use of the term ‘jihad’ mirrored the 
rhetoric used in Palestine by the MCA, Arab Executive and in newspaper articles, and it 
contributed to the horizontal acculturation of a specifically Palestinian civic identity.
14
 
 Prior to the publication of the Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council in 1925, 
newspapers, national congresses and delegations to London did not pay particularly close 
attention to the status of the emigrants.  The middle-class Arab nationalists initially viewed 
the diaspora as a branch of the national movement opposed to the Zionist policy of the 
British administration.  In the years before the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924, 
the mandate administration had not yet differentiated between residents abroad and 
permanent residents, and thus emigrants who kept Ottoman nationality faced no explicit 
threat to their international status.  Rather, the Palestinian press published letters and 
commentary from the general public that described the nationalism of their brothers in the 
diaspora and pleaded for their return home to serve the nation.  In 1920, one such letter 
concluded that since the administration claimed the country could accommodate a large 
number of new (Jewish) inhabitants, the emigrants should try to return home.
15
  Only once 
the Lausanne Treaty and the citizenship order provisions began to have a negative impact on 
the legal status of the emigrants did the nationalists in Palestine focus their attention on the 
Arab diaspora. 
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The emigrants and British policies   
 
 By the mid-1920s the emigrants’ difficulties with regard to travel and identification 
became clear to their families in Palestine.  Individuals who wished to return to Palestine or 
to travel outside their host country needed a passport or laissez-passer as verification of their 
identity.  In order to receive temporary travel documents, they needed to prove that they were 
born in Palestine and had been Ottoman nationals.  The inability of many to produce such 
documentation is evidenced in letters sent to newspapers in Palestine.  The problem was 
mentioned as early as September 1920 when an editorial in Jerusalem’s Mir’at al-Sharq 
criticised the hesitation of the immigration department of the civil administration to assist 
travelers or to approve their applications for travel documents.  It also condemned the failure 
of the authorities to provide necessary facilities for Palestinians in transit.
16
   
 At that time, British consuls had little idea of how to treat Palestinians who lived abroad 
but retained Ottoman nationality and identity documents.  By the latter half of 1922 the 
Colonial Office reported several cases that attested to the confusion of consuls.  The District 
Officer in Bethlehem received a letter from a native of that town describing how a British 
consul refused his application for a passport in order to leave South America to return to 
Palestine.  The author explained that he was forced to apply for a French passport as an 
Ottoman national born in Syria, and traveled to Palestine with it.  Shortly after, a Palestinian 
in Chile wrote a letter to his mother and explained that he too was unable to leave Chile for 
Palestine on British travel documents and instead received a passport from the French 
consul.  In a third case, the British consul in Mexico stated that he had no instructions to 
issue passports to Palestinians.
17
   
 Although Palestinian emigrants and travelers voiced their grievances to the mandate 
authorities and to newspapers they received little assistance as the international position of 
Palestine before 1922 remained ambiguous.  After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 
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1918, many emigrants expressed their desire to be under British protection.  The question of 
diplomatic protection came to the fore in 1924 when revolutionary violence broke out in 
Honduras, a country then home to a large Palestinian community.  A number of military-
backed coups and uprisings took place against the government after the 1919 civil war.  The 
country’s second civil war that broke out in 1924 led to over 5,000 deaths and the destruction 
of millions of dollars’ worth of property.  The Palestinian community in La Ceiba was 
directly affected.  Its members reported that all of their shops and homes were damaged or 
destroyed in “the guerilla insurgency of the country.”  The threat to the Palestinian Arabs 
combined with the assumption of the community as constituted of Palestinian citizens led 
inhabitants to appeal to British consular officials in Honduras.  However, the community 
received no financial or political assistance from the consuls and found that Great Britain 
expressed no interest in providing diplomatic protection to the native Palestinians.  
Community members addressed the British government through letters sent to the press in 
Palestine, arguing that the “international and humanitarian duty of the English state [was] to 
defend the rights of the natives of Palestine who have no one to defend them.”18  They wrote 
to the mandate administration and the League of Nations that the duty of the British 
government was to protect and assist individuals from the territories it administered.  As a 
result, the Palestinians asked the League to put pressure on Great Britain to extend its 
protection to the Palestinians living abroad.   
 Back in Palestine, Bethlehem’s newspaper Sawt al-Sha‘b commenting on the events in 
Honduras, stated that Great Britain had a role in the protection of all Palestinian citizens.
19
  
The Arabic press in Palestine identified the emigrants as British subjects, which further 
reinforced the way the emigrants viewed themselves as citizens of the mandate.  It came as a 
surprise to Arab observers when Great Britain did not offer to support the Palestinians who 
demanded compensation from the Honduran government.
20
  When a similar situation 
evolved in Brazil after the August 1924 uprisings, Sawt al-Sha‘b stressed the British 
responsibility to protect Palestinian lives and property and to safeguard the rights of “the 
citizens” in the diaspora.  The threats faced by emigrants in Latin America led to the 
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placement of discussions on the meaning of Palestinian nationality squarely on the front 
pages of newspapers, which stressed the citizenship of these emigrant Palestinian Arabs with 
increasing frequency.
21
 
 The problems the emigrants faced in terms of both consular protection and re-entry to 
Palestine remained unsolved by the end of 1924.  Members of the diaspora, the press in 
Palestine, and national leaders juxtaposed the rights of Arab emigrants with those of their 
Jewish counterparts.  Journalists and local leaders found it difficult to accept the denial by 
the mandate administration to allow emigrants to return to Palestine.  Press reports explained 
to readers that elsewhere in the world individuals were not forbidden to return to their 
homelands simply because they temporarily resided elsewhere.  One writer, arguing that the 
purpose of the newspaper is to enlighten and guide the people to their rights, instructed 
Palestinian emigrants to report to their nearest British consul to prove their Ottoman 
nationality in order to receive travel papers.  This example demonstrates that the press did 
not only serve as a medium for the acculturation of national identity for the emigrants but it 
actively addressed and attempted to alleviate their problems with the administration.  It also 
provided useful information not circulated by British consuls, such as that if a consul was not 
satisfied with the documents possessed by an emigrant, relatives in Palestine could request 
that the administration allow that emigrant to enter mandate territory.
22
   
 In late 1924 before the final drafts of the nationality order became known to Palestinian 
leaders, some writers published articles detailing what they knew about the situation of the 
emigrants in terms of consular protection and documentary identity.  A common theme in 
Jerusalem’s newspapers was the contrast between the refusal by the mandate administration 
to recognise the nationality of the Arab emigrants as Palestinian and the facilities available 
for every Jewish immigrant to obtain provisional Palestinian nationality.  One Arab writer 
asked if such provisions were “not an apparent assault on the highest of our rights.”23  Prior 
to the issue of the citizenship order, nationalist journalists and activists viewed the emigrants 
not as former Ottomans (the British classification of these individuals) but as Palestinian 
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natives entitled to the same status as any other Arab born in Palestine.  Yet the mandate 
administration in connection with the Honduras affair instructed British consuls in 1925 not 
to grant nationality certificates to non-permanent residents of Palestine.
24
   
 The Foreign Office failed to apply this policy in a uniform manner as suggested by the 
case of Palestinian textile merchants normally resident in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  In the early 
summer of 1925 they requested certificates to enable them to travel as Palestinians to Great 
Britain and the U.S. for business purposes.  Initially, the Foreign Office allowed for travel on 
the basis of their Ottoman nationality but warned that no further protection could be given by 
British consulates until the merchants could prove that they held Palestinian citizenship.  One 
Palestinian merchant in Port-au-Prince expressed the feeling of the victimisation of 
Palestinians who worked abroad with no identity documents.   He argued that the Jewish 
national home policy was “an attempt . . . to force [Arabs] to surrender their Palestinian 
citizenship,” adding that provisional certificates of nationality posed practical problems in 
that they did not guarantee diplomatic protection.
25
  The British administration made clear its 
opposition to granting Palestinian provisional nationality to individuals deemed to want that 
status only in order to receive the protection of Great Britain.   
 The claims by Palestinians in Honduras remained unresolved by the end of 1925.  The 
British Foreign Office stood by one particular office circular that stated Arabs could not 
claim British protection unless they had proof of Palestinian citizenship.  Natives in consular 
districts could only obtain Palestinian citizenship under Article 2 or 4 of the Citizenship 
Order-in-Council.  They had to prove their birth in Palestine, be over the age of eighteen and 
possess Turkish (meaning Ottoman) nationality on 1 August 1925 while resident abroad.  As 
explained in the citizenship order, to claim their right of nationality these individuals were 
required to proceed to Palestine to comply with the residence provision.  Yet, Palestinians 
living in Honduras and elsewhere could not easily travel to Palestine to claim their 
citizenship.  To enter Palestine, emigrants had to possess emergency certificates in place of a 
visa approved by the Chief Secretary of the Permit Section of the Palestine Government.  
According to the government, any unapproved applicant who opted for citizenship and 
presented himself to the mandate immigration authorities “should not be treated as a 
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Palestinian citizen.”26  Meanwhile in Great Britain, the Foreign Office decided that every 
applicant must demonstrate that it would be “reasonable and proper for him to be under 
British rather than Turkish protection.”27  Such a subjective policy placed yet another 
obstacle before the emigrants. 
 The impact of British policies concerning the nationality of native Palestinians living 
outside of Palestine was as negative as it was unclear.  Between 1918 and 1925, the 
confusion grew as to the proper international status of the emigrants, to whom these Arabs 
could turn to for consular assistance, and how to travel with invalid Ottoman documents.  As 
British officials drafted nationality legislation for Palestine, the practical impact of their 
legislation upon the émigré communities was not thoroughly considered.  Mandate officials 
were also somewhat oblivious of that fact that the members of diaspora communities 
believed themselves to be citizens of Palestine.  In the years before 1925 in spite of the 
distance that separated the mahjar from the mashriq, the émigré communities quickly 
grasped the awareness of a specifically Palestinian civic identity.  However, the citizenship 
legislation introduced in 1925 was in conflict with their definition of civic Palestinian 
nationality. 
 
Nationality as citizenship: discourses and practices in the diaspora and at home, 1925-
1931 
 
 Once the provisions of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council became known, the denial 
of jus sanguinis citizenship to Arab emigrants became a fully-fledged national story in 
Palestine.  In letters to friends, family, newspaper editors and the mandate administration, 
emigrants criticised the administration’s failure to grant them ipso facto citizenship.  
Importantly, in their arguments they depicted nationality as a right clearly connected to birth 
in Palestine and Arab ethnicity.  In often strong language, some emigrants argued the 
citizenship order was tantamount to the removal of Arab ethnicity from Palestine, a notion 
that newspapers picked up fairly quickly.  The following section analyses how Palestinian 
emigrants linked Ottoman nationality with Palestinian citizenship after 1925.  The debates 
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over the situation of the emigrants then triggered a particular discussion and demand for 
what the emigrants and their supporters termed ‘the right to return.’  It is important to 
analyse the history of these discussions and debates alongside the activities with which the 
emigrants associated their quest for citizenship such as joining clubs and charities and 
demanding political representation through protest letters, petitions and delegations to British 
consulates.   
 
The diaspora and connections with civil society in Palestine 
 
 By the middle of 1926 ‘Isa Bandak, the populist, anti-mandate editor of Bethlehem’s Sawt 
al-Sha‘b, wrote that no less than 20,000 Palestinian Arabs living or travelling abroad had no 
one to defend their interests.  Since they did not have recognised nationality documents, 
these Arabs could not seek consular protection anywhere.
28
  Bandak, like others such as Arab 
Executive president Musa Kazim al-Husayni, a number of middle-class nationalists, and 
diaspora associations, were baffled by the situation.  They found it difficult to reconcile their 
idea of citizenship as based on nationality with the definition of Palestinian citizenship 
provided by the 1925 Order-in-Council.  To these nationalist leaders and groups, it seemed 
natural that the thousands of emigrants had kept their Ottoman nationality and thus would 
receive Palestinian citizenship on the basis of that former nationality.     
 The pages of Sawt al-Sha‘b by early 1926 contained numerous explanations for the 
restrictions created by the citizenship order.  The newspaper’s articles expressed the growing 
fear that the order constituted a ploy to increase Jewish immigration.  With the expiration of 
the citizenship order’s retroactive two-year timeframe in August 1926, Bandak confronted 
the administration in his editorials over the limited measures taken to facilitate the 
naturalisation of Ottoman subjects absent from their homes in August 1924, and of those 
whose applications had been refused.  He wondered if orders had been uniformly distributed 
to all British consuls and whether the orders were intended to deprive emigrants from “the 
right to return (haqq al-‘awda) to their country and enjoy [British] political and consular 
protection.”  Bandak urged action: he implored the emigrants “to rush off to the [British] 
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consul to review the means for understanding nationality” and to write back to families 
detailing the obstacles they faced.
29
  He stressed that emigrants should not lose their ‘right’ 
to citizenship (haqq al-jinsiyya) and reported that many emigrants failed to register as 
Ottoman nationals in British consulates.  He urged them to notify consuls that they were 
Palestinian natives.
30
  Thus, Bandak’s newspaper set in motion a discourse that blamed Great 
Britain for deliberate discrimination against the Arabs in favour of their support for the aims 
of the Zionist Organisation in Palestine. 
 Bandak’s efforts to bring attention to the citizenship order’s provisions made headway 
among Arab communities in Latin America.  This is probably due to Bandak’s outspoken 
presence in Bethlehem, a town that had been a historical centre of migration and which 
retained a strong connection with émigré communities.  New social organisations such as 
youth, sport and local patriotic clubs played a role as well in that members explained the 
situation of the emigrants to interested individuals.  In the place of the weakened Arab 
Executive, local leaders and residents lobbied the mandate government to extend the August 
1926 deadline set to apply for citizenship.  Like Bandak, these lobbyists came primarily from 
the area around Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah, and they used their position as middle-
class nationalists—newspaper editors, municipal council leaders, lawyers, and members of 
prominent families—to publicise the situation of the diaspora in meetings of local social, 
political and religious organisations.  These local leaders closely scrutinised citizenship 
legislation in both Great Britain and in Palestine and they appealed to the rest of the 
population through manifestos and open letters.   
 Among the Arabic periodicals, it was Sawt al-Sha‘b that solicited the largest number of 
letters from Palestinians in the Republic of El Salvador, Honduras and Brazil throughout 
1926.  The Palestinian community in El Salvador had especially strong ties to Bethlehem.  
The author of one of these letters noted that emigrants from Bethlehem did not want to go 
through the process of naturalisation in other countries.  Instead, they wanted their “rightful 
nationality” automatically confirmed.  He added that the British consul refused to give 
citizenship documents to the children of Palestinian residents of El Salvador on the pretext 
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that they were natives of their country of birth—El Salvador.31  Another letter stressed that 
“[one] does not lose nationality” as the Ottoman nationality law provided for the 
transmission of nationality through descent.
32
  This letter is yet another example of the 
Arabs’ expectations that mandate citizenship legislation would be in line with familiar 
Ottoman precedents.     
 Other newspapers took the lead from Bandak and referred to his editorials on the 
citizenship order and printed letters from the diaspora.  Articles, often on the front pages, 
urged citizens to hold meetings and study the citizenship law, its implications for emigrants, 
and to review the orders to consuls circulated by the Foreign Office in London.  In mid-May 
1926, the Bethlehem Nationalist Society planned to hold a meeting with the ‘ayan (notables) 
and mukhtars (village leaders) of Jerusalem municipality in order to discuss the status and 
treatment of children born outside of Palestine.
33
  Bandak and other local leaders then wrote 
open letters to High Commissioner Plumer which newspapers then published.  This dialogue 
between the press, the emigrants and nationalists in Palestine reinforced ideas of ethno-
nationality as it developed in relation to jus sanguinis rights to citizenship and in opposition 
to the colonial-style citizenship imposed by the mandate administration.   
 As the press and political and social organisations received letters from emigrants, a 
number of assumptions associated with provisions of the citizenship order came to the fore.  
The most common to emerge was, as noted previously, the British favouritism for Jewish 
immigration to Palestine.  One journalist wrote that the Palestine Government realised the 
Jews were not applying in large numbers for Palestinian nationality because of their lack of 
confidence in the national homeland.  He claimed that in response, “the English put in place 
a deliberately strange plan which is more evidence of favouritism toward the Jews and their 
interests.”  As part of that strange plan, he continued, the administration allowed for 
immigrants to unofficially hold dual nationality.
34
  The accusation of favouritism had a 
profound impact on Arab society, which had been inundated with anti-Zionist propaganda.  
The citizenship legislation was touted as hard proof of a future political takeover of the 
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mandate by the Zionist leaders.  The press also noted the irony of the policy that restricted 
any stateless former Ottoman national from Palestinian citizenship if he held another 
nationality, whereas Jewish immigrants could hold dual nationality.   
 Another theme stressed in light of the emigrants’ situation was that of colonial ‘injustice’ 
embodied by the citizenship order.  One writer asked whether justice meant that “the 
government [can] deprive the Arab natives of Palestine the entitlement to their native 
nationality . . . [of] parents and grandparents while [the government makes] it easy for 
outsiders to obtain Palestinian nationality?”  The sensational and outraged tone of many 
letters sometimes warranted responses from officials in Palestine and Great Britain.  Sawt al-
Sha‘b printed these replies as well.  In one response, the Colonial Secretary expressed 
confidence that a large segment of the diaspora undoubtedly applied for nationality in the 
time allotted to do so.  As the press pointed out, and as records demonstrate, the mandate did 
not publish estimates of the number of emigrants who returned to Palestine to claim 
citizenship.
35
     
 
The diaspora and the right to return 
 
 The public assertion that Ottoman nationality translated into Palestinian citizenship struck 
a chord with members of the Arab Executive as well as with local populist leaders like ‘Isa 
Bandak.  Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, president of the Executive, first met Colonial 
Secretary Leopold Amery in the summer of 1926 to discuss the issues of consular protection 
and the status of Palestinians abroad.  During the meeting, Musa Kazim pointedly told 
Amery that the public held the British responsible for having transformed Palestinian 
emigrants into “orphans from the government.”36  At the same time, Bandak and other local 
leaders in Bethlehem arranged a meeting with the secretary of the Executive, Jamal al-
Husayni, to discuss the situation of the Palestinians during the Honduras crisis as they were 
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threatened with anti-Arab sentiment and expulsion as a result of Honduran immigration 
legislation.
37
   
 At the end of August 1926, Bandak joined Musa Kazim and others in another meeting 
with colonial officials in Jerusalem to discuss the obligations of the mandatory to the 
emigrants and to ask for an extension of the deadline for natives to claim citizenship.  
Secretary Amery refused to discuss changes to the order or increased assistance for the 
emigrants.  Musa Kazim then drafted an open letter to the administration to ask that the 
timeframe of the citizenship order be extended one year and to stress that some emigrants 
were not informed of the order as many had never received notice of it.  In addition, he 
pointed out that these individuals faced the difficult task of arranging to leave their countries 
of residence permanently in the short time-span envisaged by the legislation.  The law itself, 
Musa Kazim added, was difficult to understand for even competent legal authorities.
38
   
 The émigré communities in Latin America followed reports of the meetings on citizenship 
legislation between national leaders and colonial officials.  They noted the lobbyist efforts on 
their behalf, as these efforts elicited important debates on the so-called right to return.  In 
1926, the United Palestinian Society in Honduras submitted a petition to the Executive 
asking that its members hold the government to their “duty to protect” the money and lives 
of the emigrants.
39
  Several months later as debates continued over the refusal by 
immigration authorities in Palestine to allow natives to enter the territory without recognised 
citizenship, Jerusalem’s al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya included an article that equated the denial 
of travel facilities to a negation of the Palestinians’ right to return to their original 
homeland.
40
  By early 1927, the emigrants’ supporters in Palestine had appropriated the 
phrase.     
 In fact, as the mandate immigration authorities routinely denied visas and entry to 
returning emigrants, the ‘right to return’ became a loaded slogan.  It brought to light the key 
argument in support of the emigrants’ rights to citizenship, namely that the order’s 
provisions should account for both jus sanguinis and jus soli nationality.  The phrase 
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triggered accusations by Palestinians at home and abroad that the mandate’s immigration 
policy could only be carried out if jobs for Jewish immigrants were available.
41
  
Conversations on the right to return emphasised a birth-right to not only nationality but of 
belonging to a particular nation.   
 As the country began to experience economic problems in the latter 1920s, local leaders 
appealed to the mandate administration using economic arguments in an attempt to convince 
officials of the financial benefits offered by the return of emigrants.  These leaders tried to 
convince the mandate administration that Palestine could only achieve independence if the 
Arab community had the same economic opportunities as the Jewish immigrant community.  
Without allowing for the emigrants’ right to return as citizens who had expertise in business 
and commerce, the leaders explained, Arab economic independence would be hampered.  A 
group of local leaders in Bethlehem wrote to the high commissioner that the town’s 
emigrants, who had long been a source of prosperity, faced not only the deprivation of their 
“civil, political and social rights through no fault of their own” but their lack of citizenship 
potentially meant a future of “urban decay” for Bethlehem and other towns in the country.42  
Letters urged the government to be aware that “Arab emigrants in all corners of the globe” 
will protest to Great Britain and the League of Nations against the citizenship order-in-
council on economic and political grounds.
43
  Musa Kazim advocated action, telling 
Palestinians that each had the duty to “stand up in order to defend [the emigrants’] rights, 
which are our rights.”44  In this period, the slogan ‘the right to nationality’ became 
synonymous with the ‘right to return.’  Lawyers, writers and other leaders urged concerned 
citizens to begin grassroots, civil society-based initiatives such as organising delegations to 
mandate officials and beginning letter-writing campaigns to challenge the law. 
 In addition, the diaspora spurred a grassroots campaign against the order-in-council.  ‘Isa 
al-‘Isa, the editor of Jaffa’s Filastīn, in the summer of 1927 published a communiqué from 
Mexico’s Society for Palestinian Unity.  After protests sent to the mandate government and 
Great Britain by Mexico’s Palestinian community went unanswered, the Society sent a 
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delegation to Mexico City to meet with the British ambassador and discuss citizenship 
issues.  The delegation included members of other groups from Mexico.
45
  D.V. Kelly, the 
British ambassador, promised to do all he possibly could but complained to the delegation 
that his government denied his request to print the notice of the amendment of the citizenship 
order issued in November 1925 because it was too expensive.
46
  The Society for Palestinian 
Unity succeeded in attracting greater attention to the problems posed by the citizenship 
order.  “Every one of us is willing to sacrifice ourselves to raise this injustice,” its members 
wrote, “and to receive our legitimate rights given to us by nature itself and approved by our 
birth . . . [it is] this nationality which the English are trying to remove from us to implement 
Zionism.”47  Ambassador Kelly forwarded Palestinian grievances to the Foreign Office, and 
explained that the delegation represented three to four thousand Palestinians in Mexico.
48
  
Since the press and open letters continued to use the term ‘nationality’ (jinsiyya) to denote 
both nationality and citizenship, the Arabs referred to citizenship order-in-council as the 
‘nationality law.’  
 The tone of the emigrants’ complaints became more furious.  Al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya 
published a letter from the Society for Palestinian Unity of Mexico which accused the British 
authorities of creating the law on citizenship in order to “lessen the Arab race and strengthen 
the Jewish race.”  The society’s accusation was not only serious but it was effective.  This 
claim of ethnic discrimination was bolstered by the example of the administration’s 
immigration policy.  The letter of protest added that “there is not a force in this world which 
can remove our rights . . . for us, it is the blood in our veins and we have the right to 
nationality and naturalisation in the beloved homeland.”  Its tone demonstrates the attitude 
vis-à-vis nationality which informed the views of Palestinian national leaders and activists, 
that of nationality as an ancestral right.
49
  It was indeed powerful rhetoric: sensational, 
political, and easily understood by large segments of the population. 
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136 
 
 The tone of the petitions, however, varied.  Others demonstrate the willingness of some 
members of the diaspora to negotiate with Jewish land brokers if denied the opportunity to 
return to Palestine.  For instance, in the summer of 1927, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission received a petition from Palestinian Arabs in Honduras signed by men who 
owned land in Palestine.  The signatories, all Palestinian by birth, protested collectively “as a 
result of the High Commissioner’s refusal to recognise us as citizens of Palestine.”  Yet as 
they owned thousands of acres in their homeland they asked to be informed of Jewish 
bankers and financiers who were willing to buy land from Palestinians who lived abroad.  In 
the subsequent sentences, the signatories requested they be told of their citizenship status, 
when they would receive permission to return to their “beloved homeland,” and “to which 
flag we owe our allegiance.”50  From these statements it is clear that two years after the issue 
of the citizenship order-in-council, emigrant communities remained unsure of their 
nationality and their status in relation to Great Britain 
 Finally, the actions of Palestinians in the Americas inspired protests by the diaspora in 
other areas such as in Egypt.  In early 1928, twenty Palestinian students at Cairo’s al-Azhar 
University wrote to High Commissioner Plumer to explain that the situation of Palestinians 
in Egypt resembled that of those in Latin America.  Many students had been unable to give 
up their studies and return to reside permanently in Palestine at the time of the citizenship 
order.  They could not renew their passports or receive new passports to return to Palestine.  
The students asked the high commissioner if they should change their nationality “so that the 
Jews replace us in our homeland?”51  The students, like the Arab emigrants in Latin 
America, argued that the citizenship order discriminated against them on the basis of their 
Arab nationality. 
 By the end of the 1920s the lack of a concrete response from British officials over 
problems posed by the citizenship order did little to dispel the claims by the emigrants and 
their supporters that the mandate laws favoured Jewish immigrants.  The emigrant question, 
and the lack of a resolution, helped to not only ‘make’ citizens, but to refine the meaning of 
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the right to citizenship in the Palestinian Arab context.  The obvious precedent looked back 
upon by the Palestinian Arabs was that of Ottoman nationality and the jus sanguinis and jus 
soli means of its acquisition.   In the mid-1920s, this particular rhetorical language aided the 
emigrants’ sense of identification as Palestinians, as suggested by their writings to family 
and supporters at home.  The links between civil society in Palestine and the diaspora served 
to galvanize the nationalists into action.  Meetings continued between emigrants and British 
consular officials and between national leaders and colonial officials inside Palestine, while 
telegrams and letters of protest to the British administration and appeals to political and 
economic concerns increased.  By 1927, administrators in Palestine and in London had little 
choice but to address the citizenship order’s restrictions.       
 
The Committee for the Defense of Arab Emigrant Rights to Palestinian Citizenship 
 
 The work of ‘Isa Bandak, the primary lobbyist for the emigrants, was not only confined to 
writing editorials and presenting grievances to colonial officials.  Bandak’s other 
contribution to resolve the emigrant situation was the formation of an association of citizens 
in Bethlehem which aimed to educate Palestinian Arabs about the citizenship order.  The 
first mention of the Committee for the Defense of Arab Emigrant Rights to Palestinian 
Nationality, (al-lajna li-ladifā‘ ‘an huquq al-muhājarīn al-‘arab ala al-jinsiyya al-
filastīniyya) or the DAER, appears in Sawt al-Sha‘b just after the formation of the committee 
in 1927.  The committee’s role in shaping concepts of nationality and citizenship is the focus 
of this section.  Although complete records of the DAER committee are not available, its 
activities can be detailed through reports in the Arabic press and by the Arab Executive.  The 
DAER committee was instrumental for three reasons.  First, DAER emerged as the central 
organisation through which the opinions, protests and demands of the emigrants could be 
voiced.  As embodied in this role, the committee aimed to become the leading representative 
of the Palestinians on nationality issues and a mediator between the emigrants and both the 
London and Palestine administrations.  It lobbied for changes to the citizenship legislation to 
benefit all native-born Palestinians.  Second, the DAER committee made a point to address 
the British public in its appeals, using a grassroots approach to lobbyist efforts.  Finally, 
aside from appealing to Great Britain, the committee crafted internationalist rhetoric on the 
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right to nationality and the larger problems posed by the mandate administration’s legislation 
in Palestine.   
 The DAER committee members referred to their organisation as the ‘expert’ on 
Palestinian nationality legislation.  The secretary, Khalil ‘Isa Muqas, explained the duty of 
the committee as to provide the necessary facilities and guidance on the subject of 
nationality.
52
  Although the committee billed itself as the voice of the emigrants, its leaders 
initially did not represent a wide variety of Palestinians as they were elected by the 
inhabitants of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour.  Soon after its formation however, the 
committee proposed to hold a conference of Palestinian intellectuals who would discuss the 
seriousness of the emigrant question and lobby the government in a representative capacity.  
The DAER committee recruited its members in municipalities from which large numbers of 
emigrants originally came.  The membership seems to have been mostly representative of the 
nationalist middle-class and included local political and religious leaders, writers and 
lawyers.
53
  The committee relied on reports of émigré associations in order to compile its 
figures of the total numbers of Palestinians living abroad.  Since none of DAER’s listed 
members held an official position in the mandate administration or Department of 
Immigration, these figures do not match up with the British totals of emigrants or even the 
totals printed in Arab newspapers.  Despite the discrepancies, the figures that it reported 
were large enough to make an impression upon the Palestinian Arabs.  By mid-1927, a 
statement by DAER claimed to represent the figure of 50,000 Palestinian natives who were 
denied their nationality.
54
   
 After its formation, the committee first lobbied High Commissioner Plumer and other 
officials in the mandate administration.  Claiming to speak for all emigrant Arabs, its leaders 
stated aims and demands in a memorandum sent to the high commissioner in early 1928.  
The document was not anti-British: it condemned citizenship legislation, but hinted that the 
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committee believed the British did not intend to deprive the majority of emigrants from 
“their natural civil rights.”  The lobbyists stressed the economic component of the emigrant 
situation as they reminded Plumer that most emigrants owned immovable property and real 
estate in Palestine which was subject to taxation.
55
  Although the committee started out with 
cautious appeals to the economic necessity of granting citizenship to the emigrants in its first 
memorandum, the representative nature of the organisation and the political and social 
connections of its leadership (men such as Bandak and ‘Isa al-‘Isa) could not be fully 
ignored by the Colonial Office.   
 The response by the Colonial Office to DAER’s claims was not an encouraging one.  
Colonial Secretary Amery stated his belief that the Palestinian communities in South 
America had no connection with Palestine and no intention to return to settle.  On these 
grounds he thought that the principles to decide on nationality applications were “quite fair 
and equitable.”56  Other colonial officials responded to the committee differently and in 
contrast to Amery some took note of the economic aspect of the demands.  One official 
wrote to Under-Secretary Ormsby-Gore that the committee’s memorandum brought up very 
important questions that affected the nationality of those Arabs abroad who had “very 
considerable material interests in Palestine.”  He suggested that a general grant of citizenship 
would not merely be an act of fairness in order to solve the problem of Palestinian Arab 
statelessness, but the favourable extension of citizenship meant “considerable advantage to 
British interests.”  These responses show the differences of opinion within the British 
government over the impact of DAER activities.  In fact, the Colonial Office admitted that 
Arab sentiment had been stirred by the committee to protest over what was an arbitrary 
denial of rights.
57
   
 The government of Palestine did not stay silent on the debate, especially in light of Arab 
accusations against the mandate administration.  In February 1928, the committee accused 
the mandate of obstructing what it referred to as the right to enjoy the nationality by descent.  
That right had been removed by the mandatory, DAER claimed, in order to facilitate Jewish 
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immigration.  It produced a document stating that approximately 9,000 Palestinian 
emigrants, out of a total 30,000 in the Americas and Europe, requested citizenship by the end 
of 1927.
58
  The small number of applicants offered the proof, according to the committee, 
that the blame for the emigrants’ situation was to be placed squarely on the British support 
for a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Yet prior to the accusation, Sir Steward Symes, the 
government’s Chief Secretary, voiced his satisfaction in the summer of 1927 “that fairly 
regular connection is maintained between the individuals of ‘colonies’ . . . in the Americas 
and their country of origin.”  In contrast to the Foreign Office stance, Symes recommended 
that the Palestine Administration reconsider applications for citizenship made by Palestinian 
Arabs from abroad.  Although many of these applicants intended to continue to live outside 
Palestine, his recommendation indicates the willingness of the mandate administration to 
acknowledge the emigrant issue.  Symes asked for a Foreign Office enquiry into Palestinian 
diaspora communities, especially those in Chile and Mexico, to discover whether it would be 
possible to grant British financial and diplomatic protection.
59
  Indeed, the DAER committee 
by early 1928 succeeded in shifting the discourse on the emigrant situation in official 
government circles.     
 In early 1928, the DAER preparatory committee printed a forty-page entreaty titled 
“Appeal to the Noble British People” which was widely publicised in the Arab press.  With 
this, the committee attempted to address the public in Great Britain rather than the 
government.  The significance of this document was that it was evidence of the grassroots 
civic activism that informed the activities of DAER.   None of the noted Arab political 
leaders in Palestine—the Mufti, the various political factions, or the Arab Executive—
contributed to it.  The appeal catered to the emotions of people of Great Britain and called 
upon them to pressure the Parliament to consider the demands of the Palestinian Arab 
emigrants.
60
  In forty-pages, the committee endeavored to offer its definition of Palestinian 
nationality.  It asked that nationality be granted through jus sanguinis and jus soli provisions.  
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It also advocated a general extension of citizenship to all Palestinian natives based on Great 
Britain’s own citizenship legislation.61   
 The committee sought to incorporate internationalist rhetoric of nationality in its appeals.  
Importantly, it outlined an understanding of the place of nationality in the international 
system.  It noted that nationality laws connected an individual with his nation of origin and 
that certain nationality principles were recognised by every “modern and civilised” nation.  
The committee envisioned an international right to nationality which mandated that 
individuals had diplomatic protection from their nation’s government; thus, the alienation of 
emigrants from their nationality could not be internationally-sanctioned.  Ideas of nationality 
as linked to citizenship were expressed not only by Palestinian Arabs but they were part of a 
larger debate on the place of citizenship in the context of the post-1918 dominance of the 
nation-state.  The DAER appeal to the British people evoked the text of Article 34 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne to demonstrate the need to conform mandate legislation to international 
regulations.
62
  The basic arguments in the brochure summed up the previous two years’ 
worth of émigré discussions, debates, and grievances on Palestinian nationality.   
 It is unclear how many emigrants appealed to the defense committee for specific queries.  
Even so, it can be surmised that families near Bethlehem and Jerusalem knew of its raison 
d’être and its agency in connection with local nationalist associations.  Certainly the literate 
Arab population with family in the diaspora read its frequent reports published in the 
newspapers.  A certain anti-Zionist rhetoric can be drawn out of these reports and appeals; 
however, this rhetoric is not at all new.  Rather, it helped DAER to link the mandate’s 
support for a Jewish national home in Palestine with the denial of the Arab emigrants’ rights 
to citizenship and to return to their homeland.   
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Consuls, emigrants and the British Government: miscommunication and divergent 
practices  
 
 The work of the emigrants and their lobbyists, as detailed in the preceding section, meant 
that the wider Palestinian Arab population could more easily understand the reasons for 
opposition to the 1925 citizenship legislation.  However, the conflict of opinion within the 
Foreign Office over the treatment of Arabs who lived outside of mandate territory hindered 
any immediate resolution of the Arabs’ grievances.  In October 1927, the British Foreign 
Office sent to its consul in San Salvador a draft copy of instructions regarding an amendment 
to the Palestine Immigration Ordinance.  The document explained that ordinary British 
emergency certificates for travel to the mandate territory could be issued only to individuals 
who possessed Palestinian nationality.  The draft instructions also contained a clause stating 
that if applicants for travel visas to Palestine were unable to obtain a Turkish passport or 
Turkish travel documents from their state of residence, they could apply for an emergency 
certificate valid for three months that allowed holders to undertake a single journey to 
Palestine in order to naturalise.
63
  The draft contradicted Foreign Office policy detailed in 
earlier circulars that allowed for emergency travel certificates to be given to stateless 
Palestinian Arabs.  This portrait of conflicting correspondence and governmental circulars 
demonstrates the general confusion and miscommunication between the British consulates 
and the Foreign Office.     
 Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain continued to hold the Foreign Office line that it  
was not desirable to issue travel certificates to “former Turkish nationals” to visit Palestine if 
those individuals had not acquired Palestinian nationality.  In fact, he maintained that non-
citizen Palestinian Arabs who arrived at Palestinian ports with single-journey visas were 
liable to be “[suspected of] an attempt to evade the law and the Immigration authorities are . . 
. justified, in refusing permission to land.”  Emigrants, born in Palestine but without 
Palestinian citizenship by 1927, were treated as suspect by the immigration authorities upon 
arrival to Palestine.
64
  However, Jewish immigrants to Palestine were granted permission by 
the same immigration authorities to settle and take provisional nationality, on the advice of 
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the Zionist Organisation.  British consuls, however, did not interpret the instructions 
consistently in all cases.  Palestinian natives throughout Latin America, for instance, 
experienced different treatments by British consuls.  The mandate administration had the 
option to refuse entry of emigrants on arbitrary grounds, such as the doubt that emigrants 
would remain in Palestine as permanent residents and instead use their citizenship to claim 
British protection.
65
   
 According to British Secretary Chamberlain, consular officers could not issue any travel 
documents endorsed by Great Britain except for Arab individuals to return to reside 
permanently in Palestine, since such individuals abroad were neither British subjects nor 
British-protected persons.  As for those Arabs whose applications for citizenship had been 
rejected, some consuls believed they acquired Turkish nationality by default.  Yet the 
emigrants did not hold Turkish passports nor pledge allegiance to Turkey.  The default 
acquisition of Turkish nationality had no basis in international law.  Therefore, it is difficult 
to explain how Great Britain could assign Turkish citizenship to individuals without their 
consent and without the agreement of Turkey, simply on the basis that these individuals’ 
Palestinian citizenship applications had been rejected.   
 The Palestine Administration and the British government in London attempted in 1927 to 
address the growing number of grievances by Palestinian Arabs against the citizenship 
legislation.  In the first place, the Colonial Office insisted the British government could not 
extend the order-in-council’s stated timeframe (within which natives could claim nationality) 
without the consent of the Turkish government.  Evidence of British correspondence with the 
Turkish government on this issue does not exist in the archives.  In fact, the Colonial Office 
advised against contact with Turkey believing that it would be reluctant to become 
involved.
66
  Meanwhile, within the mandate administration, High Commissioner Plumer 
wrote in mid-1927 that Palestinian natives must show “genuine desire to resume their 
connection with Palestine” to travel to the territory to naturalise.  This did not guarantee that 
their naturalisation would be approved.
67
  Plumer’s statement side-stepped the issue at the 
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67 Ibid. 
144 
 
heart of the Palestinian grievances: namely, that the Arabs found naturalisation to be 
unacceptable as a negation of their right to nationality.   
 Palestine’s attorney-general, Norman Bentwich, addressed the emigrant question as well.  
He stated an intent to reconsider applications from people “who by birth, race and sentiment 
are genuinely attached to Palestine” despite their likelihood to be resident abroad for an 
indefinite period.  However, the Foreign Office disagreed and stated that it had little doubt 
such people sought only British protection to make claims against their states of residence.  
These Palestinians were “a nuisance to Consuls and no credit to the Empire” and the office 
continued to instruct consuls not to treat Palestinian natives as citizens or even potential 
citizens.  One official claimed the question of citizenship “should be decided on the merits” 
of Palestinians abroad.  If they were unable to return in the time allotted, they “are not and 
never have been Palestinian, [and] they were and remain Ottoman subjects.”68  The office 
failed to explain the existence of Ottoman subjects in the absence of an Ottoman Empire.   
 The Foreign and Colonial Offices discussed complaints together, including those 
addressed to the League of Nations.  One such letter from the Sociedad Fraternidad Palestina 
of San Salvador, written in September 1927, spoke on behalf of over a thousand Palestinian 
natives employed in trade who professed that they had “no subversive aims” and accepted 
the international mandate assigned to Palestine.  But, it continued, the natives were bound to 
Palestine “by the strongest moral, social and political ties . . . like every human being who 
has . . . a feeling of attachment to his native land.”  The Society felt the mandatory power 
seemed determined to destroy the “fundamental rights” to nationality by preventing natives 
from returning to their own country while it allowed foreign elements to enter.
69
  After 
viewing other strongly-worded complaints, Ormsby-Gore suggested reconsideration of 
claims to citizenship made in due time by individuals who returned to Palestine at some 
point after they left the territory prior to 1920.  These claims had initially been rejected by 
the administration.  His suggestion meant that any Palestinian by birth and resident abroad 
with Turkish nationality “will be freely granted permission to visit or settle in Palestine with 
his family” but would need to naturalise to become an official citizen.  Ormsby-Gore wrote 
                                                   
68 Ibid. 
69 Memo, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 Oct. 1927, CO 733/142/19-24. 
145 
 
that the extent communities in the diaspora took advantage of the concession once put into 
place would be regarded as the measure of their genuine attachment to their homeland.
70
   
 In early 1929, the DAER committee reminded the colonial secretary that the false belief 
that emigrants severed their connections with their homeland “paralysed to an unimaginable 
degree” an estimated 30,000 natives who had no recognised nationality.71  One ray of hope 
for emigrants came in April 1929 with the news that a native of Ramleh (in central Palestine) 
filed a lawsuit against the Palestine’s high commissioner and director of immigration after 
authorities refused him citizenship upon return to Palestine.  The legal proceedings had a 
favourable outcome for the complainant, who aimed for the recognition of his citizenship.  
The High Court of Justice in Palestine also required the government to pay the expenses of 
the lawsuit.
72
  Despite the outcome of such a challenge to the citizenship order, members of 
the diaspora who had no intention to yet return faced increasingly hostile host governments.  
The El Salvador Palestinian Unity Committee wrote a letter in 1929 detailing the expulsion 
of Arabs from El Salvador as a “painful catastrophe [nakba]” and broadcast an appeal to 
Palestinians at home to help.  ‘Isa Bandak wrote a lengthy memo to Plumer’s replacement, 
High Commissioner John Chancellor to urge the Palestine government to repel the “unjust 
aggression” in El Salvador against the country’s 2,000 Palestinian residents.73  Other 
countries also refused to readmit any resident without nationality who had left the country’s 
borders.
74
  For the Palestinian Arabs and other stateless individuals the possession of official 
nationality documents was crucial to any type of livelihood by the latter 1920s.  
 This paralysis noted by DAER was as much economic as it was political.  The committee 
continued to lobby High Commissioner Chancellor, with evidence the emigrants kept their 
relations with Palestine through ownership of property and land and payment of taxes.
75
  On 
the point of the financial situation of a number of emigrants, the mandate administration 
maintained an interesting position.  Although it denied return and ipso facto citizenship to 
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emigrants from all social classes, the administration continued to collect the tax revenues on 
the immoveable property and land owned by these individuals.  By 1929, the tide of Jewish 
immigration to Palestine had again risen, while bankruptcy threatened the administration.  
Angry protest letters asked that Palestinian returnees be treated like the Jews and allowed to 
enter Palestine with equal citizenship rights.
76
  Yet, even appeals to the economic benefits of 
a blanket grant of citizenship to all natives living abroad fell on deaf ears.  Complicating 
matters, the Wailing Wall riots of 1929 forced the administration to focus on the perceived 
religious strife rather than economic tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities in 
Palestine.  Although commissions of inquiry in the aftermath focused on Jewish 
immigration, they did not recognise demands of the Palestinian emigrants.   
 
Conclusion  
  
     Despite the controversy over the changes to the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council, the 
British government ratified an amended order in July 1931.  The amendment had a very 
limited effect and did not reflect the demands of the Palestinian emigrants and their 
lobbyists.  Rather, it was aimed at Palestinians resident abroad between 1924 and 1925 only, 
and provided them with ‘treaty nationality’ ipso facto.  Meanwhile, the Home Office debated 
the inclusion of a clause in the amended order stating that periodic visits made to Palestine 
by natives were not enough to signify maintenance of a ‘substantial connection’ with the 
country.  The issue of substantial connections between the diaspora and the mandate territory 
continued to be a point of conflict.  In early 1933, Sawt al-Sha‘b reported that a very large 
number of Palestinian natives went to Turkish consuls to take Turkish citizenship in order to 
have consular protection and to travel to Palestine on a recognised passport.
77
  It is important 
to note that from 1927 to 1937, the stated number of Palestinians registered as resident 
abroad rose by ten thousand persons, up to 40,000.
78
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1937, CO 733/347/4. 
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 The Palestinian Arabs crafted their own—often multiple—meanings of citizenship in the 
1920s in response to the situation in Palestine on-the-ground after the implementation of 
mandate legislation.  As the chapter has shown, these meanings were expressed most 
prominently by the emigrants once they returned to Palestine and once their hope to acquire 
citizenship came under threat.  They defined rights and protections associated with 
citizenship in letters sent home and reprinted by individuals in Palestine who knew of their 
situation.  These emigrants always connected their arguments in support of citizenship with 
their understanding of Palestine as an Arab nation (al-umma al-‘arabiyya) creating a link 
between Ottoman nationality and Palestinian citizenship rights.   
 The reactions in Palestine to the situation of the emigrants can be used to chart the 
changing terminology of nationality and citizenship as well as the changing expressions of 
citizenship.  Until the issue of the citizenship order the use of the term jinsiyya in the sense 
of citizenship was reinforced by a number of factors.  The first was the Ottoman legislative 
precedent which termed the population of the Arab provinces as Ottoman nationals.  The 
middle-class Arab nationalists focused upon the language used in the Ottoman law as they 
became increasingly alarmed by rumours and reports of the new Palestine citizenship order.  
Another factor was that citizenship was translated as jinsiyya in the Arabic publication of the 
Citizenship Order-in-Council in the mandate’s official gazette, in the order-in-council itself 
and in the press reports written shortly after its provisions were made known. 
     The Palestinian Arab mahjar also factored in as a driving force for the changing discourse 
of nationality and citizenship after 1925.  Discussions of citizenship and contentions over it 
were activated by the emigrants’ situation as affected by mandate legislation.  The outcry 
over the denial of the ‘right of return’ and ipso facto citizenship for native Palestinians who 
resided outside of Palestine shaped the vocabulary and language associated with citizenship 
and the rights to that citizenship.  The main impact of mandate legislation upon this changing 
terminology was that nationality and citizenship began to be perceived as separate statuses as 
the emigrants argued that their Ottoman Arab nationality entitled them to Palestinian 
citizenship.    In conclusion, the Palestinian Arab emigrant featured prominently in Arab 
demands to the mandate administration after the mid-1920s.  The situation of the diaspora 
was constantly re-assessed in the Arabic press and by lobbyists such as ‘Isa Bandak. 
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 The arguments developed by the emigrants and DAER lobbyists in the mid to late-1920s 
greatly impacted the Arab population’s general conceptualisation of their nationality and 
identity as Palestinian.  In the absence of a right to return to Palestine as citizens, the 
emigrants nonetheless practiced citizenship through the formation of émigré civil societies, 
elections for national leaders and aid for Palestinians at home.  This in turn forced the British 
mandate authorities and the government in London to reconsider its citizenship legislation as 
a response to the anger over the order’s perceived injustices.  However, this reconsideration 
was a long time coming, as officials in London and Jerusalem were not in agreement over 
the proper resolution for Arab natives who resided abroad and wished to return to Palestine 
as citizens.  The Jewish national home policy continued to guide the administration in 
legislation, including legislation which impacted only the Arab population.   
 In the following chapter, the effect of Jewish immigration on the legislation of citizenship 
in Palestine will be further explored alongside Arab reactions.  The advocacy of the DAER 
committee did not stop.  Rather, the late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed a rise in the tactics 
of the populist leaders to protest against British policy.  Arab nationalists urged their fellow 
Palestinians toward greater civic activism as citizens in the name of their counterparts in the 
diaspora.   
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Chapter Five 
Institutionalising Citizenship: Creating Distinctions between Arab and Jewish 
Palestinian Citizens, 1926-1934 
 
“[The Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council] termed as an ‘Instruction’ is just the sort 
of enterprise from the mind of Bentwich who loves the loose generalities of International 
Law.” 
Sir J. Risley, Colonial Office memo, May 1929 
 
Introduction 
 
     In 1930 the Colonial Office was presented with the “borderline case” of a Jewish 
Palestinian citizen who faced the revocation of naturalisation due to his residence outside 
Palestine.  Certificates of naturalisation could be annulled if their holders were absent from 
Palestine for three years, especially as the Colonial and Foreign Offices emphasised that 
“Palestinian citizenship [carried] with it the right to British protection in foreign countries.”  
As to the case at hand, officials focused on the accusation that the individual retained his 
Palestinian citizenship simply to enjoy British protection while resident abroad.  In the end, 
Colonial Office Under-Secretary John Shuckerberg decided that “it would be better, at this 
juncture, not to risk a further squabble with the Jewish Agency” over the revocation of 
citizenship.
1
  The individual remained a Palestine citizen despite his residence outside of the 
territory.  The incident was not unusual: it represents one way in which various 
administrators involved in the mandate bureaucracy applied the provisions of Palestinian 
citizenship differently for Jews and for Arabs.   
     While dealing with the issue of Palestinian Arab emigrants the administrations in 
Jerusalem and London grappled with other specifics of the citizenship legislation, most 
notably the status of Jewish immigrants and their naturalisation as Palestinian citizens.  By 
the early 1930s, different departments of the mandatory administration and the Colonial 
Office in London had established procedures to deal with the implementation of legislation, 
                                                   
1 ‘Naturalisation certificates and Palestinian citizenship, revocation of,’ 5 Dec. 1930, CO 733/179/2/4. 
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and to arbitrate over applications for both naturalisation and citizenship.  The British 
controlled the application of citizenship in order to effectively uphold the terms of the 
mandate and the obligations to the Jewish national home policy.  In other words, the control 
of citizenship provisions became a bureaucratic technique to enforce mandate policy—a 
policy that paid particular attention to Jewish immigration and naturalisation.  In reality, the 
division of control over legislation only served to reflect the muddled nature of citizenship 
and nationality within the increasingly-unstable British Empire.  In return, conflict due to 
disagreements between governmental departments caused certain provisions to be applied 
unevenly.     
     The present chapter analyses the ways Palestinian citizenship became bureaucratised after 
the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council and through the early 1930s.  The analysis takes into 
account the aforementioned messy reality of shaping political belonging and citizenship 
legislation in Palestine.  The division of control between Whitehall and the Palestine 
Administration fits into the overall de-centralised nature of the formation of mandate 
legislation.  As part of citizenship legislation, the differences between high commissioners in 
their policies toward Jewish immigration, including fears of subversives, communists and 
Bolsheviks, resulted in constant changes to policies for revocation and grants of citizenship 
to Jews and Arabs.  At the same time, because officials in Jerusalem and London feared 
conflict with the Jewish Agency and Zionist Organisation, citizenship regulations ultimately 
favoured Jewish immigrants.   
     The chapter also focuses on the creation of a ‘politics of distinction’ between Arab and 
Jewish Palestinians in the application of citizenship even prior to 1925, and then traces the 
impact of those distinctions on subsequent legislation.  The creation of inequalities between 
Jewish and Arab citizens went against the common liberal definition of citizenship that 
obscured differences between classes and ethnicities.
2
  These distinctions created by the 
citizenship legislation were very much a part of the wider colonial experience and colonial 
perceptions of the ‘character’ of whites, natives and settlers.  As Ann Laura Stoler has aptly 
shown, this categorisation by colonial administrators was a method of control based on 
                                                   
2 Nira Yuval-Davis, “Women, Citizenship and Difference,” Feminist Review 57 (Autumn 1997): 8. 
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privileging the identities of certain inhabitants as that of ‘citizens.’3  Thus, in matters of 
naturalisation, immigrants and natives were treated separately.  Along with the 1925 
Citizenship Order-in-Council, the 1922 Electoral Order-in-Council and the text of the 
mandate underlined a differential treatment of the two communities implying that the 
application of citizenship would be discriminatory.   
      Many of the same difficulties that mandate officials faced drafting the Palestine 
citizenship order such as differences of opinion between the Foreign, Colonial and Home 
Offices on the one hand, and the Palestine Government on the other, resurfaced in the 
interpretation of legislation between 1925 and 1931.  This interpretation and the actions 
taken by officials in Palestine were not done in a vacuum.  The current chapter’s analysis of 
the bureaucratisation of citizenship in Palestine can be studied in light of the wider concept 
of citizenship in the British Empire.  The case study of mandate Palestine demonstrates the 
different tiers of colonial statuses in British territories.  The tiers represented those 
inhabitants restricted from travel, or those with the privilege to enter the United Kingdom 
and its overseas possessions.  Palestine is also a remarkable case study on the 
internationalisation of the citizenship question in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Jewish national 
home policy meant that potential citizens arrived to Palestine from a range of countries and 
colonies and frequently traveled back and forth between them.  The chapter, and the example 
that opened it, demonstrate how the British mandate administration grappled with this 
internationalisation of Palestinian citizenship.  During the interwar period, many states 
experienced confusion over boundaries, the sovereignty of territorial possessions, the 
classification of nationals, and legal provisions affecting increased immigration and travel.  
All of these factors played an important role in the interpretation of Palestinian citizenship 
and the issue of further legislation that regulated it.   
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3 Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, 27; 43.  The same can be applied to the judicial system in 
Palestine.  See Assaf Likhovski, “In Our Image: Colonial Discourse and the Anglicization of the Law in 
Mandatory Palestine,” Israel Law Review 29 (Summer 1995): 297-301. 
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The politics of distinction: Palestinian Jewish and Arab citizenships 
 
     Distinctive practices in the application of Palestinian citizenship provisions for Jewish 
and Arab inhabitants had already emerged before the issue of the 1925 Palestine Citizenship 
Order-in-Council.  They can certainly be traced back to the method by which Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine acquired provisional nationality in accordance with the 1922 
Legislative Council Election Order.  Prior to the 1922 order, mandate officials were aware 
they would need to implement Article 7 of the Palestine Mandate, which required Great 
Britain to issue a law for the acquisition of Palestinian nationality for the immigrants.  The 
article, which failed to mention the Arab population, foreshadowed the future separation of 
citizenship and naturalisation processes in Palestine.  The distinctions can perhaps be traced 
further back, to the British colonial experience of creating legislation to delineate the statuses 
of the native, the European and the settler in other imperial possessions.  Administrators in 
territories of the British Empire, similar to Dutch, French and other colonial officials, 
included a number of assumptions about ‘the native’ in colonial legislation that marked 
national status prior to the outbreak of the First World War.   
     Drawing on the work of Stoler, historians can view colonial discourses on citizenship and 
nationality during the interwar period as sites of production of European power as well as 
reflections of new developments of nation-state nationality and citizenship in the imperial 
metropole.  In Palestine, these discourses included the added element of the Jewish national 
home policy.  The immigration regulations in support of the Zionists’ national home plan 
were constructed with a particular type of Jewish immigrant in mind: self-sufficient, 
prosperous, entrepreneurial and white.  According to British thinking at the time, colonial 
subjects could not become British unless they were white; the Jewish immigrants to Palestine 
however, were borderline cases.  Administrators in Great Britain considered the Jews in 
England as an inclusive ‘nation within a nation,’ and these feelings posed a clear 
contradiction with the post-war support for the Zionist programme in Palestine.
4
  Colonial 
officials based the national home policy on a racial hierarchy between Jews and Arabs, and 
                                                   
4 Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), 98-100. 
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looked toward the Jewish immigrants as the civilising influence in Palestine.
5
  This influence 
could only come from immigrants of a certain character.  The markers of character and the 
nativist ideologies often behind them “permeated debates over immigration restrictions and, 
often, the restrictive laws themselves.”6  Character did not derive from abstract or universal 
values, argues Stoler, but rather “at its heart was a conception of being European that 
emphasised a bearing, a standard of living, a set of cultural competencies and practices to 
which members of the European community were to subscribe.”7  Early colonial discourses 
linked race, culture and national identity, with culture determining the codification of racial 
distinctions and national identity.   
     By the turn of the twentieth century, colonial law in the West and East Indies accounted 
for ‘colonial mixing,’ a process which called into question imperial criteria for citizenship 
and nationality.  As a result, the Dutch and French in the Indies, Indochina and North Africa 
began to recognise that jus soli and jus sanguinis could not determine national identity in the 
new colonial nation.
8
  Two decades later, the British in Palestine adopted the same ideology 
and rendered birthplace and descent to no longer be the only determinants for the acquisition 
of nationality by inhabitants of colonies.  Mandate Palestine fit into the wider colonial 
context of legislation based upon ideologies of colonial control.  As Martin Bunton has 
shown, from citizenship to land laws, the wider colonial project such as that in Nigeria, Iraq, 
Cyprus and Tanganyika informed administrators in Palestine.  Consistency however, was 
elusive in Palestine due to the multiplicity of actors who served in the administration or 
constructed its body of legislation.
9
  Bunton adds that because lines blurred between the 
administrative and judicial functions of the government, officials enforced laws selectively 
and thus created “a unique legal regime” in Palestine.10  The 1925 citizenship order and the 
amendments discussed in the current chapter present a case in point as to how a number of 
administrators manipulated British and colonial regulations to codify distinctions between 
ethnic groups in the mandate’s nationality provisions. 
                                                   
5 Norris, Land of Progress, 84-85. 
6 Patrick Ettinger, Imaginary Lines: Border Enforcement and the Origins of Undocumented Immigration, 1882-
1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 7. 
7 Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, 27. 
8 Ibid., 97-99. 
9 Bunton, “Inventing the Status Quo,” 35. 
10 Ibid., 42. 
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     As suggested in Chapter Two the 1922 Legislative Council Election Order defined the 
Palestinian citizenry for the purpose of enfranchisement for elections to a proposed 
legislative council.  The legislative council failed to materialise in 1922 and the order’s 
provisions for Palestinian nationality were superseded by the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-
Council.  For the first time, the 1922 order codified a distinction between two types of 
citizens in Palestine: former Ottoman nationals of Palestine and non-Ottoman habitual 
residents of Palestine were citizens provided they made a declaration to this effect within two 
months from the ratification of a future citizenship law.  Jewish immigrants in the latter 
group received provisional certificates of nationality upon arrival to Palestine on the basis 
they would eventually make their declarations of citizenship.  Yet provisions for their 
enfranchisement did not include a residency requirement.  Habitual residence in Palestine 
remained undefined and essentially any Jewish arrivals to Palestine were considered citizens 
for electoral purposes.  The order did not stipulate that these immigrants had to give up their 
nationalities and passports.  This omission benefited only immigrants, since the Ottoman 
administration had prohibited the possession of dual nationality.     
     The 1925 citizenship order codified the different ways in which Arabs and Jews were to 
acquire Palestinian citizenship.  It also provided for naturalisation, requiring all applicants to 
prove they resided in Palestine for a period of two years.  In order for native but non-resident 
Ottoman nationals to claim Palestinian citizenship, Article 2 required their permanent return 
to Palestine and a residency period of six months prior to 1 August 1926, the deadline given 
to natives to claim their citizenship.  Most of the provisions of the order were written with 
Jewish immigrants in mind, such as those for naturalisation and its revocation as well as 
marriage and divorce.  Since provisional Jewish citizens came from a variety of 
backgrounds, administrative and legal advisors placed emphasis on the need to accommodate 
for the entire Jewish community in Palestine.  The political context of these distinctions 
constantly shifted alongside changes in the mandate’s bureaucracy and in the political 
situation within the territory.   
     In reference to the introduction story in the beginning of the current chapter, the 
citizenship order did not provide clear procedures for the revocation of naturalisation apart 
from an article that gave the mandate’s high commissioners power to refuse or annul 
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citizenship due to false representation, disloyalty to the government and residence abroad.
11
  
Even so, colonial officials hotly debated that power and their disagreements stalled any 
proposed clarifications of the process.  In large part, the governments in both Jerusalem and 
London feared the conflict that the removal of Palestinian citizenship could potentially create 
with members of the Jewish Agency and Zionist leaders.  British officials feared accusations 
of reneging on mandate policy.  Once again, the Arab inhabitants did not feature in the 
numerous debates on the subject.  Fearful of conflict, the Palestine Administration 
maintained a lenient immigration and naturalisation policy through the latter part of 
the1920s.  The policy also owed to the individual attitudes of the high commissioners to 
Zionism. 
     After the August 1929 Wailing Wall riots and amidst Arab demands to suspend 
immigration to Palestine, the British government and Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield sent 
to Palestine the Shaw Commission headed by Walter Shaw, a British judge, and composed of 
four members of Parliament to investigate the causes of the riots.  Sir John Chancellor, the 
high commissioner at the time (successor to Herbert Plumer), was notably less enthusiastic 
than his predecessors about the Zionist Organisation and the commission reflected his 
attitude.  It recommended suspension of Jewish land purchases and the imposition of a quota 
on Jewish immigration.  These recommendations were then examined by John Hope-
Simpson, whose report to Britain stated that the capacity for absorption of more immigrants 
had been reached in Palestine and that further immigration would severely impact the 
fellahin through the further dispossession of their land.  Finally, the Passfield White Paper of 
October 1930 included the reports of both Shaw and Hope-Simpson and endorsed proposed 
self-government in Palestine.  Unfortunately for the Arabs, in February 1931 British Prime 
Minister Ramsey MacDonald wrote a letter to Chaim Weizmann in which MacDonald 
retracted the recommendations of the 1930 White Paper.  He reaffirmed the Balfour 
Declaration as the guide to British policy in Palestine.  Consequently, the mandate 
administration made no drastic changes to immigration or naturalisation policies.
12
    
                                                   
11 ‘Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council,’ 30 January 1925, CO 733/88/383-398. 
12 For more, see Pinhas Ofer, “The Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929: Appointment, 
Terms of Reference, Procedure and Report,” Middle Eastern Studies 19 (Jan. 1983):104-118 and Martin 
Kolinsky, Law, order and riots in mandatory Palestine, 1928-1935 (Basingstoke: Macmillian, 1993). 
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     After 1929, the tense political situation, along with the MacDonald letter, suggests that 
Great Britain had rightly been fearful that numerous revocations of Palestinian citizenship 
held by Jews could lead to disagreement with Zionist and Jewish Agency leaders.  The 
Zionist Organisation and its representative to Great Britain, the Jewish Agency, significantly 
influenced the application, or non-application, of citizenship requirements and practices for 
Jewish immigrants.  Zionist involvement in citizenship legislation dated back to 1919 when 
Chaim Weizmann’s suggestions on proposals were sent to the Colonial Office in the form of 
‘official observations.’13  Over a decade later in correspondence between the Colonial Office 
and the Palestine Government in 1933, officials noted the influence of the Zionist 
Organisation on immigration and citizenship and stated that it had become “difficult for the 
Palestine Government to treat one set of Palestinian citizens differently from the rest and to 
subject them to immigration restrictions which at present apply solely to persons who are not 
Palestinian citizens.”14  The immigrants to whom the memo referred were those who arrived 
to Palestine but were not yet naturalised as citizens.      
     Also in the early 1930s the Palestine Government noted the introduction in the British 
Parliament of a bill to extend Palestinian citizenship to all Jews whom were without 
nationality.  The Member of Parliament who submitted the bill did so without considering 
the practical problems its approval would pose.  The mandatory government reacted by 
declaring that the MP in question did not realise “the obvious”: that if the estimated 200,000 
Jews around the globe who had lost their nationality thus acquired Palestinian citizenship, 
they could automatically enter Palestine by right.  The government added that if this was not 
what the bill intended and if the bill “was to confer upon a certain class of aliens Palestinian 
citizenship in a way which did not carry with it the rights to be enjoyed in Palestine . . . 
attached to that status, they would nevertheless appear to have a claim to be treated as 
British-protected persons outside Palestine.”  The Arab press criticised the proposal and 
mentioned that neither the mandate text nor the League of Nations charter contained any 
provision to allow for the bill’s proposals.  The Colonial Office wrote to High Commissioner 
Wauchope that if the bill meant anything “presumably it seems that the whole of German 
                                                   
13 ‘Future Constitution of Palestine Zionist Proposals with Secretary of State’s Amendments,’ 27 Feb. 1919, FO 
608/98/8.   
14 ‘Citizenship—Proposed Nationality of Jews,’ 1933, CO 733/247/8/3. 
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Jewry should be granted Palestinian citizenship!”15  The bill did not advance but it did 
popularise the idea in official circles that Palestinian citizenship could simply be given to 
Jews as a ‘natural’ right, crucially without any consideration for the Arab Palestinians.   
     Still, the bill further demonstrates that Jewish citizens were to be accorded separate 
treatment from their Arab counterparts in Palestine on the basis of the culture and the socio-
economic situation of the former group.  The bill also demonstrates the different approaches 
of Whitehall and the mandate administration as to how citizenship was granted in Palestine.  
Just before the proposal of an extension of citizenship to a large number of European Jews, 
Colonial Office Secretary William Ormsby-Gore expressed the view that it was the quality 
of Jews who immigrated to Palestine that mattered.  Officials in both the Palestine and 
London administrations perceived the immigrants as not only potential citizens but as a 
civilising influence.
16
 
 
Internationalising citizenship in the Palestinian context: enforcing passports and visas 
 
     The interwar period witnessed changes to immigration and travel regulations throughout 
the world.  The increased need for documentary identity meant that governments had to 
classify inhabitants as nationals, subjects or citizens, and offer them identification papers.  
The following section places Palestinian documentary identity into the international context 
of the late 1920s and early 1930s.  The Palestine Mandate was remarkable in the 
internationalisation of citizenship, meaning that it brought together numerous ethno-national 
groups living throughout the world as Palestinian citizens.  This placed it in a unique position 
in the wider British Empire.  Although only briefly mentioned here, Palestine also presents 
an excellent case study on transnational migrations of both Jews and Arabs in the early 
twentieth century across numerous—and new—borders.  The Jewish national home policy 
allowed for the acquisition of citizenship by Jews that came from a wide range of countries 
and colonies.  This characteristic range of ethno-nationalities held by Palestine’s Jewish 
population did not compare to any other single colonial population in the British Empire.  
                                                   
15 Ibid., 28 July 1933, CO 733/247/8/8-10. 
16 Norris, Land of Progress, 37. 
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This meant that Jewish residents, as opposed to their Arab counterparts, were given different 
treatment in their applications for Palestinian passports and visas. 
     The mandate administration further internationalised immigration, citizenship and 
naturalisation regulations due to the influence of previous colonial experience.  However, by 
the late 1920s mandate officials and numerous other actors involved in crafting these 
regulations had not standardised the provisions which were to regulate the application for, or 
the issuing of, passports.  The need for documentary identity was especially important to the 
immigration authorities in Palestine, as this section details.  The 1920 Aliens Restriction 
Order—one of the amendments to the 1914 and 1919 British Nationality and Status of Aliens 
Acts upon which the Palestinian nationality and immigration legislation was modeled—
required anyone who entered or left the United Kingdom to have a passport with a photo.  
With this act, the passport “became the backbone of the system of documentary 
substantiation of identity used to register and keep watch over the movements of aliens in the 
United Kingdom.”17  Yet the failure to apply passport and visa provisions evenly affected 
Palestine’s immigrants and emigrants.   
     Less than a year after the issue of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council, the British 
Colonial Office noted that both Jewish and Arab Palestinian citizens “may be placed in an 
awkward position if they want to travel” to or from Palestine and proposed to issue 
emergency travel documents to individuals without passports.  As discussed in Chapter Two, 
Palestinian passports were largely unavailable at the time of the Citizenship Order-in-
Council.  Although temporary passports were initially printed in 1920, only mandate officials 
used them and they did not resemble the Palestinian passport issued from 1924 onwards.  
The regular printing of passports did not begin until 1926.
18
  Instead, emergency certificates 
were used for one-way travel for provisional citizens and some residents of Palestine, but 
were susceptible to abuse since those in possession of them could reside outside of Palestine.  
Despite not fulfilling the residency obligation required for Palestinian citizenship, holders 
could be treated, even in their countries of birth, as Palestinian citizens under British 
protection.  The absence of passports was also made up by the laissez-passer, which was 
                                                   
17 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 116.  See also Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 15-16, for more on the North 
American case. 
18 Qafisheh, The International Law Foundations, 146. 
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treated like an emergency certificate.  After 1926, a Palestine passport looked similar to its 
British counterpart: it was brown with the words ‘British Passport’ on the cover above the 
seal of the Palestine Government.  ‘Palestine’ was written under the seal.19   
     By the time of the issue of the citizenship order, the passport translated into documentary 
proof of nationality, citizenship, and diplomatic protection.  A tightening of immigration 
regulations featured prominently alongside increased passport controls around the globe.
20
  
Statelessness was measured by the lack of a passport.  In Europe and the United States 
governments had monopolised the passport and other documentary controls on movement 
and borders since the late eighteenth century.  As the nation-state in the early twentieth 
century became a more intense network of institutions, passport and immigration controls 
aided the institutionalisation of nationality and citizenship.
21
  Populations became dependent 
on their national governments to legislate their identities and nationalities in reference to 
territorial borders.  A passport proved not only national belonging but according to Torpey, it 
was also part of “a profusion of bureaucratic techniques for administering the boundaries of a 
nation.”  Its growing importance after the First World War forced the League of Nations to 
pay attention to the plight of individuals who did not hold a passport or identity documents, 
including Arabs and other ethnic groups of former empires.  In the light of the Russian 
refugee crisis, the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, instituted the 
Nansen Passport after 1922.  Governments could accept the Nansen Passport as proof of 
identity without the need to grant citizenship rights to its bearer.
22
 
     With the widespread use of passports came the increased need for efficient travel facilities 
for emigrants, immigrants and travelers from and to Palestine.  The responsibility for this 
initially fell to the British Foreign and Home Offices which were in charge of consular and 
diplomatic facilities, and immigration and passport controls, respectively.  Before the 
standard issue of Palestinian passports, Jewish and Arab inhabitants could indeed travel and 
prove their identity but as the previous chapter has demonstrated, British consuls abroad and 
mandate immigration authorities did not always follow standard procedures.  Prior to 1925, 
                                                   
19 ‘Palestine passports,’ 11 June 1926, CO 733/114/514-515. Inside, a note requested that the holder pass freely 
and be given protection in the name of His Majesty’s Government. 
20 Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 6. 
21 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 4-12. 
22 Ibid., 122-127.  Governments were however not obliged to admit bearers of Nansen Passports into their 
territories. 
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the category of ‘provisional’ Palestinian citizenship confused consuls who were unsure of its 
international acceptance and whether both Arabs and Jews could declare it as their national 
identity.  Mandate officials and consuls generally granted laissez-passer to Palestinian Arabs 
on the basis of their Ottoman passport.  Jewish immigrants received certificates of 
provisional Palestinian nationality to travel.  However, the Arabs faced a disadvantage if 
they carried Ottoman identity documents.  They could be refused laissez-passer by British 
consuls since the Ottoman Empire no longer existed.  Furthermore, many former Ottoman 
subjects were still seen as enemies prior to the 1924 Treaty of Lausanne between the new 
Turkish Republic and the Allies.  Jewish residents with provisional certificates of Palestinian 
nationality did not face the same problems.  Jews who had been Ottoman subjects faced 
similar problems as to the Arab Ottomans if they were not in the service of the mandate 
government. 
     Once the provisions of the citizenship order became clear at the end of 1925, the Colonial 
Office requested that certain procedures be clarified, including the standard treatment given 
by British foreign consuls to applicants for travel to Palestine.  Disagreements between the 
Colonial and Foreign Offices over how to treat native Palestinians who lived abroad 
hindered any type of joint resolution.  The history of this bureaucratisation of immigration 
and nationality documentation must take into account an analysis of the differences of 
opinion between government departments.  For example, the high commissioner in 1927 felt 
that a more inclusive permission to settle in Palestine could be offered to individuals born in 
Palestine but without citizenship, against the opinion of the Foreign Office.  
     Despite Plumer’s opinion, Foreign Office consular instructions remained silent on his 
recommendations.  Palestinian natives who applied to travel to Palestine could not always 
obtain a Turkish passport or travel documents.  Emigrants who resided in countries without a 
Turkish consulate found it impossible to do so before and after 1925.
23
  Their naturalisation 
as Turkish citizens, however, was grounds for refusal of Palestinian citizenship since the 
mandate prohibited Arabs from holding dual nationality. 
     Another problem that plagued attempts to enforce passports and travel documents was the 
expiration of provisional certificates of Palestinian nationality.  This affected both Arab 
                                                   
23 Memo, Government Office in Jerusalem to Colonial Office, 18 Sept. 1927, CO 733/142/8/16-17. 
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natives who lived abroad and Jewish immigrants who were granted provisional nationality 
but had left Palestine.  Certificates given to Jewish immigrants between 1920 and 1925 as 
proof of provisional nationality had been issued on the understanding that these immigrants 
would acquire Palestinian citizenship.  As many Jews continued to use provisional 
certificates rather than claim citizenship, the Palestine government was forced in late 1925 to 
extend the validity of the provisional certificates to the end of 1926.  The Colonial Office 
decided to stop endorsing laissez-passers after March 1927 in another attempt to force 
Jewish immigrants to apply for a passport to prove their citizenship.  Those who could not 
prove that they were Palestinian citizens under the residency provisions of the citizenship 
order would be unable to travel on British-issued documents.
24
   
     Once the Palestine passport came into regular circulation in 1926, High Commissioner 
Plumer noted that it did not entitle bearers the right to enter the United Kingdom or any 
British protectorate, dominion, colony or mandate.
25
  In October 1925, the Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs confirmed that Palestinian passports offered no privilege for travel 
throughout the Empire or exemption from immigration and visa regulations.
26
  It must be 
remembered that Great Britain did not treat Palestinian citizens as British imperial subjects.  
Yet in practice a mandatory government was not in the legal position of providing travel and 
consular facilities to its own citizens.  Palestinian consular officers or embassies did not 
exist.  The duty of protection should have instead fallen upon the government which held the 
mandate—Great Britain.    
     The passport was linked directly to Palestinian citizenship.  Naturalised citizens—Jews 
and other non-Ottoman nationals and those Arabs who chose to naturalise—absent from 
Palestine for three years prior to applying for passport renewal would be required to state the 
reason for the absence to the Controller of Permits in Jerusalem.
27
  A five-year validity of 
Palestine passports was first proposed by the administration but the Colonial Office 
suggested two-years.  As such, officials argued, naturalised citizens could not evade the 
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26 Home Office memo, ‘Palestine Passports,’ Oct. 1926, CO 733/121/482-487. 
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residency obligation for more than two years without renewing their passports.
28
  If they 
attempted to do so, their citizenship status could be called into question when the passport 
was due for renewal.  In November 1926, High Commissioner Plumer authorised the Chief 
Immigration Officer to limit to two years the validity of Palestinian passports held by 
naturalised citizens in order to prevent “a considerable number” of such people from 
obtaining a passport and then settling abroad while they still came under British protection.  
Plumer referred to the practice of Jewish individuals who acquired citizenship and left 
Palestine as “the exploitation of Palestinian nationality.”29  It can be deduced that debates on 
passport renewals primarily focused on Jewish citizens since these naturalised individuals 
could freely travel in and out of Palestine, whereas Arab emigrants were frequently denied 
entry to Palestine in the first place.  Indeed, the archives show that the mandate’s 
immigration officers mainly processed passport applications and renewals for Jewish 
residents.   
     As neither the 1925 citizenship order nor the mandate’s immigration legislation provided 
a definitive standard procedure for the mandate authorities and British consuls to enforce 
passport and visa controls, the disputes between officials of the Colonial Office and the 
Palestine Administration exacerbated the disagreement over what procedures to actually 
apply for inhabitants of the mandate.  Although a variety of governmental bodies attempted 
to coordinate procedure, the need for each body to control a certain stage of that procedure 
created divergences of opinion not only in Palestine and Whitehall, but in regions where 
British consulates dealt with Palestinian Arabs and Jews.  The institutional control of 
Palestinian citizenship came to be linked closely with British nationality legislation.  
Moreover, procedures focused on facilitating the Jewish national home policy and thus 
attention very often shifted to the Jewish immigrants.   
 
                                                   
28 Art. 4 of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council referred to individuals over eighteen years of age who made 
a declaration  to become a Palestinian citizen within two years of the order if he was born in Palestine as an 
Ottoman, was resident for at least six months prior to the date of declaration and had not acquired a foreign 
nationality; Art. 5 referred to individuals who made a declaration of intent to opt for citizenship in accordance 
with Art. 2 of the 1922 Legislative Council Election Order and had a provisional certificate of Palestinian 
nationality, had been resident of Palestine and declared his desire to become a citizen according to Art. 4; Art. 7 
referred to individuals naturalised as Palestinian citizens and thus who met the qualifications for naturalisation.   
29 ‘Period of validity of Palestine passports,’ 16 Nov. 1926, CO 733/118/142. 
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Bureaucratising Palestinian nationality: naturalisation, revocation and amending 
citizenship  
 
 
     Following Arab complaints and a multiplicity of positions on the regulations for the 
acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by emigrant Arab natives, as well as the increased 
perception of the dangers of Palestine’s highly internationalised citizenship, the mandate 
administration was forced to bow to pressure to consider an amendment of the citizenship 
order in the latter 1920s.  The reform of naturalisation standards became one of the main 
points of contention over the proposed amendment.  Due to the mandate’s immigration 
policy, naturalisation was a key way individuals received Palestinian citizenship after 1925.  
The process normally applied to Jewish immigrants, although a small number of native-born 
Palestinian Arabs turned to the option of naturalisation if their claims to citizenship were 
refused.  Since immigrants had in the first instance to go through the naturalisation process, 
the administration and the British government constantly sought to ensure its provisions were 
efficiently applied.  In large part, this meant institutionalising the different procedures of 
naturalisation.  In other words, these procedures filtered through various bureaucratic 
departments in Palestine and Great Britain, becoming set practice with formal rules and 
differentiations based on an individual’s nationality at the time he or she entered Palestine.  
The distinctions between Arabs and Jews which emerged from the institutionalisation of 
naturalisation are crucial to an understanding of how each group experienced the loss of 
citizenship, denial of naturalisation, and dual nationality.   
     The current section further explores the removal of citizenship.  Drawing on British 
colonial perceptions of Eastern European Jews as deviant, disloyal and political agitators, 
this section analyses how the mandate administration and Colonial Office determined who 
was fit to receive citizenship.  As noted above, the hierarchy of citizenship and subjecthood 
applied in Palestine was far from novel.  Rather, it was standard practice in European 
colonies.  Similarly, during the interwar period in the US, such a hierarchy based on ‘ethnic’ 
or national origin was codified into immigration law to produce the new category of the 
‘illegal alien.’30 
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     Palestinian naturalisation, while following British legislation, was conditional on other 
factors, such as gender, marital status, deportation, and the laws of other states.  Since 
encouragement for Jewish immigration to Palestine was a cornerstone of mandate policy, the 
British officials focused mainly on how these conditions affected the Jewish residents.  The 
Palestine Administration first instituted naturalisation in 1925 in accordance with the 
provisions of the citizenship order.  On the basis of the 1922 electoral order, Jewish habitual 
residents with provisional certificates of nationality would not need to naturalise, but new 
arrivals (including Arabs who were unable to claim citizenship) needed to do so.  As 
explained in Chapter Two, the stated qualifications for naturalisation were simple: Jewish 
immigrants needed to have knowledge of Hebrew, English or Arabic, a good ‘character,’ and 
residence in Palestine for two out of three years prior to their naturalisation.  In addition, 
applicants paid minimal fees and gave an oath of loyalty to the government.
31
  The straight-
forward nature of the procedure suggests that debate over it was initially limited.  In fact, the 
question of British naturalisation for Arab, Jewish, and other civil servants in the Palestinian 
government was the first priority for the administration.  In early 1926 discussions between 
the Colonial Office and the Palestine Government drew attention to questions of 
naturalisation procedure, highlighting the questionable status of the Palestine Mandate as 
part of the British colonial empire.  The Colonial Office regarded naturalisation, whether to 
British or Palestinian citizenship, as a practice to be carried out entirely as provided for in 
United Kingdom legislation.
32
  The debate further demonstrated the unique situation of the 
mandate—as not a traditional colony—and Great Britain’s obligations toward the Zionist 
Organisation. 
     Before the issue of the 1925 citizenship order, the Colonial Office questioned the plan to 
grant British naturalisation to future Palestinian citizens employed in the mandate 
government.  The practice was widespread in British colonies.  The basic criteria of who 
could be a ‘European’ fluctuated in different colonial contexts in the early twentieth 
century,
33
 but in Palestine colonial officials worried about loyalty to Great Britain.  In certain 
cases, they considered the Palestinians to be akin to imperial subjects.  However, in other 
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32 Colonial Office memo, ‘Administration Policy,’ 27 Feb. 1926, CO 733/112/86-87. 
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cases as one official explained, it would be “inexpedient” to view Palestinians as subjects of 
the empire because the British government “[has] brought into being the ‘Palestinian 
Citizen.’  If we proceed to convert him into a British subject by naturalisation, we shall 
expose ourselves to criticism.”  Palestine was considered a protected state with a local 
nationality rather than a British protectorate—the inhabitants of the latter being subjects.  
Still, subjecthood was often classified along blurred lines dependent upon the British 
territory in which inhabitants resided.
34
  It became mandate practice to allow non-British or 
non-Palestinian civil servants in Palestine to choose the citizenship of either Great Britain or 
Palestine, pending the authorisation of the high commissioner.
35
  However, any alien to 
Palestine who obtained (British) imperial naturalisation inside Palestine (such as a civil 
servant) was to be recognised as a British subject everywhere, including within Palestine.
36
  
The option for civil servants of Palestine to naturalise as British subjects seemed an attractive 
one, but in practice Palestinian citizens had British protection outside of Palestine just as 
British subjects did.     
     Naturalisation, as stated above, was essential for the proposed Jewish national home.  
Only once Jewish immigrants became Palestinian citizens could they be enfranchised, added 
to communal voting registers and if male, pass their citizenship to wives and offspring.  The 
pace of immigration to Palestine slowed down after 1925.  Since a significant number of 
immigrants did not actually naturalise as citizens for reasons explained in subsequent 
chapters, the administration began to reflect on its naturalisation policies.
37
  In 1929 
Palestine’s attorney-general, Norman Bentwich, explained the need to make naturalisation as 
appealing as possible for Jewish immigrants.  He initially claimed that fees to naturalise 
hindered the policy meant to “to encourage settlers to adopt Palestinian citizenship.”38  
Eligibility criteria, as mentioned in Chapter Two, were taken from the United Kingdom’s 
naturalisation legislation and therefore the Palestine and British administrations spent a great 
                                                   
34 For a discussion of these confusing and often overlapping statuses of inhabitants of a variety of British 
possessions in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens 
and Others, 114-116. 
35 Colonial Office memo, ‘Administration Policy,’ 27 Feb. 1926, CO 733/112/86-87. 
36 ‘British naturalisation of persons resident in Palestine,’ April 1928, CO 733/167/5/1. 
37 One reason included the identification by many of Palestine’s Jews with the Yishuv as their ‘state’ and the 
guarantor of rights, duties and welfare. 
38 Government offices memo, ‘Rise in fees for naturalisation,’ 28 Nov. 1929, CO 733/171/14/12. 
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deal of energy debating how to conform the procedure in Palestine with the existing 
legislation and its periodic amendments in Great Britain.   
 
Obtaining naturalised citizenship 
 
     In the first instance, the Palestine Administration attempted to ensure that 
naturalisation procedures for married women and minor children conformed to British 
legislation.  Specifically, the citizenship and nationality status of women and children 
required clarification in the case of marriage and divorce.  The 1925 order deemed 
married women to be naturalised to the Palestinian citizenship of their husbands in line 
with British legislation.  Officials took marriages very seriously: proof of legitimate 
marriages between Jewish Palestinian citizens and foreigners was required and obtaining 
such proof often presented an obstacle to naturalisation of immigrants.   
     A second important issue the administration sought to standardize—and one that affected 
Arabs and Jews differently—was the citizenship of minors.  As late as the mid-1930s, two 
sets of rules were enforced.  The Colonial Office had been especially clear that children born 
to native Arab parents who resided outside Palestine and did not have citizenship were not to 
be considered Palestinian.  Both the Colonial and Home Offices agreed that Palestinian 
citizens who lived abroad could not register the birth of their children at British consulates.  
The policy meant that British consulates, especially in Latin America, did not have exact 
records on the number of Palestinians by descent who resided in their districts.  In stark 
contrast, Jewish immigrants to Palestine could add their minor children to their naturalisation 
certificates even if the children had not been born inside mandate territory.
39
    
     Instances of dual nationality plagued both Jewish immigrants and the Palestine 
Government, complicating efforts at regulation.  It must be recalled that dual nationality was 
acceptable only for Jewish immigrants in Palestine.  Arabs born in Palestine who lived 
abroad could not return to their homeland as citizens if they acquired any new nationality, 
including that of Turkey.  This official stance against dual nationality was not unusual in 
emerging nation states.  On the one hand it undermined the link between an individual and 
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the sovereign state, whilst on the other it multiplied claims to protections and rights.
40
  
Dependent on the regulations of the country from which Jewish immigrants came, an 
application to naturalise in Palestine could lead to the revocation of the original nationality of 
immigrants.  In these cases, immigrants were stripped of their former nationality and 
rendered stateless even if they were refused naturalisation in Palestine.  Such immigrants 
faced a similar situation to that of Palestinian Arab emigrants who could not claim 
Palestinian citizenship: they became stateless, without consular protection and without a 
valid passport.  This was most often the case for the Jewish immigrants from states in 
Eastern Europe which refused to accept dual nationality of natives.  It is perhaps for this 
reason that by the end of the 1920s, many of the early immigrants to Palestine retained their 
provisional nationality certificates and were reluctant to opt for citizenship. 
     The Palestine and British governments devoted significant amounts of energy to attempts 
to rectify the problems posed by dual nationality, particularly the deportation of naturalised 
citizens from Palestine.  The mandate administration had the power to deport anyone refused 
Palestinian citizenship, disloyal to the administration, or who carried citizenship whilst 
resident abroad.  Once a naturalised Jewish citizen was deported by immigration authorities 
in Palestine, Great Britain and the Palestine Government were under no obligation to offer 
that former citizen diplomatic protection.  Colonial officials such as Gerard Clauson 
proposed to ask foreign countries not to strip deported or non-naturalised Jewish immigrants 
of their original nationality in order to avoid instances of statelessness.  Even so, by 1930 
some European governments forced their Jewish emigrants to renounce their nationality 
before they left for Palestine.
41
  Colonial Secretary Leopold Amery advised Assistant Under-
Secretary for the Colonies, John Shuckburgh, that the Jewish immigrants without Palestinian 
citizenship were liable to be deported for not complying with the provisions of the 
citizenship and immigration legislation.  It is noteworthy that the colonial secretary also tried 
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to induce some foreign governments to accept their former nationals who had been deported 
from Palestine.
42
   
     Despite the efforts by officials to create non-restrictive regulations for naturalisation, by 
the end of the 1920s Jewish immigrants avoided that process in large numbers.  Instead, they 
chose instead to remain in Palestine without citizenship and thus without pledging loyalty to 
the mandate government.  Meanwhile, as described in Chapter Four, many Palestinian Arab 
emigrants refused to naturalise on the basis that as natives of Palestine, they should not be 
required to do so.  While the high commissioners had a duty to uphold the nationality 
legislation, the Palestine Administration was also required to be up-to-date on nationality and 
naturalisation legislation in the United Kingdom, on the precedents set by British 
administrations elsewhere, and on international standards of nationality.  All of these factors 
influenced the development of a bureaucratic apparatus dealing with citizenship regulations 
in Palestine as well as any proposed amendments.  Such amendments are the subject of the 
next section, and the culmination of legislative changes came about with the amended 
citizenship order in 1931.   
 
Amending citizenship and treaty nationality 
 
     By the end of the 1920s, the remonstrations of the Palestinian Arabs against the 
citizenship order’s failure to address adequately the status of emigrants, as explained in the 
previous chapter, drew the attention of the high commissioner.  Due to the active protest 
campaign led by the Committee for the Defense of Arab Emigrant Rights to Palestinian 
Nationality (DAER) beginning in 1927, the British took a greater interest in applications for 
citizenship by Palestinian natives who resided outside of Palestine.  Yet the opinions varied 
over how closely connected these individuals were to Palestine, hindering a unanimous 
resolution.   
     The Colonial Office was forced to reconsider rejections as a result of the large numbers of 
petitions received from Palestinian communities in South and Central America between 1925 
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and 1930.  In 1927 Colonial Secretary Amery seemed inclined to support extension of 
citizenship to emigrants who maintained a connection with their native land.
43
  However, the 
Foreign and Home Offices continued to instruct British consular officials not to accept 
applications from individuals whom they deemed to want citizenship for the purpose of 
obtaining British protection.  High Commissioner Plumer advised colonial officials that 
individuals must show a “genuine desire to resume their connection with Palestine” to be 
given consent to travel to Palestine in order to naturalise.  On the advice of Plumer, the 
Foreign Office categorically rejected thousands of applicants for citizenship through the 
latter 1920s, in spite of their possession of Ottoman identity documents.
44
   
     Colonial officials in Britain began to seriously discuss an amendment to the Citizenship 
Order-in-Council in 1929 in light of the serious violence and rioting that summer between 
Arabs and Jews and because of the unresolved issues that affected the acquisition and 
revocation of citizenship for both groups.  In the fall of 1927, the Colonial Office’s opinion 
shifted in favour of a general reconsideration (as proposed by Attorney-General Norman 
Bentwich) of citizenship applications by emigrants who had been unable to claim Palestinian 
citizenship by August 1926.  However, the Office carried out these reviews subjectively.  
The Colonial Office Legal Advisor, J.S. Risley, supported changing certain provisions of the 
legislation and wrote in a memo that the order-in-council termed as an “instruction” was 
“just the sort of enterprise” from the mind of Attorney-General Bentwich who “loves the 
loose generalities of International Law.”45  These loose generalities such as the meaning of 
nationality and citizenship in the international context were not the only stumbling blocks to 
amending the order.  The synthesis of colonial and imperial legislation and the 
internationalised nature of citizenship in Palestine not only made the mandate legislation 
unique but also weakened its international standing and recognition.  Bentwich too 
complicated matters due to his lack of experience in colonial administration and English 
law.
46
  Additionally, statements by the Colonial Office suggest a general feeling that that 
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because some emigrants had not expressed interest in returning to Palestine, the majority of 
individuals in the diaspora had the same attitude.     
     By December 1927, then-Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, 
discussed the Palestine Government’s proposal to reconsider those rejected claims for 
citizenship  which were made in time by emigrants who were legally Ottoman subjects and 
left Palestine before, during or after 1920 (and had since returned and resided for at least six 
months).  Ormsby-Gore suggested that any Palestinian by birth who resided abroad with the 
newly-created Turkish nationality would be “freely granted permission to visit or settle in 
Palestine with his family.”  This suggestion did not take into account stateless Palestinians 
who did not possess Turkish nationality papers but still held Ottoman identity documents.  
According to Ormsby-Gore, the extent to which Palestinian communities abroad took 
advantage of this concession would be regarded as the measurement of the genuine 
attachment of the entire community to Palestine.  These emigrants should find it easy, he 
continued, to fulfill the conditions to be naturalised “if their principle interests be in 
Palestine.”47  Yet, the key issue for determining the emigrants’ eligibility for citizenship was 
the period of time they resided outside Palestine. 
     A single amendment to Article 1 of the order came under consideration by 1929.  The 
basis of Article 1 was that former Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Palestine on 6 
August 1924 were entitled by the Treaty of Lausanne to Palestinian citizenship.  If they were 
absent on 1 August 1925 and returned to Palestine before August 1926 (and resided for six 
months prior to that date) without opting for Turkish or another nationality under Article 1, 
they were theoretically entitled to claim Palestinian citizenship without the need to indicate 
Palestine as their permanent home (ipso facto).
48
  Risley suggested the addition to Article 1 
of an amended clause that allowed for ‘treaty nationality.’  This meant that former Ottoman 
subjects who were habitually resident in Palestine on the date the Treaty of Lausanne went 
into force (6 August 1924) but left before 1 August 1925 and returned anytime after without 
another nationality would be entitled to make a declaration of the retention of Palestinian 
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citizenship.  The Foreign Office felt such a provision was unnecessary and suggested that the 
rest of the order should be amended instead of Article 1.
49
   
     However, provisions for treaty nationality would have not affected the vast majority of 
emigrants who left Palestine before August 1924.  Within the Palestine Administration, High 
Commissioner Plumer recognised (in opposition to the Foreign Office’s stance) the need to 
make some concessions.  He asked the Colonial Office to agree to a consideration of 
applications for Palestinian citizenship by Ottoman subjects who resided in Palestine until 
October 1924—several months after the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect—and then left, 
returning by 1927 to Palestine.
50
  This was only the minimum concession that the emigrants 
and their lobbyists had campaigned for.  The DAER committee in fact asked that all 
emigrants, regardless of when they left Palestine and of the Lausanne treaty, be given 
citizenship upon request or upon their return to Palestine.  The subjective review of 
applications by the administration and the Foreign Office did little to ease the hardships of 
emigrants not entitled to citizenship or entry to Palestine. 
 An entirely different idea came from Norman Bentwich.  Rather than an amendment to 
provide treaty nationality, he suggested to resort to the courts.  A court’s job would be to 
determine the habitual residency of Palestinian applicants for citizenship.  Of course, the 
practice of obtaining court decisions on applications for citizenship from Palestinians abroad 
would be logistically difficult and time-consuming.  Bentwich proposed other ideas, 
including one that would allow for any person who left Palestine between 1924 and 1925 and 
returned within five years to be regarded as a habitual resident according to the citizenship 
order’s Article 1.51  The implementation of this idea would have entitled these individuals to 
citizenship and it also offered the longest extension period for natives to choose citizenship 
as yet suggested by a mandate official. 
     According to Bentwich, his latter plan allowed returning emigrants to “be treated as 
Palestinians as of right and not by naturalisation [which] is a great moment to those 
involved.”  His proposal acknowledged and reflected the argument of the emigrants against 
naturalisation and supported their demand for citizenship by right of nationality (haqq al-
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jinsiyya).  Bentwich argued this would bring the Treaty of Lausanne’s provisions and the 
order-in-council into closer conformity as the treaty gave Ottoman subjects habitually 
resident in territories detached from the Empire after the war the ipso facto nationality of the 
state those territories were transferred to, on the conditions of local laws within them.
52
  The 
Foreign Office countered that the period for option for emigrants be changed to four years 
rather than five.
53
   
     In a subsequent memo from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, the Foreign 
Secretary wrote in 1929 that the entire citizenship order-in-council should be amended.  In 
other words, he felt that inserting new amendments to articles would not be sufficient.  The 
following year the Colonial Office came to the same conclusion.
54
  Although both offices 
agreed that the British Government should ratify an entirely new order, other governmental 
departments as well as the mandate administration were asked to contribute to drafting an 
entirely new, amended order.  Almost immediately after this agreement, the Foreign and 
Home Offices expressed differences of opinion over the draft’s new and re-worked 
provisions.
55
   
 One of the initial disagreements concerned the distribution of power between the 
Palestine Administration and Whitehall in situations of granting or revoking the 
naturalisation or citizenship of Palestinian Arabs and Jews.
 56
  In particular, one provision of 
the amended order draft gave high commissioners the power to revoke the citizenship from 
Palestinian natives who resided abroad but returned to Palestine to take citizenship after 
1924, as well as from Jews who arrived to Palestine between 1918 and 1925.
57
  Debates such 
as these stalled the ratification of the completed amended order-in-council.   
     In July 1931, the British government ratified the newly-written order, titled as the 1931 
Palestine (Amendment) Citizenship Order-in-Council.  It incorporated the provision for 
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treaty nationality and gave four years from the date of issue to allow native-born Palestinians 
to claim citizenship.  Ottoman subjects who were habitually resident in Palestine before 1 
August 1925 received ipso facto Palestinian citizenship unless they had acquired another 
nationality prior to the amendment.  Yet, the Home Office reaffirmed that native-born 
Palestinians resident abroad must maintain a substantial connection to Palestine to qualify for 
ipso facto treaty nationality—“periodic visits” to the territory were not enough.58  As to the 
power struggle between London and Jerusalem, the order gave high commissioners the 
explicit power to revoke or annul a certificate of naturalisation for any reason deemed 
legitimate.
59
  In sum, the amended citizenship order did not radically alter the original order 
nor allow for a significant number of Palestinian Arab emigrants to return to Palestine as 
citizens.  In fact, only those Arabs who left in the year between the ratification of the 
Lausanne Treaty and the issue of the 1925 citizenship order qualified to return as such.   
     The amended order came after the reports by the Shaw and Hope-Simpson commissions 
recommended changes to immigration legislation in order to prevent outbreaks of violence, 
and after the MacDonald letter.  Colonial administrators also drafted the amended order 
during a time of changes with the departure of both High Commissioner Chancellor and the 
attorney-general.  The latter was a significant change.  Norman Bentwich, who had become 
the resident expert on nationality legislation, was replaced by Harry Trusted in 1931.
60
  The 
secretary, under-secretary and other staff positions in the Colonial Office were also re-
shuffled.  These administrative changes, plus new developments in the internal political 
situation in Palestine hampered any general agreement between all departments involved. 
 
The amended order, subversive citizens, and the international context  
 
     After the issue of the 1931 Palestine (Amendment) Citizenship Order-in-Council, it 
became clear that the administration in Palestine applied provisions of citizenship legislation 
unevenly.  Some examples of this, prior to 1931, have already been noted in the first section 
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of the chapter.  In light of the amended order, these distinctions deserve further investigation.  
They did not all privilege Jewish immigrants, however.  In the interwar period, the Colonial 
Office and mandate administration increasingly feared that Jews were subversive, disloyal 
and international conspirators.  Such fears within the wider context of Bolshevist and 
communist anxieties were also prevalent in Palestine not only among Arabs but also those 
colonial officials who did not fully support the Zionist project. 
The removal of Jewish Palestinian citizenship   
 
     By virtue of the 1931 amended citizenship order, as mentioned above, the high 
commissioners had the power to grant or revoke any person’s citizenship.  Jews who resided 
outside of Palestine in contravention of the residency clause faced the possibility of having 
their citizenship revoked or annulled.  Additionally, in the late 1920s, the mandate authorities 
began to recommend the revocation of naturalisation certificates held by so-called 
‘undesirables.’61  The high commissioners who served after 1925 were concerned that the 
removal of Palestinian citizenship rendered some of the Jewish immigrants from Eastern 
Europe stateless and unable to be easily deported.  The following sub-section briefly 
analyses the problems associated with the removal of Palestinian citizenship before and just 
after the 1931 amendment.   
     Throughout the 1920s, immigration authorities in the British Empire and elsewhere 
tightened controls on the acceptance of Eastern European immigrants, fearing the spread of 
Bolshevik propaganda.  Prior to the First World War, Great Britain had set up special 
immigration controls for suspected subversive aliens who might incite political violence.
62
  
By the interwar period, the international range of Palestine’s potential Jewish citizens 
elicited similar fears among officials in both the Colonial Office and mandate administration.  
As discussed above, the British supported a particular type of Jewish immigrant to Palestine, 
one who was European, prosperous, self-sufficient and pro-British.  By the late 1920s, 
officials such as Chancellor expressed anxiety over Eastern European and Russian Jews who 
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immigrated to Palestine.  They anticipated that the socialist and internationalist affiliations of 
these immigrants would cause a lack of patriotism.  In particular, Chancellor expressed the 
view that these immigrants would not be loyal to Great Britain.
63
  Before 1931, the Foreign 
Office thought that high commissioners were responsible for creating a stateless class of 
people that included unsavory political agitators and others although they only annulled the 
citizenship of a small number of Jewish immigrants.  Still, the Foreign Office faced the 
repercussions of these annulments when it attempted to negotiate with other countries to 
allow their natives to return.  Most deportations of Palestine’s naturalised citizens did not 
affect only the deportee.  With the removal of the citizenship of an adult male came the 
revocation of the same status of his wife and children.  Although revocations and 
deportations did in fact happen, administrators often tried to avoid them since they reflected 
poorly on the facilitation of Jewish immigration. 
     Attorney-General Harry Trusted, Bentwich’s replacement, clearly wished to minimize 
conflict with the Zionist Organisation when he decided in 1934 that three years’ residence 
abroad for a naturalised Palestinian Jew was “not enough [cause] to revoke Palestinian 
citizenship.”  He referred to the case of a Jewish immigrant who was given a certificate of 
naturalisation in 1929 despite his apparent residence in Morocco since 1927.  When the 
individual applied to renew his Palestinian passport in 1934, mandate officials questioned 
whether he had lost his connection to Palestine due to his six-year residence abroad.  The 
individual in question gave evidence in favour of retaining citizenship.  He claimed that he 
refused French citizenship in Morocco, owned immovable property in Palestine, and that 
Palestine was his home country.  The administration decided to renew his passport for three 
years on the condition that he returned to Palestine to reside permanently before it expired.  
Trusted, like his predecessor, did not give the same leeway to Arab Palestinians born in 
Palestine and resident abroad: he did not advocate for changes to the citizenship order’s 
provisions on this issue nor did he respond to demands from the emigrants for citizenship.
64
   
     The Arabs in Palestine, meanwhile, took notice of this favouritism which allowed for 
Jews to keep their Palestine passports even if they lived outside of the country.  In 1928 the 
press reported on a new article to the immigration law of the Palestine government meant to 
                                                   
63 Norris, Land of Progress, 38-39. 
64 ‘Nationality: Revocation of Certificates of Naturalisation,’ 20 Aug. 1934, ISA/M/710/14. 
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punish, with three months imprisonment and a fine of 100 lira, any immigrant who lied about 
their birth date or name in their passport.  In response, an Arab journalist ironically 
questioned how the government intended to punish the immigrant “who carries three 
passports in his pocket for at least three different nationalities.”65   
     Even after the issue of the 1931 amended citizenship order, members of the Palestine 
Administration, the Colonial, Foreign and other offices continued to question its provisions 
as well as immigration regulations.  For example, in opposition to the opinion by H.F. 
Downie, the head of the Middle East Department, High Commissioner Chancellor and the 
Colonial Office did not entirely support the regulation that when a man’s citizenship was 
revoked, his wife and children lost theirs as well.
66
  At the crux of the disagreements was, yet 
again, the idea that revocation of citizenship held by Jews reflected poorly on the mandate’s 
efforts to facilitate a Jewish national home.  Still, other colonial administrators believed that 
certain immigrants had the potential to subvert and behave in a disloyal manner to both the 
Palestine Administration and Great Britain.  Not only were Jewish male immigrants suspect, 
but in the early 1930s the status of Jewish female immigrants became one of the most 
contentious in the light of international politics.   
 
Undesirable citizens 
 
     One proposed, but unaccepted, amendment to the 1925 citizenship order concerned 
certain ‘undesirable’ women who sought a Palestinian passport and citizenship.  This 
category included prostitutes, criminals, and political offenders who married Palestinian 
citizens in order to obtain citizenship and British protection.  In accordance with the 
citizenship order’s Article 13, alien women who became Palestinian citizens by marriage 
would not cease to be Palestinians if they divorced their husbands.  These women had legal 
citizenship, but the administration also targeted for deportation those Jewish women who 
resided illegally in Palestine without citizenship of their own or that of their husband.  
Colonial officials lobbied before 1931 for the insertion of an amendment in the citizenship 
order to the effect that an alien woman could not acquire citizenship as a consequence of 
                                                   
65 “Mudhakara ‘ala huwl qānun al-hijra” [Note on immigration law], 9 Jan. 1928, al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya. 
66 ‘Citizenship Order-in-Council Amendment Order,’ 30 May 1932, CO 733/220/12/2-3. 
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marriage or if faced with a deportation order as an ‘undesirable’ or otherwise labeled as a 
‘bad character.’67  The detailed and lengthy discussions of these particular cases in the 
archives are perhaps indicative of their frequency by the early 1930s.   
 The debate over how to grant Palestinian naturalisation to certain Jews contributed to 
what was actually an Empire-wide debate over the status of married women and the retention 
of their original nationality.  In 1932, the Home Office (with the support of the Foreign 
Office) stated that it had no objection in principle to preventing certain Jewish immigrants 
from receiving Palestinian citizenship upon marriage, but noted international standards.  
Those standards specifically included the progressive 1930 Hague Convention principles 
which, although unsigned by both the Palestine Government and Great Britain, maintained 
that a woman retained her original nationality upon marriage.  In that case, she would not be 
stateless in the event of a deportation.
68
  In the 1920s, suspect women were usually not 
stripped of their citizenship or deported.   
     The opinion of the high commissioners also played a role in defining undesirable citizens.  
High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope, appointed in 1931, argued that the practice to allow 
undesirable women to acquire citizenship was inconsistent with British nationality laws.  He 
summarised his opinion thus: divorced women stayed in Palestine “free to continue their 
objectionable activities . . . with all the privileges of indefeasible Palestinian nationality.”  At 
the same time, officials in Britain suggested that the British nationality law be changed to 
allow for separate naturalisation of husband and wife.  This change at the imperial centre 
would have been complicated and expensive to implement in Palestine, not least because it 
threatened the success of the Jewish national home policy.
69
  Thus, Wauchope suggested that 
future legislation must give Jewish wives the opportunity of separate naturalisation from 
their husbands “on very easy terms,” in light of facilitating the national home policy of the 
mandate.
70
 
     This debate again situates the Palestine Mandate in a unique position in the wider British 
Empire.  The proposal for separate naturalisation was in reference only to Jewish 
                                                   
67 ‘Citizenship Order-in-Council Amendment Order,’ 30 May 1932, CO 733/220/12. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Memo, High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Citizenship Amendment Order,’ 18 June 
1932, CO 733/220/12. 
70 Ibid., 9 May 1932.  
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immigrants—not Arabs or any other group.  Once again, debates over the separate 
naturalisation for Jews emphasised the distinct bureaucratic measures envisaged with regards 
to citizenship where the Jewish community was involved.  In support of the proposal for 
separate naturalisation for women, one colonial official wrote that unless the high 
commissioner and Foreign Office saw “strong practical [emphasis in original] objections to 
this (as opposed to objections based merely on principle and on the analogy of British 
practice), . . . the special circumstances arising in Palestine should prevail.”71  The debate 
over separate naturalisation in Palestine extended to the Dominions Office of the British 
government in whose interest it was to ensure that nationality legislation was as uniform as 
possible throughout the Empire.
72
  
     The Dominions Office, which had considerable influence over wider imperial policy, held 
the opposite opinion on female naturalisation.  Its comments reflect how by 1933 Palestine 
came to be perceived in matters of nationality.  To the Colonial Office, Assistant Secretary 
of the Dominions Office C.W. Dixon replied the following: 
 
It would be rather a pity if so fundamental a change from existing British 
practice was made in a territory under Mandate of His Majesty, as it might be 
quoted by some of the Dominions as an argument in favour of the view that 
the law of nationality as regards married women in relation to nationality of 
the Dominion concerned need not be the same as that in relation to British 
nationality.  It is not likely that any Dominion would wish to copy Palestine . 
. . as the Dominions which attach most importance to the idea of separate 
Dominion nationality are those which are strongest on maintaining 
uniformity of nationality between husband and wife. . . . Our answer would, I 
suppose, have to be that already suggested to FO, and HO, viz. that Palestine 
citizenship is not ‘nationality.’[emphasis added] 
 
In suggesting that Palestinian citizenship was not British nationality, Dixon maintained that 
nationality legislation in the Dominions would not necessarily effect how Palestinian 
individuals acquired citizenship.  He added that if the matter of independent naturalisation 
for wives was one of “first-class importance,” the possible embarrassment in the Dominions 
                                                   
71 ‘Citizenship Order in Palestine,’ 1933, CO 733/238/14/3-4.  Wauchope even noted that the Palestine 
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over policy contradictions should not be sufficient grounds to refuse Wauchope’s suggested 
proposal.
73
 
     The Palestine Administration in 1933 consulted with Whitehall and asked the British 
government to opt for separate naturalisations.  This course of action raised issues of policy 
in Whitehall and in other colonies such as India.  Great Britain could not consider the 
proposal because it diverted from Empire-wide policy, and the administration had not shown 
that the situation in Palestine necessitated that a departure from uniformity was justifiable. 
Defeated when the scheme of separate naturalizations was not implemented, the Colonial 
Office cautioned that conditions of immigration in Palestine “rendered abuses of nationality 
laws more than ordinarily dangerous” in light of the political activities of certain male and 
female Jewish immigrants.
74
   
     The language of nationality and citizenship resurged in light of changes to the 1925 order.  
In the early 1920s, Great Britain had argued that Palestinian citizenship was not a sovereign, 
internationally-recognised nationality in accordance with British nationality law.  
Furthermore, the Law Officers of the Empire had previously stated that Palestine was not a 
foreign state.  Since Article 7 of the mandate gave the Palestine Administration the 
responsibility to enact a nationality law, officials suggested in the early 1930s that it would 
be difficult “to contend that the obligation imposed by that Article has not been discharged 
by the making of the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925.”  Still the Foreign Office argued 
that Palestinian citizenship was not the same as Palestinian nationality, and that it did “not 
think it ought to be so . . . [officials] do not regard Palestinian citizenship as ‘nationality.’ ”  
In other words, it was possible to claim that Palestinian nationality did not exist since the 
Palestine Administration had not yet enacted a nationality law.  Nationality then did not exist 
in Palestine in a political or ethnic sense.  Rather the British government had passed a 
citizenship order-in-council.  Thus the Palestine Administration could possibly be charged 
with not carrying out Article 7 of the mandate.
75
  The lack of a nationality law meant that 
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citizenship could be imposed and manipulated from the centre, making the inhabitants of 
Palestine colonial citizens.   
     Similar to the discussion of independent naturalisation of women, the British government 
was reluctant to set precedents of nationality legislation in Palestine even in light of the 
increased threat of political agitation in Europe and in other British territories.  The British 
government connected threats of political agitation with the Arab community as well, 
particularly after Colonial Secretary Passfield recognised the struggle of the Arabs to attain 
rights as a ‘separate race’ in Palestine.  Against the constant Jewish immigration, 30,000 
Palestinian Arab emigrants remained without citizenship.  The Passfield Letter linked the 
political inferiority and the lack of political rights of the Palestinian Arab citizenry with 
increased political agitation against British policy and the Zionist movement.
76
  For example, 
Lord Islington, in a speech to Parliament in mid-1934, stated “though fulfilling the duties of 
citizenship, [the Arabs] are totally without its rights.”77  As political agitation increased in 
the 1930s in Palestine, so too did references to the apolitical nature of Palestinian citizenship. 
     By three years after the issue of the amended citizenship order, it was evident that the 
amendment had not, in fact, clarified the intricacies of Palestinian citizenship and nor did it 
satisfy the Zionist Organisation.  Dominions Office member K.O. Roberts-Wray stated that it 
was an “indisputable fact” that the legislation, including provisions on the revocation of 
naturalisation and the annulment of citizenship, was never intended to deny any Palestinian 
Jew of his citizenship.  Roberts-Wray saw no reason for Palestine to be “guided strictly” by 
the United Kingdom nationality laws and practices in matters of nationality and de-
naturalisation, both of which did not always favour the Jewish national home establishment.  
Despite increased threats to Great Britain from so-called communist propaganda in overseas 
territories, Roberts-Wray expressed alarm at proposals to allow the Palestine Government to 
de-naturalise those Palestinian Jewish citizens who were believed to have left Palestine and 
travelled for the purpose of obtaining communist propaganda.  He emphasized that 
individuals who became Jewish citizens by virtue of certificates of nationality granted before 
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1925 could not be de-naturalised in any circumstance.
78
  In fact implementing such a 
provision to (as the Foreign Office claimed) allow the Palestine Government to “keep these 
dangerous elements outside Palestine,” would risk confrontation with Zionist leaders.79   
     Palestinian Jewish citizens who were linked to political agitation such as communist 
activities and propaganda were increasingly perceived as a very real threat after 1933, but 
debates continued over whether, and how, to revoke citizenship from this new class of 
politically undesirable persons.  Some colonial officials suggested withholding travel 
facilities so that ‘indoctrinated’ people could not leave Palestine.80  A memo from the 
Dominions Office to Sir John Maffey, the Under-secretary of State for the Colonies in 1934, 
offered support for the proposal to deprive Palestinian citizenship from any Arab or Jew who 
went to the Soviet Union for what was referred to as a course in communist propaganda.  
The idea was a new one and at that time, not applied elsewhere in British territories.  
However, many of those accused as subversives had citizenship by virtue of their prior 
Ottoman nationality or habitual residence in Palestine.  The high commissioners continued to 
be reluctant to remove citizenship from such individuals.
81
   
 
Conclusion 
 
     The mandate policy to facilitate the Jewish national home in Palestine and encourage 
settler-colonialism through citizenship guided nationality legislation, its changes and its 
application in the years after the issue of the 1925 citizenship order.  In many cases, the 
application of citizenship and the naturalisation of Jewish immigrants conflicted with 
Empire-wide nationality laws, and the Palestine Administration and British government 
offices did their best to amend the laws to fit in with mandate policy.  At the same time, 
different approaches to standard procedure served Britain’s power and authority in Palestine: 
disagreements meant that complaints by the Arabs over contraventions of policy had little 
basis, since standard policy was usually lacking.  Meanwhile the institutionalisation of 
citizenship reflected the differences between citizenship for Jewish immigrants and 
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citizenship for former Ottoman subjects.  These differences were also reflected in 
documentary identity procedures applied to Arabs and Jews. 
     The experiences of colonial officials who served elsewhere in British colonies prior to 
their service in Palestine influenced certain nationality, naturalisation and immigration 
regulations that were implemented in the mandated territory.  The work of Ann Stoler, used 
throughout this chapter, has demonstrated that social and cultural practices signified that an 
individual was modern or European and thus was ready to become a citizen.  Indeed, this 
ideology was reflected in the language used by colonial officials in reference to the 
population of Palestine.  For example, Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews were viewed 
as separate ‘races’ in the colonial vocabulary of national identity.  Out of this discourse came 
the treatment of Jewish Palestinian citizens as more akin to British subjects in matters of 
immigration and documentary identity.  By the mid-1930s, Palestinian nationality and 
Palestinian citizenship indicated separate legal statuses.  The need to adhere to mandate 
policy to facilitate a Jewish national home while at the same time preventing immigrants of a 
certain unsavory character from acquiring citizenship convinced the British and Palestine 
administrations of the importance of colonial-style nationality legislation.   
     As the chapter demonstrates, the 1931 amended citizenship order came at a time of 
scrutiny of policy in Palestine by the British government, but neither the requests for 
restrictions on Jewish immigration nor other requests for greater protections of Arab rights 
were incorporated into citizenship legislation.  The changes, as explained above, created 
debate in Whitehall over the best proposed legislative policy.  It is interesting to note that by 
the early 1930s due to changes in the international political situation, citizenship legislation 
was tweaked to allow the high commissioners to de-nationalise anyone suspected of having 
wayward political beliefs.  In reality, Great Britain ran the Palestine Mandate as a colony and 
as such, officials expected mandate citizens to be loyal to Great Britain.  Consequently, the 
centre of the Empire ultimately approved or rejected nationality and citizenship proposals, 
and took into consideration the imperial and the European contexts during the decades after 
the end of the First World War.     
     In addition, the nature of citizenship legislation as decentralised and constructed amidst 
competing agendas and opinions, as the chapter stresses, clearly hindered a smooth passage 
of amendments and changes to the legislation itself.  The hindrance can be attributed to the 
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actions of different governmental departments, official and unofficial advisers who all played 
a role in approving or challenging changes to mandate legislation.  In sum by 1931, the 
changes to the order of 1925 did not grant greater civic, political or social rights such as the 
direct franchise, inclusive education or parliamentary representation for Arab citizens.  
However, these changes did make the process of citizenship acquisition easier for Jewish 
immigrants provided they were not ‘undesirables’ such as communists, Bolsheviks, 
prostitutes, individuals perceived to be disloyal to Great Britain or political agitators.     
     The following two chapters devote specific attention to the changes in the Arabs’ 
understanding and application of citizenship and rights during the 1930s.  By the middle of 
the decade, the British administration classified and treated the Arabs as an undifferentiated 
mass of unruly colonial subjects or as citizens dependent upon how volatile the political 
relationship between the administration and the majority Arab population became, especially 
after 1935.  The mandate administration and the government in London continued to serve as 
the sole arbitrators of the definition and the conditions of Palestinian citizenship.  In the 
decade after the publication of the 1931 amended order, colonial officials made further 
changes to nationality legislation in order to remove undesirable national elements, both 
Jewish and Arab, from Palestine. 
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Chapter Six 
From Peasants into Citizens: Expressions of Citizenship and the Mobilisation of 
Palestinian Arab Discourses of Rights, 1926-1935 
 
“…and when the children ask why no shops are open or salesmen are in the streets, the 
mother will answer that the Palestinian Arabs are striking to show the amount of 
dissatisfaction with the government and the Zionist policy . . . [this strike] will be 
civilised dissent.” 
(Editorial: “Strike tomorrow!”, 22 Aug. 1931, Mir’at al-Sharq) 
 
Introduction 
 
     In August 1931 a number of Palestinian Arab populist groups convened a congress in the 
city of Nablus that subsequently called a general strike throughout the mandate territory to 
oppose British policy that allowed Jewish settlements to be armed.  The main nationalist 
body in Palestine, the Arab Executive Committee, ultimately issued the official call to strike 
on 23 August 1931 but the strike and demonstrations would not have attracted the attention 
that they did without the growth of Palestinian civil society.  Populist leaders, grassroots 
forums and civic associations—often the subaltern political current through the 1920s—
converged to play a major role in the political community of Palestine in the years after the 
issue of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council.  In the decade after the order-in-council, new 
ideas of citizenship emerged out of the context of both civil society and popular politics.  At 
the centre of these new ideas and vocabularies of Palestinian Arab citizenship was the Arabic 
press.  The growth and popularity of the press allowed it to communicate legal developments 
and link these developments to the changing notions and the political mobilisation of 
Palestinian Arab citizenship.
1
  In other words, by the early 1930s, the Arab press succeeded 
in disseminating a new language and new discourses of citizenship rights and duties in the 
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political, legal and social spheres in an easily-understood fashion to a larger portion of the 
Arab population.     
     Chapter Four has discussed the history of the Palestinian Arab diaspora and its supporters 
within the mandate territory during the 1920s in order to demonstrate the ways in which a 
specifically Palestinian meaning of nationality and citizenship emerged, and how that 
meaning was used to contest the Citizenship Order-in-Council of 1925.  The chapter has also 
analysed the role played by civil society in the diaspora through associations, clubs, elected 
representatives and print culture in cities and towns in the Americas and highlighted their 
links with the anti-Zionist, Arab nationalist movement at home.  The current chapter links up 
with Chapter Three where focus was placed on the growth of specific Palestinian Arab 
discourses and expressions of citizenship belonging, civic identity and rights in the years 
before 1925.  This chapter depicts how the growth of popular politics allowed for the 
contestation of citizenship legislation and its favourable provisions for Jewish immigrants.  
Within the context of popular mobilisation and the agency of the press, it evaluates how 
citizens defined and re-defined themselves in light of legal changes made by the mandate 
administration and as influenced by a new terminology of citizenship, civil rights and civic 
duties that gained currency in the years between 1926 and 1935.   
     Crucially, this chapter traces the process through which the young middle-class Arab 
leadership integrated the rhetoric of rights and duties into a repertoire of public action.  This 
rhetoric emphasised the role of the subaltern citizens, such as the Arab workers, students and 
peasants, in laying claim to rights of political representation, employment and welfare.
2
  The 
rhetorical language and vocabulary used by this cross-section of society further explains a 
number of distinctions between the British and Arab notions of Palestinian citizenship after 
1925.  Through civil society linkages, new political parties, and the medium of the press the 
new nationalists ‘taught the peasants their rights.’  The chapter is based on a close reading of 
                                                   
2 The field of Subaltern Studies has been immensely influential in studies of post-colonialism, but the members 
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after the mandate system ended.  For example, see John Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers 
in Lebanon (Stanford: University Press, 2009) and Stephanie Cronin, ed., Subalterns and Social Protest: A 
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Arabic periodicals, nationalist documents, conference proceedings, records of civic 
associations and documents produced by the Palestine Istiqlal (Independence) Party. 
     In order to trace the developing and changing terminology expressed by the new citizenry 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s, the chapter is organised following the changes within 
the national movement that fostered the development of broader discourses of citizenship.  
The middle-class nationalist leadership was guided by pan-Arab and anti-mandate ideologies 
and attitudes.  Many members of this community were urban nationalists.  Some of these 
remained part of the Arab Executive as they shaped a new framework of populist (sha‘bī) 
politics that idealised all Palestinian Arabs as citizens, including previously non-political 
groups, under the banner of ‘the nation.’  The chapter begins with an analysis of the 
changing notions of citizenship after the issue of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council as 
promoted by mandate legislation such as municipal election laws, land legislation and 
cultivators ordinances.  This legislation was not meant to offer political rights to the 
Palestinian Arab citizens but instead it reinforced the apolitical nature of citizenship.  The 
reaction to mandate legislation influenced the changing language and expression of 
citizenship in the context of popular politics.  The Istiqlal Party, which popularised 
Palestinian citizenship as inseparable from national identity, helped to spur this new 
approach.  The profile of the Palestinian Arab citizen that emerged from this language was 
one which encompassed peasants, women, students and workers. 
     Studies on Tsarist Russia offer different, albeit perhaps useful, comparisons with the 
Palestine Mandate.  Similar to Russia in the nineteenth century, the print culture in the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire became one of the most important elements to facilitate the 
emergence of civil society.  By the turn of the twentieth century, other elements at work in 
Russia formed the structure of civil society such as universities, city councils, urbanisation, 
and thousands of voluntary associations whose many projects formed networks, diffused 
“public knowledge” and created a sense of participation.3  In Palestine, it was the spread of 
nationalist ideology (partially in reaction to mandate legislation) to villages and urban areas 
that fostered a sense of civic identity.  Yet, many populist leaders came from middle-class, 
educated backgrounds rather than from the working class.  As they disseminated the idea that 
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all Palestinian Arabs were entitled to citizenship rights, they became responsible for shaping 
the identities of peasants and workers as subaltern citizens. 
     The more inclusive redefinitions of Palestinian citizenship and civil and political rights 
after 1925 allowed for the subaltern citizens to become “empowered by identity politics.”  
The empowerment of civic identity politics happens, according to Margaret Somers, when 
individuals feel that a sense of who they are has been violated, especially in terms of their 
perceived natural rights.  In order to assert claims to political and civil rights the ‘politics of 
citizenship discourse’ is mobilised to justify rights through membership in a historically 
constructed national community.  Citizenship rights take on significance becoming not a 
‘thing’ but a practice.4  In Palestine, the realm of popular politics and its emphasis on 
Palestinian Arab and pan-Arab identities provided the space in which the Arab community 
could assert its active opposition to the mandate and Zionism as a key part of citizenship’s 
rights and duties.   
     The legislation—or lack of certain legislation—passed by the mandate increasingly 
affected working class and rural Arabs more so than it affected the Jewish community by the 
mid to late-1920s.  The Jewish population of Palestine was, in large part, segregated from the 
Arab community as the yishuv became more like a state-within-a-state, providing schools, 
employment and other economic opportunities to the Jewish immigrants.  The mandate 
administration ensured that its legislation did not contradict the Jewish national home policy 
and it allowed the Jewish community of Palestine to exist as largely autonomous.  The 
impact of this policy was most clearly understood by the Arabs in the form of the growing 
Jewish settlements and the mandate legislation that stimulated Jewish immigration.  It would 
be the Arabic press, national and local societies, unions, public conferences and 
demonstrations that made certain particular details of mandate legislation known throughout 
Arab society.   
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The press and mandate legislation  
 
     As explained in Chapter Two the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council initially 
had little impact on Arabs who resided permanently in Palestine since they received 
Palestinian citizenship ipso facto.  Citizenship took on significance as a status once national 
leaders and newspapers publicised reports on the situation of the thousands of Palestinians in 
the diaspora who were unable to claim that status.  In light of the plight of the Arab 
emigrants (muhājarīn) and the facilitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine by the mandate 
administration, national and local leaders began to draw attention to legislation that 
negatively impacted all Palestinian Arab nationals.  These leaders defined Palestinian 
citizenship as a natural right granted by birth or descent from Palestinian parents.  To this 
end associations and Arab Executive members by 1927 presented a number of demands to 
the Palestine Administration and the British government for the recognition of jus sanguinis 
and jus soli in citizenship legislation as well as explicit political rights for Arab citizens.  The 
legal framework of citizenship and immigration regulations, in addition to legislation which 
regulated aspects of political and social life, triggered claims to political and civil rights.  
The Arabic press published not only the text of mandate legislation but also commentaries, 
thus shaping the broader understanding of citizenship and its language by the Arab 
community. 
     The role of the press in Palestine, as in other mandates and colonies in the interwar 
period, was a crucial one which has been noted in previous chapters.  Newspapers’ front 
pages often reported the ‘world news.’  In the period under discussion, Syria, Iraq, as well as 
the colonial situation in India were topics of analysis and discussion.  More generally, the 
linkages of global civil society and what Emma Hunter calls the “globalization of political 
concepts” captured the attention of colonised peoples between Latin America, the Middle 
East, Africa and the Soviet Union by the early 1930s.
5
  In Palestine, the Arabic press 
reported the publication of the citizenship order in the fall of 1925, but many newspapers 
focused on other events, particularly the uprising in Syria’s Jabal Druze against the French 
between 1925 and 1926.  News about the anti-colonial revolt in Syria, growing factionalism 
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in the Arab Executive Committee and the conflict between the faction headed by Mufti Hajj 
Amin al-Husayni (the Majlisiyun) and that of the leaders of the opposition in Jerusalem (the 
Mu‘āridun) monopolised the news.   
     Yet in Palestine, the rhetoric and vocabulary of rights became manifest alongside that of 
nationality and citizenship after 1926.  Rachel Sieder’s work on Guatemala in the 1930s 
provides an interesting comparison with the ways citizenship rights were perceived by non-
dominant political groups.  Sieder has shown in the context of interwar Latin America that 
governments tried to create a certain type of subject or citizen through legislation.  These 
same laws which gave or removed political rights “also provide a medium through which the 
would-be subjects or citizens can resist and accommodate to their conditions of 
subordination.”6  Since British legislation in Palestine was aimed at two communities, 
different ideological constructions about rights, obligations and citizenship were created and 
filtered between pan-Arab, national and local arenas.  The Arabs frequently challenged the 
legalities of mandate policies and civil society leaders (as in the Guatemalan case) actively 
encouraged “claims of citizenship, entitlement and ideas of justice” by the Palestinians as 
citizens and as part of a historical trajectory based on their prior experience as Ottoman 
nationals.  The figure of the pre-war Ottoman Arab national, embodied with a number of 
political and civil rights, was used by writers as a rallying point to mobilise individuals to 
demand the mandate administration offer similar rights associated with citizenship.  This 
history became “embedded in popular and elite practices which shape[ed] prospects for 
citizenship” in local and national contexts.  In Palestine as elsewhere, the development of 
citizenship depended on interactions between different understandings of ‘rights,’ 
‘obligations,’ and ‘justice,’ “constituted by different individuals and groups within particular 
frameworks.”7   
     After the visit of Lord Balfour to Palestine in 1925, newspapers referred to the rights, 
duties and practices of Arab citizens with more frequency.  However, it was the 
administration’s plan to hold municipal elections in 1926 that galvanized the press to delving 
into the links between mandate legislation and the changing nature of the civil and political 
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rights of citizenship.  Concepts such as rights, justice and legitimacy—heavily used in the 
press and written statements—were understood in large part through historical experiences 
of the rule of law in Palestine from the Ottoman administration.  Editors appealed to the 
reinstatement of a representative parliament, of laws delineating the rights of all citizens vis-
à-vis the government and of a written constitution.  Others noted the Ottoman 1869 
Education Law and its stark contrast with mandatory legislation on education.
8
  Ottoman 
legislation was quite often portrayed as positive when compared with colonial legislation in 
Palestine.  By 1926, newspapers took on the task to inform their readers of the citizenship 
order’s provisions and general mandate legislation that favoured Jewish immigrants.  The 
anti-mandate periodicals did not always report in precise detail the large amount of 
legislation issued in Palestine
9
 but writers pointedly focused on regulations that privileged 
the Jewish community.  In doing so, a particular discourse became commonplace: legislation 
which negatively affected the livelihoods and political aspirations of the Arabs was 
conceived of as a negation of the rights of all Palestinian Arab citizens.  
     The Palestine Mandate charter contained the assurance that the mandatory would fulfill 
certain duties such as the protection of civil and religious rights for all inhabitants and the 
development of self-governing institutions.  As explained in Chapter Two the mandate 
charter granted rights on the basis of religious community, rather than directly to the 
individual citizen.  The first citizenship right granted to both Jewish and Arab Palestinians, 
the franchise, came into effect with the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council.  Prior to 1925, 
the 1922 Legislative Election Order-in-Council gave the franchise to all residents of 
Palestine provided they were former Ottoman subjects or Jewish immigrants who pledged to 
take on citizenship once legislation was passed to that effect.  Although citizenship became a 
requirement for the franchise and to stand for office, by 1926 the mandate administration 
failed to implement High Commissioner Samuel’s proposals for the devolution of local and 
municipal government functions to the citizens themselves.  By contrast Samuel’s successor, 
Herbert Plumer, felt that the Arabs had too little sense of civic responsibility to have the right 
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to vote.
10
  Even so, in 1926, his administration supported the formation of municipal and 
local councils (which existed in the Ottoman Empire) to regulate communal affairs as a step 
toward self-government.
11
  The 1926 Municipal Franchise Ordinance ensured proportional 
representation on municipal councils in accordance with the number of votes from each 
religious community.
12
  Palestinians could vote only for other members of their own 
religious community.  Thus, no sense of a unified Palestinian citizenship factored into the 
municipal elections because of the separation of citizens along religious lines.   
     The Arabic newspapers immediately took issue with the municipal property tax 
qualification required of all voters for the municipal council elections.  Only individuals who 
paid a fee on immovable property, or paid a standard fee if they did not own immoveable 
property in the twelve months prior to the elections could vote.  Voters also had to be 
occupants of recognised premises worth a certain amount of money within the municipal 
area.  Candidates for council positions had to have paid 100 piasters in taxes.
13
  The 
ordinance, according to one journalist in late 1926, was “contrary to the spirit of true 
democracy” since its most striking feature was that it did not enable “all classes of people the 
right” to vote.  Specifically, he argued that certain classes of Arabs were treated “as if they 
are enemies and not natives of this country” since the poorer urban Arabs did not meet the 
financial qualifications for enfranchisement.   
     The press viewed the elections as an example of the mandate’s discriminatory attitude 
towards the Arab urban lower-class whose members were unable to participate in local 
politics or hold positions of leadership.  This, in the discourse of the press, served to negate 
the most important right of Palestinian citizens: the right to representation.  Others depicted 
the legislation as purely colonial and communal rather than representative of a liberal 
administration.
14
  Furthermore, although Clause 3 of the Municipal Franchise Ordinance 
explicitly stated that electors had to be Palestinian citizens, Attorney-General Bentwich 
advised the mandate administration that those Jewish immigrants awaiting the outcome of 
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their applications for naturalisation had no reason to be refused and were eligible to vote.
15
  
The press was aware of this practice, and urged Palestinian Arabs to demand that the right to 
vote be made inalienable for all (male) Palestinians by virtue of their nationality, without 
restriction.
16
   
     Municipalities held elections again in 1933.  The municipal election ordinance itself 
defined a Palestinian citizen for the purpose of the franchise: any person who had applied for 
citizenship before 1 September 1933 as long as their application was not refused.  This meant 
that applicants needed not to have been granted citizenship at the time of the elections in 
order to vote.  Applicants could very well have been denied citizenship after they cast their 
vote, or could withdraw their applications for naturalisation after voting.  The following year, 
the Permanent Mandates Commission asked the Palestine Administration whether a large 
proportion of those who voted in 1933 “in virtue of an application” for Palestinian 
citizenship subsequently failed to secure the citizenship.  Chief Secretary Moody responded 
that as of 1 September 1933, 1500 applications for citizenship awaited decision and the 
applicants with a receipt of the fee paid for submitting their application were entitled to 
exercise “the right to vote.”  Of this number, Moody informed the commission that twenty 
percent failed to obtain citizenship.  In Haifa, the District Commissioner found that only two 
out of seventy Jewish voters were actually qualified to vote because only these two 
individuals had applied for citizenship.
17
  These are not insignificant numbers considering 
that one-fifth of the non-citizens who voted in the 1933 elections were never granted 
citizenship.  Thus they contributed to increasing the proportional representation of their own 
religious community on municipal councils in a country which was not yet their legal 
residence.     
     Significantly, Arab writers claimed that citizenship should have been sufficient grounds 
for enfranchisement in both municipal elections.  The press reaction to the restrictions on 
voting and standing for office in local elections suggests a critical focus on the 
discrimination based on economic status.  Editorials argued that the denial of rights to a large 
number of poor citizens served only to bolster the political standing of Jewish immigrants 
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(who were in better economic standing) within Palestine’s municipalities.  These criticisms, 
published and read throughout the country, had some justification as shown by the figures 
given by Moody to the Permanent Mandates Commission. 
     In the latter half of the 1920s the Arabic press, alongside local nationalist leaders like ‘Isa 
Bandak, discussed other pieces of mandate legislation related to citizenship, elections and 
taxation.  Specifically, Bandak’s Sawt al-Sha‘b invoked the phrase “no taxation without 
representation” (la dara’ib bilā tamthīl).  The first editorial to use the phrase alluded to the 
notion that until citizens were granted certain rights, they should not pay taxes to the 
government—a simple and effective slogan.18  The task of editors and political actors from 
the educated middle-class, as shown by the arguments they made against mandate 
legislation, included ensuring that all Palestinian Arabs understood the role of mandate 
colonialism in limiting the exercise of citizenship rights. 
     Newspapers’ reactions to legislative changes in land, public works and development also 
included the argument that the Arabs’ civil rights were eroded in order to give way to greater 
rights for Jewish citizens.  For example, although Arab merchants, labourers and 
corporations had few explicit rights, Jewish residents and their companies—whether 
nationals of Palestine or not—received concessions for public works and development 
projects.  The mandate guaranteed this preference, as its charter stated that Jewish-run 
businesses could be offered the rights to construct or operate any public works, services or 
utilities.
19
  The registered ‘nationality’ of the business or corporation was irrelevant to its 
right to hold a monopoly in Palestine.  Editorials and articles focused not only on the 
favouritism for Jewish immigration but also on the conditions that such a bias created for 
Palestine’s Arab citizens.  One newspaper article stated in 1928 that the “citizens of the 
villages” were neglected because the government and the Jewish companies that operated 
public works did not take their requests (such as to pave the roads) seriously.  That same 
year, a number of nationalist organisations asked that Arab employees of the Department of 
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Works strike in order to force the government to address the most important of their “civil 
rights”: the improvement of the economic situation in Arab villages.20   
     Editorials argued frequently that the administration’s support for Jewish-run companies 
limited Arab business ventures.  As noted in Chapter Four, national and local leaders argued 
that citizenship legislation prevented Arab emigrants from returning to Palestine and forming 
an entrepreneurial capitalist class.  The other arguments against mandate legislation that 
centred on the negation of Arab citizenship rights extended to the spheres of employment 
and welfare.  By the late 1920s, urban workers’ associations, often influenced by young anti-
mandate activists, referred to the government’s duty to ensure equality in employment, 
wages and benefits pay as well as safe working conditions for all citizens.
21
  Civil rights of 
citizenship also came to be associated with employment especially as the national leadership 
began to question the lack of government job opportunities for educated Muslim 
Palestinians.  In 1928, a delegation of young men from Jaffa argued that only Palestinian 
citizens should be entitled to serve the administration.
22
  This public dialogue and the 
arguments that arose from it were influenced by the belief that the Arab citizenry deserved a 
privileged position in Palestine by virtue of their citizenship, their numerical superiority and 
their Arab nationality.  At the pinnacle of these arguments, citizenship was portrayed as a 
practical, active status that could be manipulated by the mandate administration to deny 
individuals the right to participate in government, the economy and legislation. 
     The government legislation that impacted the Arab fellahin (peasants) continued to be 
portrayed by populist groups as one of the biggest affronts to Palestinian Arab rights of 
citizenship.  As a result of this particular portrayal, national and local groups construed 
(perhaps largely unknown to the peasants themselves) a notion of citizenship identity and 
projected it onto this class within Palestinian society.  One year after the announcement of 
the 1925 citizenship order, a news editorial explained the duties of the government toward 
the peasant citizens of Palestine: the most important was to provide assistance to the fellah 
through favourable land legislation.  By the mid-1920s, despite the deteriorating economic 
situation, the system of taxes and tithes imposed on peasants was so high that the money 
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taken was equivalent to at least a third of the mandate’s yearly budget.  On top of their 
constant debt to money-lenders who charged exorbitant interest rates, peasants were 
expected to contribute tithes (werko) in cash to the government which alone made up about 
32% of a family’s income by 1930.23  Newspapers, and in particular the Gaza weekly al-
Ittihad al-‘Arabī, gave a great deal of space to the peasants’ situation.  Although urban 
Palestinian Arab citizens faced different challenges due to mandate legislation, the activities 
of a number of writers, students and lawyers effectively challenged land legislation and 
brought the situation of the peasant to the fore of press reports. 
     Palestinian Arab populist leaders had long accused the British administration of ratifying 
land legislation that harmed the peasants’ livelihoods.  Indeed throughout the mandate, rural 
owner-occupiers, agricultural tenants and labourers were never entitled to legal protection 
through tenancy rights.  For example, when absentee Arab owners sold land to Jewish 
settlers the tenants often had no choice but to leave the land they farmed.  In Ottoman times, 
tenants farmed land in common and were forced to leave far less frequently when that land 
changed hands.
24
  This argument by Arab leaders is another example that shows how the 
Ottoman period was idealised in order for the leaders to garner more opposition to the 
mandate administration’s policies.  The situation under the Ottoman Empire was discussed in 
editorials and statements as nationalist leaders harked back to a time when Ottoman nationals 
had ‘rights’ to land.  
     Furthermore, the mandate government did not recognise the Arab village, village land 
funds or rural development associations as legal entities able to possess immovable property.  
Zionist companies and the Jewish Agency, on the other hand, were treated as if they were 
individual citizens of Palestine and could thus register land in their name.  According to the 
memoirs of the Palestinian land lawyer Hanna Nakkarah, the 1928 Land Settlement 
Ordinance required the registration of title deeds in order to record taxes and fees, 
development, and to partition common land.  Unclaimed land was held in trust by the high 
commissioner.  The problematic issue was that in every Arab village common land was used 
                                                   
23 “Mādhā tākhdh al-hakuma min al-fellāh” [What the government takes from the fellah], 14 Nov. 1926, Al-
Ittihad al-‘Arabī.  For more on tithes, see Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 204. 
24 Migdal, Palestinian Society, 12; 217. 
196 
 
for public purposes and perceived as being for the benefit of all residents.
25
  Arab peasant 
associations borrowed the language of rights that the more radical, young political leaders 
and the press employed in order to express their displeasure with mandate legislation.  For 
example, in 1928 and 1929 agricultural groups in Gaza presented protest letters to High 
Commissioner John Chancellor in opposition to the Land Settlement Ordinance.  The 
peasant spokesmen, like the press, invoked the idealised notion that Ottoman nationals had 
previously held the civil right of land ownership.  The Muslim Youth Association in Khan 
Younis stated that the ordinance “[took] away the people’s rights of natural ownership of 
land.”26  Another appeal written by the Society to Conserve the Land of Gaza alleged the 
goal of the Land Settlement Ordinance was to “remove all that is Arab and erase all traces of 
the Arab in Palestine.”27  Influenced by other national bodies in Palestine, peasant 
associations adopted and re-shaped the rhetorical language that framed access to land as an 
inalienable right. 
     As a result of increased communication among urban and rural communities by the end of 
the 1920s larger segments of Palestinian society registered their reactions to the new notions 
of citizenship as structured against perceived unbiased legislation.  In doing so they 
redefined the language of citizenship rights.  The activities of populist leaders and writers 
that served to publicise legal developments opened up a space for both the educated and the 
subaltern to be represented as rights-bearing citizens of Palestine.  
 
Palestinian popular politics and the representation of subaltern citizens 
 
     Following the Wailing Wall riots of August 1929, social, political and religious changes 
occurred in the Palestinian Arab national movement.  Local leaders began to point out the 
weaknesses of the Arab Executive and of Jerusalem’s political factions in the light of their 
failure to convince the British to yield to significant nationalist demands.  In his seminal two-
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volume work on the Arab national movement in Palestine, Yehoshua Porath argues that after 
1929 “[a] radical articulate generation of better educated politicians and activists began to 
emerge.”28  Recent research by Weldon C. Matthews on the Palestine Istiqlal Party, a 
populist, pan-Arab oriented political party active in the early 1930s, stresses the need to 
study concepts of identity as contingent on specific circumstances in order to analyse how 
the Palestinians defined themselves as part of a nation after a decade of mandate 
administration.
29
  The current section analyses the ways in which this new generation of 
nationalist political leaders engaged with new ideas of subaltern citizenship, and the actions 
that supported them.  Certain groups in Palestine—workers, peasants, women and students—
came to be represented as citizens both through their own efforts and through the support of 
the ‘popular politics’ movement.  Their reactions to developments in the mandate’s legal 
sphere in the late 1920s brought to the fore the different treatment of Palestinian Arab and 
Jewish citizens, as well as different treatment between rural and urban dwellers.  The Arabic 
press continued to be the medium through which popular leaders sought to abolish 
distinctions in treatment of subaltern citizens in order to present a united Arab citizenry as a 
bloc opposed to the mandate administration.     
     In his study of the ideological and practical processes by which French peasants became 
full-fledged members of the citizenry after the French Revolution, Eugene Weber notes that 
national and civic consciousness arises once rural inhabitants become aware of national, as 
opposed to only local, issues. As part of this, schools were the ultimate institution that made 
French peasants into “wise citizens” and informed their concepts of rights.30  In 1931, 
Jerusalem’s Mir’at al-Sharq published an appeal to teachers to avail themselves of their 
services in villages.  The appeal noted that the government could not be relied upon to 
decrease illiteracy and it urged citizens to establish rural, national schools.
31
  By the early 
1930s, the populist groups presented the peasant as a citizen member of Palestinian society 
in the face of Jewish immigration.  He was made to speak for himself, to demand voting 
rights and rights to education, welfare and land ownership.  In reference to India, Dipesh 
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Chakrabarty writes that “[t]he peasant did not have to undergo a historical mutation into the 
industrial worker in order to become the citizen-subject of the nation.”32  The same is true for 
Palestine: peasants, as well as other members of the working classes, effectively took on the 
roles of active political citizens, albeit often under the umbrella of the ever-widening 
populist, middle-class national movement.  
 
Creating spaces for citizenship: students, peasants, workers and women 
 
     Throughout the interwar period, Arab intellectuals, reformers and activists in the Levant 
region “established associations, committees and leagues, and congregated at international 
conferences and assemblies; they founded printing presses, schools, universities, and 
established newspapers, magazines, and learned journals, regarding the periodical press as a 
vehicle of civic life.”33  For populist leaders, the public sphere was separate from the 
government sphere and citizenship was the tie that bound civil society to the state.  The 
significance of the Arab populist movement in Palestine by the early 1930s was the 
challenge it posed to the type of mandate legislation discussed in the previous section and the 
pro-Zionist policy of the administration.   
     These new ideas of citizenship came, in large part, out of the type of civic education 
offered by national schools and their teachers who were affiliated with nationalist 
associations.  Civic education placed emphasis on a historical Arab nationality in Palestine, 
the understanding of Palestinians as belonging to a nation and the symbiotic relationship of 
rights and duties between nationals and their nation.  This education not only played a role in 
imparting the concept of civil rights and civic duties to students but by 1928 it also 
stimulated the formation of Palestinian branches of the Young Men’s Muslim Association, or 
YMMA (jam‘iyyat al-shabān al-muslimīn), and the Arab Scouts.  The former association 
published its own newspaper, Sawt al-Haqq (The Voice of Truth), and its outspoken young 
editor, school-teacher Hamdi al-Husayni, introduced the concerns of Arab urban workers and 
the importance of civic activities into the platform of the YMMA.  For instance, the Gaza 
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branch set up night courses to teach workers how to read.
34
  Students’ clubs and numerous 
civic-minded associations (which boasted heavy student involvement) formed throughout the 
late 1920s and worked to organise unions of Arab workers, discussed political issues in 
public forums, and raised funds to buy agricultural land in trust for Arab peasants.
35
   
     At the same time a former law student and schoolteacher from Nablus named Akram 
Zu‘aytir began to advocate that the youth lead popular protests and actions of civil 
disobedience (al-‘asīyan al-madaniyya).  His inspiration came from the actions of Gandhi in 
India.  In 1929, Zu‘aytir suggested that the Palestinian Arabs implement a programme of 
non-cooperation that included the refusal to pay taxes and the resignation of civil servants.  
Since he wrote for the newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq, this newspaper and other periodicals 
promoted the programme.  In January 1930, he titled one fiery front-page article “To the 
young people: storm the field and organise your ranks.”36  In fact, the press and its 
fashioning the subaltern Palestinian citizen were linked to the activism of a younger Arab 
nationalist clan: journalists and editors who had completed at least secondary school. 
     Youth associations in this period were not all political but nearly all promoted civic ideals 
and a common citizenship identification.  For example, the Youth Club of Bethlehem, 
established in 1928, claimed that its task was to spread the spirit of patriotism as well as to 
work for Arab unity.  Members also sought to carry out practical work: the club gave 
attention to women’s affairs and especially women’s literacy, established a night school and 
a public library, and aided the poor.
37
  Youth associations used publications, public lectures, 
and teachers to inform the population of their aims.  At the January 1932 Youth Conference 
in Jaffa, delegates debated certain duties to be undertaken by the citizens of Palestine.  The 
conference passed a number of resolutions and formed several civic committees composed of 
and administered by a variety of Arab citizens including students, writers and lawyers.  The 
                                                   
34 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 56-59. 
35 “Muqarat mu’tamar jama‘iāt al-shabān al-filastīn” [Decisions of the Palestine Youth Congress], 26 Nov. 
1928, Sawt al-Haqq. 
36 “Ila al-shabāb: iqtaham al-mīdān wa tanzīm sufufakum” [To the young people: storm the field and organise 
your ranks], 7 Jan. 1930, Mir’at al-Sharq.  Furthermore, the British authorities kept a file on Akram Zu‘aytir 
and his political activities even after his tenure as a teacher in Acre and the Galilee ended.  The Department of 
Education felt he “indulge[d] in matters not considered satisfactory” with his pupils.  See ISA/M/1012/15, July 
1929. Gandhi’s march across India early that year further inspired Zu‘aytir: he encouraged the youth to walk 
across Palestine to spread patriotism, discourage land sales and encourage a boycott of foreign goods. 
37 ‘Foundation law of the Youth Club of Bethlehem,’ 1928, document in Adnan Musallam, Folded Pages, 211. 
200 
 
committees, such as that for civic education, called upon the mandate government to 
establish national schools and include curriculums in agricultural education as part of their 
duty to the Arab citizens.
38
  The nature of the civic committees allowed for further 
redefinitions of subaltern citizenship.  
     Other committees discussed in public forums mandate legislation and advocated that both 
men and women form boycott committees to further pressure the administration to give 
attention to the Arab nationalists’ demands.39  The emphasis by youth associations and their 
conference resolutions on civic identity and rights for both the rural peasants and the urban 
workers meant that the two groups were represented as part of the Palestinian citizenry.  The 
students and middle-class national leaders sought to demonstrate that all classes could claim 
rights and pressure the administration to give up its obligations to the mandate charter.  
Prominent was the protection of the land holdings of the Arab peasants in the face of 
increased Jewish immigration by the early 1930s.  In times of crisis due to the increased debt 
and poverty of the peasants and the threat posed by the Histadrut, the exclusively-Jewish 
labour union, to the Arab proletariat, subaltern citizens “legitimized their own social 
demands through their participation” in civil society and national demonstrations as Joel 
Beinin has shown.
40
  However, prior to 1936 the demands for civil and political rights and 
the representation of subaltern citizenship originated from urban, educated, radical 
nationalists.     
     In the years before the Palestine Revolt began in 1936, the populist leaders themselves 
sought to challenge the mandate administration through the political and civic mobilisation 
of the peasant class.  Nationalists used newspapers, speeches, congress resolutions and 
demands to the government to incorporate the peasant into the wider national body.  Peasants 
were depicted as active participants in politics and anti-mandate activities.  Migdal also notes 
that interdependence between peasants and other classes created a national identity 
consciousness in the 1930s.
41
  Public conferences and their resolutions on behalf of the 
peasants shaped the perception of the peasant as an equal citizen by the virtue of his native 
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birth in Palestine and his service to the nation.  In May 1928 a newspaper editorial 
questioned whether the peasants knew of their rights and their duty to demand them.
42
  
Charters drawn up by landowning farmers who belonged to rural associations expressed the 
aims to improve the standard of living for the fellahin and to protect their land rights.  
Indeed, every adult fellah had the ‘right’ to join most societies and elect their administrative 
bodies.  In the early 1930s, village societies increased in number and activity throughout 
Palestine and often clearly stated their opposition to the mandate’s immigration policy.  For 
example, the principles of Acre’s Village Cooperative Society stated that its members 
oppose everything that “intrud[ed] on [the farmer’s] national and political rights.”43  The 
archives demonstrate an increase in the number of not only letters and petitions to the 
administration by peasant associations, but also the administration’s increased surveillance 
of rural associations that were deemed too political. 
     Arab urban workers were a significant bloc that drove the expansion of populist political 
activities by the latter half of the 1920s.  The growing workers’ movement contested the 
meaning of citizenship offered by the mandate and in particular, the failure of citizenship 
legislation to extend certain social and civil benefits to the Arab working class.  To counter 
the British administration’s definition of citizenship, these subaltern citizens put forth their 
own platform of civil and social rights.  Leaders of urban unions commonly expressed the 
belief that the mandate had a duty to provide Arab workers with rights (of unionization and 
shorter work hours) and welfare (housing and health care) equal to that offered to Jewish 
labourers by the Histadrut.  Arab railway workers in Palestine first organised themselves 
with their Jewish co-workers in Haifa in 1921 but it took several years for a workers’ 
movement to emerge.
44
  Once it did come into being, the movement was one of the few in 
mandate Palestine which bridged the divide between Arab and Jewish citizens.
45
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     At its most basic level, the socialist, anti-colonial principles of the union leadership 
attracted Arab workers particularly in the impoverished, crowded port cities of Haifa and 
Jaffa.  The membership rolls of Arab workers’ societies included farmers, labourers, clerks, 
masons, drivers and others.  Significantly, the rhetoric of the labour leaders—reproduced in 
the press and at national conferences—employed the same vocabulary as the populist 
national leadership.  The language used depicted the urban, low-income Arab worker as 
deserving the same treatment as the Jewish worker by virtue of his Arab nationality.  The 
Palestine Arab Workers Society (PAWS) enhanced this image as it aimed to attain benefits 
for all workers, to promote educational, social and economic improvements, to enact a law to 
limit work hours and fix salaries, and to provide housing and access to health services.
46
   
     The final ‘subaltern’ citizens to be discussed in the current section, Palestinian Arab 
women, differed little from their male counterparts in the national movement with regard to 
their collective platform and identity.  Whilst the politically-active women were usually from 
elite, educated backgrounds, their activities nonetheless contributed to the representation of 
Arab women as citizens of Palestine despite legislation that denied them the right to vote.  At 
once subaltern and elite, these women claimed to speak on behalf of the entirety of 
Palestinian Arab citizenry.  The activities of Arab women during the mandate administration 
have been narrated elsewhere, but these studies lack any analysis of conceptualisation of 
Palestinian citizenship.
47
  Arab women organised themselves and created their own civil 
society networks in Palestine, in the mahjar and in other Arab mandates and countries.  
Female newspaper columnists called upon women to educate themselves, to demand their 
rights to a civic, national education, and to fulfill their national ‘duties’ to the country.48  As 
historian Ellen Fleischmann explains, notions of rights were never fully defined but female 
writers in Palestine, as in other Arab countries, referred to liberal citizenship rights such as 
participation in the public and political sphere.
49
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     The proceedings of women’s conferences offer a better explanation of the rights that 
Palestinian women agitated for and hoped to receive.  These public gatherings offer a 
glimpse of the ways in which these women expressed themselves as Palestinian citizens.  
The first Palestine Arab Women’s Congress took place in 1929 and was organised through a 
network of societies such as charities, educational associations and the Arab Women’s 
Association (AWA).  Attended by over 200 Palestinian women, the congress’ decisions were 
liberal and supportive of women’s efforts to participate in civil society.50  Petitions and 
statements by the executive body of the congress mimicked the wording and rhetorical style, 
and suggested the same tactics, of the male-dominated national associations and conferences.   
     Petitions issued by the Executive of the Women’s Congress in 1932 explicitly discussed 
the issue of citizenship rights.  The Executive referred to the unfair administrative practice 
that allowed non-Palestinian civil servants such as Greeks, Persians, Italians, Egyptians, and 
Syrians to acquire Palestinian citizenship despite retaining the nationality of their native 
countries.  These men, the women argued, could easily be replaced “by bona-fide Palestinian 
citizens.”  As for civic education, the women emphasised the “vital importance to the Arabs” 
to support improvements of the “intellectual, moral and social standing of future citizens of 
the country.”  The Executive noted that citizens, especially the peasants, had been deprived 
of constitutional rights and protections despite their standing.  The government, according to 
the women, had the duty to alleviate the concerns of all citizens.  In closing their charter of 
congress resolutions, the signatories (President Wahide El-Khalili and Secretary Matiel 
Mogannam) demanded the establishment of a democratically elected national government.
51
  
Like the youth, workers and peasants, the women offered a representation of themselves, 
alongside other subaltern groups, as citizens of Palestine.  Through their discourse, congress 
resolutions and actions, they claimed the citizenship rights that the government denied to 
them: education, government employment, a national fund, rural aid and representative 
associations.   
     The beginning of national discourses based on the representation of the citizen received 
support not only in the press but through the networks forged between subaltern citizens and 
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the institutions that represented them.  These discourses and the actions advocated within 
them fashioned “the new man . . . [as] transformed into the citizen of the new state.”52 
 
Transitions in the political language of citizenship  
 
     In the mid-1920s, the rate of Jewish immigration to Palestine slowed, in part due to the 
worsening economic situation.  As a result the Arab Executive Committee felt it unnecessary 
to hold national congresses between 1923 and 1928.  In fact, the Executive had not mobilised 
against the mandate policy in any significant way or made demands for complete 
independence since the Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress of 1923.  The seventh (and last) 
congress was held in Jerusalem in early 1928 but it offered even less of a challenge to British 
policy than the previous six congresses had done.
53
  In the period between the sixth and 
seventh congresses, the populist movement had grown strong enough to effectively take part 
in changing the political language of citizenship and its associated social, political and civil 
rights.  Historian Eric Van Young surmises that in the instance of both a mass and an elitist 
movement for independence, each movement has diametrically opposed mentalities “through 
entirely distinct views of citizenship” and each uses different ideological appeals.54  As 
subaltern members of Palestinian Arab society gained a voice as citizens through populist 
associations and the press, the types of political action linked to the assertions of their 
citizenship accommodated for and reflected new notions of a specifically Arab nationalist 
type of civic belonging.    
     The changing political language can be attributed to the political and social situation in 
Palestine in the aftermath of the August 1929 Wailing Wall riots.  The riots themselves have 
been explained in numerous other sources, and it is only necessary to sketch the basics of the 
events here.  Disputes between Muslim and Jewish worshippers started in 1928 over changes 
to, and the ownership of, the Western (Wailing) Wall (known to the Arabs as al-Buraq), the 
western side of Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif complex.  Although the mandate authorities 
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ordered the Jews to refrain from making changes to the site, tensions continued over 
ownership and use.  In August 1929 following a small number of low-key marches held by 
Jewish youth groups and subsequent responses of protest by the city’s Arabs, an Arab 
stabbed a Jewish youth.
55
  As the tensions turned into violence, the Arabs started to spread a 
number of fiery rumours as to Jewish intentions to take over all of Palestine.  Christian 
leaders joined their Muslim counterparts and called for the defense of al-Buraq.  The riots 
spread from Jerusalem to Hebron on 23 and 24 August where fifty-nine Orthodox Jews were 
murdered.  Violence occurred in the suburbs of Jerusalem and Hebron and in Jaffa, Tel Aviv, 
Haifa and Safed.  In total, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded; over 120 Arabs died and 
232 were wounded.  All offenders were tried in British courts: fifty-five Arabs and two Jews 
were found guilty of murder.
56
 
     The political response by the British and Palestine Administration as described in the 
previous chapter was the 1930 investigation by the Shaw Commission, sent by Colonial 
Secretary Lord Passfield and headed by Walter Shaw.  It recommended a quota on Jewish 
immigration and a suspension of Jewish land purchases.  The subsequent 1930 Hope-
Simpson Report also favoured the Arab population in stating that further immigration would 
severely cripple the already-impoverished and dispossessed Arab peasants.  The outcry by 
the Zionist movement in Britain overwhelmed the recommendations and in February of 1931 
British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald reaffirmed his support for the Jewish national 
home policy.
57
   
     However, the 1930 execution of three young Arab men charged for their role in the riots 
served as a particularly salient event for the national movement and the men immediately 
became martyrs.
58
  The emerging populist movement characterised the three martyrs as 
patriotic citizens who defended the Arabs’ political and civil rights.59  As a result of the 
events from 1929 through early 1931, pan-Arab activists including ‘Awni Abd al-Hadi 
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appealed to the British to grant the “religious and civil rights [which were] closely 
interrelated” with self-governing institutions.  Abd al-Hadi, a veteran nationalist, endorsed 
the Palestinian Arab youth movement as did a small number of other established nationalist 
leaders.  His views, and those of the more radical movement, articulated a post-1929 
conceptualisation of distinct views on citizenship rights and duties.  Abd al-Hadi addressed 
the mandate government’s failures to implement beneficial legislation for all Arab 
inhabitants of the mandate and stated that in the Palestinian case, “it will be the duty of every 
one of [the] citizens to call upon [the administration] to live up to its duties.” 60  In response, 
political, youth and social groups asked that the Arab Executive convene to discuss policies 
of non-cooperation with the mandate administration and a boycott.  The fragmented political 
factions split over the tactics.  As a consequence, the more radical nationalist groups 
assumed the task of carrying out measures of non-cooperation as an explicit duty of 
citizenship.
61
 
     From the beginning of the British administration of Palestine, the first writings by 
nationalist leaders and those in the press rarely included the term ‘citizen’ (muwātin) but 
rather used the Arabic term ahl Filastīn (Palestinian people), as well as ‘national’ (watanī),  
and ‘natives of Palestine’ (abna’ Filastīn).  Throughout the 1920s, the differences in the 
political language of nationality, nationalism and later, citizenship were subtle.  These early 
terms expressed a sense of secular communal belonging, similar to the way in which ‘umma’ 
translated into ‘community’ in the era of nationalism.  As noted previously, muwātin came 
into use in Arabic newspapers and documents printed by nationalist associations in Palestine 
alongside legislation that marked members of the Arab national community as having a legal 
status vis-à-vis the administration.  However, the use of jinsiyya (nationality) continued to be 
dominant in reference to citizenship legislation.  As the mandate administration introduced 
new legislation that allowed the British to interact separately with the Jewish and the Arab 
citizens, as described in the previous two chapters, the need for a stronger rhetorical 
challenge to citizenship legislation arose.   
 Once again, the Arabic press can be used to chronicle the changes in the political 
language of citizenship after 1930.  The narrative of particular events, such as the 1933 urban 
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riots in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Nablus offer examples of the changing notions of 
citizenship.  The riots were a reaction to the mandate’s policy of support for Jewish 
immigration and land sales to Zionist settlers.  As early as the 1931 strike and 
demonstrations in Nablus, the populist Arab leaders asserted their citizenship by informing 
mandate officials that public demonstrations were active civil rights.  Press editorials 
concluded that the inhabitants of Palestine knew their rights and their duties as citizens even 
if the government did not allow their exercise.
62
  On the eve of riots in Jerusalem in October, 
an article in the city’s al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya stressed that the British did not consider the 
Palestinians as Arab nationals and urged the Arabs to assert their citizenship rights in 
Palestine through protest.”63   
     The context of political changes within the nationalist bloc, members in the new populist 
movements “stressed their identities as subaltern citizens.”64  In doing so, they created a link 
with their identity through not only birth and descent but also as practitioners of obligations 
to the Arab nation and as bearers of rights to land, employment, education and the franchise.  
The subaltern citizens and the middle-class activists together challenged the British notion of 
the colonial, apolitical Palestinian Arab citizen as they “adopted the language of social rights 
to forge the new basis of citizenship” particularly after 1929.65   
 
The Palestine Istiqlal Party, pan-Arab citizenship and the defense of citizenship rights 
 
     A study of the evolution of notions of citizenship in the context of the consolidation of 
popular politics in Palestine during the mandate is not complete without discussing the 
influence of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, Palestine’s first non-factional political party.  
The party, formed in 1931, has been the subject of only two monographs (one in English and 
one in Arabic) although its existence is mentioned in other histories of the mandate.  The 
party was active for three years but its membership, principles and formation were crucial to 
the creation of a grassroots civic movement and to the evolution of a discourse of pan-Arab 
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citizenship.  This section discusses the Istiqlal Party as the advocate of Palestinian Arab 
citizenship as inseparable from a wider pan-Arab nationality.  The actions that the party 
advocated against mandate policy, such as boycotts, strikes and non-cooperation, were 
influenced by the ideas of an inclusive citizenship for the Arabs and the right of Arab 
citizens to control the administration of the country.  Weldon Matthews refers to the party as 
a “watershed”: at once Palestinian, pan-Syrian and pan-Arab and the first of its kind to 
attempt to form a public, mass organisation whose adherents used different approaches 
toward mobilising nationalist and civic sentiments.
66
 
 
The political language and actions of the Istiqlalists 
 
     The members of the Istiqlal Party announced the party’s charter at the same time as the 
sessions of the Islamic Congress convened in Jerusalem in December 1931.  Drawn up in the 
home of Arab Executive member ‘Awni Abd al-Hadi, the pact stated the anti-colonial 
demand for independence and called for a democratic government in Palestine as part of a 
pan-Arab federation.  The idea of the federation necessitated that the Arabs of the former 
Ottoman provinces of Greater Syria be granted a federated citizenship based upon their Arab 
nationality.  The ideology of the party was not new: an anti-colonial party of the same name 
existed in 1918 in Syria.  The party’s founding statement in 1931 included the pledge that its 
members would improve the condition of their fellow citizens through their own efforts and 
activism.
67
  The party included prominent members, young and veteran pan-Arab activists as 
well as writers, teachers, lawyers and other intellectuals from the upper and middle socio-
economic classes such as Mohammad ‘Izza Darwaza, Akram Zu‘aytir, Hamdi al-Husayni, 
Ibrahim Shanti, ‘Isa Bandak and the man whose death sparked the Palestine Revolt in 1936, 
Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam.68 
     The Istiqlal Party, unlike the Executive, addressed its appeals to ‘the citizens.’  In 1933, 
the party’s conference in Jaffa highlighted the vision of its executive committee for a full-
scale boycott of the Palestine Administration.  Istiqlalists characterised the boycott as a way 
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through which citizens could demand rights, and the party encouraged the act of boycott as a 
duty of citizenship.  By advocating actions such as boycotts, the party’s populist leaders 
created a version of civil society in which all Arabs were represented as active citizens.  To 
this end, members organised a range of political activities, public festivals and holidays, 
issued political statements through local leaders, and connected with other groups which 
supported the peasants, workers and students.
69
  Seven festivals, holidays and major 
conferences took place in the early 1930s under the party’s auspices and included the 
celebration of Hittin Day in Haifa, memorial days for martyrs, and commemorations of the 
British occupation of Palestine.
70
   
     One of the party’s most prominent members, Sobhi al-Khudara, explained that national 
public opinion could be harnessed through the patronage of educated and non-educated Arab 
citizens using the language of rights and democracy.
71
  In his study on the Istiqlal Party, 
historian Samih Shabib argues the party “established the concepts of radical political 
(siyāsiya juthreya) guidance of the national struggle.”72  In the early 1930s the party 
organised actions including strikes and boycotts of British goods, particularly in the city of 
Nablus.  In late 1932 the party encouraged a general boycott of all British administrative 
functions and events.  According to a statement issued by the party to High Commissioner 
Wauchope, these acts re-affirmed the civil rights of Arab citizens of Palestine.  Similar to 
demands from other sectors of the citizenry, the Istiqlal Party argued that the citizens 
deserved equal employment opportunities as those of Jewish and British inhabitants, access 
to education and an independent parliament.
73
  Istiqlal leaders used slogans and public events 
to disseminate their vision of national and civic identity and to celebrate the civic-
mindedness of the Palestinian Arabs.   
     After 1933, the activities of the Istiqlal Party ceased due to the lack of strong leadership.  
Members were periodically arrested, exiled, placed under house arrest, and forced out of jobs 
as teachers and civil servants.  At the same time, Palestine was recovering from the urban 
riots of late 1933, which occurred in several cities of Palestine after Arab demonstrations and 
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marches against increased immigration figures and the mandate itself turned violent.  The 
riots themselves and their interpretation in the press indicate that the language of active 
citizenship promoted by the Istiqlalists had made an impact on the subaltern citizens.  For 
example, newspapers explicitly stated that “self-defense is a sacred right” as well as a duty of 
every Arab.
74
  Another newspaper described the right of the Arabs to rebel against injustices 
within the framework of civil disobedience.
75
   
 
Changing tactics and the defense of citizenship rights 
 
 With the loss of the Istiqlal Party’s advocacy for a pan-Arab civic identity by 1934, 
other nationalist political groups of a younger generation stepped into the vacuum to 
represent—or fail to represent—Arab citizenship in Palestine on the eve of the revolt.  The 
populist, educated activists saw themselves as a new generation inspired by anti-colonial 
leaders like Gandhi and by their links to the League to Combat Imperialism and to the 
Communist International.
76
  During the early 1930s, these activists increasingly used public 
space for displays of nationalism.  For example, certain holidays were created and 
commemorated through street demonstrations, marches and gatherings in local mosques and 
churches.  The displays of nationalism also included a growing number of strikes and 
boycotts.  The civic nature of these activities stressed the importance of Palestinian Arab 
agency and identity, bringing Arabs together on the basis of their common citizenship and 
the threats posed to that status by Zionism and the mandate.     
     One of the most debated components of active citizenship was non-cooperation with the 
mandate administration.  During a 1933 conference of nationalist leaders, one speaker 
suggested that non-cooperation should start with the nonpayment of direct taxes as a civic 
duty in order to force the British to abrogate the mandate.  Although the meeting’s members 
split over policy implementation, the tactic itself demonstrates the ways in which populist 
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leaders attempted to put the language of citizenship into practice.
77
  It is important to 
recognise that the Arab organisers of strikes and boycotts attempted to garner support from 
the rural and working classes in the early 1930s at conferences and public meetings, in part 
through accusations that British colonial policy caused the poor economic conditions faced 
by these classes.   
     Still, prior to 1936 these leaders largely failed to engage a large majority of peasants in 
active citizenship, as demonstrated by the lack of long-term involvement of the rural classes 
in the urban-based national movement and civil society.  When peasants stressed their 
identities as citizens who were guaranteed certain rights by virtue of that identity, they did so 
mainly in response to economic pressures.  This is evidenced in protest letters and 
testimonies of peasant associations to government officials which asked for, among other 
things, an agricultural bank, a reduction of tithes and taxes and agricultural and secondary 
schools in villages.  Furthermore, workers’ and general strikes in urban areas became more 
regular and their reasons better articulated after 1930.
78
  In 1931 one newspaper article noted 
that the citizens of Palestine “[knew] their rights and duties” when they went on strike.79  
Popular urban demonstrations had occurred since 1918, and at times had drawn thousands of 
supporters.  Women and students were drawn to demonstrations in greater numbers and they 
thus became the standard practice by the early 1930s in order for citizens to express 
displeasure at mandate legislation.   
     By the mid-1930s a new type of ‘civic’ activism emerged in Palestine aimed at stemming 
the influx of Jewish immigrants and stopping the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish 
ownership.  The new activists had a separate ideology from that promoted by the Istiqlalists 
and urban civil society, which had worked to either change mandate policy or remove 
altogether the mandate administration from Palestine.  Rather, a number of individual leaders 
from the peasant and working classes organised secret bands in the countryside and carried 
out guerilla-style tactics against the Jewish settlements in northern Palestine.  Secret cells 
were also formed in urban shantytowns such as those in Haifa by Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-
Qassem, an itinerant preacher, teacher, marriage register and member of the YMMA and 
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Istiqlal Party.  These bands attempted to educate and mobilise citizens through the idea of a 
popular revolt.
80
  Guerrilla organisations and tactics later inspired these novice fighters to 
shape a new resistance movement and orchestrate the Palestine Revolt of 1936-1939.  
Through the ideology of revolt as a means to achieve independence, the guerrilla groups 
played a role in expanding an active meaning of Palestinian civic identity and duties of 
citizenship.  Despite the tactics used by the populists to engage with a larger section of 
subaltern Palestinian society and to represent all Palestinians as citizens, the populist 
movement ultimately remained small and based in urban areas.  For the rural population after 
1933, citizenship rights and civic identity became less abstract once village leaders 
advocated a type of ‘civic’ behaviour meant to alleviate their poor economic situation—that 
of revolt against the British authorities and the Jewish settlers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
     By 1935, the Istiqlal Party and the active youth movement had all but disappeared from 
Palestine.  New political parties emerged through the efforts of leading personalities from 
either the Jerusalem-based Husayni or Nashashibi factions.  Five parties of some importance 
and standing took the place of the Istiqlalists.  Still, their platforms differed very little from 
each other and none initially advocated direct confrontation, demonstrations or non-
cooperation against the mandate administration.
81
  The brief mobilisation against the 
mandate that included actions of Arab youth, workers, peasants and women had been snuffed 
out and replaced with a return to factional politics.  The representation of subaltern 
citizenship, which had formerly been presented on the pages of Arabic periodicals, barely 
factored into the activities of the new political parties whose familial ties and sectarian 
politics dominated them. 
     Still, the half-decade prior to the Palestine Revolt was one in which the Istiqlalists and the 
more radicalised individuals associated with it shaped a particular representation of 
Palestinian citizenship as inseparable from national identity.  This representation, as 
demonstrated by the current chapter, transformed the earlier proposals of an equal national 
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identity between Arabs and Jews in Palestine into proposals for a future independent nation 
based on Arab nationality.  By the middle of the 1930s, the terminology of citizenship used 
by the Arabs changed as demands for the rights of citizenship became more frequent and 
increasingly contested by the lower classes.  The press published letters signed by ‘citizens 
of’ (muwatinīn min) rather than ‘nationals of’ (qawmī or watanī min), cultivating a broader 
sense of civic identity and the rights and duties that went along with this identity.  As 
opposition to the mandate came to be advocated in stronger terms, citizenship was 
transformed from being a middle-class discourse to becoming an active practice and 
expression of belonging by the lower classes. 
 The mandate legislation noted above also served to allow the British administration to 
continue to deny certain protections to Palestinian citizens—both Arab and Jewish.  The 
administration neither enshrined rights or protections for the population in a constitution nor 
did it grant any representative council the power to do so.  The mobilisation inherent in 
popular politics, such as that of the Istiqlalists, caused a shift in public opinion to focus on 
the failure of the mandate to provide for its citizens in the social, economic and political 
realms.  This mobilisation and the representation of citizenship in the early 1930s came in 
large part from the spread of nationalist ideologies in reaction to mandate legislation and 
through civil society networks.  Through this process, the new historical agency of a more 
inclusive Arab citizenry allowed for new negotiations of identity and citizenship.  As Partha 
Chatterjee has written, political institutions—in our case, citizenship in Palestine—must be 
linked into a network of norms in civil society that are independent from the state in order 
for the behaviours of such institutions to be put into wide and active practice.
82
  The 
Palestinian Arabs succeeded in encouraging types of behaviours of active citizenship in civil 
society and associational life outside the realm of the state.  By the mid-1930s, Arab public 
opinion continued to emphasise the unequal treatment by the mandate towards the two 
communities of citizens in Palestine.   
     Finally, the press must be considered as the medium through which the citizenry learned 
of, explained and challenged mandate legislation.  This thesis has explained, in this and other 
chapters, the crucial link between the Arabic press in Palestine, civil society and the 
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changing discourses and expressions of citizenship.  The press mobilised these discourses 
into expressions.  As readership spread to rural areas, public displays of citizenship and civic 
identity such as protest marches, demonstrations, unionization and strikes included the 
subaltern population who witnessed and became part of the national community of Arab 
citizens, often for the first time.   
     When the Palestinian Arab general strike began in April 1936, it gathered massive 
support throughout the country, owing to the attention the press gave to it.  The resurgence of 
an active citizenship was owed to the Arab community’s experiences of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s and the mobilisation by nationalist leaders and groups against mandate 
legislation.  The following chapter also addresses the new ways that Palestinian citizenship 
was defined by both the British and the Arab citizens during the first two years of the 
Palestine Revolt, from 1936 through 1937.  It will also demonstrate the transformations the 
revolt allowed for, both in civil society and in terms of mandate legislation.
215 
 
Chapter Seven 
Stalled Citizenship, the Possibility of Arab Civic Identity and the Palestine Revolt, 
1936-1937 
 
“There is no genuine enthusiasm to be observed in Palestine for Palestinian citizenship.  
It is only the Arabs in South America who are really anxious for it.  And under present 
conditions this does not surprise us. . . .  To the educated Palestinian Arab, who has 
always resented the separation of Palestine from Syria, the very idea of Palestinian 
citizenship is obnoxious as being associated with the Mandate and all it involves.” 
Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission Report, 1937 
 
Introduction 
 
     The Palestine Royal Commission of 1937, known as the Peel Commission after its 
appointed chairman, is most often remembered as the first British investigative body to 
suggest the partition of Palestine.  The Commission recommended more than simply 
partition: Sir Earl Peel validated the long-standing demand of a number of Arab nationalist 
and local leaders and Arab Executive Committee members that Arab emigrants be given 
Palestinian citizenship in order to return to Palestine if they wished.  Although the report is 
important in that it suggested the tense situation in Palestine be solved by partition, it should 
also be read as providing a broader understanding of the socio-political institution of 
citizenship and its importance to the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine in the mid-
1930s.  In particular, the report offers clear hints at contemporary notions, meanings, the 
vocabulary associated with nationality and citizenship, as well as of suggestions for the 
future of Palestinian citizenship by Great Britain.  The Commission heard evidence between 
the end of 1936 and January 1937 and it aimed to discover the reasons for the ‘disturbances,’ 
or the early years of the Great Revolt (al-thawra al-kubra) in Palestine.  As part of the 
investigation, a number of Arab witnesses testified on the issue of Palestinian citizenship and 
its inclusion in anti-mandate protest demands—an opportunity which the mandate authorities 
had never made available to the Arab population of Palestine. 
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     The context of the current chapter is the outbreak of the six-month general strike in 
Palestine in 1936 and the first year and a half of revolt from 1936 through 1937.  The chapter 
sheds light on the development of civic identity formation amidst political struggles between 
Arabs and Jews over identity and the rights associated with it.  The time period showed that 
‘citizen’ and the vocabulary and rhetoric associated with Palestinian nationality and 
citizenship cannot be depicted as givens.  Rather, multiple definitions continued to be 
negotiated by a number of actors.  As a result, during the revolt the rural inhabitants and their 
leadership engaged with citizenship rhetoric in a language different from that of the middle-
class Arab nationalist leaders.  The rhetoric of the former group was influenced by peasant 
struggles beginning in the early 1930s over decreased economic opportunities in the context 
of a world-wide depression and growing financial and agrarian problems in Palestine.  
Whilst Chapter Six demonstrated the significance of the language of rights, duties and 
belonging to a broader understanding of citizenship and civic identity for the Arab 
population, the current chapter offers insight into the changing language used by both the 
Arab population and the British administration during the general strike and revolt.  This 
language evidences a shift in the understanding on the part of mandate officials about 
citizenship and the place of Palestine as linked to the broader British colonial model.  The 
actions of both the Arab rebels and the non-violent activists influenced this understanding: 
the British response to the revolt relied on a new categorisation of the Arab citizenry in 
colonial terminology. 
     In a recent reflection on subaltern studies, Partha Chatterjee has suggested that the 
contemporary Indian peasant must be understood within a new framework of democratic 
citizenship—one that is definitely not subjecthood and is perhaps fundamentally altered from 
the normative ideas of citizenship in western liberal democracies.  The suggestion is relevant 
to the history of the Palestine Revolt and the place of the Arab citizen in it.  The previous 
chapters have suggested that the ideas and ideals of citizenship expressed by the Palestinian 
Arabs during the mandate were largely conceived within a conceptual framework of 
democratic, liberal citizenship while rooted in notions of jus sanguinis and jus soli 
nationality influenced by late Ottoman practice.  The changes to Arab civic identity owing to 
the events of late 1935 through 1937 requires historians to situate the Arab peasants—greatly 
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affected by the revolt—as well as other Arab inhabitants of Palestine as the actors who 
emerged to determine new notions and expressions of Palestinian citizenship.    
     Following Chatterjee’s argument, the insurgent peasants—who became more and more 
numerous by the end of 1936—were mass-political subjects integrated into the populist 
network of ‘the nation’ mobilised against the British authorities.1  However, the historian 
must be careful to take the nuances of peasant identities and actions into account: rural 
insurgency from 1936 was stirred not only by populist national leaders but also in reaction to 
increased economic problems in the countryside.  Nationalists easily linked the economic 
problems to the mandate’s support of Zionism and its encouragement of land sales to Jews.  
These nationalists emphasised the importance for the peasant to actively resist his loss of 
‘rights’ and identity.  This chapter explores whether the peasants also specifically defined 
themselves as ‘citizens.’  It is in this framework of the growth of mass political mobilisation 
in rural Palestine that historians must study the revolt in order to understand the expansion of 
citizenship notions and expressions and the shelf-life of both in light of the nation-wide 
revolt staged against the British.  
     Throughout the first phase of the revolt and as a result of the increase in violence in 1936, 
the British mandate authorities censored free speech, vetoed the right of assembly and 
enacted emergency regulations, measures that affected mostly the Arab population and only 
occasionally Jewish residents.  Although the six-month general strike under the direction of 
the Higher Arab Committee (HAC) was mostly peaceful and a show of civil disobedience 
influenced by the tactics adopted by the populist movement since the early 1930s, by the end 
of 1936 insurgents in the countryside turned to violence.  This intensified by mid-1937 when 
the Peel Commission published its report recommending partition.  This violence 
emboldened rebels as it forced the British, particularly High Commissioner Arthur 
Wauchope, to give attention to their actions.  In some respects it halted the development of 
Arab civil society as tensions increased between urban and rural Palestinians.  After the 
collapse of Palestine’s pan-Arab and populist Istiqlal Party by the end of 1934, Palestinian 
politics was again dominated by the moderate political current rather than the more radical, 
subaltern movement.  A number of factional parties were established, which rarely 
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encouraged the inclusion of civil society organisations.  Their platforms were largely 
indistinguishable from one another.  Their leaders came mostly from the traditional 
Jerusalem families.  The Husaynis (the Palestine Arab Party), the Nashashibis (the National 
Defense Party) and the Khalidis (the Reform Party) were prominent sponsors of the new 
parties.    
     Meanwhile, the provisions of citizenship legislation that negatively impacted the Arab 
emigrants ceased to feature in the press in the mid-1930s.  The amendments to the principle 
citizenship order of 1925 (the 1931 Palestine Citizenship Amendment Order-in-Council) had 
not solved the problem of statelessness for native Arabs emigrants.  Instead, the 1931 order-
in-council offered only treaty nationality for those natives who were abroad between the 
signature of the Lausanne treaty in 1924 and the issue of the order in 1925.  However, as 
suggested by the Peel Commission’s report, the grievances that remained over the citizenship 
legislation and the treatment of the Jewish immigrants as opposed to the Arabs did not 
disappear but rather remained relevant at the advent of revolt.    
 
Palestinian Arab civic identity practices and the general strike  
 
     At the end of 1935, High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope wrote to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies of his growing concern over what he reported as radical Arab groups in 
Palestinian villages.  He had cause for concern.  That autumn, the death of Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din 
al-Qassam in a gun battle with British forces resulted in an outpouring of Arab nationalist 
and anti-colonial sentiment against the British and it turned al-Qassam into a martyr for the 
liberation of Palestine.  Al-Qassam who came to Palestine from Syria in the early 1920s 
(avoiding a French-issued death sentence) worked as a preacher and social reformer in Haifa 
and gained a following with his anti-British appeals to the Muslim working class and 
students.   He was a member of the Istiqlal Party and led the Haifa Young Muslim Men’s 
Association (YMMA) for a time.  He secretly organised cells of fighters known as the Black 
Hand Gang (al-yad al-sawda’) which included the unemployed, labourers and the peasantry, 
and planned to begin a revolt in the north of Palestine in late 1935.
2
  Al-Qassam’s death in 
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late November reinvigorated the national movement particularly in the rural areas of 
Palestine.  The surge in national activity came in spite of the atmosphere which was 
described by Bahjat Abu-Gharbiya, a friend of al-Qassam, as follows: “in the 1920s and 
1930s, an important popular national element formed for [the Palestinian Arabs] but mandate 
authorities worked to reduce it from 1935 until . . . it was as if it did not exist.”3  
    The following section provides an analysis of how the practices and expressions of 
citizenship became increasingly ‘normalised’ in the months leading to the general strike of 
April through October 1936 and the subsequent revolt.  In other words, the rural Arab 
population engaged in greater numbers with the urban, middle-class nationalists’ language of 
social, political and civil rights and duties of citizenship.  The rhetoric that emphasised 
political rights to representation or civil rights to economic assistance, for example, became 
associated with expressions of discontent with the mandate such as strikes and protests 
which were attended by peasants and the urban labourers.  Rural associations increasingly 
wrote letters of protest to the Palestine government, expressing opposition to its policies and 
claiming to represent the ‘citizens of the villages.’  The general strike, which marked the start 
of the revolt and featured episodes of violence in the urban and rural areas, has been analysed 
in a number of studies yet these works have not considered events from the perspective of 
the ways in which rights of citizenship featured in it at a discursive level.
4
  This is hardly 
surprising since explicit slogans of citizenship by leaders and civic associations were not a 
predominate feature of the strike.  Yet a feature that is relevant to the expanding engagement 
with citizenship is the way in which Palestinian Arabs portrayed their rebellious actions as 
part of their civic and national duties and rights.  The strike marked a turning point: for the 
first time, a language of rights was mobilised alongside physical violence.  Violence was also 
imagined by revolt leaders as a necessary and legal path towards the attainment of an 
independent and representative government in Palestine.   
                                                   
3 Fi Khidām al-Nidāl al-‘Arabī al-Filastīnī: Mudhakkarāt al-Munādil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, 1916-1949 [In 
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     It is important to note that the strike was part of a broader regional context of unrest and 
political struggles, such as in Syria and Egypt, and it was certainly influenced in part by 
Zionist labour organisation.  By 1936, and indeed until the end of the revolt in 1939, the 
organisation of Palestinian Arab civil society was that of an expansion of networks.  Civic 
identity played a key role in the strike as Arab nationalist leaders relied heavily on stressing 
that all Palestinian Arabs had the same rights associated with citizenship and were part of a 
wider civic and national community in Palestine.  In a study on violence and civil society in 
Quebec and Ireland by Jeffrey Cormier and Phillipe Couton, whose work focuses on the 
early twentieth century, they maintain that certain mobilising structures are necessary for the 
emergence of both nonviolent and violent social movements.
5
  Dense civil society 
organisations and national affiliation are part of these mobilising structures. 
 
Grassroots civic action    
  
     Before al-Qassam’s death in 1935 High Commissioner Wauchope began to advocate 
proportional representation in a new legislative council, one of the Arabs’ constant 
demands.
6
  However, his attempt to reintroduce a plan for a legislative council after the 
failed attempt in 1922 (due to the Arab boycott of elections) did not come to fruition because 
the British Parliament refused to support the plan.  As a result of the continued failure to 
introduce representative government into Palestine, ‘independent groups’ led by Arab young 
men such as secondary-school teacher and journalist Akram Zu‘aytir in Nablus declared 
several general strikes in a number of urban centres.  For example, the Arab Scouts in rural 
areas and the Youth Sports Club oversaw a November 1935 city-wide strike in Nablus to 
protest the ‘Judaizing’ of Palestine and to ask for a representative council.  Zu‘aytir 
addressed letters of response to those who participated in the strike as “thanks to you, the 
citizens!” (shukrān lakum, al-muwātinīn) linking nationalist actions to a sense of civic duty.  
Similar language was used in other acts of civil protest.  In Jerusalem, thousands attended a 
demonstration to mark the anniversary of the city’s occupation by the British, and speakers 
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like the teacher and newspaper editor Hamdi Husayni and the labour unionist Michel Mitri 
appealed to ‘the citizens’ to form a popular configuration of resistance.7 
     After the November 1935 strike, Wauchope noted—and began to fear—the links between 
the more radical civil society and youth groups in rural Palestine.  Similarly, the demands for 
political representation at the village level alarmed officials.  These groups and individuals 
advocated direct political action against the British mandate administration by appealing for 
public and, at first, civil tactics.  A meeting of local leaders in Nablus decided to support acts 
of non-cooperation including demonstrations, the resignation of Arab government officials 
and a boycott of Jewish and British social and political events and they declared the 
willingness to be imprisoned for the national cause.  By that time, various urban nationalist 
leaders traveled to rural areas to speak in clubs and mosques.  In the countryside, peasants 
expressed a greater interested in politics than they had previously.
8
  Indeed, the Arab Scouts 
were politically active in 1935 in villages.  They explained their actions of spreading 
nationalist propaganda and encouraging non-payment of tithes in terms of national and civic 
duty.
9
  Similarly, in Syria during the Great Revolt against the French, a romanticisation of 
Arab leaders took place within the context of the changing approaches to popular 
mobilisation in the national movement.  To legitimise the leadership of the populist leaders, 
their figures had to be juxtaposed with ‘unjust’ leaders.  In both Palestine and Syria during 
their respective revolts against the mandatory administrations, men of religion played a 
significant role in the popular mobilisation of the rural population.  In Palestine, al-Qassam 
filled that role as he had walked through parts of the countryside to preach jihad (holy 
struggle) against the mandate administration.
10
 
     Public meetings became a standard way to chart the public opinion of the peasants and 
labourers and to encourage greater participation in political affairs.  The gatherings of 
grassroots organisations influenced thousands of supporters to join demonstrations in towns 
and cities.  By January 1936 a strong populist movement led by former Istiqlal leaders and 
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Arab youth groups withdrew confidence from the Jerusalem-based political parties and gave 
their support to the young men’s groups.11  As a result of the changing political situation and 
the higher level of political activity in the countryside, active expressions of citizenship such 
as the use of the term itself in petitions, the establishment of rural clubs for Palestinian 
Arabs, and letter-writing campaigns by which residents demanded a variety of ‘rights,’ grew 
in number.  Meetings, demonstrations and even non-payment of taxes and donations made to 
the National Land Fund allowed Palestinian Arab citizens to craft an ideology of citizenship 
duties during the revolt.   
     In the months before the general strike began the changing language and rhetoric of 
citizenship and duties was evident in the multiple actions used by urban and rural Arab 
groups and individuals to challenge the administration.  The first call by the national 
committees in Nablus for citizens to stop the payment of taxes to the mandate government 
came in March 1936.  From the beginning, the Nablus leaders portrayed the refusal to pay 
taxes as a civic, national and legal duty.  However, in the countryside local groups advocated 
a more violent approach: small groups cut telephone wires, bombed bridges and blocked 
roads as a show of resistance to the mandate government.
12
  By April 1936, after Parliament 
refused to support Wauchope’s legislative council, villages and towns throughout Palestine 
bombarded the British administrators with petitions in support of the council, taking the lead 
from the national committees in Nablus.  The language used in the documents suggests that 
the practice of voting was perceived as a right and a duty and the petitions were signed by 
‘Arab citizens.’13   
     Due to the organisation of the Arab labour movement from the first half of the 1930s, 
calls to strike received considerable attention in press reports and editorials.  In April 1936, a 
number of Arab civil servants, urban tradesmen and transportation workers went on strike.  
In response, the mandate administration issued the Emergency Regulations that criminalized 
calls for strikes and threatened those who encouraged the strike with legal action.
14
  
Regardless, nearly 140 Palestinian senior government officials in a letter to High 
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14 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 187. 
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Commissioner Wauchope explained their resignation in terms of civic duty.  Their role, they 
explained in the petition, was to serve as a link between the government and all classes of 
Arab citizens.
15
  The letter demonstrates the connection between the discursive realm of 
‘duties’ as supported by Arab civil society and the support for the call of non-cooperation 
with the government on the part of civil servants or the striking working and middle classes.   
     
The general strike and non-violence  
 
     The call for a comprehensive general strike, which started the first phase of the Palestine 
Revolt, came after an incident in mid-April 1936 when members of an Arab armed gang near 
Haifa killed two Jewish truck drivers.
16
  The murders led to a cycle of Jewish reprisals 
followed by Arab counter-reprisals and within days the British imposed a curfew on the Arab 
citizens.  Demonstrations turned violent as they spread to urban areas, with the Arabs 
expressing anger against increased Jewish immigration.  Local leaders in Nablus urged the 
use of tactics of non-violence and took the lead in prompting other municipal authorities to 
form local committees that linked up to larger national bodies such as the Youth Congress 
and the Arab Patriotic Society (al-mujtam‘a al-‘arabī al-watanī, formerly the Muslim 
Christian Association).  These leaders then announced a general strike in protest against 
immigration policy and the mandate, and prepared a statement that explained the purpose of 
national committees and asked for support from all Palestinian Arabs to recognise the Nablus 
leadership as representative of the population.
17
   
     As the work by the Nablus strike committee began, slogans of non-cooperation appeared 
in letters supporting the committee.  The committee soon received a letter from a Jerusalem 
club signed by 150 self-professed ‘citizens’ such as doctors, lawyers, union leaders, students, 
teachers and tradesmen.  They announced their support for the practical implementation of 
“no taxation without representation” (la dara’ib bilā tamthīl).  In Nablus, Akram Zu‘aytir 
and others agreed that the first serious political step was to embark on a campaign of civil 
disobedience by refusing to pay taxes.  The step had been previously advocated in the mid-
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1920s, when newspapers such as Sawt al-Sha‘b referred to it as a right of the Arabs and a 
tactic meant to express dissent from the mandate’s 1926 municipal franchise legislation.  The 
letter from the Jerusalem club added that only through non-cooperation (alata‘āwun) could 
the Arab population maintain its identity.
18
   
     By the end of April 1936, grassroots national committees swiftly formed in other 
Palestinian cities and towns and they unanimously agreed to adhere to the general strike.  In 
the call to strike, the committees used the vocabulary of civic duty.  The committees, backed 
by press reports, called for all Palestinian Arab citizens to participate.  On 25 April, the 
Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, met with the five largest political parties in Jerusalem and 
formed a coordinating body, the Higher Arab Committee (HAC) led by Hajj Amin.  Along 
with nine other administrative members this committee “represented a kind of alliance 
between traditional notables and emergent middle-class urban radicals” as the assumed self-
appointed leadership of the strike.
19
  However, the national committees were often organised 
at a local level and their leaders did not want to follow the exclusive leadership of the 
notables.
20
  According to Subhi Yassin’s history of the revolt, local leaders and committees 
immediately demanded that the HAC support civil disobedience, the nonpayment of taxes 
and yield to public opinion.
21
    
     By mid-May 1936, the HAC announced that the position of ‘no taxation without 
representation’ was the hallmark of citizenship practice.  The committee stated in a 
communiqué published in the press and addressed to the Palestinian Arabs that this would 
“help save your identity and your nationality [qawmtik].”22  One observer, the Egyptian-
Palestinian newspaper owner Mohamed ‘Ali Al-Tahir, noted that the non-payment of taxes 
and the peaceful strike were the duties of “citizens employed in the national cause” (al-
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qadiyya al-wataniyya).
23
  The adherence by a large part of the Arab population to the HAC’s 
request that the Arabs stop paying taxes as part of the general strike is a significant 
expression of active citizenship.  The call took into account struggles elsewhere in history for 
independence, such as in the United States, and the response of the Arabs proved to the 
mandate administration the power of both the individual and the collective.  Indeed, by 1936 
the simple phrase ‘no taxation without representation’ was easily understood in urban and 
rural areas (in the latter, Arabs were asked not to pay the tithe) where a rhetoric of rights and 
duties related to the political, social and economic position of the Arabs had long filled the 
pages of newspapers. 
     At first, the strike showed the diversity of Palestinian Arab civil society.  Alongside the 
workers and the notables, the peasant leadership expressed their support and even children 
refused to go to school.
24
  National committees throughout Palestine worked at the local 
level to ensure that the population received food supplies.  Initially, certain groups were 
given strike funds in lieu of their salaries.  The wealthy were asked to contribute money and 
women went door-to-door to fundraise and encourage sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifice, 
and they urged all Arab citizens to emphasise their Arab national identity.
25
   
     Meanwhile, although a number of village committees advocated civil disobedience such 
as the nonpayment of tithes alongside their urban counterparts, other village leaders instead 
urged “disobedience in all senses of the word,” meaning armed revolt.26  Violence was 
touted as a legitimate expression of citizenship and resistance to the mandate.  Support for 
violence as a tactic to resist the government and the land policies that favoured immigrant 
settlers can be traced back to the organisation of countryside bands of rebels, even prior to 
the works of men like al-Qassam.  Indeed as noted above, civil society even in its nascent 
form in rural areas could be mobilised to support violent acts against government 
infrastructure and personnel using the language of colonial oppression to incite peasants.  In 
Palestine by 1936, the rebels justified violent disobedience as the means to fully achieve the 
goal of forcing the British to surrender control of the country to the Arabs. 
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The Palestine Revolt and the notion of civic duties 
 
     The ‘not civil’ disobedience referred to above had begun in the first weeks of the strike as 
Arab guerilla rebels, often from the countryside, committed numerous murders and attacks 
on Jewish settlements and British police.  These rebels in the countryside worked 
independently from the HAC although they were meant to be under the control of the Mufti 
of Jerusalem.
27
  However the actions of these rebels were not accompanied by demands 
explicitly in the name of citizenship rights as were the non-violent expressions of political 
and civic identity (such as demands for the franchise for all Arabs) that came from the urban 
areas of Palestine.  Soon after the strike began, a former Syrian Ottoman army officer who 
had fought against the French, Fawzi al-Din al-Qawuqji, assumed control of the rebel bands 
in Palestine as commander-in-chief.  One of the first communiqués issued by al-Qawuqji, 
addressed to the ‘citizens,’ appealed to the language of natural rights: he argued that the 
revolt was a humanitarian, religious and national duty of the Arabs in Palestine and of the 
entire Arab nation.  In contrast to the non-violent civil society organisation, the revolt 
commanders called on the citizens to take up arms as a matter of duty.
28
   
     Ted Swedenburg’s ethnographical study on the Palestine Revolt provides the insight that 
many peasants joined out of fear they would lose their land and their economic livelihood to 
the Zionists.  Compared to the educated middle-class nationalists in urban centres, the 
peasants thus had little background on the ideological concept of citizenship and the rights 
and expressions associated with the term.  The peasant rebels more often depicted their 
identity as primordial and linked to the very land of Palestine but they did not explicitly 
mention citizenship.
29
  Rather, appeals were often issued in the name of Allah to the nation 
(al-umma), sons (abna’) or the noble people (karīm al-sha‘b).  The appeals contained 
localised discourses including the need for the peasants to sacrifice themselves to protect 
their land (ard) and honour (sharaf) as Arabs.  The link between land, economic stability and 
revolt is an important one and the driving force for many peasants to join guerilla bands of 
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fighters under al-Qawuqji.  Rural Arabs, unlike urban nationalists, thought of rights 
primarily as rights to land.  For example, municipal franchise laws, press censorship, 
freedom of assembly and equal opportunities in employment between Arabs and Jews did 
not necessarily concern the rural population as greatly as did the rhetorical threats that the 
mandate posed a great danger to their livelihood in agriculture.  Indeed, these threats were 
often issued by the HAC and urban leaders as well as by rebels based in the countryside. 
     More recently, historian Michael Provence has demonstrated that since the revolt’s 
commanders and many individual rebels had all been Ottoman subjects they had exposure to 
notions of nationalism and collective struggle through Ottoman education and conscription 
prior to 1918.  These former Ottoman subjects “retained the ability to communicate with and 
mobilize members of the subaltern classes from which they emerged,” particularly through 
the language of popular patriotism and Arab nationality.
30
  The engagement by the peasants 
and their leadership with the rhetoric of citizenship during the early stage of the revolt was 
less explicit and less inclusive than was the engagement by the urban nationalists; rather, the 
rights of Arabs to land and economic livelihood on the basis of their Arab origin in Palestine 
played a far greater role in mobilising the rural population to oppose the mandate and Jewish 
settlement.  For some peasants and for urban labourers, the notion of civic rights and duties 
and their subsequent expression developed through a process that involved daily interactions 
with strike committees, strikers and the mandate authorities.  Throughout 1936, associations 
and press editorials encouraged active citizenship, suggesting that village and urban 
Palestinians alike begin legal proceedings and boycotts against the mandate government over 
the loss of civil and political rights.
31
  For example, in Nazareth the Chamber of Commerce 
informed the high commissioner just as the general strike began that since the city’s 
merchants would strike, the government should not send them any bills.
32
  In a sense, both 
the rebels and the peaceful strikers crafted their own expressions of citizenship rights and 
duties even if they rarely articulated the term ‘citizen.’     
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     As noted above, the process of civic identity formation during the strike and revolt took 
place alongside political struggles in Egypt and Syria.  Both experienced revolts by their 
populations against the British and French administrations, respectively.  A number of 
Egyptians and Syrians worked in Palestine on railways and ports while Palestinian Arabs 
lived and worked in Egypt and Syria.  Emigrants in these two countries as well as in the 
Americas were actively involved in supporting the events of 1936.  These links served to 
further emphasise the notion of Arab nationality as an inclusive status tied to concepts of 
national and natural political rights throughout the Levant.  Notably, Mohamed ‘Ali Al-
Tahir, head of the Palestine Arab Committee in Cairo, wrote updates (published through the 
press) on the strike for the emigrants in North and South America, informing them of the 
intensification of violence and the tolls of dead, wounded and jailed.  One of his letters stated 
that “it becomes the duty of every Arab emigrant in the service of his country and his nation” 
to support the Palestinian Arabs’ strike and revolt.  Al-Tahir and those who read his reports 
and newspaper editorials thus helped to export the discourse of civic duty as linked to the 
revolt into the Palestinian Arab diaspora.
33
 
     The general strike was called off after six months, in October 1936, as a result of 
negotiations between the HAC and other Arab leaders in Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, Arabia 
and elsewhere.  The strike ultimately failed to paralyze the economy.  Further, by that point 
the poorer segments of the Arab population expressed an often dire discontent with the strike 
and the difficulties they incurred in their trade, particularly in the transportation of produce.  
Although the national committees and newspapers portrayed the strike as supported by all 
Palestinian Arabs, in reality they neglected to account for a large part of the population that 
simply could not afford to strike.
34
  To be sure, the everyday practices of many Palestinian 
Arabs were transformed by the six-month strike.  Nationalist language was employed more 
widely in the countryside to place the blame for economic problems on the lack of a national 
government and on the mandate’s land policies.  Yet as the end of the strike showed, 
economics played a significant role in the decisions made by the peasant and working classes 
to abandon the strike.  Slogans such as ‘no taxation without representation’ and the 
vocabulary of duties did, however, become more firmly linked to active citizenship. 
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     To step back a bit, shortly after the strike began the British government addressed High 
Commissioner Wauchope’s suggestion to send an investigative commission to Palestine.  
The commission was formed in May 1936 under Chairman Earl Peel to ascertain the causes 
of the disturbances that broke out in April, to inquire into the ways the mandate was 
implemented and to determine the obligations of the mandate administration to both the Jews 
and the Arabs.  The Peel Commission would also investigate whether the Jews and Arabs 
had legitimate grievances and if so, its task was to make recommendations in order to 
remove or to prevent these grievances.
35
  The Commission did not arrive to Palestine until 
November 1936, just after the strike had been called off.  At the same time the Colonial 
Office allowed for nearly two thousand more entry permits to be given to Jewish immigrants 
and the Palestinian Arab leaders boycotted Peel.  Their boycott lasted until January when the 
Palestinian leaders, mostly former Arab Executive members, decided to give evidence to 
Peel and his colleagues.
36
  By early 1937, new British legislation put in place in order to 
quell the revolt in Palestine (discussed in the next section) served to deny the few political 
and civil rights which the Palestinian Arabs had enjoyed before the outbreak of the revolt.  
The new Emergency Regulations impacted urban and rural Arabs as they were imposed from 
above by the military authorities sent to Palestine and by the British government.  This 
implementation was colonial in that the administration of Palestine was forced to adhere to 
imperial emergency and martial law provisions rather than impose provisions specific to the 
mandate.  Furthermore, the emergency situation made it increasingly difficult for the British 
to view the Arabs as rights-bearing citizens, as it eroded civil and political rights.  
 
Stalled citizenship: from the citizenry to the ‘population of Palestine’ 
 
     To further explain what I term ‘stalled citizenship,’ it is useful to refer to the difference 
between ‘the citizens’ and ‘the population’ in light of the response to the Palestine Revolt by 
the mandate authorities.  In terms of policy and theory, ‘the citizens’ and ‘the population’ are 
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often viewed as separate groups in colonial situations.  Chatterjee has written that the 
concept of the citizen carries with it “the ethical connotation of participation in the 
sovereignty of the state,” while the concept of the population, by contrast, “makes available 
to government . . . a set of rationally manipulable instruments for reaching large sections of 
the inhabitants of a country as the targets of their ‘policies.’”37  With the outbreak of 
collective violence in Palestine the British found it necessary to remove certain rights given 
to the Palestinian Arabs by treating them not as citizens of the mandate but rather as a 
colonial population.   
     It is clear from the documents of the mandate administration that throughout the revolt the 
Arabs were classified in the minds of the British as simply the majority segment of 
Palestine’s population.  During the Palestine Revolt, the examples of Chatterjee’s 
‘manipulable instruments’ included old and new British colonial legislation that was 
implemented by the administration: collective punishment, the enactment of emergency and 
martial law regulations and military trials.  While the Palestine government could easily 
apply these public security measures on colonial populations it was more difficult to justify 
their application to a population of Palestinian citizens internationally-recognised as British-
protected persons and over whom Great Britain did not have full sovereignty.   
     Not only were certain rights and privileges withdrawn from the Arab population, but the 
existence of Palestinian citizenship as separate from British colonial subjecthood seemed to 
be unclear.  Mandate authorities increasingly placed the inhabitants of Palestine within a 
more broadly colonial category as a population that needed to be made loyal to Great Britain.  
This was a direct result of the revolt and the British reaction to Arab violence as defensive 
and meant to protect not only the mandate territory but Great Britain itself.  During the 
revolt, the British in Palestine could no longer view the Arabs as Palestinian citizens or 
protected-subjects (despite legislation that classified them as such) but instead referred to 
them collectively at best as ‘the population’ of the territory, and at worst as suspected 
guerillas.  Indeed the military, which assumed control of Palestine by 1937, did not refer to 
the rights of the inhabitants.  Under the regime’s statutory martial law, a stage between full 
military control with martial law in Palestine and continued civil powers under partial 
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military control, the civil rights to certain protections for entire civilian population of villages 
and towns were disregarded.  For example, even in lieu of full martial law, searches and 
interrogations were carried out (harshly in some instances) on entire villages.
38
  
     The following section explores these themes, focusing on the language and action of the 
British in Palestine and that of the Palestinian national leaders and rebels. While the violence 
of the revolt and the subsequent imposition of a military regime resulted in the denial of 
certain rights to the Arab population of Palestine, the rebel leaders themselves did not 
directly address the issue of rights of citizenship but instead used rhetorical nationalist 
terminology and imposed their own vision of public order in line with their tactics in support 
of the rebellion.  In effect, both the British and the Arab rebel leaders reduced Palestinian 
citizenship to a meaningless status by the end of 1937. 
     Although a complete martial law ordinance was not introduced in Palestine, related 
ordinances that sanctioned collective and punitive punishments primarily affected the 
Palestinian Arab inhabitants by turning them into colonial subjects.  As historian Naomi 
Shepherd states, after the passage of the mandate’s Emergency Regulations by High 
Commissioner Wauchope in the early summer of 1936, “the legal system of Palestine 
became harnessed to repression . . . successive Emergency Regulations led to summary 
justice and the curtailment of civil rights.”39  The regulations additionally allowed for all 
sorts of collective punishment measures, from imposing fines to demolishing Arab quarters 
of cities and Arab homes in villages.  Initially, the high commissioner refused to comply 
with the orders to increase the number of troops in Palestine.  In large part, Wauchope’s 
stance came out of the belief he shared with the Colonial Office that a military solution to the 
grievances of the Arabs was not the best avenue toward ending the revolt.  Unlike the 
military, Wauchope believed that the Arabs’ revolt was a genuine and popular one based on 
fears of further Zionist consolidation of territory and government in Palestine.
40
  Despite 
Wauchope’s objections, Whitehall decided that the army and the Royal Air Force (RAF) be 
sent to Palestine as a show of force to contain insurgent Arab groups and to control areas 
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once the violence intensified.  The tactics meant to contain and stop the revolt were not new 
creations: a British volume on ‘small wars’ from the late 1890s supported collective 
punishment of ‘uncivilised’ natives and the book’s recommendations had been used in Egypt 
and Iraq as well as in the Boer War, India and Ireland.
41
  
     By 1935, the imperial martial law ordinance had been amended so that it no longer 
required officials to prove a crime was committed before imposing collective punishment.  
After the outbreak of revolt in 1936, the British government gave the high commissioner’s 
office the power to apply collective punishment in municipal areas in response to crimes 
committed by rebels such as the cutting of telephone wires, the destruction of infrastructure 
and rifle fire.
42
  Yet as Palestine was not a colony under full British sovereignty, theoretically 
the administration, the military and the Palestine Police were bound by international and 
British regulations that offered a standard for the proper treatment of civilian populations to 
maintain law and order during incidents of rebellion.   
     Collective punishment was used to great effect by the authorities.  The most well-known 
example of collective punishment actions during the general strike was the June 1936 
demolition of the Arab quarters of the old city of Jaffa to prevent their use as a base for 
rebels and snipers.  The demolition of homes left up to 6,000 Palestinian Arabs homeless.  
Even so, historian Matthew Hughes affirms on the basis of evidence provided by colonial 
records that urban demolitions such as those carried out in Jaffa were far less common than 
punitive acts committed by British soldiers in villages.  These included home demolitions, 
looting and destruction of household items and crops.
43
  Other examples of collective 
punishments included British soldiers forcing male inhabitants of ‘bad,’ or rebellious, 
villages to stand under the sun for days without access to food or adequate water, house-to-
house searches that resulted in deliberate sabotage of property and foodstuffs, and mass 
arrests of all male citizens of various villages.
44
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     Collective fines were primarily imposed for agrarian crimes and clan feuds prior to 1936.  
In 1936, collective fines started to be used as punitive measures under the Collective 
Punishment Ordinance and the Emergency Regulations.  For instance, authorities imposed 
punitive measures when villagers refused to name rebels.  Furthermore, Arabs were made to 
pay themselves for the repairs of demolished homes and infrastructure.
45
  The fines could be 
exorbitant and combined with the pre-existing economic hardship in the countryside, they 
led to an increase in feelings of resentment which were often channeled in nationalistic 
terms.  These types of punishments, done under a civil administration prior to the arrival of 
military authorities to Palestine, took away any sense of legal standing or presumed rights to 
protection of life, property or welfare.  Collective and punitive punishments were imposed 
upon the Arab population in order to punish this group for the actions of the exclusively-
Arab rebels.  The Jewish Palestinians did not suffer collectively from either type of 
punishment.  As a result, the civil and military authorities could continue to treat one set of 
recognised Palestinian citizens differently from the other set of citizens.      
     The Arab villagers recognised their lack of legal rights even during the strike.  Residents 
of the village of Qula reported on the excesses of force, including home demolitions, by 
British soldiers.  They referred to the actions of the soldiers as “inconsistent with the 
principles of justice and humanity” and invoked the villagers’ rights to an immediate legal 
inquiry.  Despite their hopes for legal action, those citizens whose homes were demolished or 
partially destroyed by the British were not allowed to give evidence in court.
46
  In fact, the 
citizens of the mandate could not take legal action against the government itself during the 
revolt but could only press civil charges against individual soldiers.  The British justified 
their actions as defensive measures meant to protect the government of Palestine.  Simoni 
notes that during the years of revolt, any welfare offered by the British to the Arab 
population was halted as security became the overriding concern, thus widening the gap in 
the political relations between the Arab and Jewish communities.
47
  Indeed, the removal of 
protection and rights negatively affected only the Palestinian Arab population.    
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     The emergency and collective punishment laws, particularly the 1937 Prevention of 
Crimes Ordinance, allowed for deportation and the detention of suspected criminals or 
politically-active leaders.  Journalists were jailed if their writings were too political, and 
Arabic-language newspapers were closed for publishing “dangerous articles.”  Throughout 
1936, the mandate authorities suspended Arab dailies thirty-four times.
48
  In March 1937 the 
Palestine Defence Order-in-Council gave High Commissioner Wauchope the power to carry 
out a variety of defense measures in the interest of law, order and public safety.  The order-
in-council made the carrying of firearms punishable by death and the private possession of a 
firearm could result in a life sentence in prison.  The order criminalized any meeting or 
procession including more than twelve people.  Under the order, if the Palestine Police 
stopped an individual, this individual risked imprisonment if he or she did not give the 
correct identification information and travel permit or pass.  The order also provided for the 
establishment of military court trials for offenders which did not allow appeals.
49
  
     Although the British never issued what Hughes calls ‘real’ martial law in Palestine, the 
September 1937 order-in-council imposed a ‘statutory’ martial law as noted above.  The 
army had the powers to search and arrest any suspect and it was given authority to shoot any 
suspect trying to escape or any individual who ignored military commands.  Since the British 
government classified the revolt as an internal insurrection, Arab suspects and rebels were 
denied treatment as civilians such as due process.  After the murder of British District 
Commissioner Lewis Andrews by an Arab gang in September 1937, the Colonial Office 
authorised British soldiers to torture Arab suspects and non-combatant villagers in areas with 
heavy rebel activity in order to gather intelligence.
50
  The HAC was declared illegal and its 
members forced to flee from Palestine or face arrest and deportation.  In early 1937, civil 
society groups and Arabic newspapers sent numerous petitions to High Commissioner 
Wauchope to complain of the treatment of political and other prisoners.
51
  According to the 
memoirs of Arab lawyer Hanna Nakkara, as a result of the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance 
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arrests took place regularly.  The British opened several detention camps in Palestine for 
political detainees, a category that increasingly included intellectuals and workers.
52
   
     At the same time, as the revolt became more violent and ordinary citizens were targeted 
by repressive colonial measures, rebel leaders attempted to act as government figures, 
implementing their own rebel courts, laws and enforced certain duties upon the citizens.  The 
rebels used a type of rhetoric that differed from that of the urban leadership and that of the 
British authorities.  By 1937, in some important respects these rebels sought to offer certain 
rights and expressions of citizenship without being familiar with the term.  They ordered the 
cancellation of rents and rural taxes, prescribed a certain style of dress in order to cement a 
sense of solidarity with the lower classes (for example, the decree to replace the tarbush with 
the kuffiya or hatta and the command for Christian women to veil).
53
  Unlike the urban 
leaders who had long campaigned for an inclusive citizenship for the entire Arab population, 
the actions of the rebels demonstrate a lack of engagement with the status as mentioned 
above.  Rebel leaders did not recognise identity documents given to the Arabs by the 
mandate government and went as far as to order the Palestinians to not show these 
documents to military or police officers.
54
   
     Although the civil administration remained in place, the civilian population was unable to 
effectively challenge the colonial legislation or demand the reinstatement of their civil rights.  
Notions of citizenship and Arab nationality never remained static in Palestine during 1936 
and 1937.  By then, not only could the mandate authorities manipulate definitions of 
citizenship, rights and duties, but the rebels in the countryside offered their own definitions 
of Arab identity as linked to an obligation of support for the revolt’s aims.  To be sure, the 
rural rhetoric of citizenship did not explicitly use the term, nor appeal to an ideological 
concept of citizenship.  Instead it appealed to rights to land and livelihood—unlike urban 
rhetoric which appealed to more recognised political and civil rights of Palestinian 
citizenship.  Whilst urban rhetoric used a vocabulary of citizenship, nationality and rights, 
the rebel leadership issued its calls to the people or the sons of Palestine, and couched 
demands for the population to resist the mandate government in religious phrases and 
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appeals to jihad.  Both groups however, envisioned the inhabitants of Palestine as entitled to 
control over the country by virtue of their Arab origins.  In doing so, they represented a new 
version of civic public order and political and civil action.  The defensive measures on the 
part of the British and the Arabs during the first half of the revolt shifted the understandings 
of the citizenry’s rights, protections and objects of loyalty. 
 
Palestinian citizenship and the Royal Peel Commission  
 
     The penultimate section of this chapter steps back from the 1936 general strike and the 
first year of the revolt.  Instead, through case studies of individuals and of the Peel 
Commission’s recommendations on citizenship, it investigates the affects of changes to the 
legislation that regulated the acquisition and revocation of citizenship for Arabs and Jews.  It 
also discusses the response by Arab nationalist leaders to the recommendations of the Peel 
Commission with regards to citizenship and partition.   
     The Palestine Administration and the Colonial and other offices in London continued to 
develop legislation that affected citizenship, immigration and naturalisation during the years 
of revolt.  In 1936, the Colonial Office defended its policy which gave Jewish immigrants an 
easier route to the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by stating that officials in Palestine 
were obliged to keep citizenship legislation favourable for immigrants or risk litigation from 
the Jewish community negatively impacted by its provisions.
55
  In the meantime, the Arab 
population had not seen any significant redress of their own grievances over the provisions.   
 
Citizenship struggles: case studies, 1936-1937  
 
     The archives of the Palestine Mandate include a small number of narratives pertaining to 
Arab natives’ negotiations of Palestinian citizenship in the 1930s.  The following case 
studies serve to demonstrate that during the period of tumult and political and legal 
transformations caused by the revolt, citizenship continued to be a subject of contestation for 
                                                   
55 ‘Palestinian Citizenship,’ 1936, CO 733/296/7. 
237 
 
individual Arabs.  The following also testifies to the unequal treatment in the grant and 
recognition of citizenship between Arabs and Jews. 
     The first case of a man born in Ottoman Palestine in the 1890s demonstrates how mandate 
politics played a role in influencing the treatment of natives who wished to return from 
abroad under extra-ordinary circumstances.  Hussein Khalil Abu Ziyad left Palestine in the 
early 1920s and married an American woman in the United States, all while he retained his 
Ottoman nationality documents.  Ziyad applied to the British consulate in California in 1934 
to return to Palestine as a citizen and the consul requested the application be considered by 
the high commissioner.  However, once the consul informed the mandate’s Commissioner 
for Migration and Statistics that Ziyad was “unsound and an inmate of a state hospital for the 
insane” as a result of a diagnosis with a form of dementia Ziyad’s visa for Palestine was 
cancelled.
56
    
     By the end of 1936, the Colonial Office feared that the denial of Ziyad’s return to 
Palestine could be given a “political complexion [sic]” and that his exclusion from Palestine 
could not be justified under the mandate’s 1933 Immigration Ordinance.  The case had a 
legal element.  Ziyad’s lawyer stressed in early 1937 that his client appeared to be a “Turkish 
citizen of Palestinian birth” who met all the requirements of the Foreign Office consular 
instructions that permitted an individual’s return to Palestine.  The lawyer added that Ziyad’s 
wife threatened to politicise the matter, which was most undesirable to the British 
government in the climate of revolt in the mandate territory.  In this connection, Ziyad’s wife 
stated she had recently discovered “that, due to a British law passed at the time they [Britain] 
gave Palestine to the Jews as a National home, all Arabians then in foreign countries had to 
renew their citizenship or lose it” and thus Ziyad lost his citizenship and lacked both a 
passport and a visa to return.  Still, the mandate administration refused to admit Ziyad as a 
citizen of Palestine.
57
   
     In certain circumstances, Arabs born in Palestine posed problems in terms of 
classification dependent on their birth.  In 1936 the question of the divestment of Ottoman 
nationality for certain Arabs confused mandate and British authorities.  The son of George 
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Rock, an Ottoman subject naturalised as a British citizen in the 1890s, inquired as to whether 
his father’s status made him a British subject or a Palestinian citizen.  Although John George 
Rock was born in Palestine, his father had been a resident of Britain prior to 1914.  When 
John George inquired as to his nationality in the 1930s, the British initially responded that he 
was Palestinian rather than British.  In a series of interdepartmental correspondence on the 
case, the Home Office referred to the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 in its attempt to 
decide upon the status of John George Rock in late 1936.  It found that according to the 
Ottoman law, since the elder Rock did not automatically lose his Ottoman nationality upon 
British naturalisation, John George could not be regarded as a British subject as he had 
hoped.
58
   
     The issue of multiple loyalties came into the picture in the case of John George Rock.  He 
stressed, as did his father, that the elder rock severed any ties with Turkey.  At the time of 
John George’s questioning as to whether he or his father were British subjects, his father 
proclaimed his readiness to give a statement that “on [his] naturalisation he swore allegiance 
to the British Government and no one else.”59  The case also demonstrates the uncertainty of 
the revolt years as to whether Palestinian Arabs such as John George, who assumed that he 
was in fact a British subject, would be loyal to Great Britain.   
     At the end of 1936 as Arab rebels increasingly used violence against British targets in 
Palestine, the Colonial Office and other departments were in discussion with the Palestine 
Administration over a proposal to draft another amended citizenship order-in-council.  The 
outbreak of revolt and the activities of the Royal Commission in Palestine forced officials to 
wait until the Commission published its report, which included recommendations on 
citizenship, naturalisation and immigration.   
 
Testimony to the Peel Commission  
 
     As early as August 1936, in the midst of the Arabs’ six-month general strike in Palestine, 
the commission headed by Lord Earl Peel received a memorandum from the mandate 
government that asked it to consider the division of Palestine under a cantonization scheme.  
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Under the cantonization proposal, the mandate territory would become a federation of 
cantons, or self-governing units.  The idea was an unpopular one with the British government 
and with other members of the mandate administration, but Peel and his colleagues studied it 
briefly.
60
  Since the mandate officials had agreed to set aside discussions of citizenship until 
the Commission was able to enter Palestine and release a report on the situation, it is useful 
to question whether the cantonization plan proposed a new structure for citizenship and 
nationality.   
     A former administrator in Palestine, L.G. Archer Cust, submitted one of the cantonization 
plans to the Commission.  In essence, the scheme involved the formation of three cantons: 
Arab, Jewish and a mix of the two groups.  The aim was to segregate Palestinian 
communities to avoid clashes of interests between Arabs and Jews.  Cust’s plan outlined the 
separation and autonomy of Jewish and Arab areas.  For example, Jewish immigration and 
land sales could be permitted only in the Jewish canton.  In the Arab canton, a central canton 
government and elected assembly would supervise the local bodies and Jewish immigration 
would be prohibited.
61
  Palestine’s Chief Secretary Sydney Moody was quick to ask other 
officials “whether any of us know what cantonisation means?”62  The plan raised important 
questions on the citizenship status of Arabs and Jews in the proposed cantons.  It was unclear 
whether Arabs and Jews would carry equal rights of citizenship, and the proposal neglected 
to mention the concept of Arab nationality.  In theory and practice, the cantonization plan 
went against Britain’s mandatory obligations because the plan would effectively force the 
Arab citizens out of their traditional geographical areas through a population transfer if they 
decided not to live in the Jewish canton.  Ultimately, the Peel Commission also rejected the 
scheme but its eventual recommendation of partition reflected persistent, deeper questions on 
nationality and citizenship in a partitioned Palestine. 
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     The impact upon mandate policy of civil society activism, popular politics and the 
discourse of citizenship which had taken shape from the early 1930s became clear with the 
workings of the Peel Commission in Palestine.  In January 1937 the Commission heard 
evidence that explicitly criticised the mandate’s citizenship legislation.  A number of 
outspoken Arab popular leaders were interviewed and they provided a different account from 
that of the mandate officials as to proposals for a future Palestinian government.  A very 
small but vocal handful brought up the problems of Palestinian citizenship for Arab 
emigrants and contrasted the emigrants’ situation with that of the Jewish immigrants.  
Importantly, their statements are examples of the ways in which discourses and definitions of 
nationality and citizenship had evolved from the early 1920s.  These leaders stressed jus 
sanguinis and jus soli nationality provisions as equivalent to rights to citizenship in Palestine 
as well as to Arab nationality.  Furthermore, the witnesses made clear attempts to connect 
their ideas of citizenship rights for the Arab emigrants with the provisions of nationality 
legislation in force in Great Britain. 
     The testimony of ‘Awni Abd al-Hadi in early 1937 exemplifies some of the arguments 
and hopes of Arab middle-class and former Executive body leadership for new citizenship 
regulations.  His words to the Commission highlight the Arab nationalists’ (often simplistic) 
understanding that the 1922 Legislative Election Order-in-Council was the first piece of 
legislation to allow any Jew to enter Palestine and receive citizenship with minimal 
restrictions.
63
  The fears built up in the previous decade that Jewish citizens would become a 
majority in Palestine were evident.  Abd al-Hadi’s testimony also suggests that immigration 
statistics were actively compiled by Palestinian activists.  He stated that at least 4,000 Jews 
entered Palestine on tourist visas yearly and then were subsequently ‘lost.’  As these 
individuals were not claimed as immigrants or as citizens they were excluded from the 
numbers of Jews who settled and contributed to the economic capacity of the territory.
64
  
However, Arab witnesses presented a great deal of nationalist-oriented rhetoric and demands 
to the Peel Commission, which seemed to weaken the potential impact of the testimony on 
citizenship, naturalisation and immigration statistics.   
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     Akram Zu‘aytir and Abd al-Hadi’s colleague, schoolteacher Muhammed ‘Izza Darwazah, 
gave similar statements to the Peel Commission.  Both argued that the Arabs’ claims in 
Palestine were based on their centuries-long residence as Arab nationals.  They argued, based 
on the development of notions of citizenship from the early 1920s, that citizenship status in 
Palestine was a natural right based on birth and descent in the territory.
65
  Furthermore ‘Isa 
Bandak, the leader and activist touted as an expert on Palestinian nationality and citizenship 
due to his lobbyist efforts in support of all Palestinian Arabs to receive citizenship, testified 
before Lord Peel.  Bandak urged the Commission to implement the Arabs’ own suggestions 
in its future report on the issue of citizenship.
66
  Still these Arabs who spoke to the 
Commission, all upper and middle-class individuals and self-professed nationalist leaders, 
couched their grievances in nationalist language and rarely explained in specific terms which 
rights citizenship entailed.  The rebel leaders and the rural population as a whole were not 
directly represented to the Commission; instead, lawyers, schoolteachers and newspaper 
editors spoke for the entire Arab population. 
     Finally, the testimony of the popular leader Abd al-Latif al-Saleh, well-regarded by both 
rural and urban Palestinian Arabs, is unique in that it traced the concept of Arab nationality 
from Ottoman times through to the creation of citizenship in Palestine.  Saleh commented 
directly on specific cases in which the mandate administration denied citizenship to native-
born Palestinian Arabs.  Saleh also linked citizenship in Palestine to British colonial policies, 
thereby placing Palestine into a larger narrative of British imperialism as he referenced 
colonial settlement and the nature of colonial economies as tied to Great Britain.  In addition, 
he stressed that the prejudice against the emigrants, rendered without nationality, was “quite 
apparent” and indeed the latter was “forbidden by international law.”  Saleh spoke of the 
discourse of citizenship rights in stating that the mandate text did not distinguish ‘civil 
rights’ from ‘religious rights.’67  The civil rights to citizenship were instead under the 
umbrella of religious rights and as a result, citizenship came to be governed by religious 
communities.  Saleh’s argument was valid, as indeed Arab Muslim and Christian 
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communities received citizenship in a different manner from the Jewish communities, as 
discussed in Chapter Five.   
     The Arab nationalists in Palestine were not the only ones asked to offer testimony to the 
Commission on the issues of citizenship and immigration legislation.  Mandate officials did 
as well but it was the testimony of Palestine’s Commissioner for Migration and Statistics, 
Major E. Mills, which matched up with the arguments given on citizenship figures by the 
Arab interviewees.  Mills’ statements supported the Arabs’ argument that the mandate 
administration categorised Jewish citizens separately from Arab citizens in matters of 
immigration, emigration and naturalisation.  His testimony also suggests the importance 
placed by administrators upon information-gathering on Jewish immigrants in order for the 
government to prove the success of the mandate’s Jewish national home policy.  Mills 
admitted to the Peel Commission in 1937 that “the natural increase of the population has not 
been tabulated by citizenship,” and instead explained that at the end of 1936, 43% of the 
estimated 384,000 Jewish inhabitants were Palestinian citizens.  In fact, he added that the 
number of Jews resident ‘unofficially’ in Palestine was much higher.  It could then be 
surmised that less than 43% of immigrants actually took Palestinian citizenship.
68
  Mills’ 
figures are reminiscent of debates from the late 1920s and early 1930s in which the 
administration revealed that many of the Jewish voters in the municipal elections were not 
actually citizens of Palestine.  The figures given to Peel show that less than half of the Jewish 
population could legitimately claim the rights to Palestinian citizenship in 1937. 
     For Great Britain, these figures compiled on citizenship, naturalisation and immigration 
called into question the success of the mandate’s extension of Palestinian citizenship to the 
Jewish immigrants, and thus the success of the Jewish national home policy itself.  The low 
numbers of Jewish citizens, out of the total population of Jews in Palestine, also highlighted 
questions regarding the loyalties of this population to the Palestine Government.  In sum, the 
Commission did not look favourably upon provisions of citizenship and the dual system 
which separated Arab and Jewish residents.  In its final report issued in the summer of 1937 
the Royal Commission recommended the alleviation of the Arabs’ grievances in large part 
through the partition of Palestine.   
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Recommendations on the issue of citizenship  
 
     When the Royal Commission issued its report in July, it devoted sections to citizenship 
and naturalisation of both Arabs and Jews.  It provided information on the means by which 
the government attempted to facilitate the Jewish national home policy.  For example, the 
report stated that so-called naturalisation field officers visited the outlying Jewish villages 
and settlements specifically to ensure that immigrants naturalised.
69
  Out of just over 6,000 
applications for naturalisation made in 1935, more than 1,500 were accepted by a field 
officer from Jewish settlements.  The Commission also noted that in 1936, out of the 384,000 
Jewish residents of Palestine, 92,000 were recent immigrants unable to qualify for 
naturalisation.  Peel and his men affirmed what Great Britain feared, that the high percentage 
of non-citizen Jews was due to the fact that the chief allegiance of many immigrants was to 
the Jewish community rather than to the Palestine Government.
70
   
     Two months before the Royal Commission report recommended partition, Lord Peel 
asked the Palestine Administration and Whitehall whether either objected to the inclusion of 
certain recommendations on the issue of citizenship in the final report.  The Commission 
made clear that first and foremost it planned to recommend revisions to the citizenship order-
in-council in the direction desired by the Arabs, specifically to enable all natives to obtain 
citizenship.  The Commission was extremely favourable to the Arab argument that the 
hardship for those Arab emigrants who did not sever their connections with Palestine loomed 
large as a grievance for all the Arabs.
71
  
     The British Colonial and Foreign Offices objected to the recommendations.  The British 
government re-stated its long-standing objection that:   
 
It is undesirable to grant Palestinian citizenship to persons who have been absent 
from Palestine for several years and who have intention of returning to Palestine 
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within a reasonable period and of residing there permanently. . . .[I]n many cases, 
the principle object of applications . . . is to obtain British protection for the purpose 
of pressing claims against the Governments of the countries in which they reside.  
Further, it is undesirable on general grounds to create a class of persons 
permanently resident abroad who would be entitled to British protection.
72
 
 
As explained in Chapters Four and Five, this argument was used for over fifteen years 
against stateless Palestinian Arabs.  The Commission further noted that mandate officials 
failed to take the initiative to consult or survey the emigrants themselves through British 
consuls. 
     The Commission’s official report included the testimony by the Arab witnesses.  It noted 
the figure of 40,000 emigrants who had lost their chance to acquire Palestinian citizenship 
due to the 1925 citizenship order and its requirement that natives return to reside 
permanently in Palestine.  The report also supported the Arab leaders’ statements that the 
order was not fully advertised abroad in 1925 and that the application forms for option for 
citizenship were confusing.  In particular, the emigrants found the question ‘where do you 
intend to reside?’ on the form unclear.  Thus, answers usually listed the applicant’s current 
country of residence rather than Palestine.  As a result out of over 9,000 applications, only 
100 were accepted by the mandate administration.
73
   
     The Peel Commission considered that the Arabs had a genuine grievance as to the denial 
of citizenship for emigrants and that the British should utilise every effort to restore to these 
Arabs “a right ordinarily enjoyed by the nationals of civilized peoples.”  The Commission’s 
report addressed the Palestinian Arab emigrants who did not take up any other nationality 
after they left Palestine as “people who do not wish to be regarded as Turkish citizens” and 
who owed no allegiance to Turkey; further, Turkey did not want their allegiance.  Instead, 
the emigrants had long “regard[ed] Palestine as their country where their relatives still live” 
and that “on the whole they maintain a substantial connextion [sic] with their families and 
their hope is to return to Palestine . . . to retire.”  As for the mandatory, the Commission 
wrote that the administration knew the position of the emigrants and took “all measures” to 
facilitate their return and travel but large numbers of Palestinian Arabs in Latin America 
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were unable to opt for citizenship and return to Palestine.
74
  From the report, it is evident that 
Peel and his colleagues supported the argument of the Arabs against the mandate’s 
citizenship provisions.   
     The Peel Commission concluded that it was “reasonable and proper that protection should 
be extended to the Arab emigrants by the mandatory.  Indeed, it seems that the Commission 
felt that the emigrants’ situation was important enough to be discussed despite objections by 
the British to the report.  The Commission understood the attitudes of the middle-class 
nationalists towards Palestine’s citizenship legislation as:  
 
There is no genuine enthusiasm to be observed in Palestine for Palestinian 
citizenship.  It is only the Arabs in South America who are really anxious for it.  
And under present conditions this does not surprise us.  Jewish immigrants may 
well hesitate to abandon the citizenship of some old established state in favour of 
citizenship in a country of which the future seems so uncertain.  To the educated 
Palestinian Arab, who has always resented the separation of Palestine from Syria, 
the very idea of Palestinian citizenship is obnoxious as being associated with the 
Mandate and all it involves.
75
 
 
Ten years after the first stirrings of discontent over the citizenship order, the voices of the 
emigrants and their supporters finally found public resonance and official expression in the 
report of the investigative commission.  Palestinians who resided in Palestine continued be 
negatively affected by mandate legislation, as documented above and in the previous chapter.  
For the Arabs however, the recommendation of partition overshadowed the report’s 
favourable attitude toward citizenship legislation 
  
Partition and citizenship 
 
     The Arab notable and populist leadership rejected the Peel report’s suggestion of partition 
of Palestine.  Although the report recommended that Palestine be split into an Arab and 
Jewish state with the designated holy areas (that is sacred places such as Jerusalem and 
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Nazareth) under an international mandate, it recognised the problems that partition would 
cause for nationality and citizenship.  The Commission referred to the initial and complicated 
problem of the status of Arabs in the Jewish state and vice versa, and expressed their hope 
that another body could “avail itself of the service of experts on Nationality and Minority 
problems.”76  It did recognise that those experts would need to design nationality and 
citizenship regulations broadly in order to accommodate the demands of the Arabs and the 
Jews in the territory.  
     The Commission listed three possibilities for the implementation of the national and civic 
status of the inhabitants of the partitioned territories.  First, it suggested that complete and 
full citizenship be given to every adult Arab who resided in the Jewish state if he wished.  Of 
interest, the report also noted that nationality and citizenship were not the same and the 
differences could cause problems as states increasingly defined themselves in ethno-national 
terms.  It was also noted that Arabs in the Jewish state may be given the option of citizenship 
in the co-national ‘Mother State’ on the other side of the border, meaning the Arab state.77  
The first option, to be sure, was quite new for the British government since such flexible 
nationality and citizenship legislation had not been implemented in any of Great Britain’s 
colonies or possessions. 
     In a partitioned Palestine, the Commission stated the second option to be the need for an 
inclusion of a minority statute as part of the constitution of the Jewish state in order to 
recognise the Arabs who resided within that state as a ‘National Minority.’  Presumably the 
same would be done in the Arab state, although the report envisaged that the number of 
Jewish residents was likely to be low given that the administration would be able to stop 
Jewish immigration and land purchases.  Yet the rights to be given to national minorities 
were unclear.  The third suggested option was that a ‘Nationality Statute’ recognise the Arab 
Palestinians as “an Equal Nationality  on par with the Jews, as a ‘staatsvolk,’ ” and meaning 
that the Jewish state would be composed of and administered by the two constituent, equal 
nationalities.
78
  The third option supported an egalitarian notion of citizenship for both 
groups.   
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     British officials in London and in Palestine interpreted the recommendations in different 
ways.  The report suggested that the third was the most feasible option as the one most likely 
to ensure cooperation from the Arabs in the administration of the Jewish state and to prepare 
the territory for a future union in a federation.  The principle of bi-nationalism would be part 
of both the Arab and Jewish states.  Some colonial officials argued that a minority nationality 
would not be adequate for either partitioned state because nationality would not be held 
equally and the minority group would not exercise the full political rights of citizenship.
79
  In 
response to the report the Higher Arab Committee commenting on the plans for minority and 
majority citizenships in a new Palestinian state argued the inadequacy of minority 
nationality.  The HAC felt partition was simply neither possible nor acceptable.
80
  
     Each of the three options, if implemented, represented an attempt to create an efficient 
system of documentary identity, which had increased in global and colonial importance since 
the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne.  These options were the expression of classifications 
of national identity and citizenship status as ‘from above.’  The Commission did not consider 
that the Arab and Jewish leaders themselves might be directly involved in the 
implementation of new nationality and citizenship regulations.  Moreover, although the 
partition of Palestine meant that the Arab and the Jewish states would administer their 
respective territories autonomously, the legislative framework of the new status, including 
provisions of citizenship would be devised by Great Britain.  Despite the space given by the 
Peel Commission to Palestinian voices, the Commission did not address the Arabs’ hope to 
design their own citizenship laws through an elected, representative parliament.   
 
Conclusion: proposed amendments to citizenship legislation  
 
     Partition was not implemented due to strong opposition to the plan from within sections 
of the British government, the Arab leadership and the Zionist Organisation.  The Foreign 
Office objected to the Peel Commission’s recommendation of partition and of unity between 
the Arab Palestinian state and Transjordan, while the Colonial Office endorsed it as the only 
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acceptable solution to the situation in Palestine.  The Foreign Office felt, as the Arab 
nationalist leaders had believed and voiced for nearly two decades, that the British could not 
possibly fulfill the mandate’s obligations.81  Since the partition scheme and options for new 
national statuses were not actually implemented in accordance with the Peel Report, the 
British government in London and the Palestine Administration could begin the draft of an 
amended citizenship order in line with the report’s other recommendations regarding 
Palestinian citizenship.  The draft amendment of the citizenship order did not see official 
publication for two years after the Peel Report, and it is discussed in greater detail in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis.    
     The events of 1936 and 1937 including the general strike, outright violent revolt and the 
work of the Peel Commission in Palestine highlight the numerous debates over the multiple 
meanings of nationality and citizenship under the mandate administration.  The new 
atmosphere in Palestine after 1935 changed the Arab and the British understandings of the 
rights, duties and expressions of Palestinian citizenship as a result of the violent measures 
taken by the British administration to stop the Arab population from participating in the 
revolt.  For a number of reasons, Palestinian citizenship lost some meaning during the revolt.  
On the one hand, the British military and civil authorities recommended emergency 
regulations and martial law measures such as collective punishment and the treatment of all 
civilians as rebels be applied only towards the Arab population.  On the other, the Arab rebel 
leaders did not fully support liberal notions of citizenship such as due process and 
democratic representation as shown by their actions during the revolt.  Hallmarks of 
citizenship practices such as non-payment of taxes and the general strike rested uneasily with 
those Palestinian Arabs who called for civic duties to be undertaken through violent 
resistance to the government. 
     Throughout the revolt, the vocabulary of citizenship and nationality did not change 
substantially.  Rather it was partially appropriated by the Arab rebels in order to fit the 
concepts of citizenship and nationality into their view of a future Palestine independent from 
British control and Zionist influence.  Still, citizenship was expressed actively through 
support for the revolt.  For example, protests, the nonpayment of taxes and even the new, 
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albeit non-democratic, measure of due process implemented by rebel courts transformed 
citizenship into a more tangible status of belonging to the Arab nation of Palestine.  Yet the 
parallel legislative and judicial system put into practice by the peasant rebels during the 
revolt fell short of providing rights to the Arab population.  Instead, it allowed for Arab 
civilians to be tried in rebel courts as ‘traitors’ and ‘collaborators’ without recourse to 
protections typically offered by civil constitutions. 
     At the same time, the Peel Commission referred to problems caused by the citizenship 
legislation highlighting British favouritism for Jewish immigrants.  The civil administration 
was not bound to implement the report’s recommendations since the British government did 
not require it to do so.  The testimony of Arab national leaders on the issue of citizenship and 
their statistics on Jewish citizens are also telling.  Whilst heavily influenced by nationalist 
rhetoric and propaganda against mandate policy, it is difficult to construct a nuanced 
historical narrative based on the words of a few educated political leaders and writers.  One 
can assume that these Arabs represented the feelings and beliefs of the majority of the 
population but it is difficult to gauge the extent to which mass notions of civic identity 
changed during the revolt.  Similarly, the peasant rebel leaders did not have the full support 
of the wider population.  What is clear, as shown by the actions of the rebels and the words 
and conclusion of the Peel report, is that by 1937 Arab nationality and Palestinian citizenship 
were imagined as distinct statuses as each entailed a different type of political, civic and 
social belonging to Palestine.  The rights, protections and duties associated with this 
belonging also varied according to urban and rural leadership.  These distinctions are crucial 
to the understanding of the process of citizenship and national identity affiliation in Palestine 
after the end of the revolt. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion: The End of Palestine Mandate Citizenship 
 
Introduction  
 
     The Palestine Revolt ultimately ended as a failure in 1939 for Palestine’s Arab citizens 
who fought for an end to the mandate and the beginning of self-government.  The revolt, like 
the general strike in 1936, ended due to the mobilisation by 1938 of Britain’s overwhelming 
military and legislative power that was harnessed to arrest, deport and execute suspected 
rebels.  At the same time, further strengthening Britain’s aims to end the revolt, Palestine’s 
leadership was divided.  For their part, the Arab leaders rejected the 1937 Peel Commission 
plan to partition the country between its Arab and Jewish inhabitants.  However, the calls by 
some leaders for renewed strikes in opposition to the mandate and the proposed partition had 
little effect.  As early as 1937, many urban Arab national leaders had been deported to the 
Seychelles, accused of instigating the revolt.  Once the revolt was stemmed, the British had 
executed over one hundred rebels and destroyed hundreds of houses.  Arab deaths totaled 
5,000 and the number of Arabs detained totalled over 5,500.
1
  The Palestinian nationalist 
movement effectively split into a number of factions and a stark division emerged between 
the rural and the urban Arab leaders.  As a result, any populist movement that encompassed 
all segments of Palestinian Arabs society had little chance of succeeding and even the mufti, 
Hajj Amin al-Husayni, had fled to Beirut. 
     In the final months of the revolt in 1939, the British government issued a White Paper that 
for the first time suggested a policy to institute future limits to Jewish immigration and land 
purchases in Palestine, greater Arab involvement in the mandate government and a promise 
of independence within ten years.  The 1939 White Paper ultimately meant very little since 
both the Palestinian Arab leadership, led by the exiled Mufti, and the Zionist Organisation 
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rejected its proposals.
2
  At that time, Great Britain was increasingly being pulled into 
European political events and could not devote significant resources to the post-revolt 
problems in Palestine.   
     The international situation in the late 1930s, particularly with regard to Germany’s Jewish 
policy, affected Palestinian citizens in more ways than the increase in Jewish immigration 
and naturalisation.  The Palestine Administration, and by extension Whitehall, attempted to 
balance the mandate policy of support for Jewish immigration as Germany began to clamp 
down on its Jewish citizens, with offering sufficient attention to the Arab demands for self-
government.  Great Britain also calculated its response to the 1937 Peel Commission report: 
although it refused to consider partition of Palestine, the government also knew that certain 
conditions proposed in the report to benefit the Arabs needed to be met. 
     This current chapter, the conclusion to the thesis, explores the immediate reactions of 
Great Britain and the Palestine Administration to the increased Jewish immigration to the 
mandate territory and the changes made to the mandate’s citizenship legislation in the wake 
of the Peel report’s recommendations.  On the eve of the Second World War, citizenship in 
Palestine continued to be a crucial issue for Arab residents and emigrants, as the two groups 
increasingly feared the impact upon their communities of the increased immigration and the 
benefits and rights that accompanied the immigrants’ citizenship status.  Ultimately, high 
immigration and naturalisation figures in the years following the end of the Palestine Revolt 
pushed up the percentage of Jewish citizens in Palestine vis-à-vis the Arab citizens.  This 
final chapter ultimately concludes that with the outbreak of war in Europe, Palestinian 
citizenship never fully evolved into a meaningful status that provided the Arab and Jewish 
Palestinians with equal rights and duties as members of a nation-state.  
 
Palestinian citizenship, immigration and documentary identity after 1937 
 
     The treatment of Jews in Germany beginning in the early 1930s forced the mandate 
administration to differentiate between Arab and Jewish Palestinians in cases of international 
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travel conducted by both groups.  It fell upon Great Britain to provide Germany with 
assurances that certain Palestinian citizens who requested residence in Germany for 
professional reasons were in fact Arab, rather than Jewish, citizens.  For example, as part of 
an internal Colonial Office discussion on Germany’s requirement that Great Britain forward 
a note of identification for a Palestinian Arab doctor in that country, Mafid Abd al-Hadi, the 
office explicitly noted that it was evident Abd al-Hadi became suspect due to his Palestinian 
nationality.
3
  However, it was not only Germany that was suspicious of immigrants.  The 
Palestine Administration received a number of warnings from the British government to 
ensure that all persons entering the mandate territory were genuine immigrants who did not 
attempt to evade immigration controls.  
     In 1938, the Foreign Office warned His Majesty’s consular officers to be aware of 
individuals who impersonated Palestinian citizens in order to request Palestine passports.  
The problem had been widespread since the early 1930s, but with the increased number of 
Jews who sought Palestinian citizenship for political reasons, the Foreign Office hoped to 
stem any attempts by immigrants to use their nationality simply for diplomatic protection.  In 
particular, the warning was aimed at a number of European Jews who asked for Palestine 
passports for identification and travel purposes but who could not produce proof of their 
Palestinian citizenship.
4
  
     The same problems that the administration encountered in the early 1930s persisted into 
the latter years of the decade.  For example, a significant number of Jewish women tried to 
evade immigration regulations by entering false marriages with Palestinian citizens.  In the 
first five months of 1938, Palestine’s Commissioner for Migration and Statistics withheld 
Palestine passports from seventy-three Jewish women in Poland who claimed to be married 
to Palestinians.  E. Mills, the commissioner, noted that although his department withheld 
hundreds of passports altogether, incidents of marriages of convenience decreased as 
immigration authorities carried out strict identity checks.  Even so, out of almost 4,500 
Jewish marriages in 1936, half ended in divorce only two years later.
5
  As the high 
commissioner and the Colonial Office simultaneously worked on draft citizenship 
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amendment orders, both struggled with questions of how to prevent such abuses of 
citizenship and naturalisation.    
     The 1938 Annual Report of the administration to the League of Nations included the 
year’s summary of nationality issues and special cases.  The report noted that in most special 
cases, the high commissioner granted naturalisation for Jewish immigrants regardless of 
whether those immigrants met the qualification of three years’ residence in Palestine prior to 
their application to naturalise.  In total, the mandate administration issued over 9,000 
nationality certificates in 1938, which brought the total number of certificates issued since 
1925 to nearly 54,000 out of almost 61,000 applications.  In 1938, over 18,000 individuals 
acquired Palestinian citizenship (including wives and children of male immigrants) through 
nationality certificates.  Despite the high figures, the administration noted that compared to 
previous years, the number of naturalised citizens for the year actually dropped.  Officials 
blamed the decrease on the violence of the previous two years of revolt.  Out of those 
naturalised in 1938, the majority were Polish and German Jews.  In addition, ninety-two 
‘Turkish’ individuals, forty Syrians and seventeen Egyptians became Palestinian citizens.6   
     The Palestine Administration issued a high number of Palestine passports in 1938—
nearly 15,600—in spite of the revolt.  Officials noted that many Palestinian Arabs sought 
passports once they found themselves unable to freely cross into Syrian, Lebanese and 
Transjordanian territory.  Palestinian Arabs who left Palestine due to the revolt also needed 
passports.
7
  Although mandate officials tried to keep tabs on whether Jews who sought 
Palestine passports were actually entitled to them, a number of Jews who lived outside of 
Palestine and claimed to be too ill or poor to return were able to have their passports renewed 
by the administration.  In most of these cases, the Palestine government consulted with the 
Colonial Secretary, and granted extensions of individual passport validity until the passport’s 
holder claimed he could return.  Despite long absences and repeated failures of such Jewish 
Palestinian citizens to return to Palestine, most did not have their passports or naturalisations 
revoked.
8
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     The Palestine passports themselves became symbolic of the seemingly-unending 
confusion over Palestinian nationality and the role of Great Britain in providing documentary 
identity to Arab and Jewish citizens.  In early 1939, the Foreign Office proposed that 
Palestine passports no longer have their covers labeled as a British passport but rather as 
‘Passport—British Mandated Territory of Palestine.’  The change came as a response to two 
factors; the first, a wider move by the Dominions Office to have ‘British Passport’ printed on 
any passport issued by a British protectorate.  Palestine was not considered a British 
protectorate.  Initially, the latter office felt that Palestinians were as to similar to British-
protected persons as possible and the Foreign Office agreed, stating that British passports did 
not mislead other nations to the status of Palestinian citizens as not under the full sovereignty 
of Great Britain.  However, others within the Foreign Office noted that since Palestinians 
were aliens under United Kingdom immigration legislation, their claim to British passports 
was indeed misleading and they criticised the label ‘British passport’ because it gave an 
impression that holders were entitled to certain privileges.  One official suggested the change 
because the then-current form of the passport “was ambiguous to the ordinary man, 
particularly the ordinary Palestinian and he (unfortunately) cannot by any means be relied on 
to have an exact and correction notion of what a passport is or what the rather complicated 
international situation of Palestine is.”   
     Foreign officials suggested the change to the wording of the passport for a second reason.  
A court case at the end of 1938 that involved a Jewish Palestinian, Rex vs. Ketter, resulted in 
a legal report by the Court of Criminal Appeal titled ‘Citizen in Palestine not a British 
subject.’9  Palestinian citizens who also claimed British nationality often faced different 
treatment as to their status both within Great Britain and abroad.  The court case affirmed 
that Palestinian citizenship did not translate to ipso facto British nationality or even 
protection. 
     Within mandate territory, the administration also encouraged wider use of documentary 
identification cards.  Throughout the final year of the Palestine Revolt, High Commissioner 
Harold MacMichael discussed proposals for identity cards with British Colonial Secretary 
Malcolm MacDonald.  The men concluded that compulsory cards would stem illegal 
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immigration but they both realised the difficulties in obtaining cooperation from the Jewish 
community.  In the final months of 1938, the Palestine government instituted a voluntary 
system of identification cards with the hope that the population would become accustomed to 
showing their cards.  By the end of 1938, over 170,000 citizens had identity cards and of that 
number, 90,000 were Arabs.  However, the administration feared that Palestinian Arabs 
could be easily induced to destroy their identity documents for political reasons.
10
  By the 
end of the first two decades of the civil administration, identity cards continued to be issued 
on a strictly voluntary basis.  It is interesting to note that although some officials within 
Great Britain pressed for a more inclusive Palestinian citizenship for Jews, the Jewish 
community in Palestine did not wholeheartedly support compulsory identification cards or 
other measures to ensure they were documented as citizens of the mandate. 
 
Changes to Palestinian citizenship legislation 
 
     After the release of the Peel Commission report in the summer of 1937, High 
Commissioner Wauchope and the Colonial Office separately drafted an amended citizenship 
order-in-council in response to the report’s recommendations for changes to the existing 
legislation.  Up until that time, drafts of a new amended order had been deferred until the 
publication of the report.  As in previous attempts to amend the 1925 Palestine Citizenship 
Order-in-Council, the mandate administration questioned whether amendments would 
contravene the Treaty of Lausanne’s nationality provisions since the treaty remained an 
internationally-binding document affecting Turkey and all of the provinces of the former 
Ottoman Empire.  At the same time it was recognised that the other signatories of the treaty 
were required to approve proposed amendments to the mandates’ citizenship laws.11    
     In spite of the tighter immigration and passport controls imposed by the mandate 
administration in the late 1930s, members of Parliament in Great Britain continued to lend 
support to bills that proposed universal Palestinian citizenship for Jews.  The proposals were 
problematic in that they assumed the rights of citizenship in Palestine applied mostly to 
Jews, whereas Arabs remained the majority in the territory.  The supporters of a more 
                                                   
10 ‘Identity cards,’ 16 Mar. 1939, CO 733/413/8. 
11 ‘Citizenship Order-in-Council (Amendment),’ 1937, CO 733/332/6. 
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inclusive citizenship also neglected to consider the international status of native-born 
Palestinian Arabs.  The following subsections offer insight into the post-1937 changes to 
citizenship legislation and particular ways that the proposed changes affected the Jewish and 
the Arab citizens of Palestine.  Unlike the previous years of debate over citizenship, the new 
issue of security played a major role, both in terms of the need for the British to prevent 
further violence by the Arabs and to control the ever-growing German Jewish immigrant 
population. 
 
Proposed changes to Jewish citizenship 
 
     In the first half of 1938, the Colonial Office expressed alarm after the Times published 
details of a bill introduced by a Member of Parliament that proposed a universal Palestinian 
citizenship for Jews.  Officials in the Colonial Office immediately feared the reaction by the 
Arabs once news of the bill became known in Palestine.  They quickly expressed the hope 
that the bill “never makes any further progress.”  The Under-secretary for the Colonial Office 
met with the bill’s sponsor, Commander Locker-Lampson, and the latter explained that he 
meant the bill to only be “a ‘gesture’ . . . a matter more of ‘emotion’ and he had not expected 
a division” as a result of its provisions.  The sponsor affirmed his hopes that Great Britain 
would offer protection in the form of extra-territorial Palestinian citizenship for about 
200,000 Jews in central European states.
12
  After the secretary’s discussions with Locker-
Lampson, the proposed bill to extend Palestinian citizenship to all Jews was withdrawn.  The 
office added that if such a freer grant of citizenship was contemplated for Jews from outside 
of Palestine, “it would be imperative not to overlook the claims of Arabs born in Palestine 
who are living abroad and have no opportunity in the present law to become Palestinian 
citizens.”  While technically default Turkish citizens, these native Palestinian Arabs received 
no recognition or consular assistance from the Turkish authorities.
13
  However, the 
mandate’s citizenship legislation could not have been changed by the bill since an act of 
Parliament could not change the existing legislation in Palestine.  Rather, the King had to do 
so through an order-in-council.  Britain also required citizenship be based on domicile.   
                                                   
12 Memo, C. Parkinson to H.F. Downie, ‘Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council,’ 13 Apr. 1938, CO 733/366/1. 
13 Memo, Chief Secretary’s Office to Colonial Office, ‘Citizenship bill,’ 14 May 1938, CO 733/366/1. 
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     The Colonial Office at the time felt that if Palestine were partitioned in the future, the 
Jewish state would enact its own nationality law and definition of a Jew.
14
  That definition 
complicated matters for the mandate administration as it drafted changes to citizenship 
legislation.  The discussions that arose out of attempts to resolve the complicated definition 
of ‘Jewish’ harked back to similar discussions that took place over the nationality of Jewish 
individuals in the early 1920s between the Palestine Arab Executive, including Musa Kazim 
al-Husayni, and the Colonial Office.  British and mandate officials long avoided settling 
upon a proper definition of ‘Jewish’ despite numerous Arab requests for the definition of 
nationality in relation to the Jewish ‘national home.’   
     By 1938 the growing attention given to the Jewish refugee problem in central Europe and 
the fear that Palestine was far too small a territory to play any significant role in its solution 
was evident within Great Britain.  Colonial officials stressed to administrators that if all Jews 
were granted Palestinian citizenship, Great Britain would be obliged to undertake special 
duties “to the Jewish race as a whole.”  Such a view had been resisted by successive British 
governments since the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917; instead, the Colonial Office 
stated that governmental obligations were “strictly limited to facilitating the Zionist ideal of 
the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine (an ideal to which large numbers 
of Jews are indifferent, or even hostile).”  The Colonial Office began to make clear that a 
number of specific changes suggested to Palestinian citizenship were “fundamentally 
inconsistent with accepted British principles of nationality laws.”  Despite the problems with 
the proposal to extend Palestinian citizenship to Jews throughout the world, the House of 
Commons split the vote perfectly on Locker-Lampson’s bill before its withdrawal, with 144 
votes in support and 144 votes in opposition.
15
     
     Once more, the late 1930s ushered in a flurry of Jewish lobby efforts to influence the 
proposed amended citizenship order.  The Jewish Agency requested that Jewish refugees 
from Germany be given the “full rights of citizenship” upon their arrival into Palestine, 
which would entail that the administration overlook the two-year residency period required 
before these immigrants could naturalise.  The Home Office declined to consider the 
                                                   
14 Memo, Colonial Office to Locker-Lampson, ‘Citizenship bill,’ 23 Apr. 1938, CO 733/366/1. 
15 Ibid.  If the administration put the Locker-Lampson bill’s ideas into place, foreign governments would 
possibly de-naturalise all of their resident Jews whether or not those residents had actual Palestinian citizenship.   
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suggestion while High Commissioner MacMichael disagreed with it, noting the provision 
would “differentiate between Jews in Palestine on the grounds of nationality.”  Indeed, no 
longer would the distinction in citizenship be between Jews and Arabs but between Jews of 
different origins and political backgrounds.  If the administration implemented the 
suggestion, the status of German Jews as ‘enemy subjects’ would actually become a 
privileged one since it would allow one group of Jews to receive naturalisation under 
exceptional circumstances.  In the climate of increasing anxiety over a new war, MacMichael 
did, however, note that it could be beneficial to grant Jews in Palestine who joined His 
Majesty’s Armed Forces automatic citizenship upon enlistment.16    
     The problematic situation of Palestinian Arab natives abroad received attention again in 
light of the proposed bill and the Peel Commission recommendations as the Palestine 
Administration and the Colonial Office drafted versions of a citizenship order-in-council 
amendment.  In fact, the Middle East Division of the Colonial Office wrote to Palestine’s 
Chief Secretary Sydney Moody in mid-1938 that the question of granting citizenship to 
persons born in Palestine and resident abroad had not been forgotten.   
 
The Palestine Citizenship (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1939 
 
     The drafts of the new amendment, began by Wauchope and the Colonial Office in 1937, 
dealt not only with Peel’s suggestions as to the Arabs’ grievances but also with issues of the 
status of Jewish immigrants and married Jewish women and children which had not been 
solved under the 1931 amendment.  The usual debate over changes ensued, particularly as to 
whether a married woman’s nationality depended entirely on her husband and whether 
women could be naturalised as Palestinians separately from their husbands.  In relation to the 
case of the Arab emigrants, the Colonial Office and other officials in London analysed Peel’s 
recommendations for Palestinian natives who resided abroad and could not become citizens.  
The office’s draft amendment met the points made by the Royal Commission but expressed 
hope to further quantify the meaning of ‘unbroken personal connection’ in regard to the offer 
                                                   
16 ‘Position of Jews from Greater Germany,’ 11 Oct. 1939, CO 733/397/15/5; Memo, High Commissioner 
MacMichael to Malcom MacDonald, ‘Jews from Greater Germany,’ 20 Sept. 1939, CO 733/397/15. 
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of citizenship to those emigrants who demonstrated such a connection.
17
  By 1938, the draft 
amendment had been seen and re-drafted by the Colonial, Foreign and Home Offices.  
     Wauchope’s own amendment draft differed slightly from that by the Colonial Office.  In 
reference to the Commission’s report regarding individuals born in Palestine but resident 
abroad, he supported the provision that emigrants who demonstrated a connection with 
Palestine, intended to return there to settle and who did not possess another nationality, be 
granted citizenship.  Wauchope also stated that the consent of the Lausanne signatories was 
not needed to make any changes to citizenship legislation because local Palestinian 
regulations allowed for amendments without the approval of other bodies, including that of 
the League of Nations.
18
  The draft amended orders floated between departments and 
individual officials until 1939.  Only then was an amended citizenship order-in-council 
published. 
     In May 1939, High Commissioner MacMichael accepted the final draft for the amended 
order-in-council.  Two months later, on 25 July 1939, His Majesty’s Government ratified the 
new Palestine Citizenship (Amendment) Order-in-Council of 1939.  The primary change in 
the new amendment that pertained to immigrants was the revocation of the 1931 order’s 
Article 12.  The administration intended for the amended order to end the nearly decade-long 
debate over the naturalisation of women separately from their husbands.  The 1939 order’s 
Article 6 allowed that an alien woman married to a Palestinian citizen did not become a 
Palestinian by reason of marriage but rather, she would receive a certificate of naturalisation 
on separate terms from her husband.
19
  The problem of undesirables in Palestine who evaded 
immigration controls remained only tenuously solved.  
     For the Palestinian Arabs, the changes made to Article 2 of the principle (1925) order 
made a significant and important impact.  The changes affected the status of Arabs born in 
Palestine but who resided abroad: those who possessed Ottoman nationality on the date of 
the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council, or continued to hold Turkish citizenship, 
and who had “since maintained an unbroken personal connection with Palestine and intend 
to resume permanent residence in Palestine” were given the opportunity for the first time to 
                                                   
17 ‘Citizenship Order-in-Council (Amendment),’ 1937, CO 733/332/6. 
18 Memo, High Commissioner Wauchope to Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Palestine Citizenship Order-
in-Council,’ Sept. 1937, CO 733/332/5. 
19 ‘Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council,’ 1939, CO 733/397/13. 
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acquire Palestinian citizenship by stating their option for it.  The option was, as it had always 
been, subject to the consent of the Government of Palestine and those who chose to opt could 
not hold any other nationality but Turkish.  The article allowed for two years from the date of 
the amendment for natives to exercise their option for citizenship, and allowed for 
applications to be sent to any British consul to be forwarded to the Director of Immigration 
in Jerusalem.
20
  The amended Article 2 exclusively benefited the Palestinian Arabs by 
offering natives abroad the chance to take on citizenship that had been denied for nearly 
fifteen years.   
     The victory was significant for the Arab Palestinians in that the British government 
finally met the demands of the emigrants and their national lobby group.  The change had 
also come less than two years after the publication of the Royal (Peel) Commission 
recommendations, which included a proposal to extend Palestinian citizenship to all Arab 
natives abroad.  Indeed, the change came after significant discussion between the Colonial, 
Foreign, and Home Offices.  The Home Office in particular felt that the Treaty of Lausanne 
allowed states to offer certain options in cases of nationality not provided for in the treaty 
itself thus allowing ‘default’ Turkish nationals to choose Palestinian citizenship.21 
     Meanwhile, most of Palestine’s more radical Arab leaders, including former Istiqlalists 
and members of the Higher Arab Committee, had been deported to the Seychelles following 
their involvement in the general strike and revolt and remained there as political prisoners in 
1938.  For these men, Palestinian citizenship revealed itself as a meaningless status; as he 
began a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment, Jerusalem’s Dr. Husayn Khalidi wrote to 
High Commissioner MacMichael of his shame “to remember I carry a British passport.”  
According to Khalidi, that passport, issued by the Palestine Administration, “cannot accord 
its bearer the element once famed [of] British justice which accorded every citizen a right to 
stand his trial and defend himself.”  Khalidi referred to the lack of citizenship rights despite 
his status as a Palestinian citizen—a citizenship legislated by Great Britain as he explained.  
Deported without a trial and held as a political prisoner on an island in the possession of 
Great Britain, the former mayor of Jerusalem lamented, to no effect, in a petition to the high 
                                                   
20 Ibid. 
21 Memo, Home Office to Foreign Office, ‘Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council,’ 27 Jan. 1939, CO 
733/397/13. 
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commissioner that “[w]e are either subjects of Your Majesty’s Government and Empire or 
we are not.”  If the former were true, Khalidi begged MacMichael to “submit that we are 
entitled to some sort of protection, and such treatment consistent with the fact that we are 
human beings,” such as rights of due process and return to Palestine.22    
     At the end of 1939, the Foreign Office reaffirmed that Palestinian nationality did not 
reflect nationality in an ordinary sense, but because the mandate territory was not an 
independent nation, inhabitants had a “specialised” form of British-protected person status.  
The question, according to Foreign Office members, concerned how other states viewed 
Palestinian citizenship.
23
  The final amendment to the Palestine citizenship legislation came 
in 1942.  A new amendment granted an extension of the initial two-year timeframe for option 
for citizenship (as included in the 1939 Amendment Order) to six years.  Despite the changes 
to legislation to allow for native Palestinians to return to their homeland and choose its 
citizenship, only a small number of individuals did so.  Between 1925 and 1946, less than 
500 native Palestinian Arabs who lived outside of Palestine actually returned and acquired 
citizenship.  The reasons for the small numbers of returned emigrants are not entirely clear 
and as Mutaz Qafisheh rightly argues, a number of factors played a role as to how and why 
emigrants returned as Palestinian citizens.  He suggests that the discretion exercised by the 
high commissioners had a negative impact on Palestinian Arabs who applied to opt for 
citizenship but could not prove a definitive, unbroken personal connection with their 
homeland.  Perhaps just as important was the international context after 1939—the outbreak 
of war in Europe meant that immigration to Palestine became more restrictive not only for 
Jews but also for Arabs born in the territory.
24
 
 
Conclusions and the end of Palestinian citizenship 
 
     The understanding of Palestine mandate citizenship remains crucial to contemporary 
political understandings—and manipulations—of nationality, citizenship and refugee status 
for the Palestinians.  The contemporary notions of Palestinian citizenship first came into 
                                                   
22 ‘Petitions of deportees to the Seychelles,’ Sept. 1938, CO 733/369/3. 
23 Memo, J.S. Bennett to High Commissioner, ‘Foreign Office decision,’ 9 Dec. 1939, CO 733/397/14. 
24 Qafisheh, The International Law Foundations, 108. 
262 
 
existence in liberal, progressive terms in the 1920s, if not before.  The Palestinian national 
has remained an enduring figure in the historical narrative of Palestine but because the 
British mandate administration in their creation of Palestinian citizenship failed to take into 
account the Palestinians’ own discourses of nationality the figures of the citizen and the 
national have continued to conflict with each other in the sixty-five years since the creation 
of Israel.  In an academic and political sense, the historical concepts of Palestinian 
citizenship and nationality affect the on-going negotiations of Palestinian statehood, 
particularly in light of emigrants and refugees.   
     The mandate administration and the British government acted in nearly all cases related to 
citizenship, nationality and passports between 1918 and 1942 (the year that saw the final 
changes to citizenship legislation) in favour of the Jewish immigrants and the wider mandate 
policy of support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.  The first 
consideration for all of the proposed legislation and regulations, whether by the mandate 
administration officials or the policy-makers in Whitehall, was towards the Jewish 
community rather than towards the Arab population.  This occurred in spite of the 
politicisation of citizenship and nationality by a handful of vocal Arab nationalists who 
hoped their lobbying efforts against the legislation would influence the British to reverse 
their stance and grant citizenship to the Palestinian Arab diaspora.   
     In general, the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council left various questions 
unanswered and it opened up debate on more issues in both Palestine and Whitehall than it 
resolved in the short and long terms.  In particular, the vocabulary used in mandate 
legislation, including the 1922 Order-in-Council and the 1925 citizenship order, contributed 
to much of this confusion.  Neither Great Britain’s own legislation nor Palestine’s attorney-
general clearly differentiated in wording or in meaning between nationality and citizenship 
despite the practical differences in the two statuses emphasised by the mandate 
administration.  It did so in various statements (noted in Chapters Two and Five) that 
Palestinian nationality was recognised only locally in Palestine and that Palestinian 
citizenship was internationally-recognised.  This oversight plagued the Palestine 
Administration for some time, in large part because the Arabs initially conflated the two 
terms.  After the issue of the 1925 citizenship order, the Arab middle-class nationalists and 
writers argued that Arab nationality should guarantee their citizenship in Palestine.  Their 
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arguments reflected the threat posed by rumours that the Jewish national home in Palestine 
would entail a separate, new nationality for the Jewish population.  The early 1920s, as 
explained in Chapter Two, set the tone for future years of disagreement and negotiations on 
the topic of citizenship.  In large part, this happened because mandate officials and colonial 
officials in London did not consult the Arab population on any proposed provisions for 
Palestinian citizenship.  The same officials accepted recommendations from Zionist 
Organisation leaders on provisions for citizenship as they related to both immigrants and the 
native population. 
     The new, mainly middle-class politically-inclined public in Palestine, as elsewhere in the 
Arab world in the interwar period, was an essential element in the development of discourses 
which shaped the meaning of Palestinian citizenship in opposition to British legislation.  
Alongside new civil society organisations, the political public negotiated citizenship and 
nationality within a national discursive space.  The vocabulary of the two concepts and the 
discussions on both that had been in circulation among a minority of writers and other 
intellectuals since the mid-nineteenth century were the resources used after 1918 by the 
Palestinian Arab national leadership to explain, define and challenge the construction of 
citizenship by the mandate government.  The Arabic press played the role as chief conduit 
for these explanations, definitions and challenges to mandate legislation, the definition of 
citizenship provided by the administration and the changes which affected this discursive 
field. 
 
The changing discourse of citizenship 
 
     The terminology and vocabulary, both English and Arabic, used to refer to nationality and 
citizenship changed throughout the twenty-year period under study, echoing the 
transformation of the meaning and rhetoric on identity and belonging, the duties of the 
mandate government towards its citizenry and the growing importance of the Arabic press 
and civil society.  In a broader sense, the changes can be closely linked to the negotiation of 
political, legal and social allegiances by the Arab population.  In other words, the Arab 
population transferred its loyalties and identity away from the Ottoman Empire, next towards 
the idea of Greater Syria and then to an allegiance centred on the notion of a Palestinian 
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nation.  In the early years of the mandate the self-professed Arab nationalists, including 
middle-class writers, teachers and lawyers and a number of traditional leaders within the 
Arab Executive, manipulated the language of the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms to craft 
definitions and meanings for nationality and citizenship for use in the Palestinian context.  
The language of the Tanzimat, such as that of constitutional rights, the protection of all 
citizens and their property and livelihoods equally regardless of religion, shaped the concept 
of Arab nationality that in turn was used by the Palestinian Arab nationalists to challenge the 
Jewish national home policy of the mandate administration and the 1925 legislation that 
regulated citizenship. 
     This language contributed to the Arab nationalists’ counter-definitions of citizenship in 
two important ways.  In the first instance, the vocabulary of nationality, including the 
emphasis on its primordial nature, was reproduced in writings about citizenship in the Arabic 
press and in letters to mandate administrators and the League of Nations.  Thus the British 
officials, taking the cue from the Arabs, translated citizenship as nationality (jinsiyya) in 
official mandate documents concerning citizenship and in the publication of the 1925 
Citizenship Order-in-Council.  Second, the language of Ottoman nationality derived from the 
Tanzimat was imbued with references to the civil and political rights previously granted to 
the Arab population of the Empire by virtue of that nationality.  After the beginning of the 
mandate, Arab nationalists demanded these same rights—to a representative council or 
elected parliament, a constitution with a bill of rights, an inclusive franchise not granted on 
the basis of religious community, freedom of the press, access to welfare and wider 
educational and economic opportunities for the rural population—by virtue of their Arab 
nationality in Palestine.  
     This discourse changed after the issue of the citizenship order and the realisation by Arab 
emigrants in the Americas and local leaders in Palestine that the order regulated citizenship 
in restrictive ways for the Arabs whilst it served to offer easy acquisition of citizenship and 
naturalisation for the Jewish immigrants.  Rather than continue equating nationality with 
citizenship, the diaspora reacted to the provisions of citizenship legislation by demanding 
that their Ottoman and Arab nationality be the basis for automatic Palestinian citizenship, the 
right to return to Palestine to live as citizens and British consular protection.  Further, the 
265 
 
Arab leadership began to critique the meaning of ‘national’ in the discourse of the Jewish 
national home, asking how ‘Jewish’ could be treated as a national or ethnic identity.     
     By the mid-1930s, the language of the Tanzimat in relation to citizenship had changed as 
the situation of the Palestinian Arab natives remained unchanged as they were denied return 
to Palestine as citizens.  Citizenship became an active status in the context of increased 
demonstrations, petition and letter-writing campaigns by inhabitants to the government, the 
attendance of individuals at nationalist conferences and in unions and as educational 
opportunities grew.  Its meanings and the rights associated with it were no longer the 
exclusive domain of the educated middle-class nationalists.  The press and civil and political 
associations depicted citizenship and civic identity as linked to particular rights and duties 
which the mandate administration refused to offer to the Arab citizenry.  Acts of protest 
against mandate policy such as noncooperation with the government, street demonstrations, 
and support for the general strike in 1936 and the revolt that followed it were increasingly 
depicted as duties of all Arab citizens—duties that offered the means through which the 
native population could gain political, civil and social rights as recognised citizens of 
Palestine.  These acts also signified a sense of belonging as citizens and nationals of 
Palestine, but at the same time the Arab leaders increasingly believed that the native 
population, rather than the Jewish immigrants, deserved privileged treatment as the 
legitimate citizenry.   
 
The changing expressions of citizenship 
 
     Chapter Three has demonstrated that the groundwork for the discussions of citizenship 
came out of the steady rise of mass politics bolstered by the Arabic press and as a reaction to 
British legislation in Palestine.  By 1926 the provisions of Palestinian citizenship, and the 
omission of any provision for jus sanguinis and jus soli citizenship as the 1869 Ottoman 
Nationality Law had allowed for, became clear.  At that point a number of Arab emigrants, 
many who had left Palestine during the final decades of the Ottoman Empire administration 
or after the end of the war, began to voice demands for their ‘right of return’ to Palestine as 
citizens.  With the strongest convictions, they believed that their Arab nationality, perceived 
to be granted by birth and descent, entitled them to the legal and internationally-recognised 
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status of mandate citizens.  In this way, the emigrants’ discourses shaped an alternative 
meaning of Palestinian citizenship under the mandate as a status that was arguably meant to 
be granted unconditionally and by right, on the basis of descent from Palestinian parents and 
ancestors, as discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.  The Arabic press and Arab 
national leaders such as Musa Kazim al-Husayni and ‘Isa Bandak agreed with this notion.  
More importantly, so too did the growing political community in Palestine composed mainly 
of middle-class educated individuals.   
     The emigrants, as argued in Chapter Four, helped steer the transformation in the meaning, 
terminology and the expressions of nationality and citizenship, and of the legal meaning of 
‘national’ and ‘citizen.’  Particularly through use of the term jinsiyya rather than muwātana, 
the argument by the emigrants, their supporters and the press within Palestine that Arab and 
Ottoman nationality should confer mandate citizenship to all natives had considerable 
currency.  It was easily understood by the Arab population when reproduced in the press and 
written documents.  Still, as the chapter further showed, Palestinian Arabs crafted multiple 
meanings of Palestinian citizenship in the 1920s in response to a number of situations abroad 
and at home. 
     Indeed, historically the Palestinians never became ‘national citizens’ in the sense 
understood today by the scholarly community.  As shown particularly in Chapter Five, 
nationality and citizenship remained two separate legal statuses in mandate Palestine and by 
the late 1920s, had two different meanings for the British officials and for the Arabs.  In the 
absence of an autonomous nation-state, a sovereign, ethno-national Palestinian citizenship 
remained out of reach despite the Arabs’ demands and their fears of an exclusively Jewish 
Palestinian citizenry.  The actions by the British mandate administration and the ways in 
which the administration in Palestine and the government in Great Britain bureaucratised 
citizenship and categorised the citizens by their respective religious communities led to 
further disagreement over not only the meaning of citizenship but how certain rights 
associated with citizenship, such as the franchise, could be practiced.  This in turn, can be 
partly blamed on colonial officials’ perceptions of Palestine within imperial and international 
contexts, and Great Britain’s belief that Palestine needed to conform to both contexts despite 
its position as a trusteeship granted by the League of Nations.   
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     The institutionalisation of citizenship, and the decentralised nature of that 
institutionalisation, ensured that the mandated citizens themselves had no share in their 
status.  Palestinian citizenship was not what they envisioned or expected from their 
experience as Ottoman nationals, nor was it for them.  Instead, it was a status imposed upon 
Arabs and Jews, and acquired and revoked in separate and unequal ways in order to foster a 
Jewish national homeland in Palestine.  Numerous other factors played a role in this 
bureaucratisation but the one main factor was the competition between the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices over the level of influence by each upon policy.  Both offices differed in 
opinion as to the creation of citizenship (as well as over other legislation) and both included 
members whose expertise ranged from service in colonial administrations in Egypt, Sudan, 
India and elsewhere. 
     The thesis has also shown, most prominently in Chapter Six, the historical agency of 
subaltern citizens in Palestine and their changing expressions of a civic identity between 
1918 and 1937.  Here again, the multivalent understandings of citizenship must be 
considered: civic identity was conceived alternately as part of a pan-Arab identity and as 
specific to Palestine.  The duties of citizenship were thus discussed as either to the wider 
Arab or Syrian nation or exclusively to the Palestinian nation.  However to colonial officials, 
the threat posed by the subaltern political citizen to mandate policies meant that all citizens, 
including the peasants, workers and young radicals, had to be made into apolitical colonial 
citizens.  Consequently, they were denied full political membership in the decision-making 
processes in Palestine.
25
  By the early 1930s, officials in Jerusalem and London believed that 
this denial was increasingly necessary as the subaltern peasants migrated in larger numbers 
to cities and became urban workers who were easily influenced by the mass mobilisation of 
politics and the growing public expressions of opposition to the mandate administration.  As 
Palestinian Arabs began to migrate from rural to urban spaces and came in contact with 
Arabs from other parts of Palestine, citizenship became a marker of a common identity.  As 
Chapter Six has shown, this link served to fracture earlier proposals of an equal citizenship 
for both Arabs and Jews.  Instead, peasants, workers, women and students emphasised 
Palestine’s Arab nationality and identity.   
                                                   
25 Pandey, “The Subaltern as Subaltern Citizen,” 4735. 
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     The nationalist ideology in Palestine had long included mentions to the symbol of the 
‘national’ peasant.  Yet as Chapter Seven argues, the subaltern peasant and ‘subalternity’ 
itself was constantly renegotiated—the peasant became less like a symbol by the outbreak of 
the 1936 Palestine Revolt and more of an active member of society whose opposition to the 
Palestine Administration shaped the entire citizenry.  The peasant, and other non-middle-
class individuals, no longer represented citizenship but rather practiced it as they demanded 
greater rights, protections and ultimately independence.  They then assumed control of a 
nascent judicial and legislative system during the revolt by setting up their own courts and 
posting notifications of new regulations enforced in the villages. 
     However, the practical expressions of citizenship and the rights and duties associated with 
it stalled or regressed under the weight of the British military and judicial response to the 
outbreak of revolt.  By 1937, the tactics used by Great Britain and the Palestine 
Administration to suppress the rebels had made the status of citizenship meaningless: civil 
and political rights were removed from the Arab citizenry.  The revolt, and the subsequent 
Peel Commission report, confirmed the unequal distribution of rights, benefits and 
protections of mandate citizenship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.  At the same time, 
the treatment by the British towards the Arab civilian population, who were classified as 
potential rebels, made clear the legal, political and civil separation of the Arab from the 
Jewish citizenry.  As a result the Arab rebels refused to consider a future Palestine in which 
Arabs and Jews could hold an equal citizenship status. 
     Although gains were made by the Arab lobbyists and emigrants in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s towards an easier path to the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship for natives, 
the place of Palestine within the larger British imperial system shifted throughout the Second 
World War.  By the end of the war, Palestine had become one of the most attractive places 
for Jewish refugees despite the attempts of Great Britain to reduce immigration.  Britain 
devoted less of its economic and security resources to the Palestine Administration.  The 
political situation between the Arabs and the Jewish immigrants and citizens grew 
increasingly tense and fractured, particularly as Jewish residents formed special militias 
(such as the Haganah and Irgun) and the Yishuv became more like a state within the 
mandate.   
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     Despite the attempts of Palestine’s high commissioners to effect any favourable changes 
to citizenship legislation for the Arab emigrants, none actually succeeded in changing the 
structure of that legislation by 1948.  That structure remained geared towards facilitating the 
acquisition of citizenship by Jewish immigrants.  The most important component of a Jewish 
national homeland in Palestine was that the inhabitants of that homeland were also its 
citizens.  Thus citizenship legislation was crucial to the mandate policy’s success.  The 
Palestine Administration and Great Britain ultimately surrendered to the need to maintain a 
successful policy by regulating citizenship in the most favourable ways for the Jewish 
immigrants. When the newly-formed United Nations voted to partition Palestine in 1947, 
Great Britain announced it would terminate the mandate administration in May of the 
following year.  Zionist leaders in Palestine who refused to accept partition declared the state 
of Israel in May 1948, defeating the Arab armies who attempted to stop the unilateral 
declaration of the new Israel.
26
  Palestinian citizenship ceased to exist with the end of the 
mandate. 
     The Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council of 1925, and the subsequent amended articles 
and amended orders that replaced it, transformed the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish 
immigrant populations into the citizenry of a quasi-colonial state.  For the Arab inhabitants, 
the orders did something more: the provisions differentiated between the former Ottoman 
nationals born in Palestine from Arabs (and other ethnic groups) born elsewhere in Greater 
Syria.  Although the Palestinian Arab leadership conceived of themselves as Palestinians 
long before the citizenship order (and for some time before the beginning of the mandate 
civil administration) these nationalists also saw themselves as Arab nationals alongside 
Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi Arabs.  The mandate’s citizenship legislation changed that 
perception.  In the middle of 1939, less than ten years before the mandate ended and 
Palestine’s Jewish citizens declared the establishment of Israel, the British government asked 
Palestine’s High Commissioner MacMichael to give an assurance that the mandate would 
invest the same amount of energy in preventing illegal Arab immigration into the territory as 
it did in preventing illegal Jewish immigration.  In response to MacMichael’s assurance, 
government officials asked whether the answer proved that the Arabs of Palestine were “a 
                                                   
26 See Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, and Wm. Roger Louis and Robert Wilson Stookey, eds.  
The End of the Palestine Mandate (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986). 
270 
 
separate and distinct people from Arabs of other countries.”27  The answer to the latter 
question, even without MacMichael’s assurances, can most certainly be demonstrated by the 
preceding twenty years of legislation, discourses, and behaviours that shaped Palestinian 
nationality and citizenship.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 ‘Official report of the Palestine Administration,’ 26 July 1939, ISA/M/223/21. 
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